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Abstract 
 
The thesis explores ‘what are the avenues through which the public are provided with a 
portrayal of the British Intelligence Services and, what depictions of the British 
Intelligence Services do these provide? Undertaking an empirical approach throughout, 
the thesis begins by using the intelligence cycle to assess who constitutes the British 
Intelligence Services, and what portrayals the Big 3 – the Security Service (MI5), the 
Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and the Government Communication Headquarters 
(GCHQ) provide of themselves on their websites and by speeches made by the respective 
heads. This is compared to the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services provided by 
key avenues of information, namely, the Government, academia, news journalism and 
popular culture. Whilst all the avenues provide an overall positive portrayal of the British 
Intelligence Services, with a consistent emphasis upon acting legally and ethically, due 
to the diversity of these avenues, each provides a subtly different depiction of the British 
Intelligence Services. Due to the pervasiveness of secrecy surrounding the British 
Intelligence Services, these avenues are in an influential position of informing the public 
domain about the intelligence realm. But, by finding a balance between openness and 
secrecy and increasing their own public engagement beyond the websites which require 
an individual to know they exist and actively access them, the British Intelligence 
Services could limit the role of the avenues by having a more cohesive and ongoing 
relationship with the public domain.  
 
 
 
 
  
Page | II  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Without sounding like an Oscar’s acceptance speech, there are certain people who 
deserve to be thanked due to their ongoing support throughout the course of the PhD. 
Although there were countless supervisor changes during the PhD, Dr James Vaughan 
and Dr Jenny Mathers have been a brilliant supervisory team. They have both been 
supportive throughout the significant personal challenges the numerous hospital 
appointments, changed operation dates and also when one particular chapter took over a 
year and thousands of redrafts to get into the desired state. Always understanding and 
helpful, their comments have always been beneficial and really pushed the project 
through to its current format. But, the first supervisory team of Dr Claudia Hillebrand 
and Professor Len Scott must also be thanked. It was their vision for this research project 
supported by the ESRC 1 + 3 project (Research Grant 1367383) who both inspired me 
and allowed me to pursue a subject I have found, and continue to find, fascinating. Their 
work and belief in my own ability which all four supervisors showed is something for 
which I am and will remain truly grateful and thankful for.   
 
I should also thank the Head of Department for asking me on many occasions to house 
and cat sit. I was always productive when spending time with Biscuit, she was almost the 
PhD muse! The department support staff Vicki Jones and Donia Richards have been ever 
patience with the many questions! 
 
On a personal level, I would not have remained sane without the love, kindness and 
support of my friends. My Godmother Annette Stabb has been a wonderful source of 
support and kindness. Mélanie Golliard-Jungo, who always had faith I would finish the 
PhD, even when I questioned it myself, and showed me what was possible once my 
student lifestyle ended. Benedicte Sørum, you never complained about late night 
messages and always supported me with motivational messages, for which I thank you. 
Dr Jamie Terrill, you were always on hand for a drink and a complain when we were 
both fed up of PhD research and wanted to relive our master’s fun-filled year! Most 
crucially, thank you to my wonderful office mates, Dr Desiree Poets and John Wood in 
the office of love (and its more recent occupant Dr Katarina Kušić). Through planning 
fieldwork, hating research, and hating essay marking, you have been true and loyal 
friends throughout and shown such love and support. John has remained a loyal and 
wonderful friend through many freak-outs, panics, presentations, frustration at the 
England rugby team failing at key hurdles and re-wording of written sections. Without 
such fantastic friends, I would, and could not, not have got to the end.  
 
I wish to thank all those who voluntarily gave up their time and let me interview them. I 
was so grateful for the insights which these provided and really influenced the PhD. On 
this theme, my aunt Cheryl Dawson who helped me so much when undertaking my US 
fieldwork, and I am so grateful for her advice and support during my 6 weeks in America.  
 
Finally, and most importantly, I owe so much to my parents Annette and Jeremy, my 
dear Tristan who has critiqued, been a walking thesaurus and me laugh throughout; and 
of course Timmy the cat! And, as I worked on the corrections, Snickers the car who 
adopted me and was a source of calm when I needed it. Throughout the various crises, 
you have always supported me, given advice, love, kindness, and many, many phone 
calls when the work was not going to plan. I am so grateful for all of your love and 
support; I would not have completed this PhD without this. 
Page | III  
 
Abbreviations 
BBC     British Broadcasting Corporation  
 
C    Chief of Secret Intelligence Service (UK) 
 
CIA     Central Intelligence Agency (US) 
 
CPNI    Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (UK) 
 
DI    Defence Intelligence (UK) 
 
DG    Director General of the Security Service (UK) 
 
DOD    Department of Defence (US) 
 
EU    European Union  
 
FBI    Federal Bureau of Investigation (US) 
 
FCO    Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK) 
 
FOI    Freedom of Information (UK) 
  
FoIA    Freedom of Information Act (UK) 
 
GCS    Government Communication Service (GCS) 
 
GC&CS   Government Code and Cipher School (UK) 
 
GCHQ    Government Communication Headquarters (UK) 
 
GDS    Government Digital Service (UK) 
 
IP    Investigatory Powers Act (UK) 
 
IRA    Irish Republican Army  
 
IRD    Information Research Department (UK) 
 
ISA    Intelligence Services Act (UK) 
 
ISC    Intelligence and Security Committee (UK) 
 
JIC    Joint Intelligence Committee (UK) 
 
JIO    Joint Intelligence Organisation (UK) 
 
JTAC    Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (UK) 
 
KGB    Soviet Intelligence  
Page | IV  
 
 
MET    Metropolitan Police  
 
MI5     Security Service (UK) 
 
MI6     Secret Intelligence Service (UK) 
 
MOD    Ministry of Defence (UK) 
 
MP    Member of Parliament 
 
NCA    National Crime Agency (NCA) 
 
NCND    Neither Confirm Nor Deny Policy (UK) 
 
NCSC    National Cyber Security Centre (UK) 
 
NSA     National Security Agency (US) 
 
NSC    National Security Council (UK) 
 
NTAC    National Technical Assistance Centre (UK) 
 
ORCON  ` Originator Control Principle 
 
PMQ    Prime Minister’s Questions (UK) 
 
RIPA    Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (UK) 
 
SAS    Special Air Service (UK) 
 
SBS    Special Boat Service (UK) 
 
SSA    Security Services Act (UK) 
 
SOCA    Serious and Organised Crime Agency (UK) 
 
SOE    Special Operations Executive (UK) 
 
WMD    Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 
UK     United Kingdom  
 
UN    United Nations  
 
UNSCR   United Nations Security Council Resolution 
 
US    United States of America  
 
USSR    Soviet Union
Page | 1  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Watching the numerous fictional portrayals of espionage and intelligence on television 
and in films while growing up sparked my interest in this topic, but my love of this subject 
developed while I was an undergraduate student in the International Politics Department 
at Aberystwyth University. When I was in my second year, I had the opportunity to take 
the Intelligence and International Security module with Professor Len Scott, and it was 
his lectures that truly made the topic come alive. Writing an essay for this module that 
assessed the problems posed by demands for greater accountability and how the 
Intelligence Services could overcome them developed my interest further. Following 
advice from the wonderful Dr Chikara Hashimoto, this became the topic of my 
Undergraduate dissertation.  
 
Under the guidance of Dr Huw Bennett, my awareness of how the British Intelligence 
Services can engage with the accountability process by placing information into the 
public domain expanded and deepened. I was fortunate to be the successful candidate for 
an ESRC-funded studentship on the topic “Secret Intelligence: Public Attitudes, 
Expectations and Accountability”. The question of how the British Intelligence Services 
engage with the public became a continual topic of interest during the master’s and into 
the PhD, thus resulting in the PhD seeking to examine what understandings of the British 
Intelligence Services are in the public domain. Originally, it was hoped that this would 
include public perceptions of the British Intelligence Services; however numerous 
methodological challenges such as gaining public perception data meant this was not 
viable, although the importance of assessing it remains. As a result, the research evolved 
into assessing the key-ways in which the public are provided with a portrayal of the 
British Intelligence Services, namely the transmission of these depictions, and what 
portrayals these provide.  
 
Research Puzzle  
The former Chief (C) of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) Sir Richard Dearlove 
argues that Governments have been pushed into the democratisation of national security 
due to high levels of public anxiety in the post-9/11 counter-terrorism environment. This 
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public anxiety is due in part to the fact that what citizens may fear and what genuinely 
threatens the security of the nation are not necessarily the same, although there may be 
overlap.1 Dearlove is scathing about the practice of providing information about 
intelligence to the public, arguing that it results in calls from the media and public alike 
that something must be done about the perceived threat, which can increase levels of 
worry amongst the public. This is what he terms ‘the democratisation of national security 
policy’. His analysis suggests that with public and media scrutiny, national security 
policy panders to this. However, as this thesis argues, a certain degree of openness about 
intelligence is fundamental to ensure the public’s willingness for the British Intelligence 
Services to act on their behalf, and thus maintain their democratic legitimacy.2   
 
But while placing information about the Intelligence Services in the public domain 
addresses the issues of legitimacy and accountability, it also risks compromising 
operational effectiveness, which reveals a fundamental tension between openness and 
secrecy. This tension in British intelligence between openness and secrecy lies at the 
heart of the research puzzle explored in this thesis. Although the British Intelligence 
Services, and indeed the intelligence services of all democratic states, require a degree of 
secrecy for their work. By shrouding everything they do in secrecy, they risk reducing 
public understanding of the need for such services, and therefore public support for them.  
 
Therefore, with too much secrecy surrounding their work, the democratic legitimacy of 
the Intelligence Services can be hampered as there is no understanding of the intelligence 
realm in the public domain. Although in the post-Cold War context there is a delicate 
balance between openness and secrecy, arguably instigated by the Waldegrave 
                                                          
1 Dearlove, Sir, R, ‘National Security and Public Anxiety: Our Changing Perceptions’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of National Security Intelligence, edited by Loch. K. Johnson, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2010), p. 37 
2 In his analysis, Sir David Omand explores the interplay between the Intelligence Services and the media 
where he argues that with increased counter-terrorism activities, there is a tense relationship between the 
media and the Intelligence Services which leads to his assertion that it has now become essential for the 
Intelligence Services to ensure public and legislative support for their continued collection of secret 
intelligence.  
Please see: Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark 
Corners,’ in Spinning Intelligence, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, (London, C Hurst & 
Co. Ltd, 2009), p. 44 
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Initiative,3 prior to this, the British Intelligence Services were shrouded by an almost 
obsessive focus on secrecy. The investigative journalist Chapman Pincher highlights this 
as in the late 1940s and early 1950s: 
 
The general Whitehall view was that any official 
information was an official secret covered by the Official 
Secrets Act until it was officially released.4 
 
In 1984, Pincher suggested in Too Secret Too Long, that much of the secrecy surrounding 
the actions of the Secret Service (MI5) and their counterpart MI6 was unnecessary, and 
even damaging to democracy, for example on those occasions when the commitment to 
secrecy has meant that ‘Parliament and the public have often been misled by official 
statements’.5 The extent to which secrecy has often been emphasised over openness has 
been described by the BBC as a ‘culture of secrecy’ that has governed Whitehall.6  
 
But while the pervasiveness of secrecy continues to impact upon the British Intelligence 
Services’ engagement with the public domain, there is now more of an emphasis on 
openness7 than has been previously evident, which can in fact be beneficial to the British 
Intelligence Services as the public have a more informed understanding of their actions. 
This aids not only public accountability, but also public support and trust for the 
                                                          
3 Aldrich, R, ‘Did Waldegrave Work? The Impact of Open Government upon British History’, Twentieth 
Century British History, 9/1 (1998), p. 112 
4 Pincher, C, ‘Reflections on a Lifetime of Reporting on Intelligence Affairs’, in Spinning Intelligence, 
edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, (London, C Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2009), p. 153 
5 Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1984), p. 4, 201-202, 534, 585 
6 BBC News, Whitehall’s Culture of Secrecy, Available From: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/990242.stm (Accessed 8th December 2015);  
Vincent, D, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain: 1832 – 1998, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998);  
Gill, P, Policing Politics – Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State, (London, Frank Cass 
Publishing, 1994), p. 50 
7 Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks’, Review of 
International Studies, 35/4 (2009), p. 931, 937; 
Gill, P, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq,’ in Who’s Watching the 
Spies?, edited by Hans Born, Loch K Johnson and Ian Leigh, (Dulles, Potomac Books, 2005), p. 29; 
Gill, P, ‘Theories of Intelligence’, in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, edited by 
Loch. K. Johnson, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 43; 
Phythian, M, ‘Cultures of National Intelligence’, in Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited 
by Robert Dover, Michael Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2014), p.39 
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Intelligence Services.8 Trevor McCrisken and Christopher Moran believe that ‘securing 
public trust is essential’,9 and this is a point with which Geoffrey Treverton agrees, albeit 
for rather different reasons. He argues that: 
 
Because intelligence agencies operate in secret and 
because they engage in activities that are sensitive or even 
illegal at home, they depend on public trust’.10 
 
This demonstrates the tensions between secrecy and openness and how Intelligence 
Services require a degree of both. The issues that emanate from seeking to ascertain 
where this balance should be struck is a theme central to the overall research puzzle 
explored in this thesis. Although writing about the American context where issues of 
intelligence oversight were addressed in 1975 following the Watergate scandal where the 
Intelligence Services had been directed by the Government to undertake constitutionally 
questionably domestic security operations.11 With the creation of oversight mechanisms, 
the American public allowed the Intelligence Services, who they realised they could not 
know everything about, to operate in their name, even to undertake illegal or unsavoury 
                                                          
8 The gaining of legislative and public support for continued intelligence collection is something Sir David 
Omand has highlighted as being crucial in the counter-terrorism era. For more information, please see:  
Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ p. 
44 
9 They argue that public trust is imperative in ensuring recruitment, funding and perhaps most importantly 
the morale of Intelligence Officers, as poor perceptions can have a direct impact on the efficiency of a 
particular intelligence assignment. For more information, Please see: 
 MCCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary 
between the ‘real’ and the imagined’’, Intelligence and National Security, 33/6 (2018), p. 808;  
This is a theme also discussed by Chapman Pincher as he highlights how the bad publicity surrounding 
Peter Wright’s Spycatcher autobiography (who was a retired MI5 officer, convinced that the former 
Director General Sir Roger Hollis was a member of the Cambridge 5) directly impacted upon MI5 
recruitment. For more information, please see:  
Pincher, C, The Truth About Dirty Tricks, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1991), p. 331;  
Phythian, M, ‘Cultures of National Intelligence’, p.39 
10 Treverton, G, Intelligence for an age of Terror, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009), p. 235 
11 Examples of the constitutionally questionable operations undertaken include how President Nixon 
approved individuals to break in, and install eavesdropping equipment in the Democratic National 
Campaign headquarters as Nixon prepared for his election. Another example is how the CIA was spying 
on anti-war protestors for over a decade. For more information, please see: 
United States Senate, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities (The Church Committee), Available From: 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm (Accessed 
25th February 2017); 
CNN.com, Watergate scandal: A look back at the scandal that changed US politics, Faith Karimi, 17th 
May 2017, Available From: https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/17/politics/watergate-scandal-look-
back/index.html (Accessed 30th October 2019) 
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actions, but to understand the limits imposed by American values. This formed a social 
contract between the Intelligence Services and the American public. Treverton’s 
American centred analysis focuses on the social contract, arguing that this was first 
broken following the Watergate scandal and was subsequently damaged in the mid-2000s 
following allegations of the torture of detainees accused of committing acts of terrorism 
as part of al Qaeda carried out by US military personnel operating under the instructions 
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay.12 
Undoubtedly, the social contract was further undermined following the Snowden 
revelations which revealed how America’s National Security Agency (NSA), had 
implemented the bulk collection of domestic telephone, internet and email records by 
collecting data from telephone companies.13 Along with the NSA, Britain’s Government 
Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) was a key partner in the Prism surveillance 
                                                          
12 BBC News, I hate myself for Abu Ghraib abuse, Tara McKelvey, 16th May 2018, Available From: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/44031774 (Accessed 29th August 2019); 
Treverton, G, Intelligence for an age of Terror, p. 236;  
Borelli, S, ‘Rendition, Torture and Intelligence Cooperation’, in International Intelligence Cooperation 
and Accountability, edited by Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2011), p. 
111; 
Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks’, Review of 
International Studies, 35/4 (2009), p. 933; 
Originally, the American news broadcaster CBS broke the story of the inhumane treatment of Iraqi 
prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad on the 60 Minutes programme, before photos of the 
abuse appeared in an article written by Seymour Hersh for The New Yorker. These photos, including a 
hooded individual stood on a box and naked prisoners forming a human pyramid with American service 
personnel stood behind them, received worldwide coverage and were synonymous with allegations of the 
US use of torture. For other articles please see: 
CBS News, Abuse at Abu Ghraib, Rebecca Leung, 5th May 2004, Available From: 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/abuse-at-abu-ghraib/ (Accessed 29th August 2019); 
The New Yorker, Torture at Abu Ghraib, Seymour Hersh, 10th May 2004, Available From: 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2004/05/10/torture-at-abu-ghraib (Accessed 13th March 2018);  
BBC News, Chaos and violence at Abu Ghraib, 6th May 2004, Available From: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3690097.stm (Accessed 29th August 2019);  
South China Morning Post, US torture nothing new, say Iraqis, David Enders, 5th May 2004, Available 
From: https://www.scmp.com/article/454509/us-torture-nothing-new-say-iraqis (Accessed 29th August 
2019); 
The Sydney Morning Herald, Detainee killed in Abu Ghraib Prison, 17th August 2005, Available From: 
https://www.smh.com.au/world/detainee-killed-in-abu-ghraib-prison-20050817-gdlvxw.html (Accessed 
29th August 2019) 
Researching this topic did highlight how it was also covered in the non-English speaking media as well 
such as Germany’s Der Spiegel. However as I am not a native speaker, I have not included these in the list 
of references. 
13 The Guardian, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, Glenn Greenwald, 
6th June 2013, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order (Accessed 12th March 2018) 
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programme where the NSA tapped directly into the servers of nine global internet firms, 
including Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo.14 
 
Therefore, the British Intelligence Services must actively engage with the public domain 
if they are to continue to secure public trust and ensure their democratic legitimacy 
continues via a British version of the social contract described by Treverton, something 
which can only occur with openness. Without it, public trust can be significantly affected, 
particularly, as Ian Leigh argued in 2012, if there are damning disclosures which 
progressively undermines public confidence in the Intelligence Services.15  
 
When damning disclosures occur, they not only impact on the democratic legitimacy of 
the Intelligence Services, but can also lead to a more adversarial relationship when the 
Intelligence Services are forced to engage with the public at ‘fire alarm’ moments. This 
is due to the fact that there is more coverage of their actions16 and therefore there is a 
need to defend themselves to society. By retreating from engagement with society except 
when forced to do so in times of trouble, the Intelligence Services will only ‘fight’ battles 
                                                          
14 BBC News, Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme, 17th January 2014, Available 
From: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23123964 (Accessed 1st July 2014); 
The Guardian, GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world’s communications, Ewen 
MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davies and James Ball, 21st June 2013, Available From: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa 
(Accessed 16th November 2015) 
The closeness of cooperation between the NSA and GCHQ has always been evident, with Ian Leigh 
highlighting this theme in 2005 and how legislation did not include matters of cooperation. Please see:  
Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ in Who’s Watching the 
Spies?, edited by Hans Born, Loch K Johnson and Ian Leigh, (Dulles, Potomac Books, 2005), p. 82 
15 Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade 
after 9/11’, Intelligence and National Security, 27/5, (2012), p. 733;  
Leigh’s assertion proved accurate in 2013 following Edward Snowden’s leaked revelations that the 
American NSA was undertaking numerous surveillance programmes, with GCHQ’s cooperation. These 
included the bulk collection of US domestic telephone, internet and email records, amalgamated by 
gathering data from telephone and internet companies as the NSA hacked firms such as Facebook, Google, 
Microsoft and Yahoo. For more information, please see: 
The Guardian, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, Glenn Greenwald, 6th 
June 2013, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-
verizon-court-order (Accessed 12th March 2018);  
The Guardian, GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world’s communications, Ewen 
MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davies and James Ball, 21st June 2013, Available From: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa 
(Accessed 16th November 2015);  
BBC News, Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme, 17th January 2014, Available From: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23123964 (Accessed 1st July 2014) 
16 Manjikian, M, ‘Two types of intelligence community accountability: turf wars and identity narratives’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 31/5 (2016), p. 688 
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for public support and legitimacy from a defensive position, when the depictions of 
intelligence are framed by the specifics of issues that highlight negative aspects of the 
operation of the Services, such as intelligence failures. This thesis examines how more 
regular, routine engagement with the public by the Intelligence Services can be a key 
form of intelligence accountability,17 and a form that allows wider and potentially more 
positive depictions to create the basis for the public’s awareness of the operation of the 
Services in support of the state and society. 
 
With the British Intelligence Services reluctant to engage directly with the public due to 
concerns surrounding secrecy, and that public engagement is viewed as a ‘necessary 
evil’,18 much of the engagement between the intelligence realm and the public occurs via 
key avenues of wider Government, academia, news journalism, and popular culture. In 
order to explore these puzzles, the central research question of this thesis is:   
What are the avenues through which the public are provided with a portrayal of the 
British Intelligence Services and what depictions of the British Intelligence Services 
do these provide?  
 
Another way of explaining what the thesis examines is through the diagram below 
(Figure 1), created when wording the research question. The red arrows demonstrate 
upon which areas the PhD centres. Namely, exploring both what information the British 
Intelligence Services place in the public domain, either directly to the public via their 
websites, or indirectly via four key avenues: British Government, British academia, news 
journalism and popular culture. The portrayals that these individually provide to the 
public of the British Intelligence Services are analysed (arrow 3) in order to fully 
comprehend what views are in the public domain when they are such a crucial form of 
intelligence accountability.   
                                                          
17 Aldrich, R, ‘Regulation by Revelation? Intelligence, the Media and Transparency, in Spinning 
Intelligence, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, (London, C Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2009), p. 14; 
Borelli, S, ‘Rendition, Torture and Intelligence Cooperation’, in International Intelligence Cooperation 
and Accountability, edited by Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2011), p. 
108; 
Leigh, I ‘Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation – Framing the Issue’, in International Intelligence 
Cooperation and Accountability, edited by Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills, (Abingdon, Routledge, 
2011), p. 5 
18 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017 
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(Figure 1) 
 
Assessing these depictions will help to fill a gap in the intelligence studies literature about 
how the British Intelligence Services engage with the public and what views are therefore 
in the public domain. Although numerous academics such as Sir David Omand, Simon 
Willmetts and Karen Lund Petersen have stressed the need to examine what portrayals 
of Intelligence Services are in the public domain,19 research investigating the details of 
the specific content of such portrayals has not yet been undertaken, it instead focuses of 
exploring how the communication occurs and the implications for intelligence scholars 
of taking a more cultural approach. This is particularly surprising as since 9/11, there has 
been the necessity for Intelligence Services to place more information in the public 
domain as they have been increasingly involved in the communication tasks of 
Government, through the public issuing of threat warnings, and the preparation of 
Government assessments.20 And yet the academic debate thus far merely acknowledges 
                                                          
19 Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners, 
pp. 37 – 56; 
Willmetts, S, ‘The Cultural Turn in Intelligence Studies’, Intelligence and National Security, (2019) 34/6, 
p. 800, 810–813;  
Petersen, K. L, ‘Three concepts of intelligence communication: awareness, advice or co-production’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 34/3 (2019), p. 325; 
Phythian, M, ‘Cultures of National Intelligence’, p.39; 
Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, in Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century 
– Journeys in Shadows, edited by L.V. Scott and Peter Jackson, (London, Routledge, 2004), p. 2 
20 Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ in Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services, edited 
by Daniel Baldino, (Sydney, The Federation Press, 2010), p. 195; 
Gill, P, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq,’ p. 15 
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the importance of examining these messages, despite the crucial role the public have in 
intelligence accountability. The absence of scholarly analysis of the portrayals of the 
British Intelligence Services that are in the public domain is a gap that this thesis seeks 
to fill and is thus an original contribution that it makes to the study of the British 
intelligence Services. 
 
The thesis argues that whilst there is an attempt by the British Intelligence Services to 
engage directly with the public, due to tensions between openness and secrecy, 
information remains hidden in plain sight, and therefore the avenues, which all provide 
a subtly different portrayal, retain an important capability to inform the public about the 
intelligence realm. An important aspect of the argument of this thesis is that, whilst there 
is an attempt by the British Intelligence Services to directly engage with the public, this 
primarily occurs via their websites, leaving the onus on the individual both to know the 
websites exist, and to access them in order to inform themselves about the nature and 
work of the British Intelligence Services. This places the four key avenues of wider 
Government, academia, news journalism, and popular culture in a more influential 
position to provide the wider public with portrayals of the British Intelligence Services 
than would be the case if the Services took more extensive, pro-active steps to engage 
the public directly. Due to the diversity of these avenues, each one provides subtly 
different depictions of the British Intelligence Services. Yet, there are often strikingly 
similar features in the depictions that the different avenues provide. The four avenues 
tend to converge around portraying the British Intelligence Services as always striving to 
act both legally and ethically, while any failures to adhere to these standards emanate 
from limitations of legislation. 21 
 
Whilst there remains an onus on the individual to watch the news, read a particular 
newspaper article or watch a certain programme, the four avenues all independently place 
more accessible information, in the public domain than the British Intelligence Services 
do, thus making the information more readily accessible as opposed to being hidden in 
plain sight. This reflects the fact that the four avenues are freed from the need to balance 
the tension between openness and secrecy in the same way that the British Intelligence 
                                                          
21 Limitation of legislation is a phrase used throughout the thesis and refers to how the existing British 
legislation had loopholes, or themes weren’t explored in enough detail to fully stipulate what actions the 
British Intelligence Services were able to undertake. 
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Services do. Similarly, there are times when this is a consideration for both the wider 
British Government and news journalism, although not to the same extent as it is for the 
British Intelligence Services.  
 
Tensions posed by the balance of openness and secrecy are not unique to the UK, as was 
intimated by Treverton’s analysis, mentioned above. The fieldwork conducted for this 
thesis in the United States brought out the Americans’ different approach to secrecy and 
openness. In the United States there is a much greater willingness to engage with the 
public on intelligence matters. One way of comparing the differing levels of public 
engagement is by comparing efforts by the two countries’ intelligence services to work 
with museums on exhibitions that inform the public about espionage and intelligence. 
The United States has the National Cryptologic Museum, which is the NSA principal 
way of engaging with the public.22 Originally created to house artefacts from key 
cryptologic historical moments and for NSA employees to reflect on successes and 
failures, the museum opened to the public in 1993. Alongside the artefacts which provide 
a glimpse into the history of the NSA, the museum now includes information about the 
individuals who have who have devoted their lives to cryptology and national security, 
details about the heritage of the profession of cryptologists, as well as a library full of 
NSA archives, and of course, a gift shop.23  
 
This is in stark contrast to the practice of Britain’s Intelligence Services, which most 
definitely do not undertake such activities. Britain not only lacks an entire museum 
devoted to intelligence work, but perhaps the closest it comes, the “Secret War” 
exhibition at the Imperial War Museum in London. This is based on publicly available 
sources and was put together without any engagement from the British Intelligence 
Services.24 Another example of the differences between American openness and British 
secrecy in intelligence matters is the fact that in Washington, DC the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) Building is clearly signposted, on both a street sign, and a plaque 
outside the building (see Figures 2 and 3 below). While the locations MI5 and MI6 
                                                          
22 National Cryptologic Museum, Home, Available From: https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-
heritage/museum/ (Accessed 27th March 2019) 
23 National Cryptologic Museum, About Us, Available From: https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-
heritage/museum/about/ (Accessed 3rd December 2019) 
 
24 Imperial War Museum, Secret War Exhibit, London, United Kingdom, 16th September 2015 
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buildings in central London are known by most (perhaps in part due to the inclusion in 
films), they are not formally acknowledged by signposting or identification in the same 
manner that American Intelligence Services were.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Figures 2 and 3)25 
 
Figure 2 (left) shows a street sign on Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington D.C directing 
where to go to find the FBI Building. Figure 3 (right) is the sign outside the FBI 
Headquarters and reads 935 Pennsylvania Avenue FBI Headquarters. 
 
The signage outside Intelligence Headquarters in the two capitals demonstrates differing 
approaches to openness and secrecy, with Britain seemingly favouring the latter when 
compared to her American counterpart. This suggests that there may in fact be a unique 
British way of intelligence, something Mike Goodman has discussed. He states that to 
fully understand British Intelligence, it is important to examine how intelligence is 
organised in the UK, and the underlying rationales for the structure and how it fits within 
wider Government due to the unique historical culture. By doing this, Goodman argues, 
British Intelligence breaks down into two central component parts, the committee style 
                                                          
25 Photo taken by Abigail Blyth in Washington D.C, 16th September 2016 
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approach and the drive for consensus which date back to Maurice Hankey’s centralised 
cabinet system of Government introduced in 1916.26  
 
These two themes are prevalent in exploring the role of the Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC). Composed of heads of the Intelligence Services and senior figures within policy 
making departments, the JIC ‘discusses and sets the priorities and requirements for 
collection’ which are then arranged into Bands with Band 1 being the highest priority, 
down to Band 7 being collection when there is an opportunity to do so. However, MI5’s 
statutory basis resists such banding, and necessitates MI5 to focus on protecting the UK 
against threats.27 It is this committee style approach, Goodman argues, that creates the 
drive for consensus, in stark contrast to America where dissenting views are 
acknowledged within the National Intelligence Estimates. However, since the Iraq War, 
there is now the option to include dissent in British intelligence analysis.28  
 
Goodman’s analysis demonstrates how Britain’s unique historical context continues to 
influence the structure and operations of British Intelligence in a contemporary context. 
Thus, it is apt to argue that there is a British way in Intelligence, an assertion which is 
prevalent throughout the thesis. Indeed, it was particularly noticeable when undertaking 
fieldwork in terms of the openness and willingness to engage with my research from 
American officials compared to their British counterparts. This allows for the thesis to 
build upon Goodman’s argument of the British way in Intelligence by comparing and 
contrasting the two countries and in particular, through their relationships with 
intelligence accountability mechanisms.  
 
The different relationship which America and the UK have with openness and secrecy 
potentially emerges from how intelligence as an academic discipline emerged in America 
in the 1960s29 which Len Scott argues resulted in:   
                                                          
26 Goodman, M, ‘The British way in Intelligence’, in The British Way in Cold Warfare – Intelligence, 
Diplomacy and the Bomb, edited by Matthew Grant, Continuum, London, 2009), p. 127–128, 135  
27 Goodman, M, ‘The British way in Intelligence’, p. 131–133  
28 Goodman, M, ‘The British way in Intelligence’, p. 136–137  
29 Marrin, S, ‘Improving Intelligence as an Academic Discipline’, Intelligence and National Security, 
(2014), p. 2; 
Dorondo, P. J, ‘For College Courses in Intelligence’, Studies in Intelligence, 4/3, (1960), pp. A15 – A 18; 
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A degree of informed debate and a degree of openness 
that was in stark contrast to Britain, where lessons were 
considered entirely within the very narrow Whitehall 
confines. There was no public or parliamentary debate.30  
 
Scott’s analysis succinctly highlights key differences between the two countries in their 
approaches to openness and secrecy, thus furthering the assertion of a British way in 
intelligence.  This occurs in how any discussions in the UK occur within the confines of 
Whitehall, thus preventing any public accountability. This is in contrast to America as 
well as parts of Eastern Europe and Latin America, where the creation of intelligence 
accountability occurred in response to revelation, allegation or moral panics.31 In the 
American context, intelligence accountability was created in 1976 following the 
revelations of the Watergate scandal which led to the establishment of the Church 
Committee.32 But for Britain, the ISC was created exogenously, and not in response to 
wrongdoing. Therefore, Phillip Davies highlights that Britain is an example of how 
intelligence accountability can be implemented when there has been no ‘fire alarm’ 
                                                          
Central Intelligence Agency, Library – Reading Room Sherman Kent Strategic Intelligence for American 
World Policy, Available From: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP79T01762A000400020010-2.pdf (Accessed 15th August 2019) 
30 Scott, L, ‘British Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War’, in The Oxford Handbook of National Security 
Intelligence, edited by Loch. K. Johnson, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 140 
31 Davies, P, ‘Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic oversight in the absence of 
moral panic’, in Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services, edited by Daniel Baldino, (Sydney, The 
Federation Press, 2010), p. 134, 140, 148, 154;  
Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 
9/11’, (2012), p. 732;  
Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, Second Edition, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
2012), p.173–175  
32 The Watergate scandal refers to the burglary of the Democratic National Committee Offices in the 
Watergate complex in Washington D.C in 1972 and the attempts by President Richard Nixon to cover up 
his involvement in allowing American intelligence agencies to undertake more domestic surveillance. This 
was after it was discovered that the 5 burglars were all part of the President’s re-election campaign. For 
more information, please see:  
CNN.com, Watergate scandal: A look back at the scandal that changed US politics, Faith Karimi, 17th 
May 2017, Available From: https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/17/politics/watergate-scandal-look-
back/index.html (Accessed 30th October 2019) 
Warner, M, ‘The Rise of the US Intelligence System, 1917 – 1977, in The Oxford Handbook of National 
Security Intelligence, edited by Loch. K. Johnson, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 119–120;  
United States Senate, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities (The Church Committee), Available From: 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm (Accessed 
25th February 2017) 
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moment.33 But, by not being forced into openness, the British intelligence accountability 
mechanisms remain shrouded in secrecy,34 something which should not be surprising due 
to the way in which secrecy has been a central component to the extent that any 
information was covered by the Official Secrets Act.35 But, it is problematic as it hampers 
public accountability of the British Intelligence Services, which in turn causes problems 
for their democratic legitimacy. 
 
This demonstrates another way in which the unique historical context of British 
Intelligence continues to impact on the current mechanisms. Although Goodman’s 
analysis of how the British way in intelligence is centred upon the committee style 
approach and drive for consensus, the thesis builds on this and Davies assertions of the 
uniqueness of the UK context, as it argues that the pervasiveness of secrecy36  is another 
key characteristic of the British way in intelligence.  
Literature Review  
As the discussion above on the research puzzle of this thesis demonstrated, there is an 
acknowledgement within the intelligence studies literature of the importance of assessing 
what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are in the public domain. By 
examining different facets of the intelligence studies literature, this section demonstrates 
how the sub-genres of intelligence accountability, cultural intelligence which includes 
the cultural cold war and popular culture literatures, intelligence failures, accounts 
                                                          
33 Davies, P, ‘Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic oversight in the absence of 
moral panic’, p. 134, 40 
34 BBC News, Whitehall’s Culture of Secrecy, Available From: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/990242.stm (Accessed 8th December 2015);  
Vincent, D, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain: 1832 – 1998; 
Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 
9/11’, p. 725, 728 
Davies, P, ‘Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic oversight in the absence of moral 
panic’, p. 155 
35 Pincher, C, ‘Reflections on a Lifetime of Reporting on Intelligence Affairs’, p. 153; 
BBC News, Whitehall’s Culture of Secrecy, Available From: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/990242.stm (Accessed 8th December 2015);  
Vincent, D, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain: 1832 – 1998 
36 Pincher, C, ‘Reflections on a Lifetime of Reporting on Intelligence Affairs’, p. 153; 
BBC News, Whitehall’s Culture of Secrecy, Available From: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/990242.stm (Accessed 8th December 2015);  
Vincent, D, The Culture of Secrecy: Britain: 1832 – 1998;  
Gill, P, Policing Politics – Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State, p. 50, 80;  
Scott, L, ‘British Strategic Intelligence in the Cold War’, p. 140 
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written by former practitioners, teaching intelligence, and media studies all explore 
themes central to this thesis.  
 
Intelligence Accountability Literature  
The intelligence accountability literature has been of most use due to the numerous 
themes central to the thesis which it explores. These include: limitations of legislation, 
the tensions between openness and secrecy, and the role of the public and news 
journalism as forms of intelligence accountability. In analysing the balance between 
openness and secrecy, Leigh explores the importance of Intelligence Services ensuring 
democratic legitimacy by adhering to ethical standards. He argues that this has been 
challenged by the relationship between oversight and international intelligence 
cooperation activities.37 Focusing on the implementation and activities of the ISC and the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission,38 Leigh’s detailed examination explores 
limitations of legislation as the passage below demonstrates. 
 
The legislation lacks detail. It is startling to find, for 
example, that the key term ‘national security’ is not 
defined with any precision. The legal implication is that 
the agencies are able to move flexibly into new areas of 
work without seeking explicit parliamentary approval.39 
                                                          
37 Leigh, I, ‘More Closely Watching the Spies: Three Decades of Experiences,’ in Who’s Watching the 
Spies?, edited by Hans Born, Loch K Johnson and Ian Leigh, (Dulles, Potomac Books, 2005), p. 4–6;  
Leigh, I ‘Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation – Framing the Issue’, p. 3–17; 
Leigh, I, ‘National Courts and International Intelligence Cooperation’, in International Intelligence 
Cooperation and Accountability, edited by Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills, (Abingdon, Routledge, 
2011), p. 223–233  
Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 80–81;  
Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 
9/11’, p. 722–738  
Leigh, I, ‘Intelligence and the Law in the United Kingdom’, in The Oxford Handbook of National Security 
Intelligence, edited by Loch. K. Johnson, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 643–647 
38 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ pp. 79–99;  
Leigh, I ‘Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation – Framing the Issue’, p. 5–6 ; 
Leigh, I, ‘National Courts and International Intelligence Cooperation’, p. 232, 242;  
Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 
9/11’, p. 725–734; 
Leigh, I, ‘Intelligence and the Law in the United Kingdom’, p. 644–647  
39 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 95;  
This is a theme also explored on page 82 in relation to how the Intelligence Services Act which governs 
the actions of GCHQ, does not detail the arrangement for international cooperation, something which is 
central to the work of GCHQ as they share vast amounts of information with the American National 
Security Agency. 
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This is a theme repeated throughout Leigh’s numerous publications.40 The overall 
arguments have provided a clear base for the research puzzle in terms of how the 
democratic legitimacy which the British Intelligence Services are seeking to maintain 
can be affected by wider themes such as the limitations of legislation. This provides a 
starting point on which the thesis builds by assessing what portrayals are in the public 
domain, something which can impact upon the democratic legitimacy which the British 
Intelligence Services are striving for.  
 
The tensions between openness and secrecy are discussed by Len Scott and Peter Jackson 
by highlighting the problems which emerge from the lack of an accepted definition of 
intelligence. They highlight that increasingly, there is ‘all source analysis’ which means 
that ‘intelligence estimates are almost always based on a combination of secret and open 
source information, very often drawn from government departments that have no direct 
involvement in secret intelligence’. Thus, it is difficult to judge what intelligence 
policymakers receive, a problem which they argue is exacerbated by secrecy.41 This 
intimates that the balance between openness and secrecy in the UK, is favouring the 
latter. Although there may be times when the Government does not want to expand on 
the use of intelligence, by discussing it more openly with the public would aid public 
comprehension of the intelligence realm and the relationship between intelligence and 
                                                          
The limitation of legislation was also discussed in relation to human rights and how the latter could be 
protected via stronger intelligence oversight but is not due to the limitation of the legislation, and proposed 
legislation in 2012 governing intelligence oversight in the UK.  
For more information, please see:  
Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 
9/11’, p. 723  
40 Leigh, I, ‘Intelligence and the Law in the United Kingdom’, p. 643; 
Leigh, I, ‘National Courts and International Intelligence Cooperation’, p. 236; 
Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 79, 80–83; 
Leigh, I, ‘More Closely Watching the Spies: Three Decades of Experiences,’ p. 5;  
Leigh, I ‘Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation – Framing the Issue’, p. 7; 
Gill, P, ‘Theories of Intelligence’, p. 50 
Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks’, p. 939 
41 Scott, L, and Jackson P, ‘Intelligence’, in Palgrave Advances – International History, edited by Patrick 
Finney, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 164;  
This is a theme which Peter Gill and Mark Phythian also reference, highlighting how the relationship 
between intelligence and policy is not always explored in public statements. For more information, please 
see: 
Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p.103 
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Government. This is particularly prevalent in the UK context after the allegations of 
intelligence being politicised in the lead up to the Iraq War. 
 
The Intelligence accountability literature increasingly acknowledges how the 
relationship between British Intelligence and the public is conducted by the media, and 
specifically news journalism.42 However, despite the centrality of this relationship, 
Richard Aldrich rightly argues it has received minimal analysis.43 This is slowly 
changing, as those specialising in intelligence accountability such as Claudia Hillebrand, 
Cris Matei, Karen Lund Petersen, Sir David Omand, Mike Goodman and Robert Dover 
examine the relationship between intelligence and the media,44 this thesis will contribute 
to the growing discussion due to the contemporary analysis undertaken. Hillebrand’s 
analysis of news journalists reporting of intelligence proved a useful starting point, as 
she explores how they are crucial to inform and educate the public in the realm of 
intelligence. However, news journalism’s scrutiny of intelligence matters remains 
indirect, informal and infrequent, arguably due to the media strategies adopted by the 
Intelligence Services and their Governments. Hillebrand argues that these actions include 
the use of excessive secrecy which acts as a blanket to conceal abuse, corruption, or 
incompetence, only providing sporadic information from insiders, and the Intelligence 
Services simply refusing to respond to stories which journalists are reporting on.45  All 
of these contribute to the limited coverage of intelligence issues by restricting the work 
of news journalists.  
 
Examining the case of America, Denmark and the UK, Petersen explores why these 
Intelligence Services communicate with the public, arguing that it is either as a form of 
                                                          
42 Dover, R, and Goodman, M, ‘Introduction: Intelligence and the Information Age’, in Spinning 
Intelligence, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, (London, C Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2009), p. 9 
43 Aldrich, R, ‘Regulation by Revelation? p. 13  
44 Hillebrand, C, ‘The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight’, Intelligence and National Security, 
27/5 (2012), pp. 689–706; 
Matei, F, C, ‘The Media’s Role in Intelligence Democratisation’, International Journal of Intelligence and 
CounterIntelligence, 27/1, (2014), pp. 73–104;  
Petersen, K. L, ‘Three concepts of intelligence communication: awareness, advice or co-
production’, pp. 317–328 
Goodman, M, ‘British Intelligence and the British Broadcasting Corporation: A Snapshot of a Happy 
Marriage’, in Spinning Intelligence, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, (London, C Hurst 
& Co. Ltd, 2009), pp. 117–132  
45 Hillebrand, C, ‘The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight’, p. 701–704  
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awareness, advice or co-production.46 In particular, Petersen’s communication as 
awareness argument proves insightful as she states how it is:  
 
A means to create accountability in the institution by 
creating a general democratic public awareness. 
Openness and secrecy are the defining counter-concepts, 
as the concept of communication relies on the classical 
dilemma between the need for security national interest 
against the need for democratic debate.47 
 
Using Petersen’s analysis, the thesis’ focuses upon portrayals of the British Intelligence 
Services in the public domain examines how the communication of these messages 
provides an awareness of the intelligence realm.  
 
Both Petersen and Hillebrand (in her discussion of the role of news journalism), explore 
the importance of assessing what depictions of the intelligence realm are in the public 
domain. But, for both, this is a passing theme to their analysis which centres upon why 
the Intelligence Services engage with the public, and the role the media have in holding 
the Intelligence Services to account, respectively. Thus, the thesis will contribute to this 
literature via its originality in exploring the depictions.  
 
The intelligence accountability literature has been incredibly useful due to its emphasis 
upon what information is placed in the public domain. This leads to a growing discussion 
pertaining to news journalism and its role in informing the public. But despite this, it fails 
to examine how the British Intelligence Services are portrayed via news journalism or 
any of the other avenues which this thesis explores.  
 
Cultural Intelligence Literature  
Cultural intelligence studies fall into two broad categories: one takes an anthropological 
approach to determine a specific intelligence culture, while the other studies media 
                                                          
46 Petersen, K. L, ‘Three concepts of intelligence communication: awareness, advice or co-production’, pp. 
317–328  
47Petersen, K. L, ‘Three concepts of intelligence communication: awareness, advice or co-production’, p. 
319   
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representations of espionage which can include the study of spy fiction.48 The latter will 
be used in this thesis due to the way in which the four avenues identified above provide 
cultural narratives about the British Intelligence Services for the public domain. Trevor 
McCrisken and Christopher Moran argue that cultural products should be viewed as a 
legitimate source of study and research49 as they ‘contribute significantly to the 
production and reproduction of narratives about, and within, the political world’.50 As 
McCrisken and Moran state: 
 
 The way in which the general public understand their 
[Intelligence Services] work, is to a significant extent, 
culturally constructed.51  
 
This highlights that whilst cultural intelligence studies explore why such research is 
crucial, it occurs fleetingly, such as McCrisken and Moran’s article which examines the 
role James Bond has on public understandings of the intelligence realm, and the 
relationship between Bond and the real world of intelligence. They argue that it has ‘filled 
a public knowledge vacuum about intelligence agencies and security threats’.  To 
illustrate this point, they highlight a feature that an Italian magazine ran in 1966, which 
saw readers send in questions about being a real-life spy. The most comment responses 
were whether you had to be a bachelor, did the job come with a fast car and how many 
people would you have to kill in a year.52 This demonstrates McCrisken and Moran’s 
assertion of how Bond has fulfilled public knowledge about the intelligence realm. 
Indeed, had the British Intelligence Services been more open about their actions, Bond 
would not have been in such an influential position. It is therefore important to fully 
comprehend what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are in the public domain, 
something this thesis seeks to ascertain.  
                                                          
48 McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary 
between the ‘real’ and the imagined’’, p. 803 
49 McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary 
between the ‘real’ and the imagined’’, p. 805; 
Willmetts, S, ‘The Cultural Turn in Intelligence Studies’, Intelligence and National Security, (2019) 34/6, 
p. 800 
50 McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary 
between the ‘real’ and the imagined’’, p. 805 
51 Willmetts, S, ‘The Cultural Turn in Intelligence Studies’, p. 810 
52 McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary 
between the ‘real’ and the imagined’’, p. 805–808  
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The Cultural Cold War and James Bond literatures which encompass intelligence and 
media academics are key sub-genres which are the basis of the thesis’ analysis. They do 
examine themes salient to the thesis, such as; how historically the Intelligence Services 
engaged with the different avenues being discussed, what themes the early British spy 
novel explored, or specific themes in the Bond franchise.53 However, these literatures do 
not provide a cohesive, contemporary overview of the portrayals of the British 
Intelligence Services across various forms of popular culture. Thus, the originality of this 
thesis will contribute to these different literatures which address only one facet of the 
research puzzle.  
 
Cultural Cold War, James Bond and Popular Culture Literatures  
The Cultural Cold War literature provided a useful starting point for understanding how 
important popular culture can be in providing a specific depiction to the public. It also 
served to highlight how the British as well as the American Intelligence Services 
cooperated with academics, authors and journalists,54 aiding the decision as to which 
avenues of dissemination to analyse in this thesis.  In particular, it explores the role of 
popular culture at a time when the West was seeking to demonstrate their superiority 
within culture, socio-economic and political systems. Both Frances Stonor-Saunders and 
Hugh Wilford examine how the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in 
                                                          
53 Stafford, D, The Silent Game – The Real World of Imaginary Spies, (Toronto, Lester & Opren Dennys 
Limited, 1988), p. 156; 
Amacker, A, K and Moore, D, A, ‘ “The Bitch is Dead”: Anti-feminist Rhetoric in Casino Royale’, in 
James Bond in World and Popular Culture: The Films are Not Enough- Second Edition, edited by Robert 
G Weiner, B. Lynn Whitfield and Jack Becker, (Newcastle Upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2011), pp. 144–155; 
McNeely, T, L, ‘The feminisation of M: Gender and Authority in the Bond Films’, in James Bond in World 
and Popular Culture: The Films are Not Enough- Second Edition, edited by Robert G Weiner, B. Lynn 
Whitfield and Jack Becker, (Newcastle Upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), pp. 156–161; 
Another example of the narrow literature is evident in Joseph Oldham’s chapter: ‘The Man behind the 
Desk and Other Bureaucracies’ which focuses on intelligence leadership in popular culture 
Oldham, J, ‘The Man Behind the Desk and Other Bureaucracies’, in Spy Chiefs Volume 1 – Intelligence 
Leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom, edited by Christopher Moran, Mark Stout, Ioanna 
Ioradanou and Paul Maddrell, (Washington D.C, Georgetown University Press, 2018), pp. 283–300 
Black, J, ‘The Geopolitics of James Bond’, in Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century – 
Journeys in Shadows, edited by L.V. Scott and Peter Jackson, (London, Routledge, 2004), p. 136 
54 Whitfield, S. J, ‘The culture of the Cold War’, in The Cambridge Companion to Modern American 
Culture, edited by Christopher Bigsby, (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 265; 
Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, p. 1-2, 20, 87; 
Wilford, H, ‘Secret America: the CIA and American culture’, in The Cambridge Companion to Modern 
American Culture, edited by Christopher Bigsby, (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 278–
279; 
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conjunction with MI6, undertook cultural as opposed to political warfare by creating 
literary prizes, funded literary entities as well as opening art exhibitions and music 
festivals.55 
 
Nicholas Schou explores similar themes as he highlights how the CIA used news 
journalism and popular culture in the Cold War, with a particular emphasis on the US 
activities in Vietnam and Nicaragua before examining how such actions continue.56 By 
interviewing news journalists and CIA officers, Schou seeks to provide both 
perspectives, although his writing does suggest he is scathing of the CIA for their 
willingness to engage with news journalism as he questions why Guantanamo Bay would 
need public affairs officers.57 But despite this, it is a starting point to understand the 
similarities and differences between the UK and US Intelligence Services engagement 
with the public domain, and how openness can occur without hampering ongoing 
intelligence activities.  
 
The dedicated James Bond literature tends to have a narrow scope, focusing on a 
particular theme such as exploring geopolitics or the role of gender and sexuality within 
the James Bond franchise.58 Whilst these provide a useful starting point for the popular 
culture analysis, the Bond literature fails to address what depictions of intelligence are 
                                                          
55 Wilford, H, ‘ “The Permanent Revolution”? The New York Intellectuals, the CIA and the Cultural Cold 
War’, pp. 194–209;  
Wilford, H, ‘Secret America: the CIA and American culture’, p. 278–279; 
Stonor Saunders, F, Who Paid the Piper – The CIA and the Cultural Cold War, (London, Granta Books, 
2000), p. 21 
56 One clear example of this which Schou explores is the policy of embedding journalists into specific 
military units, a policy the US first initiated during the Vietnam War. However, since 9/11, this has been 
continually used by the US Department of Defence based at the Pentagon and there have also been TV 
programmes about such activities such as the 2008 TV Mini Series Generation Kill about a Rolling Stone 
reporter embedded with the 1st Recon Marines in Baghdad in 2003.  
Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, p. 1-3, 20, 69, 87; 
International Movie Database, Generation Kill, Available From: https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0995832/ 
(Accessed 7th September 2019) 
57 Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, p. 81 
58 McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary 
between the ‘real’ and the imagined, p. 808–809; 
Amacker, A, K and Moore, D, A, ‘ “The Bitch is Dead”: Anti-feminist Rhetoric in Casino Royale’, pp. 
144–155; 
McNeely, T, L, ‘The feminisation of M: Gender and Authority in the Bond Films’, pp. 156–161 
Another example of the narrow literature is evident in Joseph Oldham’s chapter: ‘The Man behind the 
Desk and Other Bureaucracies’ which focuses on intelligence leadership in popular culture 
Oldham, J, ‘The Man Behind the Desk and Other Bureaucracies’, pp. 283–300; 
Black, J, ‘The Geopolitics of James Bond’, p. 136 
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provided through the films and books. The popular culture analysis was further aided by 
the discussions from intelligence studies academics such as Robert Dover, Moran, Scott 
and Jackson and to a lesser extent, Omand examining this theme. They have all discussed 
the importance of assessing the relationship between intelligence and popular culture, 
and have undertaken some analysis of the relationship such as ethical considerations.59   
 
Dover’s examination of what depictions are provided within Spooks, the Bond franchise 
and the American drama 2460 is the closest to what the thesis explores in Chapter 6 ‘A 
Fractious Relationship’. He argues that popular culture depictions of intelligence provide 
a distorted and fragmentary view of intelligence, leading the public to think they know 
what Intelligence Services do, which can create new realities within which policymakers 
begin to operate.61 This is a salient theme, as it was through popular culture that the 
Committee of Imperial Defence created the forerunners to MI5 and MI6 in 1909.62 But, 
by focusing on the British context, as well as placing popular culture depictions within a 
wider analysis, of how key avenues where popular culture is just one, this thesis builds 
on Dover’s analysis to fully comprehend the portrayals provided by the British 
Intelligence Services, British Government, academia, news journalism and popular 
culture.   
 
Emanating from a communication studies perspective, Tricia Jenkins analyses the role 
of popular culture in conditioning the public on intelligence matters in the post-9/11 
world.63 Although focusing on the American context, with no discussion of Britain or 
any other country, Jenkins provides an overarching understanding of how influential 
popular culture can be in educating the public, although she does not examine the 
substance of the depiction provided by popular culture. Therefore, the existing academic 
literature exhibits the importance of researching what depictions of the British 
                                                          
59 Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, p. 18 
60 Dover, R, ‘From Vauxhall Cross with Love: Intelligence in Popular Culture’, in Spinning Intelligence, 
edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, (London, C Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2009), p. 202 
61 Dover, R, ‘From Vauxhall Cross with Love’, p. 201–202  
62 Cobain, I, The History Thieves – Secrets, Lies, and the Shaping of a Modern Nation, (London, Portobello 
Books, 2016), p. 16 – 19;  
Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, the Authorised History of MI5, (London, Penguin Books, 2009), p. 19–
20  
63 Jenkins, T, and Alford, M, ‘Intelligence Activity in Hollywood: Remembering the “Agency” in CIA’, 
p. 7–8  
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Intelligence Services are provided by the specific avenues, but how these come together 
to form an overarching portrayal. 
 
This section has examined different facets of the intelligence studies, cultural cold war, 
media studies and James Bond literatures. All of these sub-genres have acknowledged64 
the importance of assessing what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are in the 
public domain, but have not undertaken this rigorous analysis, thus establishing the 
originality of this thesis.  
 
Intelligence Failures Literature  
The intelligence failures literature has proven useful due to its focus on the case study of 
the lead up to the Iraq War in 2002, when the British Intelligence Services were discussed 
extensively within the public domain. This was due to how the British Government 
published altered intelligence assessments stating that Saddam Hussein had Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD). Since 2003 and the Iraq invasion, Michael Wesley argues that 
much has been written about intelligence failures and, in particular, the politicisation of 
intelligence.65 Examining both the US and UK context, Giovanni Coletta’s detailed 
analysis explores how the failure of the Iraq intelligence assessments in 2002 was due to 
structural and methodological flaws in intelligence analysis which were exacerbated and 
intensified by politicisation.66 Although something of an overview of both the US and 
UK contexts, Coletta’s analysis provides an understanding of how the politicisation 
occurred, such as policymakers encouraging the Intelligence Services to focus on 
particular themes, and its role in enhancing existing problems within intelligence 
analysis.67 Paul Pillar, a former US intelligence analyst, is scathing of the Bush 
                                                          
64 This was noticeably prevalent in the Cultural Intelligence Studies literature with Simon Willmetts in 
particular, highlighting the importance of the theme.  
65 Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ p. 188; 
Zegart, A, Spying Blind, (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2007); 
Zegart, A, Eyes on Spies, (Stanford, Hoover Institute, 2011); 
Betts, R, K, ‘Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable’, World Politics, 31/1, 
(1978), pp. 61–89; 
Jensen, M, A, ‘Intelligence Failures: What Are They Really and What Do We Do about Them?, 
Intelligence and National Security, 27/2, (2012), pp. 261–282;  
Fitzgerald, M, Lebow, R, N, ‘Iraq: The Mother of all intelligence failures’, Intelligence and National 
Security, 21/5 (2006), pp. 884–909 
66 Coletta, G, ‘Politicising Intelligence: what went wrong with the UK and US assessments on Iraq WMD 
in 2002’, Journal of Intelligence History, 17/1 (2018), p. 73, 75 
67 Coletta, G, ‘Politicising Intelligence: what went wrong with the UK and US assessments on Iraq WMD 
in 2002’, p. 73 
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administration who deviated from professional standards by ignoring intelligence 
assessments as they sought to make the case for war, and instead selected pieces of raw 
intelligence to bolster support for the war. He therefore makes recommendations of how 
to fix the intelligence-policy relationship, which includes having the legislative monitor 
the relationship, enhance the role of the ombudsman in the CIA, and have a stronger 
declaration that the Intelligence Services should not be part of policy advocacy.68 
Combined with Pillar, this provides an insight into how the politicisation occurred in the 
lead up to the Iraq War, albeit without analysing what portrayals of the Intelligence 
Services the Governments were providing. Thus, the thesis will contribute to this 
understanding in the intelligence failures literature.   
 
Geoffrey Treverton also explores the politicisation in the context of the Iraq War and the 
belief that Saddam Hussein had WMDs. He highlights the 5 key reasons why 
politicisation can occur namely: direct pressure from senior officials; cherry-picking; 
question-asking; taking a house line on a particular subject; and having a shared mind-
set. Treverton also analyses how all were evident in the build up to the Iraq War.69 In 
contrast, Leigh examines how the Intelligence Services can be politicised when their 
neutrality is affected,70 demonstrating the numerous ways in which politicisation of 
intelligence manifests. However, by simply focusing on the ways in which politicisation 
occurs, there remains an omission in detailing what portrayals of the British Intelligence 
Services were evident at the time of the intelligence failure, demonstrating originality 
and contribution to the thesis.  
 
Peter Gill and Michael Wesley explore the politicisation of intelligence in the lead up to 
the Iraq War, with Gill focusing on the role of the media in the politicisation 
process.71This is in the wider context of exploring the relationship between knowledge 
(intelligence) and power (policy) which Gill utilises to understand the intelligence 
failures and how the media were utilised by the Government, such as naming Dr David 
                                                          
68 Pillar, P, ‘Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, 85/2 (2006) p. 19, 22, 24, 26–27  
69 Treverton, G, Intelligence for an age of Terror, p. 174 
These are themes also explored by Michael Wesley which the Literature Review will further examine  
Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ p. 196, 199 
70 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 84 
71 Gill, P, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq,’ p. 12–15, 24  
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Kelly as the source behind Andrew Gilligan’s BBC Radio 4 Today Programme assertions 
that the Iraq dossier had been ‘sexed up’.72 This means Gills analysis does not explore 
what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services were evident in the media as a result 
of the politicisation. In contrast, Wesley criticises how close the heads of the Intelligence 
Services in the UK, America and Australia were to policymakers.73  Drawing the 
distinction between intelligence being policy relevant and intelligence being politicised, 
Wesley argues that intelligence analysis is about providing facts to policymakers on 
which policy must be based.74 The analysis provides a clear understanding of how 
separate intelligence and policy should be in order to prevent politicisation. This is 
perhaps most eloquently highlighted when he argues that Intelligence Services ‘play a 
distinct role in the business of Government’.75 Thus, Wesley’s argument provides an 
understanding of politicisation of the Iraq context, but also the links between intelligence 
and wider Government.76   
 
Literature written by Former Practitioners  
Former practitioners writing about the intelligence realm is another sub-genre which has 
proved useful as it provides a first-hand perspective on the intelligence realm. This was 
notable in Pillar’s exploration of the ways politicisation can occur.77 These provide an 
unparalleled understanding of the issues the intelligence community faced in the 
disclosure of politicised intelligence assessments. However, with all former practitioners, 
there is the possibility of them simply wanting to portray former employers in a positive 
manner, as opposed to being critical of both Intelligence Services and their actions. 
                                                          
72 BBC News, Full text: Gilligan’s Today reports, 24th July 2003, Available From: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3090681.stm (Accessed 4th May 2018); 
BBC News, Dr David Kelly: Controversial death examined, 17th December 2011, Available From: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13716127 (Accessed 4th May 2018); 
Gill, P, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq,’ p. 24, 29 
73 In the UK context, there were assertions of a closeness not between the heads of MI5 and MI6 with 
policymakers, but rather between Sir John Scarlett, the head of the JIC with policymakers  
For more information: Please see:  
Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ p. 189–190 ;  
The Independent, WMD and the fatal war of misinformation, Raymond Whitaker, 25th January 2004, 
Available From: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/wmd-and-the-fatal-war-of-
misinformation-75254.html (Accessed 23rd September 2019) 
74 Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ p. 190 
75 Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ p. 188  
76 Peter Gill also makes reference to the politicisation of intelligence in the lead up to the Iraq War 
77 Pillar, P, ‘The Perils of Politicisation’, in in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, 
edited by Loch. K. Johnson, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 472 – 484  
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Whilst this must always be considered, they still prove a useful source of information 
which would otherwise not be in the public domain, a theme which Chapter 4 ‘A 
Symbiotic Relationship’ explores. Although it is far more common in the US context for 
former intelligence practitioners to turn to academia,78 it has occurred fleetingly in the 
UK, with Sir David Omand a contemporary example.79  
 
Omand’s work has been influential in this thesis as it explores how the public should be 
informed on intelligence matters, and argues that this is required due to the over-reliance 
upon news journalism to provide an informed understanding of intelligence to the 
public.80 This implies the necessity for the British Intelligence Services to further their 
own engagement with the public to prevent an over reliance on news journalism for an 
understanding of the British Intelligence Services. Like Omand, Treverton, a former 
practitioner,81 explores that public trust is crucial for the Intelligence Services in 
democratic countries to operate in secret.82 Although centred on the American case,83 
Treverton’s overall arguments prove a useful starting point for assessing how important 
                                                          
78 When attending the International Studies Association Annual Conferences in 2016 and 2018, this theme 
was incredibly noticeable. Several US academics précised their presentations by saying that they used to 
work in the US Intelligence Services.  This information is often also highlighted on their academic staff 
profiles. See below for examples of this 
John Hopkins University, Mark Stout, Programme Director, Sr. Lecturer, Available From: 
https://advanced.jhu.edu/about-us/faculty/mark-stout-phd/ (Accessed 31st October 2019) 
79 This is a theme which Chapter 5 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ explores in more detail but is worth 
highlighting how the academic writings of former practitioners although covering multiple themes, provide 
another insight into how the British Intelligence Services wish to engage with the public 
80 Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ 
p. 43–44 
81 Treverton, G, Intelligence for an age of Terror, p. 66, 235; 
In 1975, Treverton served on The Church Committee which was the name given to the first Senate 
Intelligence Committee after its Chair, Senator Frank Church. It was created to look at the CIA domestic 
activities, as well as covert activity abroad which included the assassination of foreign leaders, alleged 
abuses by the Internal Revenue Service, FBI allegedly undertaking domestic spying by the military and 
the alleged interceptions of the conversations of US citizens by the NSA. For more information on this, 
please see:  
McNeil, P, P, ‘The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community’, in Intelligence and National Security, 
the secret world of spies, edited by Loch Johnson and James Wirtz, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 14 
82 Treverton, G, Intelligence for an age of Terror, p. 235; 
This is one of many themes discussed by Treverton but considering the Central Research Question and 
research puzzle, is the most useful for this research. He also explores the role of technology on the 
intelligence cycle in th 21st Century, a theme which will be further explored in Chapter 2, as well as how 
in the post 9/11 context, there has been the ‘blurring distinctions between crime, terrorism and war’.  
Treverton, G, Intelligence for an age of Terror, p. 134; 
Treverton, G, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, New York 2001), p. 103 
83 Treverton, G, Intelligence for an age of Terror, p. 84-5, 122 
 
Page | 27  
 
it is to balance secrecy and openness, as well as what portrayals of Intelligence Services 
are in the public domain.  
 
Teaching Intelligence Literature  
Teaching intelligence has continually been discussed in an American context84 since the 
creation of intelligence as an academic discipline in the 1960s.85 This has created an 
American centric discourse which fails to understand intelligence structures and practises 
in other countries. As the thesis centres on the British context, it will aid the existing 
American dominated teaching intelligence literature. Currently, there is a growing 
emphasis on the British approach to teaching intelligence,86  with many of these 
comparing it to the US. By providing an overview of the British approach to teaching 
intelligence at different universities, Goodman explores how post 9/11, the British 
academic study of intelligence was at the same point that American academia was in the 
1960s.87 Helen Dexter, Mark Phythian and David Strachan-Morris further these themes 
when exploring the subtle differences between the UK and US intelligence academic 
discipline by exploring how they teach intelligence at Leicester University where they 
are all based.88 
 
                                                          
84 An example of this is how Loch Johnson has written about the links between the CIA and academia; 
Johnson, L. K, ‘Spies and scholars in the United States: winds of ambivalence in the groves of academe’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 34/1 (2019), p. 1–21 
85 Central Intelligence Agency, Library – Studies in Intelligence – Studying and Teaching Intelligence: The 
Approach in the United Kingdom, Intelligence Education by Michael Goodman, Available From: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Studying_Teaching_6.htm (Accessed 22nd August 2019);  
Marrin, S, ‘Improving Intelligence as an Academic Discipline’, p. 2; 
Dorondo, P. J, ‘For College Courses in Intelligence’, pp. A15 – A 18; 
Central Intelligence Agency, Library – Reading Room Sherman Kent Strategic Intelligence for American 
World Policy, Available From: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP79T01762A000400020010-2.pdf (Accessed 15th August 2019); 
Phythian, M, ‘Cultures of National Intelligence’, p. 33 
86 An example of this can be seen in an article written by Christopher Moran who although explores 
intelligence popular culture, has also written an article about the teaching of intelligence where he uses 
examples from the module he convened. In particular, he discusses how successful it proved to be to have 
former practitioners come and talk to the students and provides comments from the students to support 
this. For more information, please see:  
Moran, C, ‘Note on Teaching Intelligence’ Intelligence and National Security, 31/1, (2016) pp. 118–130  
87 Central Intelligence Agency, Library – Studies in Intelligence – Studying and Teaching Intelligence: The 
Approach in the United Kingdom, Intelligence Education by Michael Goodman, Available From: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Studying_Teaching_6.htm (Accessed 22nd August 2019) 
88 Dexter, H, Phythian, M, Strachan-Morris, D, ‘The what, why, who and how of teaching intelligence: the 
Leicester approach’, Intelligence and National Security, 32/7 (2017), pp. 920 – 934  
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This emerging literature from established intelligence academics explores the ways in 
which intelligence is being taught in the UK.89 But, it also analyses the mechanisms 
through which cooperation between intelligence services and academia occurs, with a 
particular emphasis upon engagement with former practitioners.90 This proved useful for 
Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’; although its usefulness was limited as the 
literature does not discuss what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are 
portrayed by intelligence academia. This occurs due to the teaching intelligence literature 
being predominantly based on individuals’ experiences, as opposed to analysing what 
depictions of the British Intelligence Services are evident within academia. Thus, the 
thesis will contribute to this understanding of what portrayals are evident within 
academia and whether the type of publication, such as an official history, affects this. 
 
Media Studies Literature  
Media studies scholars (such as Brian McNair and Richard Keeble) examine the 
important role of news journalism in providing the public with information to make an 
informed political decision.91  Bernard Margueritte agrees with this to the extent that he 
describes journalists as a pillar of democracy.92 Henry Heald concurs, stating that 
journalism is a foundation of democracy, considering the centrality of journalists in 
informing the public.93 Schou furthers this theme, stating that an informed citizenry is an 
essential cornerstone in a democratic country.94 Therefore, it is clear that news journalism 
can be a key way in which the public are informed and educated on intelligence themes, 
                                                          
89 Walsh, P, ‘Teaching Intelligence in the twenty-first century: towards an evidence-based approach for 
curriculum design’, Intelligence and National Security, 32/7 (2017), pp. 1005–1021;  
Lowenthal, M, ‘My take on teaching intelligence why, what and how’, Intelligence and National Security, 
32/7 (2017) pp. 986 – 994  
90 Moran, C, ‘Note on Teaching Intelligence’ pp. 118–130; 
Dexter, H, Phythian, M, Strachan-Morris, D, ‘The what, why, who and how of teaching intelligence: the 
Leicester approach’, p. 921 
91 McNair, B, News and Journalism in the UK – Fourth Edition, (London, Routledge, 2003), p.  23; 
Keeble, R, ‘Introduction,’ in Media Values – Inspired by Bill Porter; Founder of the International 
Communications Forum, edited by Richard Lance Keeble, (Leicester, Troubadour Publishing, 2010), pp. 
xi–xii 
92 Margueritte, B, ‘New media and new civilisation: An appreciation of Bill Porter,’ in Media Values – 
Inspired by Bill Porter; Founder of the International Communications Forum, edited by Richard Lance 
Keeble, (Leicester, Troubadour Publishing, 2010), p. 25 
93 Heald, H, ‘How the media can be the heralds of a “new world order”,’ in Media Values – Inspired by 
Bill Porter; Founder of the International Communications Forum, edited by Richard Lance Keeble, 
(Leicester, Troubadour Publishing, 2010), p. 59 
94 Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, p. 5 
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and therefore important to assess what depictions of the British Intelligence Services it 
provides.  
 
Chapman Pincher’s numerous books have also been utilised in order to provide a first-
hand understanding of the historical relationship between news journalism and the British 
Intelligence Services. The overall arguments provide a clear starting point as he seeks to 
include the perspectives of the British Intelligence Services and does state when the 
information has been provided by them, something particularly evident in Too Secret Too 
Long95 which portrays the British Intelligence Services as seeking to act legally and 
ethically. In his autobiography Dangerous To Know, the excessive secrecy surrounding 
intelligence matters and thus the role of journalists in seeking to overcome this is 
continually highlighted.96  
 
In The Truth About Dirty Tricks, Pincher further discusses what he sees as the desire of 
the British Intelligence Services to always act legally and ethically, even in the face of 
difficult situations such as the troubles in Northern Ireland.97  This remained an 
overarching theme in Their Trade is Treachery which, based on disclosures from Peter 
Wright,98 examines how the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence 
Services was significantly affected by the Cambridge Five, and other moles such as Harry 
Houghton at the Underwater Weapons Establishment.99 This is combined with the 
continued suggestions that the former Director General (DG) of MI5 Sir Roger Hollis 
                                                          
95 Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, p. 105, 317, 520, 534 
96 Pincher, C, Dangerous to Know, (London, Biteback Publishing, 2014), p. 12, 30, 31-40, 65, 214 
97 Pincher, C, The Truth About Dirty Tricks, p. 4, 23, 25, 32-33, 127-128 163, 167, 181-182, 273, 331 
98 Pincher, C, Dangerous to Know, p. 221;  
Gill, P, Policing Politics, p. 12–13  
99 Pincher, C, ‘Reflections on a Lifetime of Reporting on Intelligence Affairs’, p. 162 
The Cambridge Five refers to Five individuals, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Anthony Blunt, Kim Philby 
and John Cairncross were Soviet moles within British Intelligence after they were recruited at Cambridge 
University during the 1930s 
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was also a Soviet mole.100 Despite the book ostensibly describing events,101 it insinuates 
that British Intelligence was something of a leaky cauldron during the Cold War, due to 
the actions of individuals in providing information to the Soviet Union. Perhaps it is 
through his close cooperation with the British Intelligence Services that Pincher is able 
to imply where the issues emanated from. 
 
Pincher’s overall arguments are useful for understanding the history of excessive secrecy 
surrounding the British Intelligence Services. This is combined with the first-hand 
accounts he includes from intelligence officers, although there is only Pincher’s account 
of the discussions. Yet, what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services were evident 
either within the wider media or other facets of the public domain is not explored.  
 
The intelligence accountability literature explored themes central to the wider research 
puzzle such as the tension between openness and secrecy, how this can affect what 
information is placed in the public domain, and the ways in which public accountability 
can occur. Whilst all of the literatures surveyed have been incredibly useful, they tend to 
have applicability for one avenue discussed. This highlights how little scholarly attention 
has been focused upon examining what overarching depictions of intelligence are 
contained within popular culture, demonstrating the original contribution which can be 
made by this research. However, the intelligence accountability literature has been useful 
throughout due to its discussion of the overarching themes which are central to the 
research puzzle. Whilst the thesis contributes to all of the literatures assessed, it is 
intelligence accountability where the thesis situates itself.  
 
                                                          
100 Pincher, C, Their Trade Is Treachery, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1981), p. 3, 11-13, 38-41, 
57-58, 67-68, 69-72, 76, 79-81, 158; 
Security Service, Who We Are, Former Director Generals – Sir Roger Hollis, Available From: 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/sir-roger-hollis (Accessed 12th September 2019);  
Pincher goes on to argue that Hollis’s handling of the Profumo Affair could not have been more 
advantageous to the Soviets than if Moscow had been monitoring the situation daily. The Profumo Affair 
centred on the War Minister John Profumo having an affair with Christine Keeler who was friendly with 
the Soviet military attaché Eugene Ivanov and it was thought that Profumo was passing state secrets to the 
Soviets via Keeler after a KGB agent who was passing information to the FBI claimed that Ivanov had 
installed a microphone in Keeler’s bedroom and had been gathering valuable intelligence by listening to 
the pillow talk between Profumo and Keeler. For more information, please see:  
Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, p. 317-332 
101 Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, p. 12-13, 16-21 
 Pincher, C, Their Trade Is Treachery, p. 82-87 
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Methodology 
The Case Studies 
To analyse the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain, two 
case studies stood out as being obvious examples to analyse the depictions evident due 
to the substantial attention from all of the avenues namely British Government, academia, 
news journalism and popular culture that they received. The case studies are the lead up 
to the Iraq War in 2003 and the Snowden revelations in 2013.  Not only was intelligence 
an important factor in both cases, but both cases also conveyed specific portrayals of 
intelligence to the public.  
 
In the lead up to the Iraq War, the British Intelligence Services were placed at the centre 
of the political and public discourse when Blair’s Government sought to make the public 
case for war via intelligence assessments. These were made in a JIC report relating to 
Iraqi WMD that became known first as the September dossier and then the dodgy dossier. 
This report sought to further the Blair Government’s aims and objectives in justifying an 
invasion of Iraq by stating that Saddam had WMDs and was ready to use them, as well 
as drawing links between Saddam and Al Qaeda. Furthermore, and of most concern to 
the British public, the dossier implied that British military personnel stationed in Cyprus 
could be attacked by WMDs from Iraq at very short notice (within 45 minutes).102 The 
report acquired the nickname ‘dodgy dossier’ when it became known that the intelligence 
assessments it contained were altered by the Blair Government to make the case for war 
more persuasive.  
 
The government’s willingness to amend intelligence reports reflects the high priority it 
placed upon Britain’s role in supporting the United States in this conflict, which was 
revealed in the finding of the Chilcot inquiry that Blair promised President Bush that he 
would ‘be with him whatever' as an ally against Iraq.103 British Intelligence continued to 
be in the spotlight after the 2003 invasion of Iraq due to their alleged involvement in the 
American rendition of terror suspects and the use of torture techniques in President 
                                                          
102 The Independent, Chilcot? Chaff? Dodgy Dossier? Here’s an Iraq War glossary, Andy McSmith, 5th 
July 2016, Available From: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/chilcot-chaff-dodgy-
dossier-heres-an-iraq-war-glossary-a7119996.html (Accessed 1st May 2018) 
103 Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2016), p. 
4, 15–16, 58 and p. 73 
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Bush’s Global War on Terror,104 with one Libyan citizen claiming that Britain was 
complicit in his rendition to a Gadaffi controlled Libya where he was tortured.105 
However, due to the prominence of the British Intelligence Services in the decisions 
leading to the war, it is solely these portrayals which the research will seek to analyse.  
 
Ten years later, the British Intelligence Services were in the news again. In June 2013, 
the former CIA contractor Edward Snowden leaked classified documents to investigative 
journalists about how America’s National Security Agency (NSA), had implemented the 
bulk collection of domestic telephone, internet and email records by collecting data from 
telephone companies.106 Along with the NSA, GCHQ was a key partner in the Prism 
surveillance programme where the NSA tapped directly into the servers of nine global 
internet firms, including Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Yahoo.107 These disclosures 
were published in The Guardian,108 The revelations demonstrated the role of the media109 
in holding the Intelligence Services to account. This then resulted in Britain’s Intelligence 
and Security Committee (ISC) who oversees the British Intelligence Services, seeking to 
examine the most serious claims made by Snowden pertaining to British Intelligence in 
                                                          
104 The Guardian, Torture: British role suppressed, Available From: http://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/defence-and-security-blog/2014/dec/10/cia-torture-mi5-mi6 (Accessed 21st June 2015);  
Borelli, S, ‘Rendition, Torture and Intelligence Cooperation’, in International Intelligence Cooperation 
and Accountability, edited by Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2011), p. 99, 
109 
105 BBC News, UK pays £2m over Libyan rendition claim, Available From: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-20718675 (Accessed 18th March 2015) 
106 The Guardian, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, Glenn Greenwald, 
6th June 2013, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order (Accessed 12th March 2018) 
107 BBC News, Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme, 17th January 2014, Available 
From: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-23123964 (Accessed 1st July 2014); 
The Guardian, GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world’s communications, Ewen 
MacAskill, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davies and James Ball, 21st June 2013, Available From: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa 
(Accessed 16th November 2015) 
The closeness of cooperation between the NSA and GCHQ has always been evident, with Ian Leigh 
highlighting this theme in 2005 and how legislation did not include matters of cooperation. Please see:  
Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 82 
108 The Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practice and ethics of the British press highlighted the role of The 
Guardian in undertaking investigative journalism. For more information, please see: 
An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press Report, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, 2012), pp. 267 and 352  
109 The Guardian, The NSA files: the Guardian front pages – in pictures, Available From: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2013/oct/10/nsa-files-guardian-front-pages (Accessed 6th 
May 2015)  
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the Privacy and Security Report.110  This demonstrates the role of the media within the 
accountability process as without the revelations purported in the media, the ISC would 
not have instigated such an inquiry, as Chapter 6 ‘A Complicated Relationship’ will 
examine further.  
 
Triangulation of Sources  
One of the first academic articles I read when undertaking this PhD was Phillip Davies’ 
‘Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of the Elite Interview Data in 
the Study of the Intelligence and Security Service’. In it, he discusses that to research 
intelligence; the ideal balance of sources is to combine interviews with memoirs, 
secondary sources and other available documents.111 This triangulation attempts to 
overcome the problems of one narrative from dominating the research, particularly if it 
is not reliable. It is particularly useful as Gill states that: 
 
Researching and writing about security intelligence 
matters is fraught with difficulties; doing so with respect 
to the UK is yet more so. Why? Researchers depend on 
information about their subject matter, and information 
on these matters is difficult to come by; therefore there 
may just be very little to go on.112 
 
Therefore, the triangulation approach allows for the inclusion of multiple sources to 
overcome the issues of secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence Services. One of the 
ways that the triangulation approach was applied in the research for this thesis was by 
undertaking elite interviews with British, European and American officials. Interviewing 
Britain’s international partners, who have become increasingly important as a result of 
the post-9/11 expansion in bilateral and multilateral cooperation,113 furthered the 
                                                          
110 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Privacy and Security, p. 1 
111 Davies, P, ‘Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of the Elite Interview Data in the 
Study of the Intelligence and Security Service’, Politics, 21/1 (2001), p. 74 
112 Gill, P, Policing Politics, p. 35 
113 Following the Global War on Terror bilateral and multilateral cooperation has been central and thus 
interviewing those who Britain has worked with may provide more of an insight into the work undertaken 
by the British Intelligence Services. For more information, please see: 
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triangulation process. This continued when undertaking 6 weeks of fieldwork in America 
as it highlighted the different relationship between openness and secrecy. It demonstrated 
that there is in fact more openness that the British Intelligence Services could undertake 
without affecting intelligence operational security. 
 
To comprehend how the British Intelligence Services depict themselves to the public, 
their websites and speeches made by their respective Heads are analysed in this thesis. 
Although the ‘ring of secrecy’114 surrounds the British Intelligence Services, there is 
undeniably more which could be placed in the public domain. For example, the British 
Intelligence Services could engage with museum exhibits such as the ‘Secret War’ at the 
Imperial War Museum, encourage university programmes which allow students to write 
policy recommendations,115 as well as enhance their use of social media to further public 
awareness. Although GCHQ does have a social media presence on Instagram and 
Twitter, no evidence was found of either MI5 or MI6 using similar techniques. On 
Instagram, they have just over 15,000 followers with the posts centring on their public 
engagement activities, such as the children’s TV show Blue Peter Enigma competition 
to mark the centenary of GCHQ.116 However, their Twitter profile has over 100,000 
Twitter followers, and uses key hashtags on their posts as well as highlighting 
information from their history and how an individual can get involved.117  
 
But despite GCHQ utilising social media to some effectiveness, it remains something of 
a missed opportunity when comparing it to their American counterparts. On Instagram, 
the CIA have 261,000 followers and use it to highlight staff profiles whilst the FBI have 
1.4 million and provide photos of their work in keeping America safe. Although the NSA 
                                                          
Scott, L and Hughes, R, G, ‘The Future of Intelligence: Seeking Perfection in an Imperfect World?’, in 
Intelligence and International Security – New Perspectives and Agendas, edited by Len Scott, R. Gerald 
Hughes and Martin. S Alexander, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2011), p. 7; 
Leigh, I ‘Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation – Framing the Issue’, p. 3–4, 12;  
Leigh, I, ‘National Courts and International Intelligence Cooperation’, p. 231 
114 Glees, Anthony, Davies, H, J, Phillip, Morrison, N, L, John, The Open Side of Secrecy, Britain’s 
Intelligence and Security Committee, (London, Social Affairs Unit, 2006), p.19 
115 This was a theme which was evident in the Diplomacy Labs programme run by the State Department 
and will be further discussed in Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ 
116 Instagram, GCHQ, Available From: https://www.instagram.com/gchq/?hl=en (Accessed 19th March 
2019); 
BBC CBBC, Blue Peter – Closed: Blue Peter Enigma Competition, Available From: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/cbbc/joinin/blue-peter-enigma-competition-2019 (Accessed 5th December 2019) 
117 Twitter, GCHQ, Available From: https://twitter.com/GCHQ (Accessed 5th December 2019) 
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does have an Instagram account, there is limited usage with only 10 posts and just under 
3000 followers.118 Like GCHQ, the three main US Intelligence Services are more active 
on Twitter. The CIA has 2.7 million followers and combined with the use of hashtags, 
provides historical information of their work, declassified documents, and pictures from 
inside the headquarters.119 The FBI posts similar information to their 2.6 million 
followers, as well as highlighting the stories of FBI officers and requests for information 
about ongoing operations.120 Whilst the NSA does have a Twitter account with 625,000 
followers, like Instagram, they do not use it as affectively as their counterparts and 
instead, provide details of how the NSA is engaging with policymakers at the 
Pentagon.121 Although there are questions as to why the NSA does not utilise social 
media to the same extent as the CIA and FBI, it demonstrates the increased openness in 
placing information into the public domain when compared to the British Intelligence 
Services. Thus, it is an activity which the British Intelligence Services could use to further 
enhance information directly placed in the public domain.  
 
When exploring the websites, it became clear that the Big 3 all utilise them to publish 
speeches made by their respective Heads. These were therefore included within the 
analysis of how the British Intelligence Services seek to portray themselves in the public 
domain. It was staggering to realise just how many publicly available speeches there 
were, particularly from consecutive MI5 DGs post 9/11. By including all of these 
speeches on the websites, there is an attempt to ensure the public can access this 
information to thus have an informed understanding of the intelligence realm. But, it is 
questionable whether by simply making a speech available online, the public will be 
aware of its existence and read it to fully understand the work of the Intelligence Services.   
 
                                                          
118 Instagram, CIA, Available From: https://www.instagram.com/cia/?hl=en (Accessed 5th December 
2019); 
Instagram, FBI, Available From: https://www.instagram.com/fbi/?hl=en (Accessed 5th December 2019); 
Instagram, NSA, Available From: https://www.instagram.com/nsausgov/ (Accessed 5th December 2019) 
119 Twitter, CIA, Available From: https://twitter.com/CIA (Accessed 5th December 2019) 
120 Twitter, FBI, Available From: https://twitter.com/FBI (Accessed 5th December 2019) 
121 Twitter, NSA, Available From: https://twitter.com/NSAGov (Accessed 5th December 2019) 
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Although not numerous, there are some memoirs published by former practitioners such 
as Dame Stella Rimington122 and Tom Marcus.123 Any published memoirs from 
intelligence officials must have been vetted by the Intelligence Services before 
publication124 due to the nature of their work. Although the vetting process may restrict 
the nature of the information within the book, due to minimal available sources and the 
importance of triangulation, they will be used in a critical manner. Their usefulness 
emanates from discussions about life within the British Intelligence Services and the 
difficulties which can occur, such as not being able to discuss your work socially, a 
perspective which can be compared to that depicted within popular culture. In the case 
of Dame Stella Rimington, as the first publicly named DG,125 her autobiography 
discusses the emphasis MI5 placed on adhering to legal and ethical standards as they 
pushed to be placed on a legislative footing in the late 1980s. 
 
Gaining approval for an autobiography is required, evident in how the first page of 
Marcus’s Soldier Spy clearly states that ‘it has been vetted and cleared for publication by 
his former employer [MI5]’.126 This undoubtedly occurs due to the Government view 
that the publication of insider accounts of the Intelligence realm are damaging, there is 
no centralised process through which this occurs.127 However, it seems this will soon be 
changing as MI6 will be requiring entrants to sign their copyrights over to the service to 
prevent novels or memoirs from being published.128 It is unknown whether this will 
extend to MI5 and GCHQ as well. This is in stark contrast to America where the CIA 
have a centralised system allowing for the publication of memoirs and novels, namely a 
publication review board for former employees to seek approval.129 This suggests at the 
                                                          
122 Rimington, S, Dame, Open Secret, (London, Arrow Books, 2001)  
123 Marcus, T, Soldier Spy, (Milton Keynes, Penguin Books, 2017) 
124 Hansard, House of Lords Written Answers, 5th June 2000, Volume 613, Column 123 
125 Security Service, Who We Are, Former Director Generals – Dame Stella Rimington, Available From: 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/staff-and-management/dame-stella-rimington.html 
(Accessed 28th July 2015)  
126 Marcus, T, Soldier Spy 
127 Gill, P, Policing Politics, p. 9; 
This is something also intimated by Dame Stella Rimington in the acknowledgements to her autobiography 
as she refers to those within MI5 who were unsure about the publication of her book. For more information, 
please see: 
Rimington, S, Dame, Open Secret, p. ix 
128 Le Carré, ‘My plots are inspired by a true betrayal’ The Times (London), 2nd October 2019 
129 Gill, P, Policing Politics, p. 10; 
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differing approaches to former employees writing either fact or fiction about their time 
in the intelligence realm. The differing stances on this matter demonstrate the differing 
relationships between openness and secrecy in each country as the discussion on the 
British way in Intelligence revealed. 
 
Chapter 5 ‘A Complicated Relationship’ scrutinises the portrayals of the British 
Intelligence Services in news journalism. Due to the large volume of reporting available 
for analysis, it was important to identify a clear focus that would allow the chapter to 
explore how the British Intelligence Services were portrayed by different types of media 
outlets with differing political affiliations.130 This would allow for a greater 
understanding of whether the portrayals differed based on political affiliation, type of 
media outlet, or whether there were different depictions being created. Therefore, three 
British media outlets that constitute the two most important news sources to the public131 
as well as their role in scrutinising British Intelligence in the two case studies (the build 
up to the Iraq War and the Snowden revelations) were chosen for analysis. 
 
It was equally important to discern which events to focus on. Chosen due to their role in 
the reporting of the assertions that the dodgy dossier was sexed up in the lead up to the 
Iraq War,132 the BBC a public service broadcaster, has a Royal Charter which stipulates 
the importance of impartiality.133 According to its 2016 / 2017 annual report and Ofcom’s 
2018 News Consumption in the UK report, it is influential in providing news to the public. 
The British public also regard the BBC as reliable; over 83% of adult respondents to the 
Ofcom 2018 News Consumption survey said the BBC provides good analysis and high-
                                                          
Central Intelligence Agency, About CIA – Keeping Secrets Safe: Publication Review Board, Available 
From: https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/publications-review-board (Accessed 7th October 2019) 
130 This was also in part due to how there are numerous forms of news journalism as is intimated by Ofcom: 
Ofcom, News Consumption in the UK, Produced by Jigsaw Research, Summer 2018, Available From: 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/116529/news-consumption-2018.pdf (Accessed 
4th October 2018) p. 4 
131 Ofcom, News Consumption in the UK, Produced by Jigsaw Research, Summer 2018, Available From: 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/116529/news-consumption-2018.pdf (Accessed 
4th October 2018) p. 136 
132 Audioboom, Andrew Gilligan – Iraq – 29th May 2003, Available From: 
https://audioboom.com/posts/822830-andrew-gilligan-iraq-29-may-2003 (Accessed 22nd June 2018); 
BBC News, Full text: Gilligan’s Today reports, 24th July 2003, Available From: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3090681.stm (Accessed 4th May 2018) 
133 McNair, B, News and Journalism in the UK, p. 36;  
Broadcasting – Copy of Royal Charter for the continuance of the British Broadcasting Corporation, 
(London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2016), p. 5 
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quality commentary on current affairs. This was a theme the 12-15 year old respondents 
also agreed with.134 The BBC One television channel was the most used and most popular 
news source (62%), and had the highest proportion (27%) of respondents to the Ofcom 
2018 News Consumption in the UK survey saying it was their most important news 
source, with 6% of respondents choosing the BBC website and/or app.135 The BBC News 
Channel was equally popular, with 9.9% of the population using it during 2015-2016, 
combined with the app having 7.5 million monthly unique browsers,136 making it the 
highest-ranking website or app in the Top 20 News Sources.137 Therefore, considering 
the role of BBC in reporting on the dodgy dossier and it being one of the most popular 
news sources across numerous platforms, it was a clear choice to analyse what portrayals 
of the British Intelligence Services it provides to the public. 
 
The Guardian newspaper published the Snowden revelations in June 2013.138 As the 
statistics for the BBC indicated, news consumption is continually occurring online.139 In 
2017, Ofcom statistics show that the left-leaning The Guardian140 had the second highest 
weekly readership, with the majority being online views as the excerpt (figure 4) from 
the 2018 News Consumption in the UK report shows.  
                                                          
134 Ofcom, News Consumption in the UK, Produced by Jigsaw Research, Summer 2018, Available From: 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/116529/news-consumption-2018.pdf (Accessed 
4th October 2018) p. 121, 137 
135 Ofcom, News Consumption in the UK, Produced by Jigsaw Research, Summer 2018, Available From: 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/116529/news-consumption-2018.pdf (Accessed 
4th October 2018) p. 8, 20 – 21 and 28 
136 BBC Annual Reports and Accounts 2016 / 2017, (London, Broadcasting House, 2017), p. 30–31  
137 Ofcom, News Consumption in the UK, Produced by Jigsaw Research, Summer 2018, Available From: 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/116529/news-consumption-2018.pdf (Accessed 
4th October 2018) p. 8, 20 – 21 and 28 
138 The Guardian, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, Glenn Greenwald, 
6th June 2013, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-
verizon-court-order (Accessed 12th March 2018);  
The Guardian, NSA Prism programme taps in to user date of Apple, Google and others, Glenn Greenwald 
and Ewen MacAskill, 7th June 2013, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-
tech-giants-nsa-data (Accessed 20th March 2018);  
The Guardian, The NSA files: the Guardian front pages – in pictures, 10th October 2013, Available From: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2013/oct/10/nsa-files-guardian-front-pages (Accessed 6th May 
2015) 
139 Press Gazette, NRS: Daily Mail most popular UK newspaper in print and online, Dominic Ponsford, 
26th February 2015, Available From: https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/nrs-daily-mail-most-popular-uk-
newspaper-print-and-online-23m-readers-month/ (Accessed 9th October 2018) 
140 BBC News, The politics of UK newspapers, 30th September 2009, Available From: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8282189.stm (15th March 2018) 
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(Figure 4) 
 
Figure 4, is a table taken from the Ofcom 2018 News Consumption in the UK report 
showing the digital and print readership figures for British newspapers.141 
 
With so many views occurring online, the resulting effect is that its revenue largely 
emanates from online contributions and advertising as opposed to sales from print 
copies.142 As the Snowden revelations are a case study the chapter explores, due to the 
centrality of the British Intelligence Services and the Government Communication 
Headquarters (GCHQ) in the allegations, it would be remiss not to include The Guardian 
when assessing what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are in the public 
                                                          
141 Ofcom, News Consumption in the UK, Produced by Jigsaw Research, Summer 2018, Available From: 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/116529/news-consumption-2018.pdf (Accessed 
4th October 2018) p. 41 
142 The Guardian, Guardian Media Group digital revenues outstrip print for first time, Jim Waterson, 24th 
July 2018, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2018/jul/24/guardian-media-group-
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domain. To compare the depictions of British Intelligence, The Daily Telegraph, which 
has a political orientation to the right of centre,143 whilst having readership figures and 
demographics similar144 to those of The Guardian as Ofcom statistics above demonstrate, 
will be analysed. This combination of a differing political persuasion but similar 
readership figures and demographics between the two newspapers allows for conclusions 
to be drawn about whether the political leanings affect the depictions of the British 
Intelligence Services, whether the reporting is affected by wider factors, such as finances, 
and how British Intelligence is portrayed to a similar reader demographic.145  
 
Attending Edinburgh Spy Week in April 2017 was a turning point for the research for 
Chapter 6 ‘A Fractious Relationship’. The discussions highlighted the numerous facets 
to spy fiction,146 with one category of spy novels being insider spy fiction.147 By drawing 
this distinction, it suggests a way in which the British Intelligence Services can 
inadvertently engage directly with popular culture and provide a credible view of their 
work to the public. But this is not necessarily always the case. Joseph Oldham discussed 
how Ian Fleming and John Le Carré, both of whom worked for British Intelligence, 
characterise the romance and realism genres of spy fiction respectively.148 Therefore, 
                                                          
143 BBC News, The politics of UK newspapers, 30th September 2009, Available From: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8282189.stm (15th March 2018) 
144 In the two socio-economic groups, there is a 1% difference between the readership levels of the 
newspapers; 
Ofcom, News Consumption in the UK, Produced by Jigsaw Research, Summer 2018, Available From: 
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0024/116529/news-consumption-2018.pdf (Accessed 
4th October 2018) p. 42–44; 
The socio-economic groups are ABC1 and C2DE as is stipulated by YouGov which draws the distinction 
between the two, using the phrases white-collar workers and blue-collar workers to explain the difference 
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You.Gov, Britain’s middle-class meritocracy, Available From: 
https://yougov.co.uk/news/2013/06/24/britains-middle-class-meritocracy/ (Accessed 4th October 2018) 
145 Although analysing the views of British Intelligence in tabloid newspapers would aid overall 
comprehension of how public perceptions of intelligence are influenced, particularly due to the role ‘The 
Sun’ played in the reporting of the dodgy dossier with the infamous headline ‘Brits 45 mins from doom’, 
the chapter would have become a thesis addressing how the media informs understandings of British 
Intelligence as opposed to a chapter examining how British Intelligence engages with the public. 
The article referred to here is available from:  
The Sun, Brits 45 mins from doom, George Pascoe-Watson, 25th September 2002, Available From Nexis: 
https://www.nexis.com/search/newssubmitForm.do (Accessed 15th March 2019) 
146 Monroe, A, ‘Spy Fiction in History’, Lecture at National Library of Scotland, 18th April 2017 
147 This refers to novels written by former practitioners either during or at the end of their intelligence 
career. For more information, please see: 
 Wilford, H, ‘Secret America: the CIA and American culture’, p. 275–276  
148 Oldham, J, ‘Spies, Conspiracies and the Secret State in British Television Drama’, Lecture at Edinburgh 
University, 21st April 2017 
 
Page | 41  
 
their novels and adaptations were a key starting point when deciding upon which popular 
culture depictions of British Intelligence to assess. But it was important also to explore 
other popular culture portrayals of the British Intelligence Services, including the more 
recent Bond films, and the BBC drama Spooks. This allowed for three key forms of 
popular culture to be examined – films, books, and TV; thus providing a cohesive 
understanding of the depiction of the British Intelligence Services provided to the public. 
 
To assess the Government responses to the two case studies, evident in ‘Chapter 3 ‘A 
Complementary Relationship’, Hansard, the Parliamentary record of discussions in the 
House of Commons and Lords,149 was used. It proved a useful source to ascertain how 
the British Intelligence Services were portrayed in its verbatim transcripts of the debates. 
However, to ensure triangulation of information, this was combined with elite interview 
data which formed an integral part of the methodology.   
 
Undertaking Interviews  
Throughout the course of the PhD, a total of 23 interviews have been undertaken with 
academics, journalists, museum curators and policy practitioners. Two of these 
interviews were conducted off the record and thus could not be quoted from in the project. 
But, they nevertheless influenced my understanding and thinking on the topic. The 
inclusion of interviews within the project was always something I deemed important to 
ensure first-hand perspectives could be incorporated. With the exception of the former 
practitioners who turn to academia, the intelligence literature omits the perspective of the 
British Intelligence Services. To not include the perspective of those who you are writing 
about, does seem to be something of an omission. Whilst this could be due to the 
difficulties in getting members of the British Intelligence Services to willingly discuss 
these themes, this thesis overcame these problems by approaching those within the wider 
British intelligence realm.  
 
Ideally, I would have liked to interview serving personnel from MI5, MI6 and GCHQ 
who work on public relation matters in order to fully understand what portrayals they 
seek to provide of themselves, as well as how they seek to engage with the public domain. 
                                                          
149 Parliament, Parliamentary Business, Publications and Records – Hansard, Available From: 
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However, as the British Intelligence Services only name the heads of the organisation, 
directly reaching out to them proved difficult as the ‘contact us’ sections related either to 
press queries or providing information on a threat.150 To overcome this, research was 
done on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Home Office websites due 
to their roles in overseeing the British Intelligence Services,151 to discover who worked 
closely with the British Intelligence Services and would thus have an understanding of 
their work. This formed the bulk of the revised interview wish list. Not only are these 
names published, but so was the generic email formula for many civil service 
departments. One clear example of this was emailing the-then British Ambassador to the 
United States Sir Kim Darroch, who was approached due to his previous role as David 
Cameron’s National Security Adviser.152 Due to his experiences in this role, I had hoped 
that Sir Kim could have provided me with insights into the mechanisms of British 
Intelligence and an understanding of the relationship between the Intelligence Services 
and policymakers. Although this attempt to set up an interview with Sir Kim was not 
successful, it did result in an interview with someone equally knowledgeable (Private 
Interview 16),153 who contacted me directly after Sir Kim passed on my email to them. 
While the interview conducted was not with the individual originally intended, the 
ultimate interview subject nevertheless was a senior figure and provided useful insights, 
particularly about engagement with popular culture. A similar process happened several 
times in the course of the fieldwork, but they all resulted in useful interviews, even 
though they were not conducted with the person or postholder that I had originally hoped 
to meet.    
 
Contacting those in a position of seniority was something I did when requesting 
interviews, based on advice from another PhD student. Those in more senior positions 
are not only knowledgeable about the specific topics that I wanted to discuss in 
interviews, but they also know whether this is a discussion they are authorised to have, 
                                                          
150 Secret Intelligence Service, Contact Us, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/contact-us.html 
(Accessed 28th July 2015); 
Security Service, Contact Us, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/contact-us (Accessed 20th 
November 2018) 
151 Security Services Act of 1989, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1989);  
Intelligence Services Act of 1994, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1994) 
152 Gov.uk, Sir Kim Darroch – British Ambassador to the USA, Available From: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/people/kim-darroch (Accessed 19th March 2019) 
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and know who the best person is to talk about these themes if they themselves are not 
available.  Interviews took place with serving civil servants (although one has since 
retired) to provide the British perspective of how they perceive who are the British 
Intelligence Services, and to understand how the British Intelligence Services seek to 
engage with the public, either directly or via the four avenues identified by this thesis.  It 
was surprising just how open the interviewees were about the activities of the British 
Intelligence Services and the candid way they explored the impact of the Snowden 
revelations on the British Intelligence Services, and in particular, GCHQ. This was 
something of an overriding theme, that although none of these interviewees agreed with 
Snowden’s actions, they acknowledged that Snowden had aided public debates about 
what information the Intelligence Services place in the public domain.  
 
Interviews were also conducted in other countries, furthering the triangulation of data. 
These occurred in two different contexts – European Union member states and America. 
This allowed for differing views of the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in 
the public domain, as well as whether the British Intelligence Services are engaging with 
the public domain in the same or different manners when compared to other countries. 
In May 2016, two former intelligence practitioners from European Union (EU) countries 
were interviewed154 and both provided useful understandings of who constitute the 
British Intelligence Services by those who have cooperated with them. Between August 
and September 2016, American fieldwork was undertaken where academics, museum 
curators and practitioners were interviewed due to the importance of UK – American 
cooperation.155  This highlighted to me that there is far more which the British 
Intelligence Services can do to directly engage with the public whilst not causing 
operational difficulties. Examples include having academics in residence, dedicated 
public engagement activities and quite simply, just being more willing to engage with 
the public domain. Thus, the American context should not be seen as unique,156 but 
something which the British Intelligence Services should aspire to. Whilst this would 
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reduce the pervasiveness of secrecy and potentially encourage greater intelligence 
accountability, the British way in Intelligence would continue due to its unique historical 
context which has created a committee style approach and a drive for consensus in the 
setting of intelligence priorities and analysis.157 It is not disputed that secrecy is 
fundamental to the work of British Intelligence, but there is more information which the 
British Intelligence Services could publicise, particularly if the public are to continue to 
be an important form of intelligence accountability.  
 
All interviews adhered to University ethical best practice and thus written permission to 
interview an individual was sought. However, there was one case where this proved 
problematic as although the individuals were happy to be interviewed, they could not 
sign the interview consent form without lawyers from their employer approving it. 
Therefore the interview did not occur as by the time overseas fieldwork finished, they 
still had not received approval to sign the interview release form. This proved frustrating, 
particularly as it was an overseas interview with the National Cryptologic Museum and 
would have been inherently useful about how public engagement can occur. 
 
Consent was requested to record the interview on a Dictaphone; purely for the benefit of 
re-listening to it when writing up the PhD. Interviews had a semi-structured approach 
where I had a list of questions to begin with, but didn’t always strictly follow them based 
on the responses from the interviewee; allowed me to fully listen to the responses as 
opposed to be furiously writing notes and this method was found to be most effective. 
But, there were times when either electrical equipment was not permitted in a building 
or the interviewee preferred the interview to be off the record. However, for those 
interviews which were recorded, it was notable that the interviewee was more 
forthcoming once the recording finished. Despite this information, combined with some 
of the other interviews being off the record, they still provided useful detail which 
influenced my own thinking and analysis on the subject. All interviewee responses are 
stored securely, with Dictaphone recordings and written notes only given generic file 
names. Therefore, if the data was ever lost or stolen, the contents would look rather 
boring to anyone else. But, to identify the interviewees in the thesis, they are all given an 
identification number, in the chronological order in which the interviews are undertaken 
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and, where the name of the interviewee. However, anonymity was a recurring stipulation 
from many in return for the interview. 
Chapter Outline  
Chapter Two ‘A Direct Relationship’ begins by drawing a distinction between Britain’s 
Intelligence Services and Intelligence Community using what Treverton terms the ‘real 
intelligence cycle’.158 This allows for a clear understanding throughout the thesis of who 
constitutes the British Intelligence Services. The chapter then analyses what depictions 
the British Intelligence Services themselves are placing directly in the public domain by 
utilising their websites and speeches made by their respective heads. Unsurprisingly, they 
seek to portray themselves in a positive manner, especially considering that their websites 
are arguably designed as a recruitment tool. Whilst the Big 3 all explore the same themes 
such as their adherence to legal and ethical standards, they discuss these themes in 
varying manners, demonstrating that whilst they are all part of the wider British 
Intelligence Services, they each retain their individual organisational entity.159 However, 
there remain questions about how accessible the information is, with much of the 
information being hidden in plain sight as the individual still has to actively search for it, 
something certainly the case in relation to the speeches. Frustratingly, this is easily 
rectifiable by furthering direct engagement with the public such as aiding museum 
exhibits or simply making the information more user friendly. However, this is unlikely 
to change; as one interviewee succinctly stated, the British Intelligence Services view 
public engagement as a necessary evil.160 Until there is a mentality shift, this will 
continue to be the case.  
 
Chapter Three ‘A Complementary Relationship’ analyses the Government rhetoric about 
the intelligence services during the two case studies. This allows for a comparison of how 
intelligence was depicted to the public over a decade, as well as under Governments of 
different political persuasions. In the Snowden case, there was overwhelmingly a 
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consistency in the portrayals between the Cameron Coalition Government and the British 
Intelligence Services. This centred on how the issues surrounding the legality of their 
actions emanated from the limitations of existing legislation,161 as opposed to the British 
Intelligence Services acting illegally and unethically, demonstrating a cross-Government 
message being provided to the public. Yet there remains the problem as to whether the 
content of Ministerial statements and debates in the House of Commons are effectively 
placed in the public domain. To access such information, the public are either reliant on 
accessing Hansard or on news journalism coverage. Whilst the latter does include live 
coverage of House of Commons and devolved Government debates, only a tiny 
proportion of society (0.6% of the population) accessed BBC Parliament each week 
during the periods covered by these cases.162  
 
Chapter Four ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ examines the portrayal of the British 
Intelligence Services in academia. Historically, there is evidence of this relationship as 
following the First World War, cabinet members debated the creation, content and 
authorship of official histories of the First World War.163 Although this discussion did 
not result in an officially-sanctioned published account of the warm there is a clear 
suggestion from the archival information of the emphasis British Government placed on 
academia as a way of engaging with the public. Similar discussions occurred after the 
Second World War, resulting in the Cabinet Office sponsoring the writing of official 
histories of those organisations involved in the war,164 although these were designed for 
internal consumption to thus provide the Cabinet Office and British Intelligence with a 
greater understanding of wartime intelligence. One such example of was William 
Mackenzie’s history of the Special Operations Executive which did not become publicly 
available until 2000.165 
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164 Mackenzie, W, The Secret History of S.O.E Special Operations Executive 1940-1945, (London, St 
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During the Cold War, academic also provided a way for Britain to further a particular 
rhetoric in order to aid public discourse. Although the British Government had had 
information departments in various guises since 1917,166 in January 1948, the Foreign 
Secretary Ernest Bevin established the Information Research Department (IRD) to 
coordinate a global response to hostile propaganda.167 As well as working overseas,168 
the IRD also sought to influence British public opinion, utilising a wide variety of 
instruments, including: academia; the press; broadcast media (principally the BBC); 
books; visual media including films and posters.169 Similar activities also occurred in the 
American context with the CIA encouraging former practitioners and intellectuals to 
write for peer reviewed academic journals.170 This is not the only way in which the CIA 
utilised academia. Loch Johnson states how professors and campus administrators would 
aid the recruitment of overseas students so the CIA could focus on using these students 
as possible intelligence agents when returning to their native country.171  
                                                          
166 Government Communication Service, Government Communication Service Handbook, (London, 
Cabinet Office, November 2017), p. 8 
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Cooperation between the intelligence services and academia has continued in the post-
Cold War period, and it is this which Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ will explore. 
Beginning by examining how the British Intelligence Services have engaged with 
university-approved courses and centres of excellence, the chapter explores that there is 
clear engagement between the British Intelligence Services and academia. This is 
something which is further prevalent in the analysis of the official histories of MI5, MI6, 
JIC and SOE; which allows comprehension as to how both current and former British 
Intelligence Services have been portrayed by academics. Although a consistent portrayal 
is apparent, it is weaker than was evident in Chapter Three ‘A Complementary 
Relationship’. The wider academic literature explored in this chapter highlights the 
amount of secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence Services. The thesis does not 
dispute that the British Intelligence Services require a degree of secrecy in order to 
function effectively, but it is the pervasiveness of secrecy, as discussed in the British way 
in Intelligence which becomes problematic. Perhaps if a policy of greater openness was 
pursued by the British Intelligence Services, this would ally public concern of 
information being shrouded in secrecy as it would be clear that only that information 
which needed to be protected, would not be in the public domain. Thus, if the British 
Intelligence Services undertook more forward-facing public engagement either by 
themselves or in conjunction with one of the avenues, when information is prevented 
from disclosure, know that this is for a very salient theme. 
 
Due to the role of news journalism in informing and educating the public on intelligence 
matters,172 Chapter Five ‘A Complicated Relationship’ explores the depictions of the 
British Intelligence Services in news journalism, something which there is historical 
evidence of. The IRD used freelance journalists, or what Jenks refers to as ‘pliable’ 
journalists’173 was a policy adopted by that organisation from the outset, and is a theme 
that the academic literature extensively explores. It was seemingly so successful that:  
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When it closed in 1977, the IRD had a list of more than 
100 journalists on nearly every national newspaper who, 
wittingly or unwittingly, would use its material.174 
 
This demonstrates how extensively news journalism was used by the IRD, something 
Chapman Pincher also highlights.175 Jenks and Andrew Defty both explore this, focusing 
on the cases of Hugh Chevins, Elizabeth Monroe, Malcolm Muggeridge and Edward 
Crankshaw. They all worked for the IRD and utilised their material in articles published 
at home and abroad.176 Pincher also explores this practice in his autobiography, 
recounting the way that MI5 would routinely approach certain journalists at all the major 
newspapers, and that he himself, was asked to publish particular stories.177 Such 
cooperation also occurred in the American context, where the CIA have continually 
engaged with news journalism since their establishment. As was the case with British 
Intelligence, the CIA had hundreds of journalists acting as paid or unpaid assets, some of 
whom were deemed favourite journalists, as well as providing journalists with briefings 
at their Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.178 This is a theme which the first section of 
Chapter Five ‘A Complicated Relationship’ examines, using Steve Hewitt and Scott 
Lucas’s typology of whether there is an adversarial, dependent, manipulative, laudatory 
or supportive relationship between British Intelligence and news journalism.179 
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In particular, the BBC has a long association of cooperating with the Government, as 
they were one of the main channels used for disseminating IRD propaganda.180 This 
allowed for the monitoring of foreign broadcasts and perhaps more interestingly, for BBC 
broadcasts to be used for intelligence purposes.181 Wilford’s analysis explains why this 
was the case: a combination of wartime cooperation between the BBC and Government 
departments; and the obscure wording of the Government’s white paper in 1946 about 
the importance of the BBC cooperating with Government departments to plan 
programmes in the national interest.182 However, such cooperation was problematic for 
the Home Services as the BBC was meant to have editorial independence.183 
Undoubtedly, the extensive historical cooperation set a precedent of engagement between 
British Intelligence and news journalism, thus placing the latter in a unique and privileged 
position of providing the public with a depiction of the British Intelligence Services. 
 
Centred on the two case studies, the chapter explores what portrayals the BBC, The 
Guardian and The Telegraph provided of British Intelligence. Irrespective of the media 
organisation, there was an overarching positive portrayal of the British Intelligence 
Services. By continually highlighting the politicisation of intelligence in the dodgy 
dossier in the Iraq War context, the British Intelligence Services were depicted as being 
capable and effective by contrast with policymakers, who were blamed for distorting and 
misusing the intelligence they were provided with. To some extent, this was a theme also 
evident in the Snowden case where although questions were raised about the ethical 
nature of GCHQ’s actions, these were in the wider context of the significant limitations 
of legislation governing those actions.  
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This resulted in a significant consistent portrayal to the themes evident in Chapter Three 
‘A Complementary Relationship’ suggesting that there is a consistent portrayal of the 
British Intelligence Services. But, news journalism also provides a negative portrayal of 
British Intelligence illustrated in relation to the illegality and unethical nature of their 
actions in relation to the Snowden revelations. This intimates how there are often 
differing depictions provided by the British Intelligence Services themselves and by one 
of the avenues.  
 
The final chapter ‘A Fractious Relationship’ scrutinises the depictions of the British 
Intelligence Services provided by popular culture.  This is a key avenue to explore as:  
 
Organisations and individuals, from the CIA to the FBI, 
from V I Lenin to Joseph Goebbels, have all expressed the 
view that cinema is the most important medium for 
transmitting political ideas.184 
 
This was certainly evident at the beginning of the 20th Century when during a time of 
considerable fear and uncertainty about British power and security, spy fiction rose in 
popularity.185 The chapter begins by furthering this historical overview of the way that 
popular culture has provided depictions of the British Intelligence Services dating back 
to the early 1900s. It then explores key themes highlighted in contemporary popular 
culture which include: surveillance; communications and code; science and technology; 
secret diplomacy; deception and secrecy; acting legally and ethically; threats and society; 
and finally the role of gender. These are central to the popular culture depictions and can 
provide a credible view of British Intelligence. At times, this leads to a consistent 
portrayal. However, it also explored themes not otherwise in the public domain such as 
the role of secret diplomacy. This demonstrates how each of the avenues identified in 
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this thesis can in fact aid the overall portrayal of the British Intelligence Services by 
highlighting themes not otherwise in the public domain. Indeed, popular culture can also 
influence the British Intelligence Services; it was Le Queux’s spy novels which had a 
direct impact on the creation of MI5 and MI6. Therefore, there can be a real-world impact 
to the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services placed in the public domain.  
 
Conclusion 
All four avenues identified in this thesis – the British Government, academia, news 
journalism and popular culture – all provide positive portrayals of the British Intelligence 
Services. Although there are differences in the details and types of the depictions they 
provide to the public, their overarching portrayals are remarkably consistent with each 
other, especially in the way that they present the British Intelligence Services as always 
striving to act legally and ethically. Any lapses in achieving the high standards that the 
intelligence services aspire to are almost always depicted as the results of limitations of 
legislation and therefore the fault of elected politicians.  Equally, whilst information is in 
the public domain, it is not easily accessible, and the onus remains on the individual 
citizen to actively know where to find, and then access the information, something 
particularly prevalent in relation to the Intelligence Services’ websites. This results in 
this information being hidden in plain sight as opposed to being more easily accessible 
as the four avenues identified in this thesis tend to be. In turn, this places them in a more 
influential position of providing a depiction of the British Intelligence Services to the 
public. Thus, public accountability and the democratic legitimacy of the British 
Intelligence Services is based on the depictions ostensibly provided by the avenues.  
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Chapter 2: A Direct Relationship: The British Intelligence 
Services in the Public Sphere 
 
Introduction 
The British Intelligence Services seek to directly engage with the public domain 
themselves, something one interviewee stated was required as: 
 
You need a licence to operate in order to operate.1 
 
Therefore, the section first assesses which organisations constitute the British 
Intelligence Services. Without a clear understanding of who they are, it is impossible to 
ascertain what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are evident in the public 
domain. Although the term British Intelligence Services is within the common 
vernacular,2 there is no consensus of which organisations it refers to. By utilising the 
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intelligence cycle, the chapter draws a distinction between the Intelligence Services and 
Intelligence Community. It argues that the ‘Big 3’ of the British Intelligence Services 
are; the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and the 
Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ). By assessing historical and 
organisational links, the chapter argues that Defence Intelligence (DI) are also part of the 
British Intelligence Services, all of whom seek to ensure Britain’s continued safety and 
security. 
 
The chapter will then focus upon what portrayals the Big 3 provide to the public. To do 
this, it is their websites, which are the primary public face which communicates 
information to the public,3 which are analysed. However, DI are excluded from this 
analysis as they do not have their own website to directly engage with the public. Rather, 
information is available via Government websites,4 perhaps due to the fact that unlike 
their counterparts, their actions remain based on the Royal Prerogative as opposed to 
being legislated for.5 Whilst some of the websites include videos as well, the majority of 
information is available through written content. Although the British Intelligence 
Services are placing information in the public domain, the onus remains on the individual 
to access this or watch the videos. Therefore it is the written information which they are 
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more likely to consume, hence the emphasis on it within this chapter. This will be 
combined with the examination of information from public speeches made by the heads 
of these organisations, the reasoning for which was explored in the introduction’s 
methodology section. Although the websites may first and foremost function as a 
recruitment tool, they provide a key form of direct public engagement from Britain’s 
Intelligence Services. 
 
In 2003, Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller, MI5’s Director General (DG) explained 
why she perceived such speeches to be required, arguing that with high public interest in 
their work, it is important that they should speak on the record.6 But despite this, public 
speeches remain a rarity, particularly from the heads of GCHQ and MI6. This 
demonstrates a salient theme the section will highlight, how the ‘Big 3’ all explore the 
same themes, such as: structural and organisational difficulties; acting legally and 
ethically; capability, effectiveness and cooperation; workforce and diversity; and the 
importance of secrecy, but they all place a different emphasis upon these themes. This 
allows for the analysis to compare and contrast what themes the individual services are 
emphasising on their websites. Overall, a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence 
Services individually and collectively, is prevalent throughout their websites and a theme 
to which the speeches allude.    
The Intelligence Cycle 
The academic literature identifies an intelligence cycle which, originally a British 
concept, was first utilised in the 1940s and 1950s, following the use of an intelligence 
chain to explain the concept.7 It has continued to be a useful mechanism for analysing 
how intelligence works, by linking the five key stages of: planning and direction, 
collection, processing, all source analysis and production, and finally dissemination.8 
Although this cycle is predominantly used to analyse how intelligence failures occur, it 
                                                          
6 Security Service, News and Speeches – Global Terrorism: Are We Meeting The Challenge?: Baroness 
Eliza Manningham-Buller, 16th October 2003, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/global-
terrorism-are-we-meeting-the-challenge (Accessed 13th December 2018) 
7 Omand, Sir, D, ‘The Cycle of Intelligence’, in Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by 
Robert Dover, Michael Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2014), p. 63 
8 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, Second Edition, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
2012), p. 4, 11; 
Goodman, M, ‘The British way in Intelligence’, in The British Way in Cold Warfare – Intelligence, 
Diplomacy and the Bomb, edited by Matthew Grant, Continuum, London, 2009), p. 128–129 
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has a much wider applicability. Peter Gill states how it can be used for heuristic value in 
explaining how the five stages interlink with one another, as opposed to a model of what 
happens in the intelligence realm due to its applicability for differing levels of 
intelligence; national, individual, organisational or transnational.9 But perhaps more 
crucially for this thesis, the intelligence cycle  also helps us to understand exactly which 
actors should be included in a definition of the British Intelligence Services.  
 
Due to the prominence of the intelligence cycle, first as a means to comprehend 
intelligence and later as an information tool;10 numerous diagrams explaining it in a 
plethora of ways are available. However, in recent years, their use has been questioned, 
and Sir David Omand has argued that it simply portrays intelligence in a sequential 
manner and that its applicability has dissipated following the end of the Cold War.11 
Whilst this suggests that intelligence after the Cold War changed, which perhaps 
instigated the Intelligence Services portraying images of themselves to the public,12 it 
                                                          
9 An example of this highlighted by Gill is how intelligence has been used in sport. In 2003, the England 
Rugby Union team swept their dressing room for bugs ahead of the World Cup Final against Australia. 
This was following an incident in 2001 where surveillance equipment allowed the Australian Rugby Union 
team to crack the codes used at the scrum and lineout by the British and Irish Lions, thus giving the 
Australians dominance at the set piece plays. Another example of intelligence gathering in sport was also 
evident in rugby union when two men (who when questioned claimed to be Reuters journalists) were found 
covertly filming the New Zealand (All Black) rugby team during a training session in West London in 
2005 before playing England at Twickenham. For more information, please see: 
Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, Second Edition, p. 10, 12; 
Gill, P, ‘Theories of Intelligence’, in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, edited by 
Loch. K. Johnson, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 48; 
Gill, P, Policing Politics – Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State, (London, Frank Cass 
Publishing, 1994); 
The Guardian, England hunt rugby spies, Robert Kitson and Paul Kelso, 18th November 2003, Available 
From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/nov/18/uk.rugbyworldcup2003 (Accessed 3rd October 
2019); 
The Guardian, All Blacks discover spies in the bushes, Robert Kitson, 16th November 2005, Available 
From: https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2005/nov/16/rugbyunion.gdnsport33 (Accessed 3rd October 
2019) 
10 Omand, Sir, D, ‘The Cycle of Intelligence’, p. 59 
11 Omand, Sir, D, ‘The Cycle of Intelligence’, p. 64 
12 This occurs as following the end of the Cold War, the Intelligence Services were having to justify their 
existence and budgets to the public and demonstrate why they were required. Therefore, it would have 
been in their interest to be providing such information to the public domain. For more information, please 
see: 
Dearlove, Sir, R, ‘National Security and Public Anxiety: Our Changing Perceptions’, in The Oxford 
Handbook of National Security Intelligence, edited by Loch. K. Johnson, (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2010), p. 34; 
Phythian, M, ‘Cultures of National Intelligence’, in Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited 
by Robert Dover, Michael Goodman and Claudia Hillebrand, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2014), p. 39; 
Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, the Authorised History of MI5, (London, Penguin Books, 2009), p. 777–
781  
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negates Gill’s assertion of how applicable the intelligence cycle is to all levels of 
intelligence. One diagram of the intelligence cycle is provided by Operational Security 
and demonstrates both the cyclical nature and how the different stages interlink. This 
diagram reproduced below (figure 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Figure 5) 13 
 
Geoffrey Treverton has argued that a different intelligence cycle should be utilised to 
fully understand intelligence due to the enhanced role of technology in modern life. 
Although it still has 5 integral stages, what Treverton has termed the Real Intelligence 
Cycle (figure 5) places a greater emphasis upon the relationship between collection, 
analysis and policymakers. He argues that such a model is required in the information 
age; as although more ‘raw’ intelligence is available via the internet, policymakers 
become increasingly reliant upon the analysis and processing stages to both comprehend 
the nature of the raw intelligence, and to place it into a wider context,14 something also 
intimated by Pillar.15 
 
                                                          
13 Operations Security, Intelligence Threat Handbook, Intelligence Collection Activities and Disciplines, 
Available From: http://fas.org/irp/nsa/ioss/threat96/part02.htm (Accessed 26th November 2015) 
14 Treverton, G, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information, (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, New York 2001), p. 103  
15 Pillar, P, ‘Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, 85/2 (2006) p. 17 
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(Figure 6)16 
 
The internal arrows demonstrate how technological changes have altered the cyclical 
nature of intelligence. Although Omand agrees with this theme, his discussion furthers 
the impact of technological advancements, stating how the 24 hour news cycle can 
provide mistaken impressions to the public on the excessive use of violence in police 
raids.17 By these being televised, there is often increased pressure exerted upon policy-
makers to provide instant responses and up-to-date analysis to evolving stories.18 In an 
intelligence context, this places analysts under increasing pressure to provide policy-
makers with the information required to address such stories, but this can be 
problematical as the raw intelligence may not have been collated or processed. Thus, 
Treverton’s arrow from raw intelligence to policy-makers is accurate and demonstrates 
how the cyclical nature is not always followed. It also determines how intelligence 
collection and analysis are a separate part of the intelligence process.  
 
                                                          
16 Treverton, G, Reshaping National Intelligence. 106 
17 Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ 
in Spinning Intelligence, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, (London, C Hurst & Co. Ltd, 
2009), p. 53–54  
18 Dover, R, and Goodman, M, ‘Introduction: Intelligence and the Information Age’, in Spinning 
Intelligence, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, (London, C Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2009), p. 9 
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This occurs as the Intelligence Services undertake analysis to convert complex technical 
information into descriptions of real-world events,19 which can then be understood by 
policymakers.  Therefore, it is clear to see a distinction here in how the Intelligence 
Services are responsible for collection and analysis of intelligence, with an intelligence 
community disseminating the analysis to policymakers. Gill and Phythian explore the 
role of the Intelligence Services and Intelligence Community, stating that the intelligence 
communities have suffered the most from the events of 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq in 
2003.20 Using this analysis and applying it to the British case, it is possible to see the 
Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) as part of the intelligence community due to their role 
in disseminating intelligence,21  something which was particularly prevalent in the lead 
up to the Iraq War.22 This suggests that Britain has a separate intelligence community 
which has the JIC at its core who formally connect the Intelligence Services with 
Government,23 a key step in the intelligence cycle.  
 
An Intelligence Community which is capable of cross-Government analysis and 
dissemination overcomes vertical and horizontal barriers which exist for the Intelligence 
Services24 in seeking to share information. This would provide policymakers with timely 
all-source analysis on a particular issue. The Intelligence Community is central to this 
process as they are providing the intelligence assessments to the British Government, as 
opposed to undertaking intelligence collection.25 Using the intelligence cycle, this section 
has differentiated between Britain’s Intelligence Services and Intelligence Community 
                                                          
19 Omand, Sir, D, ‘The Cycle of Intelligence’, p. 60 
20 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 108 
21 This is a theme which the Gov.uk website examines in relation to the JIC, arguing that they have a central 
role in assessing intelligence before disseminating this to policymakers. For examples of this, please see: 
Gov.uk, Joint Intelligence Committee, Available From: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-security/groups/joint-intelligence-committee 
(Accessed 21st October 2015); 
Aldrich, R, Cormac, R, and Goodman, M, Spying on the World – The Declassified Documents of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee 1936 – 2013 (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2014), p. 6;  
Gill, P, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq,’ in Who’s Watching the 
Spies?, edited by Hans Born, Loch K Johnson and Ian Leigh, (Dulles, Potomac Books, 2005), p. 16 
22 Hansard, House of Commons, 24th September 2002, Volume 390, Column 3; 
Pillar, P, ‘The Perils of Politicisation’, in in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, edited 
by Loch. K. Johnson, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 474 
23 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 83 
24 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 108, 111 
25 Gov.uk, Joint Intelligence Committee, Available From: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-security/groups/joint-intelligence-committee 
(Accessed 21st October 2015); 
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which is key to understanding what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are in 
the public domain. The subsequent section will then address which organisations 
constitute the British Intelligence Services.  
 
Writing in the aftermath of the Iraq War, the former US intelligence analyst Paul Pillar 
explores the relationship between intelligence gathering and policymakers. He highlights 
how policymakers influence which topics intelligence agencies address, but not the 
conclusions that they reach, with the intelligence community (who have a greater 
analytical role as opposed to intelligence collection), avoiding policy judgements.26 
Although specific to the US context, this provides a cohesive understanding of how the 
intelligence services, intelligence community and policymakers should work with one 
another in the context of seeking to prevent an intelligence failure. Mark Lowenthal 
draws a similar distinction, stating that:  
 
Intelligence exists to support policy, not to make policy. 
In democracies, policy decisions are the sphere of the 
elected officials and their duly appointed subordinates.27 
 
Both Pillar and Lowenthal draw a clear distinction between the work of the Intelligence 
Services and policymakers, a theme the intelligence cycle further exhibits. This 
demonstrates how useful it can be in seeking to ascertain who constitutes Britain’s 
Intelligence Services.  
 
Which organisations are the British Intelligence Services?  
As Gill’s analysis demonstrated, intelligence can occur at the transnational, 
organisational, individual or national level.28 But for the purposes of the thesis, it is the 
national level of intelligence in Britain which is focused upon in seeking to ascertain 
what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are provided to the public by the 
different avenues. As identified in the intelligence cycle, it is those organisations that 
                                                          
26 Pillar, P, ‘Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq’, p. 16–17;  
Pillar, P, ‘The Perils of Politicisation’, p. 472–474 
27 Lowenthal, M, ‘My take on teaching intelligence why, what and how’, Intelligence and National 
Security, 32/7 (2017) p. 987 
28 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 12 
Gill, P, ‘Theories of Intelligence’, p. 48 
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collect and undertake some analysis of intelligence before disseminating it to the 
intelligence community, which will be included within the understandings of who 
constitutes the British Intelligence Services.  
 
In Britain, MI5, MI6 and GCHQ constitute Britain’s Intelligence Services and, in this 
thesis, are referred to as the ‘Big 3’. This is due to the fact that they all have a role in 
obtaining and monitoring intelligence, a theme which their websites and key pieces of 
legislation all determine.29 Indeed, their importance in gathering intelligence is not to be 
underestimated. In legislation which affects the ‘Big 3’ such as the Freedom of 
Information Act of 2000 (FoIA), the Justice and Security Act of 2013 (JSA) and the 
Single Intelligence Account, they are exempt from disclosing information on the grounds 
of national security.30 Yet despite this, there is no clear definition of national security in 
either UK or European law, something which provides the Government with the 
flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances.31 But without such a definition, Peter Gill 
and Mark Phythian argue that the phrase is a trump card to prevent other investigations 
and highlight a specific example. They state that: 
   
Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Attorney General, 
Lord Goldsmith, forced the Serious Fraud Office to stop 
their investigation of allegations of bribery and 
corruption between BAE systems and Saudi Arabia over 
deals involving the selling of fighter aircraft. Court action 
                                                          
29 Security Service, How We Work – Gathering Intelligence, Available From: 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/gathering-intelligence (Accessed 19th November 2019); 
Secret Intelligence Service, Home, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/index.html (Accessed 23th 
November 2015); 
Government Communication Headquarters, Mission – Overview, Available From: 
https://www.gchq.gov.uk/section/mission/overview (Accessed 19th November 2019); 
Intelligence Services Act of 1994, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1994), p. 1–2;  
Security Services Act of 1989, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1989), p. 1–2; 
Investigatory Powers Act, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2016), p./ 205, 217, 249, 279 
30 Freedom of Information Act, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2000), p. 14; 
Justice and Security Act, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 2013), p. 6–17;  
Gov.uk, Corporate Report – Security and Intelligence agencies financial statement 2018-2019 Documents, 
web version, Available From: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-and-intelligence-
agencies-financial-statement-2018-to-2019 (Accessed 19th November 2019) 
31 Security Service, What Is National Security, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-
us/what-we-do/protecting-national-security.html (Accessed 16th October 2015); 
Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 82 
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challenging the legality of Blair’s intervention has made 
it clear that he felt the UK government had no choice 
given that the Saudis had threated to halt intelligence 
collaboration regarding terrorism.32 
 
This demonstrates how the phrase ‘national security’ can be utilised for a plethora of 
purposes. In the British context, if the ‘Big 3’ act to ensure national security, such a 
definition should be evident and stipulate what actions they are eligible to undertake. In 
the interviews with British civil servants, this was a theme discussed with one interviewee 
talking candidly about this point. They stated that whilst they agreed from an academic 
stance of the importance of defining the term, from a practitioner perspective, it was clear 
what it referred to, although this wasn’t fully elaborated upon.33 Another, who was 
spoken to informally one evening, intimated that the lack of a definition was by design 
as it provides flexibility to move into new areas which is the reasoning for a lack of a 
concise definition. The former Chief (C) of MI6 intimates that this is the case, 34 
something with which intelligence academics Ian Leigh and Gill and Phythian agree. 35 
 
However, the lack of a definition of national security can result in it being used as a 
means of preventing information being published.36 This has been a criticism made 
against the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that they often claim something 
is a matter of national security, merely because they do not want embarrassing 
information published.37 Whilst there is undoubtedly information which could be 
damaging to national security were in published using it in order to prevent any 
disclosures is damaging to both public accountability and the Intelligence Service’s 
                                                          
32 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 194;  
This case was also discussed briefly in:  
Leigh, I, ‘National Courts and International Intelligence Cooperation’, in International Intelligence 
Cooperation and Accountability, edited by Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills, (Abingdon, Routledge, 
2011), p. 244 
33 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017 
34 Dearlove, Sir, R, ‘National Security and Public Anxiety: Our Changing Perceptions’, p. 39 
35 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 95 
36 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, p. 194 
37 Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, (New York, 
Skyhorse Publishing, 2016), p. 10, 12 
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democratic legitimacy. This is a clear problem emanating from the lack of a clear 
definition as to what constitutes national security.  
 
The research sought to provide the perspective of those working with, and in, British 
Intelligence to ensure that their views are included within the academic debate. One 
question which was asked to all British and overseas Government interviewees was ‘Who 
do you believe to constitute the British Intelligence Services’? The interview subjects all 
identified MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. One interviewee expanded this group to include 
components of the armed forces and the police in their understanding of the British 
Intelligence Services.38 Therefore, it seems apt to include these three Intelligence 
Services within the understanding of British Intelligence who can be viewed as the Big 
3 within the intelligence realm.  
 
In an academic context, Ian Leigh assumes a legal approach to assessing who constitutes 
the British Intelligence Services. He argues that the British Intelligence Services are those 
who have been legislated for, namely: MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. This is contrasted to 
Britain’s to other parts of the intelligence machinery such as Defence Intelligence (DI), 
the JIC and Intelligence Assessments Staff which remain based on a royal prerogative, 
something which further demonstrates the uniqueness of the British case.39 By 
contrasting this to Patrick Emek’s British Intelligence Services – A Short Review from 
1984, it is possible to ascertain that whilst the ‘Big 3’ have always been deemed part of 
the British Intelligence Services, there is disagreement as to who else is included. Emek 
argues that the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) who undertake 
such covert activities.40 The inclusion of covert action military entities is interesting and 
demonstrates the problems Len Scott and Peter Jackson discuss that emerge from the 
                                                          
38 Private Interview 5: 21st January 2016; 
Private Interview4: 21st January 2016; 
Private Interview 10: 1st June 2016; 
Private Interview 11: 1st June 2016; 
Private Interview 12: 1st June 2016; 
Private Interview 13: 2nd June 2016; 
39 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 79 
40 Emek, P, British Intelligence Services – A Short Review, (London, Mandala 2 Projects, 1984), p. 3; 
Royal Navy, Special Boat Service, Available From: http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/the-
fighting-arms/royal-marines/special-boat-service/special-boat-service (Accessed 3rd November 2015) 
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difficultly in attempting to define intelligence and where covert action is situated within 
this.41 
 
For the JIC, their functions are explored in the academic literature, with Phillip Davies 
highlighting how it provided executive level direction for the Intelligence Services as 
well as steering interagency coordination.42 Through Davies’ analysis, it is therefore 
possible to see how the JIC is an integral part of Britain’s analytical Intelligence 
Community.  
 
In a post 9/11 world, intelligence collection has increasingly occurred via private 
companies. Following President George. W. Bush’s decision to invade Iraq,43 there was 
an exponential rise in the number of private military and intelligence contractors who 
undertook mundane roles on behalf of the military.44 Blackwater, who received notoriety 
for their heavy-handed actions45 during the Iraq War, were just one company who 
received large contracts from the US State Department.46 Although the Iraq war media 
rhetoric centred upon the American use of such companies, Britain also utilised their 
services.47 Hakluyt is one such example who received notoriety following the death of 
an operative in China in what has been described as dubious circumstances.48 Ostensibly 
                                                          
41 Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, in Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First 
Century – Journeys in Shadows, edited by L.V. Scott and Peter Jackson, (London, Routledge, 2004), p. 3 
42 Davies, P, ‘Britain’s Machinery of Intelligence Accountability: Realistic oversight in the absence of 
moral panic’, in Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services, edited by Daniel Baldino, (Sydney, The 
Federation Press, 2010), p. 142; 
Gov.uk, Joint Intelligence Committee, Available From: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/national-security/groups/joint-intelligence-committee 
(Accessed 21st October 2015) 
43 BBC News, War draws condemnation, Available From: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2867027.stm (Accessed 8th October 2015) 
44 The Guardian, A very private war, Available From: 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/aug/01/military.usa (Accessed 6th October 2015) 
45 The Guardian, Former Blackwater guards sentenced for massacre of unarmed Iraqi civilians, Available 
From: http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/apr/13/former-blackwater-guards-sentencing-baghdad-
massacre (Accessed 6th October 2015);  
Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks’, Review of 
International Studies, 35/4 (2009), p. 938 
46 The Spy Who Billed Me (Website) Not Blackwater, but Xe, as in Xena Warrior Princess, Available 
From: http://www.thespywhobilledme.com/the_spy_who_billed_me/private_military_corporations/ 
(Accessed 6th October 2015) 
47 Gill, P, ‘Theories of Intelligence’, p. 48, 51, 53  
48 Evening Standard, MI6, a death in China and the very secretive Mayfair company full of spooks, 
Available From: http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/mi6-a-death-in-china-and-the-very-secretive-
mayfair-company-full-of-spooks-7603151.html (Accessed 8th October 2015) 
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recruiting former practitioners from the British Intelligence Services,49 Hakluyt, which 
was created in 2011 by former MI6 operative, Christopher James, expanded in 2015 to 
include a cyber division continues to work closely with MI6.50 Considering that the thesis 
is exploring national intelligence gathering organisations, private military and 
intelligence companies are omitted from understandings of who the British Intelligence 
Services are within this thesis. 
 
Combining legislation and academia, this section has demonstrated how the ‘Big 3’ have 
always been part of the British Intelligence Services, with the JIC at the heart of the 
Intelligence Community. Although private military and intelligence organisations have 
been excluded from understandings of who constitutes the British Intelligence Services, 
it is important to explore whether there are any other organisations within Britain’s 
complex intelligence machinery who are part of the Intelligence Services. 
 
The Big 3, but who else? 
The Big 3 are key members of Britain’s Intelligence Services and all seek to ensure 
Britain’s safety and security against complex and globalised threats by the continued 
collection and analysis of intelligence.51 However, they are not the only organisations 
with such aims and objectives, as DI and the Metropolitan Police also strive to ensure 
                                                          
49 Sir Ian Lobban is an example of a former practitioner who then worked for Hakluyt after his retirement 
from GCHQ. For more information, please see:  
Companies House, Welcome to the Companies House Service – Hakluyt, Available From: 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/search/companies?q=hakluyt (Accessed 8th October 2015); 
Hakluyt, Cyber, Available From: https://www.hakluytcyber.com/ (Accessed 18th March 2019); 
Hakluyt, International Advisory Board, Available From: https://www.hakluytandco.com/advisory_board 
(Accessed 18th March 2019) 
50 Gibb, J, Who’s Watching You?, (London, Collins and Brown, 2005), p. 115 
51 Security Service, The Threats, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/what-we-
do/the-threats.html (Accessed 8th October 2015); 
Sir Richard Dearlove, the former C of MI6 explores how due to the globalised nature of the world, nothing 
nowadays can maintain a regional issue, using the examples of how the reverberations of the Russian 
military action in Georgia or the Israeli intervention in Gaza resonate ‘loudly and rapidly’ through the 
wider international security system.  
For more information, please see: 
Dearlove, Sir, R, ‘National Security and Public Anxiety: Our Changing Perceptions’, p. 35–36; 
The Guardian, C for Chief as career spy takes over at top of MI6, Richard Norton-Taylor, 26th February 
1999, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/feb/26/richardnortontaylor (Accessed 3rd 
October 2019); 
University of London, Board of Trustees – Sir Richard Dearlove KCMG OBE, Available From: 
https://london.ac.uk/about-us/how-university-run/central-university-governance/board-trustees/sir-
richard-dearlove-kcmg (Accessed 3rd October 2019) 
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Britain’s safety and security,52 something particularly evident following the Paris attacks 
in November 2015.53 This leads to questions as to whether either organisation also 
constitutes a member of the British Intelligence Services. 
 
Historical organisational links 
The existence of MI5 and MI6 dates back to the instigation of the Secret Service Bureau, 
an inherently secretive organisation established by a sub-committee of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence.54 With the War Office and the Admiralty dominating the Committee, 
they exerted their beliefs, values and objectives onto both the Committee and 
organisations it established.55 As a result, MI5 and MI6 had militaristic characteristics 
which would enhance cooperation between the newly created intelligence organisations 
and the military. MI6 was particularly impacted by the close military relationship as they 
cooperated closely against the threat of German imperialism.56  
 
MI5 is perhaps best explained as an amalgamation of the Secret Service Bureau and 
MO3, a counter-espionage organisation created by the War Office in 1903 and which 
Andrew describes as the direct predecessor of MI5.57 The influence of the military is also 
apparent in the appointment of Major-General Sir Vernon Kell, a former British Army 
officer as the first Director General (DG).58 As the military was the only pre-existing 
                                                          
52  Gov.uk, Defence Intelligence, Available From: https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/defence-
intelligence (Accessed 8th October 2015); 
Gov.uk, Special Branch – Have you got what it takes, Available From: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/117491/ct-special-
branch.pdf (Accessed 8th October 2015) 
53 Sir Bernard Hogan Howe, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner announced an increased number of 
armed response vehicles on the streets of London by a third, perhaps to allay fears of what would happen 
if a similar attack was seen in the UK. For more information see:  
BBC News, Islamic State is plotting deadly cyber-attacks – George Osborne, Available From: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34839800 (Accessed 18th November 2015) 
54 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, the Authorised History of MI5, p. 20 
55 MacKintosh, J, P, ‘The Role of the Committee of Imperial Defence before 1914’, The English Historical 
Review, 77, (1962), p. 490 
56 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909 – 1949, (London, Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2010), p. 7 
Secret Intelligence Service, News: 03 December 2018 – MI6 ‘C’ Delivers Rare Public Speech at St 
Andrews University, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/news/alex-younger-st-andrews-speech.html 
(Accessed 10th December 2018); 
Goodman, M, ‘The British way in Intelligence’, p. 130 
57 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, p. 5 
58 Security Service, Who We Are, Former Director Generals – Major-General Sir Vernon Kell, Available 
From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/who-we-are/staff-and-management/major-general-sir-
vernon-kell.html (Accessed 9th December 2014) 
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organisation with intelligence capabilities, modelling MI5 and MI6 upon them was 
logical and aided a close working relationship.  
 
The importance of code breaking has been recognised throughout history and in the early 
1800s, Britain had a dedicated team of cryptoanalysts. However, they were disbanded 
following the illegal interception of personal correspondence.59 This highlights how 
scandal and intrigue has always been synonymous with intelligence organisations. It also 
exhibits the historical importance of cryptography, further evident as on the eve of the 
First World War, both the army and navy re-instated their cryptanalysts, MI1b and Room 
40 respectively.60 
 
Following their numerous successes during the First World War, the importance of 
cryptanalysts was corroborated. This created the forebearer to GCHQ, the Government 
Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) in 1919 under the Admiralty’s influence,61 and it 
was governed by the same customer liaison architecture as MI6.62 This relationship 
continued during World War Two when GC&CS, stationed at Bletchley Park, were 
responsible for decryption of German military ciphers.63 This highlights the close 
relationship between the military and GCHQ, something which remains as Leigh 
highlights how GCHQ continue to provide technical advice and information technology 
security to both wider Government, but also to the armed forces.64  
 
Throughout their history, there has been a clear military influence upon the Big 3, 
furthered through their continued cooperation as the Intelligence Services served 
alongside the military in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.65 Therefore, there may be 
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merit in including facets of the military which engage with the ‘Big 3’ in the 
understanding of the British Intelligence Services. As the interviews intimated, this is 
most likely to be DI.66 An integral part of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), DI provides 
them with intelligence products and assessments67 determining that like the Big 3 it has 
responsibility for the collection and some analysis of intelligence. The intelligence cycle 
would therefore suggest that DI is another part of the British Intelligence Services.  
 
Following the end of the Second World War, Britain sought to ensure their intelligence 
capabilities remained, albeit in a more cost-effective and centralised manner which 
created the Joint Intelligence Bureau.68 They had responsibility for a myriad of 
intelligence activities, including topographic, economic, industrial and scientific 
intelligence.69 These would not only have aided the military at a time of rising tensions 
with the Soviet Union, but also wider Government and in particular the Big 3 who were 
also seeking to counter the Soviet threat.70 Therefore, the forerunner to DI would have 
had close cooperation with the Big 3 due to the nature of the work undertaken, and this 
is something that undoubtedly continues.  
 
The work of DI is predominantly military in nature, with offices at specific military bases, 
and the current chief is a serving 3-star military officer.71 This suggests that military 
intelligence is DI’s first priority. However, with economic and industrial intelligence also 
under their prerogative, cooperation with wider Government and the ‘Big 3’ is vital for 
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DI.72 By exploring historical organisational links of the Big 3, it is possible to determine 
that DI is another member of the British Intelligence Services. 
 
Similarities in working environment 
Similarities between the Big 3, the Police and the military are further evident in relation 
to their institutional culture. In the military context, Alastair Finlan states that:  
 
once through the barriers with the outside world, one 
enters a different community, a place where smartly 
attired, well-groomed people of both sexes wearing a 
common-uniform move around with a purpose.73  
 
The London headquarters of both MI5 and MI6 are also surrounded by high levels of 
security, with the MI6 headquarters surrounded by high gates, with guards stationed at 
them. Although, unlike armed forces personnel, the staff of MI5 and MI6 do not wear 
uniforms, the latter are nevertheless clearly part of a professional community set apart 
from other civil servants. This is perhaps furthered by the amount of secrecy which 
governs their work, something the former DG Dame Stella Rimington has referred to. 
She stated that during her time in MI5, she was part of a separate and distinctive 
community, characterised in part by the prohibition on discussing work matters with 
outsiders. In practice this meant that MI5 staff socialised almost exclusively with one 
another, narrowing their social circle considerably,74  particularly evident in how the Big 
3 all have clubs and societies for staff and their families to use. 75  Phillip Knightley 
agrees, asserting that those working within the intelligence services tend to socialise 
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predominantly with one another, as they are able to relax in each other’ company, as 
opposed to being wary of anyone deemed an outsider.76  
 
No matter what professional field is being analysed, a degree of self-segregation is likely 
to be evident due to shared similarities between co-workers.77 This links back to 
Rimington’s discussion about the difficulties in attempting to socialise when your work 
is shrouded in secrecy and intimates how the Big 3 attempt to support their staff, a theme 
the subsequent section will explore.   
 
Although difficult to ascertain the separate identity, the concept of entering a different 
world was evident several times when undertaking empirical fieldwork, with examples 
including needing to swipe ID cards to enter lifts and certain parts of the building. This 
was particularly noticeable when visiting the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Headquarters in Washington D.C. They had their own police force monitoring the inside 
and outside of the building, as well as strict airport-style security when entering. This 
was also evident when attending the National Cryptologic Museum which is situated next 
to the National Security Agency in America. Despite being a public museum, proof of 
attendance and identity was required. This is despite there being street signs advertising 
the location of both organisations.78  
 
There is clearly a distinct culture and environment surrounding Britain’s Intelligence 
Services, something which is also evident in relation to the Police Force, as Nina Cope 
argues.79 Therefore, it is important to ascertain whether the Police, or any part of them, 
could constitute part of the British Intelligence Services, particularly considering the role 
of the Metropolitan Police’s Special Branch in counter-terrorism activities.  
 
                                                          
76 Knightley, P, The Second Oldest Profession – The Spy as bureaucrat, patriot, fantasist and whore, 
(London, André Deutsch Limited, 1986), p. 341 
77 Schneider, S, Northcraft, G, ‘Three Social Dilemmas of Workforce Diversity in Organisations: A Social 
Identity Perspective’, Human Relations, 52/11, (1999), p. 1447 
78 Private Interview with John F. Fox Jr – FBI Historian, J Edgar Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania 
Avenue, Washington D.C. 20th September 2016; 
National Cryptology Archives, Annapolis, Maryland; 
Please see the photographs of the street signs for the FBI Headquarters which are in the introduction.  
79 Cope, N, ‘Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence?’ British Journal of Criminology, 44 
(2004), p. 196 
 
Page | 71  
 
Policing and Intelligence 
Special Branch was founded in 1883 to counter the threat posed by Irish Republican 
bombings,80 and is now an integral part of the Metropolitan Police force.81 They have 
substantial expertise in combatting terrorism and due to the continued and serious threat 
it poses, cooperate closely with MI5 on domestic terrorism.82 However, the principal aim 
of the British Police remains the protection of life and property,83 and thus whilst they 
may support the Intelligence Services in the protection of national security, this is not 
their primary responsibility.  
 
Following the 7/7 London attacks, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) was 
created and is an amalgamation of staff from MI5, the Police and other Government 
departments. This ensures that all knowledge in countering terrorism can be harnessed,84 
demonstrating the continued cooperative relationship between the Police and the British 
Intelligence Services. Although JTAC is accountable to the DG of MI5, they are a stand-
alone organisation deemed an integral part of Britain’s national intelligence machinery 
who have a crucial role in combatting terrorism.85 Using the intelligence cycle, it is 
possible to determine that JTAC are part of the intelligence community due to the all 
source intelligence analysis they undertake on terrorism related matters. But if in future 
terrorism is no longer regarded as constituting a significant threat, JTAC’s role within 
British Intelligence may be questioned.  
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In Britain, Intelligence is forming an integral part of policing nowadays, 86 evident in how 
both rural and urban police forces recruit intelligence analysts who utilise the intelligence 
cycle.87 This is perhaps unsurprising as Gill argues that the intelligence process is the 
same for domestic and criminal intelligence, it is the specific targets which differ.88 
Police analysts are driven by crimes which have been perpetrated as opposed to priorities 
stipulated by the Government as is the case for the ‘Big 3’. Indeed, this has posed 
something of a dilemma for MI5 in particular when taking criminal justice approach to 
terrorism and seeking to ensure prosecutions, a theme consecutive DGs have examined.89 
 
But despite the significance it has, intelligence-led policing is still controversial.  Based 
on primary interviews, Cope concludes that many front-line officers fail to see the 
significance of intelligence analysts90 and Gill and Phythian highlight the gender, age 
and education gap which often exists between analysts and detectives.91 Although there 
remains a close working relationship between the ‘Big 3’ and the Police, 92 Britain’s 
police force does not constitute part of the British Intelligence Services. 
 
Conclusion  
This section has used the intelligence cycle to determine which organisations constitute 
the British Intelligence Services.  Due to their role in intelligence gathering, it is 
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indisputable that the British Intelligence Services refers to the Big 3. It is the Big 3 that 
are also most commonly associated with the term ‘intelligence services’, perhaps due to 
their prominence within popular culture which increases public awareness of them. 
Interview material obtained during fieldwork conducted for this thesis also revealed an 
overwhelming consensus that the Big 3 are the central actors of the British Intelligence 
Services.  
 
However, difficulties arise when seeking to assess whether there are any other 
organisations that should be included in the British Intelligence Services. As was 
discussed, there are substantial similarities between DI and the ‘Big 3’, such as the origins 
of the services, and in particular, their aims and objectives. This is something which will 
undoubtedly continue, as will the importance of JTAC due to the continued threat posed 
international terrorism. But, it is DI which this thesis regards as constituting part of the 
British Intelligence Services due to their role in intelligence gathering on military, 
scientific and economic intelligence, amongst others.93 In contrast, JTAC along with the 
JIC are part of the wider intelligence community who do not actively collect and collate 
intelligence but rather analyse and disseminate all source assessments to wider 
Government. 
 
 
The Intelligence Services Websites: What Portrayals are evident  
Acting lawfully and ethically  
Compare and contrast: Emphasis on adherence  
The websites of the Big 3 all state how they seek to ensure that they are acting lawfully 
and ethically. For GCHQ, this included emphasising their adherence to legislation. In a 
‘Message From The Director’ on the website it states that: 
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We work under one of the most stringent legal and 
oversight regimes in the world, including the new 
Investigatory Powers Act. 94 
 
In a speech centred upon the legacy of Alan Turing, Sir Iain Lobban explicitly states how 
GCHQ has always lawfully intercepted communications,95 furthering the positive 
portrayal that GCHQ always adhere to legislation and are therefore acting legally. Their 
website furthers this depiction with sections dedicated to oversight and ethics, with the 
latter demonstrating how GCHQ are aware of the ethical implications of their work, and 
the open environment in which staff can air any concerns.96 The importance of acting 
legally and ethically was also portrayed elsewhere on the website with the staff profiles, 
and in particular, Helen’s story emphasising the training provided to ensure staff are 
aware of the legislation underpinning their actions.97 This portrays adherence to 
legislation as central to GCHQ’s work. 
 
These sections on the GCHQ website also demonstrate the open environment in which 
ethical concerns can be raised,98 the importance of which is discussed in an academic 
context by Ian Leigh.99 Through the existence of the staff counsellor, the Big 3 all depict, 
albeit to varying degrees, how staff can raise any legal or ethical concerns. 100 Although 
no mention of the staff counsellor was apparent on the MI5 website, despite the post 
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originating in MI5 following the Peter Wright allegations,101 it likely remains an 
important aspect of ensuring legal and ethical standards. In contrast, MI6 does 
acknowledge the staff counsellor, saying you can ‘receive support relating to (their) 
Service from the staff counsellor.’102 This could be for numerous reasons, including the 
ability to raise any legal or ethical concerns.  
 
Although this does demonstrate how the Big 3 are seeking to act in a legal and ethical 
manner by providing a mechanism for staff to raise complaints, Leigh argues it is a 
flawed system. He highlights the lack of a link between the administrative procedures 
and the legal jurisdiction of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC).103 
Considering their responsibility for analysing the policy, administration, expenditure and 
operations of the Big 3,104 they would be the body to examine allegations of wrongdoing 
made by the staff. Leigh’s analysis agrees with Annie Machon’s assertion that although 
the staff counsellor exists, they have no ability to do anything.105 This suggests that whilst 
the British Intelligence Services attempt to provide mechanisms in which staff can raise 
problems, issues arise from the limitation of legislation governing the staff counsellor.   
 
MI5 also seek to depict themselves as acting legally and ethically, and indeed petitioned 
to be placed on a statutory footing in the late 1980s, demonstrating how they have always 
wanted to act within the law, to the extent that they pushed Ministers to legislate for their 
powers.106 In the first ever public speech made by a serving head of the British 
Intelligence Services, MI5’s DG Dame Stella Rimington stated that: 
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The security service must operate within a clear 
framework of the law. Its activities must be limited to 
countering genuine threats to national security…. With 
the proper legal authority, we may need to tap (their) 
telephones, open their letters or eavesdrop on their 
conservations to find out their intentions…. Applications 
to the Secretary of State for warrants to intercept letters 
or telephone conversations, or to interfere with property, 
are rigorously examined by the Service’s legal advisers 
and by the most senior levels of management, and again 
within the Hone Office.107 
 
By highlighting how MI5 are acting legally and ethically in the first speech of its kind, 
the emphasis of ensuring activities are legal and ethical is suggested. Indeed, in her 
autobiography Rimington alludes to this, when discussing how MI5 had to push to be 
placed on a statutory footing.108 Adhering to legal and ethical standards arguably remains 
a central aspect to MI5’s work as successive DGs Baroness Manningham-Buller, 
Jonathan Evans, and Andrew Parker all explicitly explore this theme in their speeches.109 
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This is combined with the MI5 legal team having to review any operational plan to ensure 
its compliance with legal and procedural standards.110 Thus, MI5 depicts themselves as 
striving to continually ensure legal and ethical standards. 
 
Another theme which MI5 portrays is how their actions must be necessary and 
proportionate, something also evident in Chapter 3 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’. In 
1994, Dame Stella Rimington argued that the levels of investigation must be 
proportionate to the threat whilst respecting individual liberties. In turn, this means that 
the more intrusive the means of investigation, the higher the authorisation should be.111 
The importance of this assertion remains as consecutive DG’s have all highlighted the 
importance of proportionality, with Parker directly stating: 
 
We take our legal and ethical duty to use these powers 
proportionately extremely seriously. We never use them 
for the sake of it and do not trawl at will through people’s 
private lives.112 
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This theme is further evident as MI5 explains the strict legal framework under which they 
work to ensure that all actions are necessary, proportionate and in accordance to the 
law.113 Taken from the MI5 website, the table on the following page (Figure 7) 
demonstrates what actions they can legally undertake, furthering the depiction of 
adhering to legislation.  
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(Figure 7)114 
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Whilst MI6 also demonstrates their adherence to a strict legal framework where they 
report to Ministers, including examining the legislation which provides the parameters in 
which they can operate, and ensuring their actions do not damage diplomatic relations,115 
they do not provide as much detail as MI5. This is further evident as many of the other 
references to legal and ethical activities on their website are implicit,116 something which 
could have been made clearer. This is somewhat confusing as the speeches made by C 
do in fact further this depiction, evident as Alex Younger states:  
 
In SIS, we have a service rooted in and inspired by the 
values of liberal democracy, determined to defend our 
country and the international rule of law, and carrying 
out remarkable and highly effective work in the face of 
potential threats.117 
 
This raises questions as to why their adherence to legislation could not have been more 
explicit on the website, as well as demonstrating a clear contrast between the MI5 and 
MI6 websites in highlighting this theme. For MI6, they are depicting how they seek to 
act legally and ethically within the limitations placed on them by the existing legislation 
which is not something they can control. This is something of a recurring theme on the 
Big 3 websites, and in the academic accountability literature.118 This leads to the implicit 
                                                          
115 Secret Intelligence Service, Our Mission, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-mission.html 
(Accessed 3rd November 2015); 
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(Accessed 10th December 2018 
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address-at-the-2017-women-in-it-awards.html (Accessed 10th December 2018) 
118 The limitation of legislation is something Ian Leigh and Peter Gill both explore in their academic 
discussions and the thesis explores in the literature review section of Chapter 1. For a selection of their 
work about the limitation of legislation, please see: 
Gill, P, Policing Politics, p. 3, 164–165; 
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depiction that if there are issues with the actions undertaken by the British Intelligence 
Services as the Snowden revelations suggest, this is due to the legislation as the Big 3 are 
acting within this. In turn, this indirectly places the onus upon consecutive British 
Governments for not seeking to effectively legislate for the Intelligence Services. Gill 
explores the ramification of this as he states how:  
 
If the security intelligence agency does not conduct itself 
within a framework of law then it may well come to 
constitute the antithesis of liberal democracy.119 
 
Therefore, it is crucial for the British Intelligence Services to act in a legal and ethical 
manner, as well as provide this portrayal to the public due to the importance of ensuring 
public confidence in a democratic society. Indeed, this is a theme which the speeches in 
particular have centred upon. In a speech at St Andrews University in December 2018, 
Alex Younger, C of MI6, acknowledges that the work of the Intelligence Services is done 
in the public’s name. He then implicitly portrayed how MI6 would never undermine this 
by acting in an illegal or unethical manner.120 The importance of such public trust is 
agreed upon, and previous DG speeches have all explored its importance.121 However, it 
was a speech in 2003 by the then DG Baroness Manningham-Buller which directly 
addressed the importance of ensuring public confidence. She states that: 
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it: Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller, 1st September 2005, Available From: 
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(Accessed 15th December 2018); 
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Change: Andrew Parker, 8th October 2013, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/the-enduring-
terrorist-threat-and-accelerating-technological-change (Accessed 20th December 2018); 
Security Service, News and Speeches – Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Trust: Jonathan Evans, 5th 
November 2007, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/intelligence-counter-terrorism-and-trust 
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We need to continue to tell them (the public) about the 
threat, explain the nature and extent of it, and be clear 
about what can be expected of us by the public. We need 
and rely on public cooperation and support for our 
work…. Informing the public increases their confidence 
that the authorities are addressing the problem and have 
the capability to respond appropriately to terrorist 
threats.122 
 
Her predecessors have built upon her argument with Evans acknowledging the 
importance of trust with the public.123 Parker furthers this as he highlights how engaging 
with the public is required as the public discourse about intelligence does not accurately 
provide a view of what is happening within the Intelligence Services.124 Therefore, it is 
in the interests of the British Intelligence Services to provide the public with an 
understanding of their work as they depend on the public trusting them to do their 
work.125 
 
Another way in which public confidence is explored by the Big 3 is in their 
acknowledging, and critiquing, illegal or unethical behaviour. This was particularly 
evident in the speeches made by MI5’s DGs following the Iraq War. In a speech from 
October 2003, Manningham-Buller scathingly remarked that: 
 
there are unscrupulous individuals who will fabricate 
material, exploiting the laws of supply and demand.126  
                                                          
122 Security Service, News and Speeches – Global Terrorism: Are We Meeting The Challenge?: Baroness 
Eliza Manningham-Buller, 16th October 2003, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/global-
terrorism-are-we-meeting-the-challenge (Accessed 13th December 2018) 
123 Security Service, News and Speeches – Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Trust: Jonathan Evans, 5th 
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124 Security Service, News and Speeches – The Enduring Terrorist Threat and Accelerating Technological 
Change: Andrew Parker, 8th October 2013, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/the-enduring-
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125 Security Service, News and Speeches – A Modern MI5: Andrew Parker, 28th October 2015, Available 
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126 Security Service, News and Speeches – Global Terrorism: Are We Meeting The Challenge?: Baroness 
Eliza Manningham-Buller, 16th October 2003, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/global-
terrorism-are-we-meeting-the-challenge (Accessed 13th December 2018) 
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Although unclear which Intelligence Service, or even possibly a member of the 
Government, that she is referring to, Manningham-Buller’s assertions depict that there 
are those within the intelligence realm who would act unethically but they are in a 
minority, therefore creating a positive portrayal of MI5 within the public domain. As will 
become evident in Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’, this is something of a 
consistent portrayal, demonstrating that the understandings the British Intelligence 
Services seek to provide of themselves are at times, are also provided to the public via 
the different avenues. 
 
Legality and Ethicality in Intelligence Cooperation 
 
Only through international cooperation will we be 
successful in reducing the threat from terrorism.127 
 
International intelligence cooperation is both commonplace and crucial as the quote 
above from Baroness Manningham-Buller states, as it seeks to combat the threat from 
terrorism, a subtly referred to theme on the MI5 website.128 Indeed, the academic 
literature also explores the importance of this theme, demonstrating the agreement on the 
importance of international cooperation from both practitioners and academics alike.129 
Successive DGs have highlighted this in their public speeches, with Evans stating 
cooperation: 
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Has saved British lives. Many attacks have been stopped 
as a result of effective intelligence cooperation.130  
 
This depicts the importance of international cooperation, something which the Big 3 all 
emphasise to varying degrees on their websites. In particular, they explore how 
international cooperation can enhance their effectiveness, a portrayal which will be 
further explored. However, why this depiction is only implicit on the MI5 website whilst 
a central theme to the public speeches, raises questions as to what overall portrayal MI5 
seeks to portray via the website.  
 
But, this depiction of international cooperation fails to explore how states can have 
different understandings of what constitutes legal and ethical actions, something which 
could in fact be a major hurdle to overcome if there were to be international intelligence 
oversight.131 Alex Younger alludes to this, stating that those countries who do not share 
Britain’s laws, know where Britain’s red lines are.132 This portrays that whilst other 
nations who Britain cooperates with may act illegally or unethically, Britain has higher 
standards and does not undertake such activities, no matter the threat posed. This theme 
was particularly prevalent when Younger discussed the British response to the Salisbury 
Attack in March 2018 which involved exposing the perpetrators and the expulsion of 
                                                          
130 Security Service, News and Speeches – Defending the Realm, Jonathan Evans, 15th October 2009, 
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Russian diplomats following the poisoning of a former Russian spy now living in the 
UK.133  
 
This was combined with how Britain’s ‘allies trusted our intelligence in the Salisbury 
attack. We felt this as an act of solidarity and it meant a huge amount to us.’134 Younger 
depicts not only how well thought of British Intelligence is by its counterparts, suggesting 
their capability and effectiveness, but also that no matter the nature of the threat, Britain 
will always respond legally and ethically, furthering the positive portrayal of MI6 and 
the wider British Intelligence Services. This also demonstrates a contrasting depiction of 
legality and ethicality as these themes were not as prevalent on the MI5 or GCHQ 
websites. 
 
Evans does explore this theme in an explicit manner when he states:  
 
I can say quite clearly that the Security Service does not 
torture people, nor do we collude in torture or solicit 
others to torture people on our behalf. That is a very clear 
and long-established principle…. I do not defend the 
abuses that have recently come to light within the US 
system since 9/11… We do not solicit or collude in torture. 
We do not practice torture.135 
 
This portrays MI5 as a lawful and ethical organisation who does not, and has not, 
undertaken illegal or unethical activities, and will willingly condemn the actions of those 
who have. Throughout the DG speeches post 9/11, this is a recurring theme, creating the 
portrayal of MI5 acting legally and ethically to the extent that they are openly critical of 
those who do not.   
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Perhaps such a depiction is promoted due to the difficulties international cooperation can 
pose for intelligence oversight, particularly due to the Control Principle (ORCON). This 
stipulates that whichever country gathered the intelligence retains operational control 
over which countries and organisations can access it. Increasingly, Leigh argues it is 
being used to demand total secrecy during court cases on the assertion that if the 
information was provided, it could hamper further intelligence cooperation and matters 
of national security.136 But assessing whether this is accurate or being used to prevent 
information being placed in the public domain remains difficult and highlights the 
ongoing tensions between openness and the need for secrecy, with international 
cooperation demanding the latter. 
 
This section has been predominantly based upon information from MI5 and MI6 due to 
its availability, demonstrating a key contrast between the ‘Big 3’ websites. Although the 
GCHQ website does suggest the importance of acting legally and ethically, particularly 
in relation to adherence to legislation,137 this was not a central portrayal provided. This 
was somewhat surprising as it was GCHQ who were most affected by allegations of 
illegal and unethical activity in the Snowden revelations.138  
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Structural and organisational difficulties  
Due to the nature and structure of the British civil service, there are numerous 
organisations which have an intelligence dimension to their work, as this chapter 
discussed in the context of the intelligence cycle. This results in the Big 3 cooperating 
with numerous other Government departments and institutions. Therefore, there has been 
the release of British Intelligence documents and papers in the files of other departments, 
released under the thirty-year rule. Whilst MI5’s former DG Sir Stephen Lander states 
that this was an accidental as opposed to systematic approach,139 it demonstrates the 
structural difficulties which can be posed by extensive Government cooperation. Indeed, 
it was through such archival disclosures that the former C’s secret slush fund for covert 
action in the Middle East was discovered.140 This demonstrates how cross-Government 
cooperation can cause structural difficulties, leading to the release of information relating 
to the British Intelligence Services. This certainly depicts wider structural issues being 
beyond the control of the British Intelligence Services. Therefore, information may be 
publicly available, even when the British Intelligence Services wish for it to remain 
secret.  
 
Creation of Organisations and organisations, and organisations…… 
Over the past 15 years, the British Government has created numerous organisations with 
an intelligence role, arguably due to the Government’s desire to ensure a cohesive cross-
Government approach to terrorism, as well as overcoming the problems surrounding the 
politicisation of intelligence following the Iraq War. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre 
(JTAC) sought to develop coordinated arrangements for handling and disseminating 
intelligence in response to the international terrorist threat. Whilst being an organisation 
within MI5, it is staffed by 16 different Government departments and agencies,141 
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suggesting that organisational difficulties could occur. This is also evident in the case of 
The Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) which is situated within the 
Cabinet Office and by working with Government and the private sector, aids protection 
of Britain’s critical national infrastructure.142 The newly established National Cyber 
Security Centre (NCSC) also uses the expertise of staff from across Government and its 
website clearly states how it is part of GCHQ.143 This is in conjunction with the National 
Technical Assistance Centre (NTAC) which manages intercepted communications data 
to those entities who have requested it, also being located within GCHQ, despite their 
extensive cooperation with wider Government.144 This demonstrates how new 
organisations are continually created, with staffing coming directly from the Big 3 and 
other entities. Therefore, there are structural difficulties relating to ensuring the analysis 
and dissemination of intelligence in a timely manner. 145  
 
This highlights how there are various structural and organisational difficulties affecting 
the British Intelligence Services, all of which have to be overcome. Although this theme 
is not discussed by the heads of GCHQ or MI6 who have not made as many public 
speeches, it is likely to be a theme which also affects them if new organisations are also 
struggling with the amount of information. This demonstrates a clear contrast in the 
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themes the heads of the respective services discussed. Although the British Intelligence 
Services are alluding to the structural and organisational difficulties they face, they 
perhaps do not see this as a central theme to examine on their websites when compared 
to, arguably, the primary objectives of encouraging recruitment and ensuring public 
confidence in their work. 
 
Following the end of the Cold War, MI5 placed an increasing emphasis upon organised 
crime, which led to the Security Services Act being amended in 1996 to allow MI5 to act 
in support of the Police in serious criminal investigations.146 This shifting emphasis may 
also have been due to the British Intelligence Services having to justify both their 
continued existence and budgets during the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and before the catastrophic events of 9/11.147 But, with the establishment of the 
Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) before it was replaced by the National 
Crime Agency (NCA), MI5’s focus shifted back towards counter-terrorism, something 
which was also affected by the events of 9/11.148 This demonstrates how the creation of 
new organisations can cause significant structural and organisational issues whilst also 
implicitly depicting MI5 as being ineffective if their role in the prevention of serious and 
organised crime was now the jurisdiction of a new organisation.  
 
In comparison, in the case of GCHQ, it led to a rather different depiction. To combat 
sexual child exploitation, GCHQ and the NCA cooperate closely, even creating the Joint 
Operations Cell.149 Thus, GCHQ has a pivotal role in breaking paedophile rings. 
Following the Snowden revelations in June 2013, GCHQ was depicted as acting in an 
illegal and unethical manner.150 But by highlighting their involvement in anti-paedophilia 
operations, this is an attempt to redress this depiction as GCHQ as an organisation acting 
in the public interest in their endeavour to stop child sexual exploitation.  
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Territorial Battles  
Once MI5 and MI6 were created, the first heads made a conscious decision for MI5 to 
focus on domestic intelligence and MI6 to concentrate on foreign matters,151 a distinction 
which continues in a contemporary context.152 But despite this, the MI5 and MI6 websites 
suggest that this separation is not always adhered to. In 1994, MI5 was given ‘the main 
responsibility for intelligence investigations into all aspects of Irish terrorism activity 
anywhere in the world’;153 demonstrating how the separation was not adhered to, with 
MI5 operating overseas by examining Irish terrorism around the world. Arguably, this 
occurred due to the nature of the threat, as well as the peculiarity and complex historical 
relationship between Britain and Ireland.  
 
Territorial battles also seem to have affected intelligence sharing between the services, 
with Chapman Pincher claiming that both services have tended to hoard as opposed to 
share information with one another. This occurred to the extent that for many years, MI5 
were banned from accessing MI6 files. This meant a formal written request had to be 
submitted to access an MI6 file,154 something which was not conducive to intelligence 
cooperation. Neither was the tendency for both organisations to withhold information 
from one another due to the rivalry between them,155 and demonstrates the pervasiveness 
of secrecy if intelligence could not be shared. However, a similar criticism was also made 
about the American intelligence services not sharing intelligence prior to 9/11 due to 
deeply ingrained values and habits within the individual intelligence agencies.156 
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Although there is no evidence as to whether such issues continue to affect the British 
Intelligence Services, available information would suggest it is unlikely due to the 
emphasis upon a cooperative approach to countering terrorism, evident in MI6’s counter-
terrorism section. It states that:  
 
Working closely with the Security Service (MI5), we also 
disrupt threats in the UK, where the threat has an 
international angle.157  
 
Whilst this could simply refer to intelligence-sharing due to the international nature of 
threat, the obscure language depicts MI6 as operating on the streets of Britain. This could 
suggest to the public that Bond’s activities taking place on the street of Britain. But 
despite this connotation, MI6 are highlighting an organisational difficulty posed; how the 
nature of the threat requires the domestic and overseas separation to be challenged.158  
 
The British Intelligence Services all depict the structural and organisational difficulties 
they face, albeit to varying degrees. Whilst GCHQ emphasise the importance of cross-
Government cooperation, MI6 implicitly alludes to the difficulties caused by the 
evolving nature of the threat. This highlights that whilst the Big 3 cooperate extensively, 
they remain separate organisations with their own identity and culture. However, there 
remains structural and organisational issues to be overcome, but these are not created by 
the British Intelligence Services having separate identities, but rather wider 
circumstances.  
 
 
Cooperation 
Terrorism and Cooperation 
                                                          
Gill, P, ‘Theories of Intelligence’, p. 50 
157 Secret Intelligence Service, Our Mission, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-mission.html 
(Accessed 3rd November 2015) 
158This is a theme also intimated by Ian Leigh. For more information, please see: 
Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 81;  
Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 
9/11’, p. 722 
 
Page | 92  
 
In 1994, Dame Stella Rimington gave the first public speech by a serving DG. In it, she 
highlighted the importance of cooperation in combating terrorism,159 suggesting that 
cooperation has always been a central component to the work of the British Intelligence 
Services. In a contemporary context, all three of the websites, highlight the importance 
of it,160 with MI6 providing the most information. The ‘Intelligence Explained’ section 
has a counter-terrorist case study, depicting how cooperation occurs, thus portraying how 
important engagement with MI5 and GCHQ is as it ensures that the UK remains safe and 
secure’. 161 
 
This portrays how cooperation between the Big 3 enhances their capability and 
effectiveness in maintaining Britain’s safety and security. However, the depiction could 
have been furthered had it explored how the information collected by the Big 3 engaged 
with the wider British Intelligence Community, a theme lacking discussion on all of the 
websites. Although a reason for this could be, as one interviewee stated, that the minute 
mechanics of engagement between the Intelligence Services and wider Government is 
something the public would not be interested in.162 But surely without giving the public 
the option of understanding this information, you cannot effectively argue that they are 
uninterested in the topic. 
 
This depiction was also evident in speeches made by serving DGs,163 however, it is 
perhaps clearest in a speech made by Evans where he states that:  
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We work on an integrated basis with our sister agencies, 
GCHQ and SIS, so that the particular skills of each 
agency are focused on the same threat. Their assistance 
and the intelligence they have provided to us have been 
invaluable to our operations, giving us coverage beyond 
our traditional strengths.164 
 
In December 2018, Younger, Chief (C) of MI6 explores the same theme; namely how it 
is via cooperation that attacks by the so-called Islamic State or Daesh have been 
prevented.165 This creates a consistent positive portrayal of the capability and 
effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services in combatting terrorist threats via 
cooperation. But it also demonstrates more openness from MI5 and MI6 in discussing 
their actions thus providing greater understandings of their activities to the public. 
However, the onus remains on the public to access the websites and transcripts of 
speeches in order to have this understanding of the British Intelligence Services.  
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One interviewee argued that unless an individual is interested in a subject, they are not 
going to attempt to find the information.166 This furthers the point that the onus remains 
on the individual to access the information, as opposed to the British Intelligence Services 
directly engaging with the public sphere. Considering the existence of the Government 
Digital Service (GDS) which took over from the Government Communication Service, a 
disconnect remains in terms of engaging with the public on matters relating to security 
and intelligence. This was something one interviewee alluded to in terms of how the GDS 
has a limited understanding of secret and top secret information, which they suggested 
could be due to the GDS’s narrow experience in Government.167 First-hand experience 
of this theme was evident as an interview was sought with the GDS but the email chain 
refusing the interview said ‘not really my area’ even though the topic of the PhD had 
been clearly stated. 
 
The importance of cooperation in ensuring the capability and effectiveness of British 
Intelligence has been a theme both of Younger’s speeches have discussed. His 2016 
speech from inside MI6 highlighted that it is the fusing together of different expertise 
which not only makes British Intelligence successful in keeping the country safe, but also 
sets Britain’s intelligence community apart, being one of the most integrated in the 
world.168 However, as structural and organisational difficulties explored, this can cause 
issues at times, something omitted from Younger’s analysis. But the comments do further 
the over-arching positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services through the 
discussion of how their cooperation enhances their capability and effectiveness. 
 
During the interviews with British civil servants, the topic of intelligence cooperation 
was discussed, primarily to allow for triangulation with what information the Big 3 
placed into the public domain themselves. Following on from a question as to who 
constitutes the British Intelligence Services, one interviewee was asked whether this 
leads to close cooperation between them. But they refused to answer as it was deemed 
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operational.169 This was in stark contrast to another interviewee who said they could not 
think of an operation when the Big 3 have not cooperated closely and been in lock-step 
with one another.170 Whilst this response does intimate that the Big 3 cooperate closely, 
there is a clear juxta-position between what officials will say, and what information is 
publicly available on the websites. This also suggests at the continuing secrecy 
surrounding Whitehall discussions pertaining to intelligence, despite the Big 3 putting 
this information into the public domain themselves. 
 
Law Enforcement Cooperation  
The Big 3, and most notably GCHQ, explore cooperation with other British Government 
organisations, and in particular with law enforcement and the military.171 Former GCHQ 
Director Robert Hannigan suggests the importance of military cooperation when 
highlighting how GCHQ personnel served with the military in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
other conflicts which he does not name.172 Younger also discusses his organisation’s 
close relationship with the military, having been one of the many SIS officers who have 
served in Afghanistan,173 demonstrating a comparable rhetoric between the two. This also 
shows a degree of self-critique, as in highlighting military cooperation, Younger 
acknowledged the difficulties MI6 officers faced, as well as errors in rectifying these 
problems.174 This depicts MI6 as an organisation aware of their own failings and willing 
to overcome these. Therefore, they are not solely attempting to provide the public with a 
‘squeaky-clean’ portrayal, but rather one that is honest about issues they have faced. 
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Although acknowledging their failings could create a portrayal of wrongdoing, the 
awareness of these issues implicitly depicts MI6 in a positive manner as they are seeking 
to overcome these problems.  
 
In discussing MI5’s counter terrorism approach, Manningham-Buller, Evans and Parker 
all allude to their service’s engagement with the military. However, this is in a more 
implicit manner than MI6’s and GCHQ’s discussion of military cooperation, 
undoubtedly due to the domestic focus of MI5 not necessitating as much military 
cooperation. Therefore, successive DG speeches simply suggest at cooperation with the 
military in Afghanistan and Iraq.175 This depicts a close relationship existing between 
British Intelligence and the military as it is a comparable theme across the websites. It 
also highlights how although there is a comparison in the themes the Big 3 explore on 
their websites and in speeches, there are contrasting manners in how this information is 
provided.  
 
As well military cooperation, GCHQ highlights their ongoing work with law 
enforcement. This is due to the all-pervasive nature of cyber threats and security, and 
their emphasis upon countering serious and organised crime, something the website 
continually highlights.176 To those who access and actively digest the information, this 
depicts how law enforcement cooperation is a central component to GCHQ’s activities.  
 
MI5 also explore the importance of law enforcement, focusing on their cooperation with 
the Police. Such an emphasis is placed upon this that the second ever public speech made 
by a serving DG was the annual James Smart Lecture to the City of London Police, a 
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lecture which Manningham-Buller also gave in 2003.177 Since the first speech in 1994, 
police cooperation was continually referred to in speeches with Evans arguing it aided 
their ability to combat the threat from Al Qaeda,178 something Andrew Parker has also 
suggested.179 This depicts how closely MI5 and the Police work with one another. 
Therefore, it is unsurprising that MI5 have been taking a more criminal justice approach 
to terrorism, a theme the following section will explore.  
 
Criminal Justice Approach 
Since the 1990s, MI5 has undertaken a criminal justice approach.180 However, this has 
caused issues for MI5 in seeking to ensure that intelligence can be admitted as evidence 
in criminal proceedings. This is due to the high levels of evidence courts require or 
evidence to commit a crime, a theme both DG speeches and the website portray.181 This 
approach is unsurprising considering MI5’s counter-terrorism and organised crime 
emphasis at different points during the 1990s and 2000s as the previous section about 
territorial battles discussed. By highlighting issues pertaining to the criminal justice 
approach, it intimates that MI5 have been constrained in terms of securing convictions, 
as opposed to an inability in catching suspects. Therefore, they depict themselves as 
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capable and effective whilst being constrained by a criminal justice approach. An 
example of this is highlighted by Gill as he explores how the mandate of the Intelligence 
Services cannot be fully applied to criminal law, arguing that: 
 
The prime concern of security intelligence agencies is 
information-gathering, not prosecution, and therefore its 
targeting of people and groups will be based on the 
perceived need for information, not whether there is likely 
to be some immediate ‘result’, as is more likely to be a 
priority for the police.182 
 
This demonstrates a difficulty which MI5 have been grappling with, something Evans 
discusses in terms of the difficulties in not being able to wait until after an atrocity has 
happened to bring an individual to justice.183 This implicitly highlights the difficulties of 
not wanting to allow a terrorist attack to occur in order to gather evidence to be used in 
criminal proceedings, thus portraying the difficulties MI5 have of demonstrating their 
capability and effectiveness within a criminal justice approach. This is explicitly depicted 
when in 2010 Evans discusses MI5’s involvement in the disruption of an Al Qaeda cell 
in North West England. But due to their early intervention, they could not sustain 
criminal proceedings against the individuals.184 This furthers the depiction of the 
frustrations MI5 face in preventing atrocities whilst still collecting enough evidence, a 
portrayal evident in Manningham-Buller’s 2005 speech. In it, she succinctly highlights 
the dilemma MI5 face between protecting citizens within the rule of law when the 
intelligence does not amount to clear cut evidence.185 Implicitly, this also portrays MI5’s 
desire to act legally and ethically in seeking to gather evidence to ensure a conviction 
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within the rule of law, something of paramount importance as they seek to ensure their 
democratic legitimacy. 
 
However, the difficulties Manningham-Buller discussed have been overcome as in a rare 
speech about their successes in 2013, Parker stated that there had been four major trials 
related to terrorist plots. This included plans for a 7/7 style attack with a rucksack bomb, 
two plots to kill members of the Armed Forces and a failed attack on an English Defence 
League march using an array of weapons.186 Discussion of such successes have continued 
with Parker stating that in the first 6 months of 2017, there were 379 terrorism related 
arrests.187 This provides two clear depictions. Firstly, that MI5 has been inherently 
capable and effective in the prevention of these attacks and secondly, that they have come 
to understand what evidence can be utilised to gain convictions and have been successful 
in this.  
 
But perhaps more importantly, they are slowly becoming more open as MI5 are more 
willing to discuss their successes. Since 2012, DG speeches have discussed attacks that 
have been prevented or guilty convictions secured via the possibility of accessing a 
defendant’s communications data, something explicitly stated in Parker’s 2015 speech.188 
Overall, by being more open, there is a  positive portrayal created that the British 
Intelligence Services are capable and effective, in their legal activities to secure 
convictions whilst implicitly portraying how access to communications data is something 
required to prevent attacks. This contrasts to the lack of statistical information from MI6 
or GCHQ, although this is arguably due to the different emphasis that they all have. 
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International Cooperation 
 
Today nearly all our investigations… have an 
international dimension, and simple enquiries are 
rendered complex by the need to liaise with several 
different countries. My service has links to services in 
over 100 countries.189 
 
Here, Manningham-Buller highlights how the nature of the threat requires international 
cooperation, depicting an organisation willing to cooperate with others in order to ensure 
Britain’s safety and security. Indeed, it is seemingly a crucial theme to MI5 as successive 
DGs and academics alike explore its importance, whilst also highlighting the issues it 
can cause, something particularly expressed in Evans’ speeches.190 This is combined with 
how Manningham-Buller and Parker both gave public speeches to Dutch and German 
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Intelligence Services respectively.191 But, providing such assistance had been ongoing 
since the Cold War when MI5 officers were invited to give lectures to the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police security branch on themes such as interviewing suspects and surveillance 
techniques.192 The current DG Parker furthers this portrayal when he discusses how due 
to the terrorist threat, MI5 are increasingly needing to operate across international 
boundaries.193   
 
This suggests the continuing importance MI5 places upon international cooperation, 
something also depicted on their website, although to a limited extent.194 Why such an 
understanding could not be included on the website is unknown when the information is 
publicly available elsewhere, suggesting that whilst the MI5 website is informative, there 
is more information which could be included. In turn, this would increase awareness of 
their actions as opposed to hiding the information in plain sight.  
 
For MI6, international cooperation is one of the many facets of their overseas work. The 
‘Our History’ section explores this theme by focusing on US and Allied cooperation 
during the Second World War, and MI6’s role in the creation of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) in 1947.195 Implicitly, this depicts an intelligence service who remain 
shrouded in secrecy. In contrast, GCHQ does highlight the importance of international 
cooperation in cyber security and the extent to which they cooperate with America, 
something also indirectly portrayed via the picture of the American President’s residence, 
the White House,  at the top of this page on the website.196 Yet despite this, it remains a 
theme under-explored in speeches by the Directors of GCHQ which instead focuses on 
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cooperation within British Government. This is somewhat surprising as the Snowden 
revelations centred upon the amount of cooperation there was between GCHQ and their 
American counterpart the National Security Agency (NSA).197 Perhaps omitting this 
from any speeches is a subtle attempt to divert attention away from the Snowden 
revelations and move the rhetoric forwards. 
 
Each service has placed a different emphasis upon the types of cooperation. This 
demonstrates that despite all being central members of the British Intelligence Services, 
they remain distinct from one another. Yet, this did not prevent a central positive 
portrayal from being evident throughout, that by cooperating extensively with one 
another, the military, law enforcement and their overseas partners, their capability and 
effectiveness is increased.   
 
 
Diversity and the Workplace  
Historically been diverse  
In conjunction with highlighting the diverse workforce in a contemporary context, the 
Big 3 all provide the depiction that they have always been inclusive and diverse work 
places, a theme particularly emphasised by MI6 The ‘Our History’ section of their 
website explores how during the First World War, women played a central role in La 
Dame Blanche, a network of mainly female spies in German-occupied Belgium who 
provided detailed information to British Intelligence by watching German train 
movements.198 This highlights how MI6 realised the important role women could play, 
something Keith Jeffrey acknowledges in the MI6 official history which put MI6 in sharp 
contrast to the rest of the civil service in terms of women’s employment at this time.199 
After the First World War, MI6 continued to have an inclusive workforce, as they offered 
jobs to injured military personnel, and women, no matter their marital status, as 
secretaries, clerks, typists and drivers, and Cumming often sent women to work 
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abroad.200  This depicts how MI6 not only realised the role women could play in 
intelligence, but actively sought to utilise them in their work, something which continues 
with C highlighting the importance of women within MI6’s contemporary workforce.201 
This attempts to dispel the portrayal of MI6 being a club for the boys, by highlighting the 
continual inclusivity and diversity, of the workforce. 
 
In comparison, it seems that this is something MI5 also realised, albeit to a lesser extent, 
as during the First World War, members of the Girl-Guides were used as messengers 
within the MI5 Headquarters, after being deemed more reliable than their male 
counterparts.202 In the interwar period, perhaps seeing the success MI6 had in using 
female officers, Sir Maxwell Knight actively employed female agents203 which was 
inherently successful as the case of Olga Grey intimates. Having infiltrated the 
communist party in Britain, she gave evidence at the Old Bailey, against what was termed 
the Woolwich Arsenal Spy Ring, a Soviet spy cell who were copying details of British 
weaponry and passing them to Moscow.204 
 
GCHQ highlights its historical diversity, although not by exploring the role of women, 
demonstrating a contrasting approach to the subject amongst the Big 3. In a speech 
celebrating the role of Alan Turing, Iain Lobban states that GCHQ:  
 
Was at the most tolerant end of the cultural spectrum. In 
an organisation which valued the skills and 
characteristics that differences can bring, Turing’s 
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homosexuality was less of a talking point than his insights 
into the complex crypt problems of the day.205 
 
This provides the depiction that GCHQ has always been a tolerant place to work, 
something which is in sharp contrast to comments made by Hannigan. He acknowledges 
that during the 1960s and 1970s, some staff, who were openly gay, were failed by GCHQ 
in not providing the support required. This meant that staff could be interrogated if 
suspected of being gay, and could be dismissed from the service, with no support. 
Hannigan goes on to say how sorry he was that so many were treated in this manner ‘right 
up until the 1990s when the policy was rightly changed’.206 
 
Here, Hannigan critiques past actions undertaken by GCHQ and seeks to apologise for 
them.  Whilst this self-critique is pleasing to see, it contradicts the depiction provided by 
Lobban in terms of how GCHQ has always been a tolerant workplace.207 It also stands in 
stark contrast to the portrayals of inclusivity painted by MI5 and MI6. Therefore, when 
analysing all the available information, the portrayal is that there are undeniably aspects 
of GCHQ’s history which were similar to the opinions in wider society at the time, but 
this does not prevent GCHQ, as well as MI5 and MI6, always striving to be diverse and 
inclusive. 
 
 
Staff diversity in numbers  
Due to the self-serving interest of promoting recruitment, the Big 3’s websites all 
emphasise how diversity manifests in terms of the activities they undertake, including 
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possible career trajectories, and the nature of the workforce.208 For MI5, they utilise 
statistics to enhance this depiction, as the website states that of the 4,000 staff, 40% are 
women, 8% from Black and Ethnic Minorities and 3% have disabilities.209 Ensuring a 
diverse workforce as the service continually expanded, has been a continual policy for 
MI5, something which is evident when analysing the history of the service. In 1941, there 
was a dramatic expansion in staff numbers, due to the Second World War,210 and by 1994 
half the 2,000 staff were women.211 In the early 2000s, there was another staff expansion, 
and by 2006 the staff had increased to 2,800, with 6% from Black and Ethnic 
Minorities.212 This is perhaps due to the increase in counter-terrorism work in recent 
years which Leigh states took 80% of their efforts and resources.213 This depicts the 
increase in the diversity of MI5, demonstrating how they represent a microcosm of 
British society. 214   
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In contrast, statistics are not available for GCHQ, and they simply highlight that their 
6,000 staff215 comes from a diverse range of backgrounds. The nature of the diversity is 
subtly referred to, as the webpage lists support groups available for staff, including those 
to support women, ethnic minorities, LGBT individuals, and those with disabilities.216 
Unlike MI5, GCHQ explores neurodiversity, highlighting how some employees are on 
the autistic spectrum,217 depicting GCHQ as an inherently inclusive organisation. 
Equally, it intimates how diversity is not solely referring to ethnicity. This depicts how 
GCHQ are attempting to ensure that preconceptions do not prevent innovation,218 
something both MI5 and MI6 state in different manners, such as nowadays seeking to 
recruit those with technological expertise.219  
 
In the case of MI6, the website explicitly highlights diversity amongst its staff, as well 
as the support organisations available.220 In contrast, speeches by C only imply this 
theme, with the 2016 speech stating how MI6 officers are representative of wider 
society.221 This intimates that MI6 is a microcosm of wider British society, thus depicting 
a diverse and inclusive workforce, something Younger states offers divergent approaches 
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to a problem, thus providing a more cohesive solution.222 Perhaps more interestingly, this 
portrays a desire to move beyond the criticisms pertaining to group-think mentality made 
by the Butler Inquiry following the Iraq War.223By depicting MI6 as a microcosm of 
society, indirectly, it is seeking to move beyond the stereotypical MI6 officer as being an 
Oxbridge graduate and Bond-esque and further promoting MI6 as a possible career to 
those who may not have considered it.224  This demonstrates how the websites are 
attempting to promote recruitment by highlighting that they want individuals from all 
backgrounds.  
 
Workplace Support  
As the previous section alluded to, the Big 3 all seek to provide support for their 
employees. In MI6, this includes ensuring staff have ‘the support they need to stay safe 
and the guidance and training required to navigate the complex and ethically hazardous 
environment.’225 Two years later in 2018, C states how this has been strengthened in lieu 
of an ISC report.226 This provides the depiction of how MI6 seeks to support staff as 
much as possible, a portrayal also evident on the MI6 website as the Working Here page 
has a section dedicated to staff wellbeing and benefits available.227 This is something 
which GCHQ and MI5 also depict, with the staff profiles portraying what training 
available, particularly relating to acting legally and ethically, as this chapter has 
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highlighted.228 By exploring such themes, it portrays the British Intelligence Services as 
seeking to provide support for staff, particularly in ensuring their work remains legal and 
ethical. 
 
The support available to staff extends to their wellbeing, a theme all of them emphasise, 
with support structures including flexible working hours, mental health support and 
counselling services.229 This provides a cohesive depiction of how the British 
Intelligence Services as a whole, strive to ensure that staff are well supported throughout 
their careers. But MI6 takes this depiction further, by explicitly highlighting the provision 
of clubs and societies, an onsite restaurant, gym and occupational health services which 
serving or former staff and their families are able to access.230 This depicts MI6 as an 
organisation who takes the welfare of its staff seriously and strives to ensure they have 
all the support required, something particularly important due to the nature of the work 
and secrecy surrounding it.231 Whilst MI5 and GCHQ may also have such provisions, it 
is not explicitly alluded to, with the MI5 website simply stating there are clubs and 
societies, and no reference to whether families are able to access them,232 exhibiting 
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contrasting portrayals amongst the Big 3. But DG speeches allude to the support DGs 
themselves seek to provide to both serving and former personnel.233 For GCHQ, the 
references are far subtler with the careers section highlighting the ‘exceptional welfare 
and support on offer’234 and a press release intimating the existence of clubs and 
societies.235  
 
It is not doubted that GCHQ are concerned with staff welfare, why they do not refer to it 
in the same manner as MI6 is somewhat strange and demonstrates a theme which they 
could explore on the website and would not have any operational consequences. 
Arguably, this would enhance GCHQ’s website as a recruitment tool by highlighting to 
prospective employees the support offered, as well as furthering the positive portrayal 
available to those who access the website that they are concerned about the welfare of 
their staff.   
 
By discussing the workplace in such a candid and open manner, the Big 3 via increased 
openness, are portraying how they are career options to everyone as they represent a 
microcosm of society. This demonstrates how increased openness can be beneficial to 
ensuring continued public confidence of their work, as there are themes which do not 
require excessive secrecy. 
 
Importance of Secrecy  
Secrecy has always surrounded the British Intelligence Services and when they were 
founded, Sir Mansfield Cumming had a fake address for MI6 to protect their work, 
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something which continued. By 1919, he would send people to this fake address,236 to 
maintain the secrecy surrounding their activities. Although there is no evidence of MI5 
undertaking such actions when they were founded, Evans does highlight that during the 
1980s, they had a discreet cover as an opaque Government department, which he argues 
demonstrates the pervasiveness of secrecy at this time. 237 Indeed, even when they were 
publicly acknowledged, Rimington discussed why MI5 required secrecy,238 a theme 
which her predecessors have all explored.239  This demonstrates how: 
 
Secrecy is essential if we are to avoid our opponents 
knowing whether they are on our radar and learning how 
we go about our work, and if sensitive sources are not to 
be put at risk.240 
 
Parker’s 2015 speech ‘A Modern MI5’ explored the importance of this, using an 
historical example. In the 1920s, a public disclosure of intercepted Soviet telegrams 
resulted in the Soviet regime moving to a more secure means of communication,241 thus 
preventing Britain accessing them. In a contemporary context, at a roundtable at George 
Washington University where Younger was a panellist, this theme was prevalent in 
discussions pertaining to the damage of the Snowden revelations in the ability of the 
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American and British Intelligence Services’ capability to operate.242 This provides clear 
comparison from MI5 and MI6 about why secrecy is required by the British Intelligence 
Services, and how it remains central to their work. Indeed, it also intimates how over 
time, MI5 are becoming more open by providing such details as opposed to the previous 
speeches which merely intimate the importance of secrecy.  
 
Younger implicitly highlights the importance of balancing openness with secrecy. In his 
first ever public speech, he highlights why speeches are such a rarity; namely due to the 
secrecy surrounding their actions which limits the scope of his speech, whilst 
acknowledging that everything MI6 does is in the public’s name.243 Whilst depicting the 
importance of secrecy, Younger’s comments do portray the awareness of the contrast 
between ensuring public confidence and maintaining secrecy, something of a 
juxtaposition for a democratic intelligence service. But despite this, MI6 maintains a 
depiction of secrecy, in both public speeches and on the website. In his December 2018 
speech, the importance of secrecy is a central theme as Younger states that: 
 
The ability to create relationships of trust between our 
officers and people inside the organisations we need to 
understand. We call these brace people agents, and they 
put their livelihoods, and sometimes even their lives, at 
risk on behalf of the UK. That is why our people, our 
methods and our operations must always remain a 
secret.244 
 
                                                          
242 Secret Intelligence Service, News: 20 September 2016 – MI6 Chief takes part in panel session on 
intelligence at George Washington University, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/news/george-
washington-university-panel-talk.html (Accessed 18th September 2017); 
YouTube, CIA-GW Intelligence Conference: Panel on The View from Foreign Intelligence Chiefs, 
Available From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yefBv7Q3sv0 (Accessed 24th January 2018);  
In particular, it was the head of the Australian Intelligence Service who was most scathing of the damage 
caused by Snowden in this regard. 
243 Secret Intelligence Service, News: 8 December 2016 – Inside the Modern Day MI6, Available From: 
https://www.sis.gov.uk/news/inside-the-modern-day-mi6.html (Accessed 14th December 2018) 
244 Secret Intelligence Service, News: 03 December 2018 – MI6 ‘C’ Delivers Rare Public Speech at St 
Andrews University, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/news/alex-younger-st-andrews-speech.html 
(Accessed 10th December 2018) 
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This depicts not only an understanding of the work of agents, but also provides a clear 
argument for the necessity of secrecy to their work. On the website, this depiction is 
furthered on both the ‘Our History’ and surprisingly, the ‘Contact Us’ section. From their 
instigation until the end of the Second World War, there is a concise depiction of key 
moments from MI6’s history. This is in contrast to MI5 who explore their entire 110-
year history. But from 1949 onwards, the only information pertains to the appointment 
of Sir Dick White as C in 1956, having been DG of MI5, and the creation of the 
Intelligence Services Act in 1994 as ‘the secret nature of our work means we cannot give 
much information on our operations since then.’245 
 
The ‘Contact Us’ section stresses the importance of any individual who contacts MI6, 
ensures their own personal safety and gives suggestions of how to do this.246 This furthers 
the portrayal of how MI6 are concerned about the ongoing safety of all those who work, 
or engage with them as well as justifying the amount of secrecy. The necessity of the 
British Intelligence Services having a degree of secrecy has not been doubted, but the 
emphasis placed on it depicts that it is used as a cover screen to prevent further 
questioning. This places a greater emphasis on the avenues providing an understanding 
of the British Intelligence Services to the public, something which could be easily 
overcome if the British Intelligence Services furthered their direct engagement with the 
public, combined with making information more easily accessible. This could be easily 
overcome by seeking to ensure as much information which does not damage methods or 
operations is publicly available.  
 
Andrew Parkers argues how successive Governments have: 
 
                                                          
245 Secret Intelligence Service, Our History, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-history.html 
(Accessed 20th November 2017) 
This is the same time frame that the MI6 Official History by Keith Jeffrey goes up to and provides the 
same argument as to why this time frame is evident. 
Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909 – 1949, p. vii–viii, xv–xvi  
246 Secret Intelligence Service, Contact Us, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/contact-us.html 
(Accessed 28th July 2015) 
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wrestled with the inherent tension between the necessary 
of our operations, and the legitimate desire for greater 
transparency about the nature of our powers.247 
 
This intimates the tensions secrecy can cause, particularly in relation to engaging with 
the public, a theme which both Rimington and Manningham-Buller explored in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. Thus depicting how the tensions of secrecy have been ever 
present, with the former giving a recommendation of how the accountability process 
could fill this knowledge gap.248 In a more contemporary context, Evans alluded to this 
theme in terms of the difficulty for the public to comprehend the full extent of 
information relating to intelligence which ends up in the public domain.249 However, this 
is undeniably something which could be overcome if British Intelligence themselves 
furthered their own engagement with the public, something Rimington suggested in 
1994. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by examining who constitutes the British Intelligence Services before 
analysing what portrayals they placed of themselves in the public domain. Using the 
intelligence cycle, the chapter first made a distinction between the Intelligence Services 
and Intelligence Community and concluded that it is the Big 3 namely MI5, MI6 and 
GCHQ as well as DI who constitute Britain’s Intelligence Services. Due to the 
availability of information, the chapter then compared and contrasted what portrayals of 
the British Intelligence Services were provided by the websites of the Big 3 and rare 
public speeches by their heads. These portrayed numerous themes which the chapter has 
                                                          
247 Security Service, News and Speeches – A Modern MI5: Andrew Parker, 28th October 2015, Available 
From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/a-modern-mi5 (Accessed 21st December 2018) 
248 Security Service, News And Speeches – Security and Democracy: Is There A Conflict: Dame Stella 
Rimington, 12th June 1994,  Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/security-and-democracy-is-
there-a-conflict (Accessed 11th December 2018); 
Security Service, News and Speeches – Global Terrorism: Are We Meeting The Challenge?: Baroness 
Eliza Manningham-Buller, 16th October 2003, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/global-
terrorism-are-we-meeting-the-challenge (Accessed 13th December 2018); 
Security Service, News and Speeches – Countering Terrorism: An International Blueprint: Baroness Eliza 
Manningham-Buller, 17th June 2003, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/countering-
terrorism-an-international-blueprint (Accessed 14th December 2018) 
249 Security Service, News and Speeches – The Threat to National Security: Jonathan Evans, 16th 
September 2010, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/the-threat-to-national-security (Accessed 
18th December 2018) 
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explored, including acting legally and ethically, cooperation, structural and 
organisational difficulties, workplace and diversity, and finally the importance of 
secrecy. Whilst the Big 3 all highlight these themes to varying degrees, there is consensus 
about their importance. Therefore, the websites are comparable in terms of the themes 
they explore but contrasting in how they examine these topics. This is most evident in 
the case of GCHQ who do not explore workplace diversity or the importance of secrecy 
to the same extent that MI5 and MI6 do.  
 
The public speeches utilised have ostensibly been from MI5 DGs. In comparison, there 
are only three available by a serving Director of GCHQ, and two from C. However the 
latter’s are far more informative as the GCHQ speeches tend to be discussing wider 
themes such as promoting the work of Alan Turing.250 But it would be remiss not to 
utilise the speeches from as they not only enhance the depictions evident on the website 
but provide a telling mechanism for analysing how the content has changed over time. 
Whilst these speeches were all publicly available on the MI5, MI6 and GCHQ websites, 
these are not always easily accessible. Equally, this relies on the public accessing the 
websites, searching for the speeches, and then reading them, or on news journalism to 
report on such matters.  Therefore, it seems apt to argue that these speeches are somewhat 
hidden in plain sight.  
 
The first public speech given by Dame Stella Rimington in 1994, merely sought to 
provide an insight into the intelligence world,251 whereas her predecessor Sir Stephen 
Lander, simply gave a factual talk about the release of information to what is now the 
National Archives.252 By 2003, there was a shift in emphasis with Manningham-Buller 
focusing upon terrorism and how MI5 as well as wider British Intelligence sought to 
combat it, including giving statistics of the number of foiled attacks and emphasising the 
                                                          
250 Government Communication Headquarters, Speech – Director GCHQ makes speech in tribute to Alan 
Turing: Sir Iain Lobban, 4th October 2012, Available From: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/speech/director-
gchq-makes-speech-tribute-alan-turing (Accessed 21st December 2018) 
251 Security Service, News And Speeches – Security and Democracy: Is There A Conflict: Dame Stella 
Rimington, 12th June 1994,  Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/security-and-democracy-is-
there-a-conflict (Accessed 11th December 2018) 
252 Security Service, News and Speeches – British Intelligence in the 21st Century: Sir Stephen Lander, 21st 
June 2001, Available From, https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/british-intelligence-in-the-21st-century 
(Accessed 14th December 2018) 
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importance of international cooperation.253 Perhaps it was due to the changing threats in 
the post 9/11 context, which required MI5 to become more engaged with the public, 
something particularly evident in the number of public speeches given by Manningham-
Buller. Evans also sought to provide more information to the public, such as highlighting 
the continued threat posed by Al Qaeda.254 Thus, over time, there has been a gradual 
openness in the themes MI5 are willing to publicly discuss, although there is arguably 
more that could occur in this respect. 
 
For the current DG, there is a continued attempt to further provide an understanding of 
the British Intelligence Services,255 something his counterpart, C has also undertaken, 
giving the first speech from within the iconic Vauxhall Cross Headquarters to news 
journalists.256 This intimates how news journalism is perceived to be an important way 
in which the public are informed about intelligence matters, demonstrating the validity 
of its inclusion as an avenue of information analysed in this thesis. Another theme both 
highlight is the successes the British Intelligence Services have had, something earlier 
speeches only ever subtly referred to. Whilst the early 2000s marked a turning point in 
terms of DGs giving statistics on the number of attacks prevented, Parker not only 
provides such statistics, but also what these constituted, a recurring theme in his many 
speeches.257 Implicitly, this portrays how capable and effective MI5 have been in 
                                                          
253 Security Service, News and Speeches – Global Terrorism: Are We Meeting The Challenge?: Baroness 
Eliza Manningham-Buller, 16th October 2003, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/global-
terrorism-are-we-meeting-the-challenge (Accessed 13th December 2018); 
Security Service, News and Speeches – The International Terrorist Threat To The UK: Baroness Eliza 
Manningham-Buller, 9th November 2006, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/the-
international-terrorist-threat-to-the-uk (Accessed 17th December 2018) 
254 Security Service, News and Speeches – Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Trust: Jonathan Evans, 5th 
November 2007, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/intelligence-counter-terrorism-and-trust 
(Accessed 17th December 2018) 
255 Security Service, News and Speeches – The Enduring Terrorist Threat and Accelerating Technological 
Change: Andrew Parker, 8th October 2013, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/the-enduring-
terrorist-threat-and-accelerating-technological-change (Accessed 20th December 2018) 
256 Secret Intelligence Service, News: 8 December 2016 – Inside the Modern Day MI6, Available From: 
https://www.sis.gov.uk/news/inside-the-modern-day-mi6.html (Accessed 14th December 2018) 
257 Security Service, News and Speeches – The Enduring Terrorist Threat and Accelerating Technological 
Change: Andrew Parker, 8th October 2013, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/the-enduring-
terrorist-threat-and-accelerating-technological-change (Accessed 20th December 2018); 
Security Service, News and Speeches – Director General Speaks on Terrorism, Technology and Oversight: 
Andrew Parker, 8th January 2015, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/director-general-
speaks-on-terrorism-technology-and-oversight (Accessed 20th December 2018); 
Security Service, News and Speeches – Director General Andrew Parker Speech to BFV Symposium: 
Andrew Parker, 14th May 2018, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/director-general-andrew-
parker-speech-to-bfv-symposium (Accessed 21st December 2018) 
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preventing a terrorist attack and bringing the perpetrators to justice. This depiction is also 
evident from MI6 although more explicitly as Younger also provides such information 
by highlighting how via cooperation, Daesh attempted attacks have been prevented.258 
This portrayal is also evident twice on the MI6 website in relation to their involvement 
in stopping the AQ Khan network from selling nuclear weapons to third parties.259 
 
It was pleasing to see particularly in the speeches, that the British Intelligence Services 
do acknowledge their failings which depict them not only as human, but willing to move 
forward whilst highlighting issues they have faced. This allows for a clear depiction of 
how nowadays, the British Intelligence Services strive to act legally and ethically, as well 
as the emphasis placed on ensuring staff are aware of this and can discuss any concerns 
they have. This is perhaps one of the overarching portrayals all of the websites provide. 
Discussing their failings also prevents assertions that the websites are portraying a 
‘squeaky-clean’ version of themselves in the public sphere in order to encourage 
recruitment, but are rather seeking to ensure that there is an understanding of their actions 
as they understand the importance of maintaining their democratic legitimacy via public 
trust and confidence in them.  
 
Whilst the Big 3 all highlight the overarching themes of acting legally and ethically, 
cooperation, structure and organisation, diversity, and the importance of secrecy, there 
are nuances in how they emphasise them, demonstrating how they remain separate 
organisations, despite their close cooperation.  Overall, there is a positive portrayal of the 
British Intelligence Services in their adherence to legislation; capability and effectiveness 
of ensuring Britain’s safety and security; the structural and organisational difficulties 
they have to overcome; the nature of the workforce and the importance of secrecy to the 
work of the British Intelligence Services.  
                                                          
258 Secret Intelligence Service, News: 03 December 2018 – MI6 ‘C’ Delivers Rare Public Speech at St 
Andrews University, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/news/alex-younger-st-andrews-speech.html 
(Accessed 10th December 2018); 
Secret Intelligence Service, News: 8 December 2016 – Inside the Modern Day MI6, Available From: 
https://www.sis.gov.uk/news/inside-the-modern-day-mi6.html (Accessed 14th December 2018) 
259 AQ Khan is discussed on the counter-proliferation drop down section at the bottom of the ‘Our Mission’ 
page which provides some information about the threats MI6 are seeking to prevent. Please see: Secret 
Intelligence Service, Our Mission, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-mission.html (Accessed 
3rd November 2015); 
Secret Intelligence Service, Our History, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-history.html 
(Accessed 20th November 2017) 
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Whilst it has been pleasing to see the British Intelligence Services seeking to provide a 
depiction of themselves directly to the public, there are still questions about how 
accessible the information is. They all have websites which seek to actively engage with 
the public, with GCHQ launching a new one in 2016,260 which coincides with one 
interviewee’s assertions that the Snowden revelations demonstrated the necessity of 
engaging with the public and restoring public trust.261 Therefore, it is unsurprising to see 
an emphasis across the Big 3 that they are always acting in a legal and ethical manner. 
But much of the information is somewhat hidden in plain sight, making the depictions of 
the British Intelligence Services something that needs to be actively searched for as 
opposed to being easily accessible. This could be easily rectified and would portray 
British Intelligence as an entity willing to engage with the public in a user-friendly 
manner.  
 
Interviews with British civil servants provided the assertion that the public are happy 
with what is going on, and will only delve into the details if they have a specific 
interest,262 but, and perhaps more telling, public engagement from the Big 3 is deemed a 
‘necessary evil’.263 Although interviews demonstrated the realisation that the Big 3 can 
be better at telling their own story, there remains significantly more which they could do 
for this to occur. In particular, finding a balance between openness and secrecy would be 
an obvious starting point, combined with the possibility engaging with museums and 
exhibits. At the Imperial War Museum, the ‘Secret War’ exhibit is dedicated to the 
intelligence realm, and includes information relating to the contemporary context, with a 
specific emphasis upon the role of the British Intelligence Services in countering 
terrorism, and the 7/7 attacks in London in 2005.264 However, all the information is based 
on publicly available sources, and there is no engagement from the British Intelligence 
                                                          
260 Government Communication Headquarters, 404 – Page Not Found, Available From: 
https://www.gchq.gov.uk/features/working-other-government-departments (Accessed 9th January 2019) 
261 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017; 
Private Interview 5: 21st January 2016; 
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Private Interview 2: 8th January 2016; 
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Services.265 Therefore, they utilised the same sources to create the display as are being 
analysed in this chapter, namely the Big 3 websites and public speeches. 
 
This is in stark contrast to the International Spy Museum in Washington D.C which does 
have direct input from former intelligence practitioners, something which they 
highlight.266 In an interview with the museum’s curator, Dr Vince Houghton explored 
this theme stating that they have ‘always had close collaboration’ with the Intelligence 
Services, evident as since their founding, there have been 3 former Central Intelligence 
Agency employees and a deputy NSA director on the board, and MI5’s former DG Dame 
Stella Rimington was also a board member when the interview was undertaken in 
2016.267 This demonstrates that Britain is somewhat behind their American counterpart 
in terms of engaging with the public, and demonstrates that there is far more which they 
could do to enhance the understandings they seek to provide of themselves to the public. 
This would prevent the avenues from being in such an influential position in providing 
an understanding of intelligence in the public domain. As the next chapter will explore, 
this can mean that by not directly engaging, the British Intelligence Services rely at times, 
on their political master’s to provide the public with information relating to their actions.  
 
 
                                                          
265 Private Interview 1: With Amanda Mason – 7th October 2015  
266 International Spy Museum, Board of Directors, Available From: 
https://www.spymuseum.org/about/leadership/governing-board-of-directors/ (Accessed 23rd March 2019) 
267 Private Interview 18: With Dr Vincent Houghton – 20th September 2016 
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Chapter 3:  A Complementary Relationship – British 
Intelligence Services and the Government 
 
Introduction  
Intelligence plays a crucial role in informing and executing the policies of British 
Governments,1 resulting in the successive British Governments having a clear 
understanding of the actions of the British Intelligence Services, who require 
Government approval for their continued activities.2 Therefore, the elected Government, 
via Parliament, are in a clear position to provide a depiction of British Intelligence to the 
public, something which results in an inherently positive depiction.  
 
To assess what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services are disseminated from the 
political as opposed to bureaucratic Government of the time, the chapter will explore the 
Parliamentary statements and debates surrounding the two case studies, both of which 
provide a positive depiction of the British Intelligence Services. The first, the lead up to 
the Iraq War, results in the superlative nature of British Intelligence, particularly in 
relation to their capability and effectiveness being highlighted by Ministerial statements. 
This portrayal is something the long-awaited Chilcot inquiry questioned, particularly 
raising concerns about the limitations of intelligence not being evident in the 
Government’s use of intelligence.3 But, this is not something the chapter focuses upon 
due to the emphasis consecutive Governments place on their independence from official 
reports and inquiries, a central theme evident in the creation of the Chilcot Inquiry.4 The 
second case study, the Snowden revelations, advances the positive portrayal of the British 
                                                          
1 Scott, L, and Jackson P, ‘Intelligence’, in Palgrave Advances – International History, edited by Patrick 
Finney, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 164; 
Foreign Affairs, Intelligence and the Presidency How to Get It Right, by Jami Miscik, Available From: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-04-17/intelligence-and-presidency?cid=int-
lea&pgtype=hpg (Accessed 15th June 2017);  
Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’ in Democratic Oversight of Intelligence Services, edited 
by Daniel Baldino, (Sydney, The Federation Press, 2010), p. 188;  
Gill, P, Policing Politics – Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State, (London, Frank Cass 
Publishing, 1994), p. 50 
2 Intelligence Services Act of 1994, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1994); 
Security Services Act of 1989, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1989)  
3 Report of the Iraq Inquiry – Executive Summary, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2016), p. 
43–46, 73–77, 115–118, 131–132  
4 Hansard, House of Commons, 15th June 2009, Volume 494, Column 23 
 
Page | 120  
 
Intelligence Services, by not only furthering the depiction of their capability and 
effectiveness, but also the legality and ethical nature of their actions.  
 
Methodology 
As the relationship between Government and Intelligence Services varies between 
countries,5 this chapter arguably has the least applicability to the wider intelligence 
literature due to its inherent British focus. However, it still aids understanding of political 
institutions and the role of intelligence within them.  Through researching the 
Government responses to the case studies, the potential of each theme becoming its own 
chapter was evident. Therefore, a tight focus on both case studies, as well as which 
Government statements are examined is paramount. Thus, Government statements at key 
points from the Iraq War controversy and the Snowden revelations will be analysed. For 
the Iraq case study, these include: when the September dossier was made public; when 
the allegations of sexing-up the dossier were made; and when the Butler Inquiry reported 
its findings. For the second case study, the speeches analysed are directly following the 
Snowden revelations and after the David Anderson Report was published. 
 
Hansard has been used extensively to access speeches and written statements made by 
Government Members of Parliament (MPs) in the House of Commons. Although there 
are speeches made to news journalism by the Prime Minister, Foreign and Home 
Secretaries on these topics, these are analysed within the news journalism chapter and 
will therefore be omitted from the analysis in this chapter as news journalists invariably 
include their own analysis on the speeches, as opposed to repeating the speech or written 
statement word for word as they are in Hansard. Hansard allows for Government 
Ministers to place information directly in the public domain. In fact, the investigative 
journalist Chapman Pincher argues that Parliament can be deemed a medium in its own 
right through Hansard.6 Using it allows to clearly compare and contrast between the 
portrayals the Intelligence Services themselves are seeking to put directly into the public 
domain and the Government depiction of the Intelligence Services. 
 
                                                          
5 Teirilä O, J, and Nykänen, ‘The Public Dimension of Intelligence Culture: The Search for Support and 
Legitimacy, International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, 29/2 (2016), p. 283  
6 Pincher, C, The Truth About Dirty Tricks, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1991), p. 49 
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Ministerial Statements  
In this section, only statements made by key Government Ministers, namely the Prime 
Minister, Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary will be scrutinised, due to their role in 
overseeing British Intelligence.7 As the Foreign Secretary William Hague succinctly 
explained:  
 
I am responsible for the work of GCHQ and the Secret 
Intelligence Service, SIS, under the overall authority of 
the Prime Minister. My Rt. Honourable Friend the Home 
Secretary is responsible for the work of the Security 
Service.8 
 
As Hague alluded to, the Prime Minister also has a role in overseeing British Intelligence, 
something Ian Leigh argues results in the Prime Minister acting as a Government 
mouthpiece on intelligence matters, despite the secretaries of state having overall 
responsibility for the British Intelligence Services.9 Therefore, this section will examine 
Parliamentary statements made by the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Home 
Secretaries which are available via Hansard on both the reasons for the Iraq War and the 
Snowden disclosures.10 These suggest that over time, there is more willingness to discuss 
intelligence matters explicitly, as opposed to subtle references which are seemingly based 
on existing understandings of British Intelligence. Thus, over time, there is seemingly a 
move towards more openness to discuss intelligence in the public domain.   
 
                                                          
7 Security Service, MI5 Video Transcripts – Director General MI5, Andrew Parker – Speech – 17/10/2017, 
Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/who-we-are-video-transcript  (Accessed 21st December 2018; 
Government Communication Headquarters, Feature – GCHQ oversight, Available From: 
https://www.gchq.gov.uk/features/gchq-oversight (Accessed 29th November 2018); 
Secret Intelligence Service, Our Mission, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-mission.html 
(Accessed 3rd November 2015) 
8 Gov.uk, Speech – Foreign Secretary statement to the House of Commons – GCHQ: Rt Hon William 
Hague, 10th June 2013, Available From: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/foreign-secretary-
statement-to-the-house-of-commons-gchq (Accessed 1st January 2019); 
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Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1984), p. 531 
9 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ in Who’s Watching the 
Spies?, edited by Hans Born, Loch K Johnson and Ian Leigh, (Dulles, Potomac Books, 2005), p. 84  
10 UK Parliament, Hansard, Available From: https://hansard.parliament.uk/ (Accessed 16th January 2019) 
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Iraq: The Government Perspective through the House of Commons  
In 2002, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair decided: 
 
to share with the public the intelligence being presented 
to the Government which showed that Iraq was in serious 
breach of several United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions’ (UNSCR).11 
 
This results in assessments made by British Intelligence placed directly into the public 
domain, as they attempted to enlist public and political support for the invasion of Iraq 
by providing ‘intelligence-related material concerning the attempts of the Iraqi regime to 
acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD).12 Paul Pillar argues that this 
approach of publicising the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessments in order to 
bolster public support for the Iraq invasion, was clearly the politicisation of intelligence.13  
 
However, the publication of the intelligence assessments, Michael Wesley argues, was 
an effect of the new security environment and meant that law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies were involved in the communication tasks of Government.14 
Indeed, at the time, even the Prime Minister Tony Blair acknowledged that this was a 
unique event,15 occurring 
 
                                                          
11 Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee Report on Iraqi Weapons of Mass 
Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments 11th September 2003 (London, The Stationery Office, 2004), 
p. 5 
12 Leigh, I, ‘Accountability of Security and Intelligence in the United Kingdom,’ p. 85 
13 Pillar, P, ‘The Perils of Politicisation’, in in The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, 
edited by Loch. K. Johnson, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 474 
14 Wesley, M, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence’, p. 195;  
This was something witnessed again under the Cameron Coalition Government when they published a JIC 
assessment about the Syrian use of chemical weapons against the domestic population. 
For more information, please see:  
Hansard, House of Commons, 29th August 2013, Volume 566, Column 1425, 1432; 
BBC News, UK intelligence assessment on Syria under analysis, Gordon Corera, 29th August 2013, 
Available From: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23883617 (Accessed 3rd October 2019);  
Gov.uk, Correspondence – Syria: reported chemical weapons use – Joint Intelligence Committee Letter, 
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15 Hansard, House of Commons, 14th July 2004, Volume 423, Column 1436 
 
Page | 123  
 
Because it is important that we explain our concerns 
about Saddam to the British people, we have decided to 
disclose its (the Joint Intelligence Committee) 
assessments’.16  
 
The following section analyses what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services were 
provided when direct references were made to them, before assessing the more indirect 
and subsidiary references evident. This creates a portrayal of intelligence based on subtle 
insinuations which arguably played upon current beliefs pertaining to the British 
Intelligence Services already in the public domain.  Perhaps this emerges from how in 
Pillar’s analysis, Government ‘public statements ostensibly reflect intelligence, but they 
do not reflect intelligence analysis, which is an essential part of determining what the 
pieces of raw reporting mean’.17 
 
Direct References to British Intelligence 
Considering that the Government sought to publish the September dossier to present the 
public with the same information that they had been provided with in relation to the threat 
posed by Saddam,18 it would have been strange had they not directly discussed 
intelligence. In the 24th September 2002 House of Commons debate, Tony Blair stated:  
 
I am aware, of course, that people will have to take 
elements of this on the good faith of our intelligence 
services, but this is what they are telling me, the British 
Prime Minister, and my senior colleagues. The 
intelligence picture that they paint is one accumulated 
over the last four years. It is extensive, detailed and 
authoritative. It concludes that Iraq has chemical and 
biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to 
produce them, that he has existing and active military 
plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, 
                                                          
16 Hansard, House of Commons, 24th September 2002, Volume 390, Column 3 
17 Pillar, P, ‘Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, 85/2 (2006) p. 20 
18 Hansard, House of Commons, 24th September 2002, Volume 390, Column 3 
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which could be activated within 45 minutes, including 
against his own Shia population, and that he is actively 
trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability.19 
 
Blair’s comments directly portray the capability and effectiveness of the British 
Intelligence Services in providing the Government with key information relating to 
Saddam’s WMD capabilities. This included the ability to launch them in 45 minutes and 
the attempted acquisition of nuclear weapons. Whilst highlighting the role of intelligence 
in Blair’s policy-making in relation to Iraq, it also portrays British Intelligence positively 
by directly demonstrating what information they had provided the Government with to 
allow such an assessment of Saddam’s WMD capabilities. This correlates to Wesley’s 
assertion that both the US and UK Governments had speeches vetted for accuracy and 
publicised this fact,20 something evident in the excerpt from Blair’s speech above.  
 
Following the Gilligan assertions on the BBC Radio 4 Today Programme that the 
September dossier had been sexed-up,21 this was a theme Blair furthered during Prime 
Minister’s Questions (PMQs). By not only emphasising how his decision-making was 
based on JIC assessments, which are of course, centred on collated intelligence 
assessments, Blair stated how the British Intelligence Services had discovered hidden 
documentation about Saddam’s missile capabilities.22 This rhetoric expands on the 
suggestion that the decision to go to war was based on the role of intelligence and the JIC 
assessments in informing Government decision-making. In turn, these direct references 
to the work of the British Intelligence Services could encourage public sentiment that if 
the Blair Government were influenced by the intelligence, any issues pertaining to why 
the war occurred was due to information policy-makers received. Although inherently 
subtle, this suggestion seemingly places the onus for any issues which may occur, on the 
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British Intelligence Services as opposed to the Government, perhaps due to a self-serving 
interest. 
 
Indeed, the depiction of the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence 
Services remains evident in the Government response to the Intelligence and Security 
Committee (ISC) report. Here, they welcome the ISC finding that ‘there was convincing 
intelligence that Iraq had active chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.’23 This 
furthered the portrayal of the British Intelligence Services being capable and effective, 
as if they are able to collect such coveted information from inside a hostile regime, which 
another organisation has deemed as convincing intelligence. 
 
In the September dossier debate, the depiction of the capability of the British Intelligence 
Services is directly alluded to as Blair stated:  
 
We have well founded intelligence to tell us that Saddam 
sees his WMD programme as vital to his survival and as 
a demonstration of his power and influence.24 
 
This depicted the British Intelligence Services as capable and effective for being able to 
provide the Blair Government with information about how Saddam views his WMD 
programme. Undoubtedly, such an awareness would provide greater clarity to the policy-
makers as to how Saddam perceives his position and ambitions in relation to WMD 
capabilities, thus exhibiting the importance of such intelligence.  Indeed, Blair seemingly 
puts such an emphasis on the information he has received from British Intelligence, 
arguing after Saddam claimed to destroy his WMDs; 
 
We are asked now seriously to accept that in the last few 
years – contrary to all history, contrary to all intelligence 
– Saddam decided unilaterally to destroy those 
weapons… Iraq continues to deny that it has any WMD, 
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although serious Intelligence Service anywhere in the 
world believes it.25 
 
Whilst suggesting Britain has evidence showing Saddam was not serious in his offers, 
Blair further demonstrated the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence 
Services in gathering this information. This is in conjunction to questioning the 
credibility of those who refuted the assertions that Saddam posed a threat due to his 
WMD capabilities. This rhetoric of implying an implicit understanding of Saddam’s 
intentions was also evident in the 24th September 2002 debate where Blair states: ‘We 
know from experience that it [Iraq] will try to avoid weapon inspections. We know from 
current intelligence that that is its intention.’26 By continually repeating ‘We or I know’ 
in his statements, Blair is again referring to information provided by British Intelligence, 
advancing the direct references to how the Government policy is inherently centred upon 
intelligence from services who are incredibly capable and effective in their provision of 
reliable information. The latter is something which was slowly expanded upon 
throughout the Government rhetoric, advancing the superlative nature of the British 
Intelligence Services.  
 
This was something of a continual theme, in the 24th September 2002 debate where Blair 
reiterated how information pertaining to Iraq’s WMD programme came from JIC 
assessments.27 Indeed, when Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary replaces the Prime 
Minister in answering questions, he furthered this rhetoric, as he argued that the dossier 
states that Saddam is prepared to use WMD.28 Although inherently implicit, this 
suggested that intelligence has provided information about the intentions of the Saddam 
regime, reiterating the rhetoric of how capable and effective British Intelligence has been 
in providing such information.  
 
By the Government furthering this view of British Intelligence, it perhaps ousts concerns 
about unethical and immoral activity suggested by whistle-blowers in the late 1990s. 
Having been made redundant unexpectedly, Richard Tomlinson publicised what he 
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termed a ‘bad management style’ within MI6, before being imprisoned for breaching the 
Official Secrets Act.29 David Shayler and Annie Machon claimed that MI5 could have 
prevented the 1993 Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) bombing in Bishopsgate, London, as 
well as most controversially, that MI6 had been involved in a plot to assassinate the 
Libyan leader Colonel Gadaffi.30 However, if these revelations were to be fully quashed, 
then surely the Government rhetoric would have explored the probity of the British 
Intelligence Services, a theme absent from the discussions. 
 
By highlighting the credibility of the intelligence on which the dossier is based,31 the 
portrayal of the effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services is expanded upon. 
Although slightly less prevalent, this depiction remains evident when Blair sought to 
abrogate the Government of any wrongdoing by stressing how the Butler and Hutton 
inquiries had reached the same conclusions. These pertained to the good faith of the 
Intelligence Services in compiling the dossier, as well as how any issues emanate from 
how the intelligence should have been presented, as opposed to the collected 
intelligence.32 They also acknowledge that caveats about the intelligence could have been 
clearer.33 Thus, the British Intelligence Services are portrayed as effective by providing 
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accurate and credible intelligence as the issues surrounding the dossier did not emanate 
from them, but arguably from the process of disclosing a Government intelligence report 
to the public without amending it for public consumption. 
 
In announcing the creation of the Butler Inquiry, Jack Straw stated:  
 
Let me take this opportunity to pay tribute to the 
outstanding work of the British intelligence agencies 
around the world, often in difficult and hostile conditions. 
This inquiry is emphatically not a challenge to that vital 
work, nor to the dedication and professionalism of the 
people who work in those agencies; but what the inquiry 
should do is to help the Government better to evaluate and 
assess the information that they provide.34 
 
This direct reference to the work of the British Intelligence Services furthers the depiction 
of their capability and effectiveness in gathering information in difficult and hostile 
places, a portrayal which was also evident in the Government response to the ISC 
report.35 This is a theme Straw later expanded upon when he stated that the assessment 
of Iraq made by the British Intelligence Services was the same as that made by their 
counterparts around the world,36 thus expanding upon the portrayal of effectiveness if 
they are reaching the same conclusions as their counterparts around the world. Most 
notably, this is perhaps referring to American Intelligence who were central in the 
provision of information evident in Colin Powell’s now infamous United Nations (UN) 
speech37 which made the US intelligence community ‘highly visible’.38 
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The Blair quotation also explores the professionalism of the British Intelligence Services, 
a theme which the Government explicitly commended in their responses to the ISC 
report.39 Such a portrayal may be the desired effect in leading the public to the suggestion 
that the British Intelligence Services provided accurate and credible intelligence, which 
others agreed with and therefore there were no problems with the intelligence which 
provided the premise for the Iraq War. In turn, this intimated the effectiveness of the 
British Intelligence Services, thus leading to the positive portrayal of them in the context 
of the Iraq War. 
 
Although occurring in a different context, the professionalism of British Intelligence was 
directly referred to in the Ministerial responses to the ISC report when the dissenting 
views within Defence Intelligence (DI) about the validity of the intelligence in the dossier 
was examined. By stressing that such concerns emanated from two individuals and the 
concerns were dealt with internally,40 the professionalism of the British Intelligence 
Services in handling concerns from staff who disagree with the majority view is inferred. 
The British Intelligence Services are portrayed positively here due to the clever wording 
which also implicitly criticises those who disagree with the intelligence by implying that 
these were not widely held beliefs and thus the intelligence of the threat Saddam posed 
remained credible. This also links into the British way in Intelligence as it demonstrates 
the extent to which there is a drive for consensus in intelligence analysis, something 
which Mike Goodman highlighted as being a key characteristic of the British way in 
Intelligence.41 
 
Positive depictions of the British Intelligence Services continue when Jack Straw praised 
their activities for maintaining world peace. 
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In the intervening period since the Iraq War began, events 
elsewhere have greatly increased anxieties about the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of the 
need for reliable intelligence and effective international 
action. According to reports over the weekend, an 
individual has sold nuclear secrets to North Korea.42 
 
This exhibited the brilliance of the British Intelligence Services for discovering such 
information, a continual theme in the arguments of WMD proliferation. In highlighting 
Libya’s desire to have WMD capabilities, the ability of the British Intelligence Services 
to gather such information is highlighted, furthering the capable and effective portrayal.43  
Cooperation with America and Pakistan to shut down the AQ Khan network which 
sought to sell nuclear information to what MI6 terms ‘countries of concern’44 also 
portrays the effectiveness and excellent work of British Intelligence. Seemingly, this is 
deemed something of an intelligence success that not only do MI6 refer to it on ‘Our 
History’ page of the website which includes minimal information post 1994,45 it also 
influenced the interactive role-playing game at the International Spy Museum,46 alluding 
to how much information about it is publicly available if it can influence such an exhibit. 
 
Thus far, direct references to the British Intelligence Services by the Blair Government 
have all resulted in a positive depiction. However, there are portrayals of the British 
Intelligence Services being ineffective and providing the Government with dubious 
intelligence. This was certainly evident in the Government response to the Butler Inquiry. 
It raised doubts about the accuracy of the intelligence relating to the assertion that 
Saddam could launch WMD in 45 minutes, and resulted in Blair’s acknowledgment of 
Butler’s finding that not all the intelligence can be relied upon.47 Ministers are seemingly 
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beginning to acknowledge that there are limitations to intelligence, thus suggesting that 
problems surrounding the inaccuracy of intelligence stemmed from the British 
Intelligence Services not providing the Blair Government with accurate information.  
 
Significant parts of the intelligence have now been found 
by the SIS to be in doubt. The chief of SIS, Sir Richard 
Dearlove, has told me that it accepts all the conclusions 
and recommendations of Lord Butler’s report that 
concern the service. The SIS will fully address the 
recommendations that Lord Butler has made about its 
procedures and about the need for the service properly to 
resource them.48 
 
Although the criticism is levied solely at MI6, it suggests there were issues with the 
intelligence in the lead up to the Iraq War, raising questions about the reliability and 
credibility of the intelligence in the dossier and by extension, the decision to go to war. 
This undeniably portrays both MI6 and arguably British Intelligence as an entity in a 
negative manner.  But the wording utilised prevents this theme from becoming the overall 
portrayal of MI6. Rather, by emphasising the willingness of MI6 to change working 
mechanisms suggests a desire to ensure they are once again providing the Government 
with credible intelligence.  
 
A recurring theme noticed is the Government emphasis on the access to information 
provided to the various inquiries,49 which for the ISC report, included access to classified 
material used in the September dossier, briefings from officials including the Prime 
Minister, Chair of the JIC and the heads of the Intelligence Services.50 This suggested to 
the public that the Government are doing as much as possible to cooperate with inquiries, 
perhaps a way of pre-empting assertions of the various reports being a cover-up of the 
Government’s activities. In the creation of the Butler Inquiry, Jack Straw highlighted that 
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some of the recommendations will be classified,51 a decision he alluded to, was not solely 
taken by the Government. These direct references sought to further the view that the Blair 
Government was placing as much information in the public domain, suggesting they had 
nothing to hide from public scrutiny.  
 
The direct references to British Intelligence are frequent throughout the Government 
statements on the lead up to the Iraq War, and at key points following the invasion. Whilst 
some direct comments provided a negative view of the British Intelligence Services, this 
was over-shadowed by the overriding positive portrayal of British Intelligence which 
centred on their capability and effectiveness. 
 
Indirect and Implicit Views of Intelligence  
On 24th September 2002, Blair made a speech in the House of Commons to accompany 
the publication of the September (later to be known as the dodgy) dossier. As the previous 
section examined, this speech included numerous direct references to the British 
Intelligence Services, but there were also indirect and implicit references which sought 
to further the portrayals the speech already created.  When emphasising the weaponry 
Saddam had access to, Blair began by highlighting what information the UN weapon 
inspectors in Iraq had gathered, before going on to discuss the dossier’s conclusions, and 
how these emanated from JIC who had a central role in providing intelligence 
assessments for consecutive Governments. 52  
 
It [the dossier] concludes that Iraq has chemical and 
biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to 
produce them, that he has existing and active military 
plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, 
which could be activated within 45 minutes, including 
against his own Shia population, and that he is actively 
trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability.53 
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By alluding to the role of intelligence within the dossier as the quote above demonstrates, 
it is implied that the British Intelligence Services provided the information pertaining to 
Saddam’s ability to launch WMD in 45 minutes. This is perhaps the key phraseology 
which caused concern amongst the British public about a WMD attack in such a short 
space of time. The same day, the London Evening Standard published the headline ‘45 
Minutes from Attack’ and the following morning, The Sun had the headline ‘Brits 45 
minutes from doom’.54 This demonstrates how crucial the wording can be in creating a 
certain viewpoint in the public domain. Indeed, the authoritative rhetoric suggests 
agreement from UN inspectors and British Intelligence to the extent to which WMD exist 
in Iraq, thus seeking to prevent any disagreement or questioning. 
 
This theme was ever present when Blair explored the nature of Saddam’s weaponry, 
particularly focusing on the ballistic and long-range missile capabilities. Although Blair 
does not refer to British Intelligence having provided this information, he claimed that it 
was detailed in the dossier.55 Equally, in a response to a question, Blair stated there was 
evidence to show that if a war in the Middle East occurred, Britain would not be able to 
stand apart.56 The wording in both examples alluded to the Blair Government having 
intelligence relating to the use of missiles in Saddam’s desire to launch WMD, something 
implied as:  
 
In the past four or five years the issue of Iraq, weapon 
inspections and what we do about that regime has come 
over my desk pretty much week after week.57 
 
As with the direct references, this advanced the portrayal that British Intelligence were 
capable and effective in their ability to provide the British Government with such 
important information from inside a hostile regime. Whilst subtly referring to the role of 
intelligence in policy formation, it also depicts the threat Saddam has continually posed 
to Britain, and how the information emanates from British Intelligence, although this is 
not directly specified. This is furthered due to the certainty in which this information is 
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portrayed, almost in a manner which is saying to the public, if you disbelieve what we 
are saying, you are disbelieving the continual work of the British Intelligence Services 
who are inherently capable and effective. Therefore, the rhetoric encouraged the public 
to reach the same conclusion as the Government due to the threat perceived to emanate 
from the Saddam regime.  
 
The capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services in gathering 
information about the threat posed by Saddam was implied on several occasions. When 
discussing the brutality of the security apparatus of the Saddam regime against Iraqi 
citizens, something the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stated was included in the dossier,58 
the effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services is once again suggested due to the 
amount of information they have collected from inside a hostile regime. There is an over-
riding implication through the Government statements that due to the capability and 
effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services, the wealth of information collected 
about the threat from Saddam, results in action being an imperative.  
 
When discussing Iraqi opposition groups, the capability and effectiveness of British 
Intelligence is further alluded to when Blair states that: ‘I have not personally seen the 
opposition Iraqi groups but I know that the Government are in touch with them’.59 This 
phraseology implied the role of British Intelligence either in the instigation or continual 
contact with opposition groups, furthering the view of the hard work undertaken by the 
British Intelligence Services to gather as much information as possible about the threat 
of Saddam. Indeed, this arguably plays into the public understanding of the role of British 
Intelligence in providing such information as during the troubles in Northern Ireland, 
MI6 initiated contact with the IRA.60  
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Although we did not deal with this in the dossier, there is 
no doubt, for example, that certain forms of terrorism in 
the Middle East are supported by Iraq.61  
 
By suggesting that the Iraqi regime’s support for terrorist organisations could have been 
discussed in the dossier, knowledge of links between terrorism and the Saddam regime 
are implied to be based on information from the British Intelligence Services. In the 
response to the Butler Inquiry, Blair acknowledged that it was intelligence which 
suggested the link between WMD and terrorism as well as how this influenced his 
thinking on the threat Saddam posed.62 Thus in this instance, intelligence undoubtedly 
had a direct impact upon Government decision and policy making.  
 
The link between Saddam and terrorism is seemingly another way in which the 
Government are purporting that the British Intelligence Services have provided a wealth 
of information and therefore, the action in Iraq would be a positive in the prevention of 
terrorism. This theme was particularly prevalent on the 18th March 2003 debate before 
the vote on going to war where a direct link is made between the invasion of Iraq and 
preventing Al Qaeda recruitment.63 Undoubtedly, this played into public concerns about 
terrorism, considering the recent history of the IRA attacks in the UK, and 9/11 some 18 
months previously. Highlighting such themes sought to encourage, and reinforce the 
suggestion that the war in Iraq was the right action due to the support the Saddam regime 
gave to terrorism.  
 
The 18th March 2003 debate also saw the Government rhetoric place an implicit emphasis 
upon intelligence by depicting Saddam as a tyrant with the capability of using WMD 
who had continually flouted United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs).64 
This subtly alludes to the role of intelligence by stating what capacity Saddam had in 
which to utilise WMD, thus alluding to the continued capability and effectiveness of the 
British Intelligence Services in gathering such information. Indeed, this depiction was 
furthered when Blair discussed how Saddam’s son-in-law had defected. Blair stated that:  
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He disclosed a far more extensive biological weapons 
programme, and, for the first time, said that Iraq had, 
weaponised the programme – something that Saddam had 
always strenuously denied. All this had been happening 
while the inspectors were in Iraq.65  
 
By stating how these activities were still occurring when UN weapon inspectors were in 
Iraq, the reliability of intelligence provided by the inspectors is questioned subliminally, 
thus putting an increased emphasis upon the role on the information collected by the 
British Intelligence Services.66  
 
In response to the ISC report, the Government stressed the ISC conclusions that the JIC 
was free of any political pressure or interference, although issues of uncertainty could 
have been made clearer by the JIC.67 Emphasising this theme could be for the self-serving 
purpose of abrogating the Government of blame following the assertions made by the 
BBC journalist Andrew Gilligan about the sexing-up of intelligence in the dodgy 
dossier.68 But, in doing so, British Intelligence is portrayed both positively and 
effectively as the rhetoric of the Government response implies that as there was no 
interference in the JIC’s assessments, these were therefore accurately based on the 
intelligence they received from the individual British Intelligence Services. 
 
These examples which mostly relate to information of WMD and their capabilities, 
demonstrated how the Government although not directly referring to the British 
Intelligence Services, has portrayed them in a positive manner by suggesting how capable 
and effective they are. Implicitly, this creates the perception of how accurate the 
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intelligence must have been at the time, therefore justifying the Government’s case for 
war, which is arguably what the Government would have been seeking to achieve through 
this rhetoric. However, as the following section exhibits, intelligence was at times a 
subsidiary theme in the desire to further the depiction of the threat Saddam posed. 
 
Intelligence as a subsidiary theme  
Intelligence was something of a subsidiary theme when the Government were seeking to 
highlight why the Iraq intervention would be positive, a rhetoric which was ostensibly 
based upon humanitarian arguments.69 This depiction leads to the assertion that both Iraq 
and the Middle East would be better off without Saddam in power, a theme the 
Government explored in both Blair’s statement to the House of Commons with the 
publication of the September dossier, but also in numerous responses to questions.70 
Indeed, the rhetoric also intimated that the UK and wider international system had tried 
numerous times to find a solution, but as Saddam had not acknowledged the actions of 
the UN, details of the UNSCRs, or allowed the UN weapon inspectors into the country 
to assess WMD capabilities, this was the last available option.71 This builds to the final 
argument of the brutality of the Saddam regime against Iraqi citizens, thus furthering the 
humanitarian and responsibility to protect arguments, whilst suggesting that such 
knowledge emanates from the British Intelligence Services.72 One clear example of this 
is when Blair stated that:  
 
The brutality of the repression – the death and torture 
camps, the barbaric prisons for political opponents, the 
routine beatings for anyone or their families suspected of 
disloyalty – is well documented.73 
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When the Foreign Secretary announced the creation of the Butler Inquiry, he also 
explored this theme as a reason for the Iraq War, claiming it was the right decision to go 
to war in Iraq as Saddam had continually flouted international law.74 This demonstrates 
the continued rhetoric both before and after the invasion of Iraq by the Blair Government 
that overthrowing Saddam was the right decision, irrespective of intelligence of WMD 
due to the brutality of the regime. This subsidiary theme was also evident in PMQs 
following the Gilligan allegations of sexing up the dodgy dossier. Blair’s responses 
focused on what a tyrant Saddam was, and therefore the Iraq War was necessary,75 
portraying an unwillingness from the Government to discuss these assertions, which 
included questions about the reliability of the intelligence provided. But, despite the 
desire to focus on why the war was a positive action, intelligence as a subsidiary theme 
is evident, thus creating the portrayal of how hard the British Intelligence Services had 
worked to gather information on horrific actions inside a hostile regime. This was 
something of a continuing portrayal throughout the direct and indirect references made 
to the British Intelligence Services.  
 
Following the publication of the Butler Inquiry in 2004, the Blair Government 
acknowledged that ‘evidence of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction was indeed less 
certain and less well founded than was stated at the time’.76 This demonstrated how 
intelligence was a subsidiary theme to the Government response, despite the centrality of 
intelligence to these WMD assertions before the invasion, showing a shifting focus away 
from discussing intelligence. Arguably, this would still have been within the public 
consciousness, and thus although Blair simply refers to evidence of WMD being less 
certain, to many, they would assume this to relate to the British Intelligence Services. 
However, what is perhaps most telling in the Government rhetoric is that whilst they 
acknowledge there may have been limitations to the intelligence, they still believe the 
war in Iraq to have been the right course of action. This argument was centred on the 
humanitarian rhetoric that Iraq would be a better place without Saddam.77 But, by failing 
to acknowledge the limitations of intelligence provided, the rhetoric subtly implies that 
the intelligence was not overly important to Blair. Whether this was the desired impact 
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of the Government response is unknown, but it would further public belief of the war in 
Iraq not being solely based on available intelligence, but a wider desire from the Blair 
Government to oust Saddam.  
 
The desire not to discuss intelligence was also evident in a statement made by the 
Coalition Government in the debate to mark the 10th anniversary of the Iraq War, 
furthering the view of the changing sentiment of the rhetoric. Mark Simmonds, the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who provided 
the Government’s position is keen not to discuss events leading up to the war, until after 
the publication of the much anticipated Chilcot Inquiry. Instead, he seeks to discuss the 
ongoing situation in Iraq.78 But, this does lead to intelligence being a subsidiary theme 
as Simmonds highlights cooperation ventures between the UK and Iraqi Government 
designed to aid the ongoing security situation which he acknowledges is somewhat 
volatile with terrorist attacks still occurring in some parts of the country.79 Implicitly, this 
alludes that there is British Intelligence Services’ involvement to aid the security situation 
as following 9/11 and 7/7, much was in the public domain about the role of the British 
Intelligence Services in the prevention of terrorist attacks.80  
 
It is possible that the changing rhetoric was due to the Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
Coalition Government seeking to demonstrate their own achievements in Iraq, but it may 
signify a change in the willingness to discuss intelligence-related themes, suggesting at 
the pervasiveness of secrecy. This is somewhat surprising considering the amount of 
information in the media about the role of intelligence in the lead up to the Iraq War to 
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mark the anniversary.81 It will be interesting to compare this to the Coalition Government 
statements about the Snowden revelations to determine whether this view of intelligence 
as a subsidiary theme is part of a wider rhetoric or a one-off, perhaps in an attempt not to 
be drawn into party political arguments.  
 
Throughout this section, how intelligence is often a subsidiary theme in the House of 
Commons debates has been highlighted, something which seems particularly prevalent 
when the Blair Government sought to emphasise both the humanitarian and responsibility 
to protect arguments, but also how Saddam brought upon the intervention himself by 
continually flouting international law. However, these themes still allow for subtle 
inferences to be made about the British Intelligence Services, and their ability to gather 
information. Overall, this results in an incredibly subtle, but positive portrayal of the 
British Intelligence Services in the public domain.  
 
Whilst the majority of the references to the British Intelligence Services are implicit, 
these still portray them as being capable and effective as they have collected intelligence 
from a hostile country which is credible and reliable. Such a depiction was also prevalent 
in the direct references although this saw dedication of British Intelligence explored too, 
thus aiding the positive portrayal. This was combined with the implicit suggestion that 
issues surrounding the dodgy dossier emanated from the JIC assessment being placed in 
the public domain.82 This overarching depiction furthered the positive portrayal of the 
British Intelligence Services. Equally, over time, there was reluctance to discuss 
intelligence. Whether this was due to changing attitudes towards the British Intelligence 
Services or a desire for the Government rhetoric to evolve is hard to assess but will 
perhaps become more evident when compared to Government statements about the 
Snowden revelations.  
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Snowden: The Government Perspective through the House of Commons  
Although the same criteria have been utilised to assess the portrayals of the British 
Intelligence Services in both case studies, the Snowden revelations demonstrated how 
the actions of the British Intelligence Services was discussed more explicitly than in the 
Iraq context. This meant that there was a clearer emphasis upon the British Intelligence 
Services, with intelligence as a subsidiary theme not being evident when analysing the 
rhetoric. Instead, there were numerous direct references to the British Intelligence 
Services as well as it being subliminally referred to. In the Snowden context, the British 
Intelligence Services are portrayed in a positive manner, with an emphasis upon how they 
are always striving to act. legally and ethically. 
 
Direct References to British Intelligence  
Throughout Hague’s 10th June 2013 statement, there are numerous direct references to 
how the British Intelligence Services act in a legal and ethical manner.  
 
This combination of needing a warrant from one of the 
most senior members of the Government, decided on the 
basis of detailed legal advice, with such decisions 
reviewed by independent Commissioners and 
implemented by Agencies with strong legal and ethical 
frameworks, with the addition of Parliamentary scrutiny 
by the Intelligence and Security Committee whose powers 
are being increased, provides one of the strongest systems 
of checks and balances and democratic accountability for 
Secret Intelligence anywhere in the world.83 
 
The comments highlight the emphasis the Government places upon the British 
Intelligence Services acting legally and ethically by exploring the numerous mechanisms 
in place to ensure this. Other statements also explored this theme, with Prime Minister 
David Cameron stating in PMQs that they have structures which are ‘ensuring that they 
[British Intelligence] act under a proper legal basis’.84 One week later, Cameron 
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reiterated this point again in PMQs,85 and it was discussed again in FCO topical questions 
in January 2014. This repetition continually repeats the argument of how strong and 
robust the legal structure is, and the role of warrants for the interception of content 
communications,86 thus depicting that the British Intelligence Services always act legally 
and ethically. This is a consistent portrayal when compared to the information the Big 3 
place in the public domain via their websites and speeches. 
 
Indeed, how the British Intelligence Services act legally and ethically was also discussed 
in the National Security Westminster Hall debate which examined how the legal 
framework governing British Intelligence is fully compatible with the European Union 
convention on human rights.87 This was followed by Theresa May stating in response to 
David Anderson that ‘it is absolutely the case that our agencies have been and are 
working lawfully and ethically in everything they do.’88 The comments all provide a 
direct portrayal of how the British Intelligence Services act in a legal and ethical manner, 
thus adhering to European stipulated standards on these issues. Arguably, this is a theme 
which the Government is seeking to continually suggest to the public by its repetition. 
There is such an importance on acting legally and ethically that Hague highlighted it in 
responses to questions that GCHQ has internal structures where staff can raise ethical 
and legal concerns,89 themes also explored on their website,90 demonstrating a 
consistency in the information placed in the public domain by the British Intelligence 
Services themselves and one of the avenues.  
 
Hague’s statement is continually refuting claims that GCHQ used the American National 
Security Agency (NSA) for information which they cannot legally obtain in the UK, 
claiming that: ‘I wish to be absolutely clear that this accusation is baseless’ and ‘the idea 
of GCHQ setting out to circumvent UK law by cooperation with other countries is 
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baseless’.91 This leads to emphasising how British laws are always upheld, even when 
the information emanates from another country.92 Indeed, Hague furthers this rhetoric 
when assuring other MPs that their communications would not be accessed and that 
warrants are not signed off on political grounds as mechanisms in place would prevent 
it.93 This clearly depicts close cooperation between British Intelligence and the 
Government when seeking to provide a particular image of the former to the public. It 
also portrays that acting in a legal and ethical manner is not just central to British 
Intelligence, but an ingrained principle to all their work, thus, they always act in a legal 
and ethical manner, no matter what the circumstances, a theme which the Intelligence 
Services themselves have been keen to emphasise.94  
  
This theme was explored in greater detail in the Westminster Hall Security and 
Intelligence Services debate where James Brokenshire, the Parliamentary Under 
Secretary for the Home Department stated that the work of British Intelligence:  
 
is carried out in accordance with a strict legal and policy 
framework that ensures that activities are authorised, 
necessary and proportionate… The work of the security 
and intelligence agencies is carried out in accordance 
with a strict legal and policy framework, which ensures 
that their activities are authorised, necessary and 
proportionate, including from Secretaries of State, from 
the interception of communications commissioner and the 
intelligence services commissioner as well as from the 
Intelligence and Security Committee itself.95 
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By repeating this point within two sentences, it furthers the rhetoric of how there are 
mechanisms in place to ensure that the British Intelligence Services act legally and 
ethically. Equally, it also portrays how their actions are necessary and proportionate, 
evident when Brokenshire highlighted how the commissioners analyse the codes of 
practice GCHQ has to ensure that they adhere to Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 
2000.96 The necessity and proportionality of their actions is furthered as Brokenshire 
stated that the interception commissioner ‘must be satisfied that such measures are legal, 
necessary, proportionate and carefully targeted’.97 By highlighting the necessity and 
proportionality of GCHQs actions, the Government seek to highlight how the British 
Intelligence Services are adhering to legal and ethical standards, a theme furthered in the 
response to the ISC report.  
 
The Government welcomes the Intelligence and Security 
Committee’s clarification that GCHQ does not have 
‘blanket coverage’ of all internet communications, and 
that it only examines those communications that relate to 
its statutory purpose… The Government welcomes the 
Intelligence and Security Committee’s conclusion that 
only the communications of suspected criminals or 
national security targets are deliberately selected by 
GCHQ.98 
 
This depicts how GCHQ ensure their actions are necessary and proportionate, and 
therefore demonstrates that they are acting legally and ethically, something furthered 
when it is stated how:   
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the principles set out in the Human Rights Act 1998 
underpin and act as an appropriate constraint on all the 
Security and Intelligence Agencies.99 
 
British Intelligence are therefore portrayed as always seeking to ensure actions are 
necessary and proportionate, and in turn that their actions are legal and ethical, furthering 
the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. This was also evident in the 
Westminster Hall Security and Intelligence Services debate where:  
 
the agencies’ recruitment and training procedures are all 
designed to ensure that those operating within the right of 
secrecy can be trusted to do so lawfully and ethically.100  
 
Not only does this further the depiction of how the British Intelligence Services always 
strive to ensure that they act legally and ethically, but also creates a consistent portrayal 
to the depictions the British Intelligence Services provide on their websites. In particular, 
GCHQ emphasises staff training to ensure all are aware of the legal and ethical 
framework of their actions, and how staff can raise any concerns they have about illegal 
or unethical behaviour.101 The clear similarities in the depictions the British Intelligence 
Service and Government suggests a clear ‘cross-Government’ awareness of what themes 
should be purported to the public. This creates consistency in the depictions of the British 
Intelligence Services placed in the public domain. This was something not evident in the 
Iraq case, intimating that how the British Intelligence Services and Government 
engagement with the public has evolved, perhaps due to more openness in the discussions 
of intelligence. 
 
In the first statement following the Snowden revelations, Hague explained that:  
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I receive hundreds of operational proposals from SIS and 
GCHQ every year. The proposals are detailed. They set 
out planned operations, the potential risks and the 
intended benefits of the intelligence. They include 
comprehensive legal advice describing the basis for the 
operations and comments from senior Foreign Office 
officials and lawyers.102 
 
This depicts the mechanisms which ensure that the British Intelligence Services act 
legally and ethically, thus furthering how the adherence to legal standards is central to 
MI6 and GCHQ, and undoubtedly to MI5. However, this can lead to difficult ethical and 
legal decisions, something Hague stressed, whilst also highlighting how he does not 
approve all the warrants which MI6 and GCHQ request.103 This leads Hague to explain 
the nature of warrants stating how they ‘are legally required to be necessary, 
proportionate and carefully targets, and we judge them on that basis.’ 104 This portrays 
the British Intelligence Services as not only acting legally and ethically by ensuring 
Ministerial approval for their actions, but also how they are not simply receiving approval 
for all actions they seek to undertake, suggesting at the importance of Ministerial scrutiny 
of their actions. This also subtly infers that if any issues surrounding warrants are 
incorrect, it emanates from the Minister as opposed to the British Intelligence Services 
seeking to act illegally or unethically.105 
 
To ensure that secret intelligence remains secret… 
secrecy is essential to safeguard sensitive methods and 
sources, and to protect the lives of those who work for us 
on the basis of confidentiality and anonymity.106 
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This demonstrated a salient theme, namely, the role of secrecy within Intelligence with 
Brokenshire’s comments from the Security and Intelligence Services Westminster Hall 
debate depicting its importance. Indeed, how crucial it is was also evident in the National 
Security debate where using an American example, Brokenshire discusses how publicly 
stating that the US had the ability to read Bin Laden’s communications in the 1990s, 
suddenly stopped and ‘we did not hear from him again until September 2001.’107 This 
highlighted not only the importance of secrecy to intelligence operations, but provided a 
direct reference to how it is crucial for the continued capability and effectiveness of the 
British Intelligence Services. This theme was also evident in the Westminster Hall 
National Security debate which supported the MI5 Director General in his comments on 
the issues which can emanate from revealing British Intelligence’s capabilities.108 This 
rhetoric is another example of the cross-Government; consistent portrayal of British 
Intelligence provided in the Snowden context. 
 
In the Government response to the ISC report, they stated how it is only the most sensitive 
information which has been redacted, and have sought to put as much information into 
the public domain as possible,109 something which does come across in the ISC report.110 
This demonstrates a desire for there to be more information in in the public domain which 
can lead to a greater comprehension of British Intelligence, something Hague deemed 
was crucial, even before the Snowden disclosures.111 Arguably, the necessity of this 
emanated from the coalition’s desire not to repeat issues of a lack of public understanding 
and confidence in the intelligence presented in the lead up to the Iraq War. 
 
When the Government rhetoric sought to encourage cross-party support for the actions 
of the British Intelligence Services, they were portrayed in an incredibly positive manner. 
A clear example of this is how they were portrayed as having a crucial role in protecting 
the UK, something evident in a remark from Brokenshire who stated:  
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I am sure we all agree on how essential is the work that 
our intelligence agencies do for us day in, day out to keep 
this country safe.112 
 
The direct reference portrays the crucial role British Intelligence has in protecting the 
country,113 something everyone in the House of Commons would wish to ensure. 
Successive Governments have all utilised British Intelligence, something Hague is keen 
to stress by remarking on how many of the mechanisms of intelligence, and particularly 
those for intelligence sharing with the US, used by the Coalition Government have not 
changed since the Blair and Brown Governments.114 Whilst this demonstrated how the 
British Intelligence Services have always been subject to the same robust mechanisms 
ensuring their actions are legal and ethical, it reads as if providing a subtle warning to the 
Labour Party of how actions in relation to overseeing and sharing intelligence are the 
same, perhaps to prevent any questions on this theme. This is further suggested when 
Hague highlights that the Coalition Government has sought to improve how intelligence 
is used by Ministers, stating:  
 
Intelligence is weighed and assessed alongside all other 
sources of information available to use as a Government, 
including diplomatic reporting and the insights of other 
government departments, and that all this information is 
judged carefully in deciding the Government’s overall 
strategy and objectives.115 
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These are comments which seem inherently directed towards the Labour leadership 
following the issues of the politicisation of intelligence by policymakers in the lead up to 
the Iraq War.116 the clearest example of this Government rhetoric was in responses to 
questions where Hague states that after how intelligence was used in Iraq, the Coalition 
Government sought to ensure that such issues did not happen again.117 These direct 
references portray the British Intelligence Services as being inherently capable and 
effective, something of a consistent portrayal when compared to the first case study 
explored in this chapter. In concluding his speech, Hague furthered this rhetoric when 
paying tribute to the integrity, professionalism and dedication of the staff of British 
Intelligence. He argued that in the House of Commons:  
could witness the integrity and professionalism of the men 
and women of the intelligence agencies, who are among 
the very finest public servants our nation has, then I 
believe that they would be reassured by how we go about 
this essential work…The British people can be confident 
in the way our Agencies work to keep them safe. But 
would-be terrorists, those seeking to spy against this 
country or those who are the centre of organised crime 
should be aware that this country has the capability and 
partnerships to protect its citizens against the full range 
of threats in the 21st century, and that we will always do 
so in accordance with our laws and values but with 
constant resolve and determination.118 
 
This furthered the depiction of the British Intelligence Services acting in an inherently 
positive manner by highlighting not only how they act legally and ethically, but the 
dedication and professionalism of the staff in seeking to protect the British public. This 
is something which Hague alludes to aiding the capability and effectiveness of the British 
Intelligence Services. Hague furthered this theme when responding to questions where 
he acknowledged the difficult circumstances in which British Intelligence work.119 This 
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serves as a clear similarity between the portrayals of British Intelligence provided in both 
case studies. There is a passion in Hague’s words, leading to the depiction that he is 
attempting to provide this message on behalf of the British Intelligence Services. This 
was also prevalent in Theresa May’s comments following the Anderson report which 
also provided the view of the dedication and professionalism of British Intelligence as 
she states:  
 
I would like to finish by paying tribute to the vital work of 
the men and women of those intelligence and law 
enforcement community, whose work is not always 
known, whose successes often go unrecognised and whose 
efforts day in and day out are fundamental to keeping 
everyone in this country safe.120 
 
With the majority of the Ministerial Statements being provided by junior FCO and Home 
Office Ministers, it was perhaps an attempt by the Coalition Government to move the 
debate onwards as they do not want to provide the Snowden revelations with discussion 
time from senior Ministers in the House of Commons as this could suggest the validity 
of the assertions. Although there are only a few comments made by the Prime Minister 
on either the subject of the British Intelligence Services, or the Snowden revelations, the 
times Cameron does discuss it, he too pays tribute to the staff.121Although relating to 
GCHQ, Cameron states:  
 
It comprises very, very, dedicated, hard-working crown 
servants who do incredibly valuable work to protect our 
safety and security every day of the week, and they deserve 
solid support from right across the Chamber and from 
both the Front Benches.122 
 
Clearly, this directly portrays the dedication and professionalism of GCHQ, and arguably 
wider British Intelligence, furthering their positive depiction. This is another theme 
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which should arguably unite the House of Commons, something which Cameron does 
allude to in his comments, highlighting that although there may be disagreements in how 
intelligence is used, or how they should be governed, the underlying principle that the 
British Intelligence Services are capable and effective in no small part to their dedication 
and professionalism, should be recognised. This is arguably the case as it is a theme 
which both case studies have analysed as being evident in both Blair’s Labour and 
Cameron’s Coalition Governments rhetoric. 
 
The over-riding portrayal of the British Intelligence Services in the Snowden context is 
a positive one, with their capability, effectiveness, dedication, professionalism and 
legality of their actions all being key themes the Government rhetoric explores. Whilst 
acting legally and ethically was perhaps the overarching depiction, all of the themes 
explored further the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services in the public 
domain.  
 
 
Indirect References to British Intelligence  
One theme which created numerous implicit references to the British Intelligence 
Services was the continuing rhetoric of The Guardian damaging national security by 
publishing the Snowden revelations. In the first Government statement made following 
the publication, the Foreign Secretary William Hague never directly refers to either 
Snowden or his allegations. However, the language used made it clear that this is what 
Hague’s statement directly relates to as:  
 
Mr Speaker, with permission I will make a statement on 
the work of the Government Communications 
Headquarters, GCHQ, its legal framework and recent 
publicity about it.123  
 
Indeed, throughout both the Coalition and Cameron Conservative Majority Government, 
the language used in their statements is crucial in the creation of subliminal references to 
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the British Intelligence Services. This is evident in how Hague referred to the damage 
the revelations will have on British Intelligence, stating how maintaining the security of 
the UK and her allies now becomes more difficult.124 Therefore, the onus is placed on 
Snowden being in the wrong for publishing information which could have severe 
consequences, despite not naming him. In turn, this provided the implicit suggestion that 
the British Intelligence Services and her allies, will have to work far harder to ensure 
Britain’s safety and security, implying that their capability and effectiveness could be 
somewhat limited.  
 
This theme was further evident during PMQs when David Cameron stated:  
 
I think the plain fact is that what has happened has 
damaged national security, and in many ways The 
Guardian itself admitted that.125  
 
This was in the context of The Guardian destroying the files it had, which although 
Cameron implied was the newspaper’s own choice, is something The Guardian have 
claimed was undertaken by GCHQ who, combined with the cabinet secretary and 
Government deputy national security adviser, placed significant pressure on them to 
destroy the documents.126 This continues the indirect suggestion that it was those who 
published the information that were in the wrong, and caused difficulties for the British 
Intelligence Services to remain capable and effective in the collection of intelligence. 
 
In October 2013, this theme was evident in a Westminster Hall debate initiated by 
backbenchers who were scathing of The Guardian for publishing the Snowden 
revelations, believing that the lives of staff could be affected.  Julian Smith who initiated 
the debate stated:  
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This debate, however, focuses on a narrower and darker 
issue: the responsibility of the editors of The Guardian for 
stepping beyond any reasonable definition of journalism 
into copying, trafficking and distributing files on British 
Intelligence and GCHQ. That information not only 
endangers our national security but may identify 
personnel working in our intelligence services, risking 
their lives and those of their families.127 
 
Whilst the Government response to this debate also places the onus of culpability on The 
Guardian, this occurs in a far more muted manner. Brokenshire provides the Government 
stance in the debate and questions The Guardian’s decision to publish the Snowden 
allegations stating that:  
 
I appreciate and respect the fact that journalists may 
spend significant time weighing up whether an issue is 
damaging to national security, and genuinely believe that 
they are doing the right thing. However, I respectfully 
suggest that they are simply not in a position to make 
national security assessments.128 
 
This questions the assertion made by Glenn Greenwald, one of the journalists involved 
that himself, Snowden and Laura Poitras only sought to publish information ‘that the 
public should see and that can be revealed without harm to any innocent people’.129 
Therefore, the Government are subtly criticising not only the journalists, but the wider 
editorial organisation at The Guardian for the publishing of this information. This theme 
continues when the rhetoric once again centres upon how the Snowden revelations can 
cause issues for the British Intelligence Services ensuring Britain’s safety and security, 
stating that those who released the information:  
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would do well to understand that the types of capability 
they are writing about are those we have relied on in 
recent years to stop terrorist plots, disrupt organised 
crime and put cyber-criminals, including those exploiting 
children or illegally proliferating arms, behind bars.130 
 
By highlighting how the prevention of criminal activities could be affected following the 
Snowden revelations, there is perhaps a desire to gain cross party support that the amount 
of information published has hampered the ability of the British Intelligence Services to 
ensure the countries’ safety and security. In turn, this allows for the implicit depiction of 
how the British Intelligence Services continually strive to be capable and effective. 
Indeed, this portrayal continues when the Government also highlighted how national 
security had been further affected by The Guardian providing this information to other 
newspapers around the world.131 Most notably, the Snowden allegations were also 
published in the German newspaper Der Spiegel and The New York Times,132 thus 
spreading sensitive information about British Intelligence to a wider audience.   
 
The damage caused by the Snowden revelations has been a theme of continual discussion, 
with claims that British spies had to be moved,133 and Sir David Omand comparing the 
damage to national security caused by Snowden akin to that of the actions of the 
Cambridge 5.134 This arguably intimates the validity of Smith’s assertions that the lives 
of British Intelligence officers are being put at risk due to the revelations. Also, the head 
of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service stated in a roundtable at George Washington 
University that ‘Snowden damaged your [American and British] national security in very 
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significant ways’.135 Combined with the Government rhetoric in the Westminster Hall 
debate about national security, this leads to the depiction of how the Snowden revelations 
have created a difficult working situation for British Intelligence, most notably due to 
their methods being leaked to their adversaries. It also alluded the role that British 
Intelligence has, not only in protecting national security, but also in the prevention of 
child exploitation, something GCHQ in particular is involved with and is highlighted on 
their website.136 This demonstrated how the British Intelligence Services undertake vital 
work not only in aiding national security, but the prevention of wrongdoing, furthering 
the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services due to the scope of their work.  
 
In the 10th June 2013 statement Hague asserts that ‘it has been the policy of successive 
British Governments not to comment on the detail of intelligence operations’.137 This is 
relating to the successive Government policy of Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND) 
which the Investigatory Powers Tribunal states is a lawful response, relating to ‘the 
operational activities if the Intelligence Services, including their intelligence–gathering 
capabilities and techniques’.138 However, it is somewhat surprising to see it used in the 
Snowden context, when all the information Hague is referring to is already in the public 
domain. This demonstrates how at times of crisis, the Government seemingly revert back 
to excessive secrecy which is in fact more damming as by not discussing the nature of 
the Snowden revelations, it is as if the Government are covering up allegations of 
wrongdoing. This is evident as following a question asking Hague to comment on the 
nature of the revelations, he stated:  
 
It is not possible for any Government to do that while 
respecting the need to maintain the secrecy of our 
intelligence work.139 
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It is not disputed that the British Intelligence Services require a degree of secrecy for 
their work, but if this becomes too pervasive to the extent that it prevents discussion in 
the public domain, it suggests that there is something which the British Intelligence 
Services are attempting to keep out of the public sphere. In turn, this limited discussion 
can imply that the British Intelligence Services may undertake illegal and immoral 
actions.  At fire alarm moments, there needs to be more openness and discussion in order 
for the public to fully comprehend what has happened. The tensions between openness 
and secrecy is a wider theme addressed in the research puzzle which undoubtedly affects 
public understanding of the British Intelligence Services. When there is arguably too 
much secrecy surrounding them, something the use of the NCND principle seemingly 
implies in this context.  
 
Perhaps it is due to this realisation that Hague goes on to intimate how the British 
Intelligence Services always act in legal and ethical ways, highlighting the key role 
Ministers have in approving warrants, as well as what information these require,140 a 
theme further explored in responses to questions when he stated that: 
 
we go beyond those requirements in assessing the impact 
on the privacy of individuals in order to try and make sure 
that it is only when absolutely necessary that we invade 
that privacy.141 
 
This depicted the importance placed on the British Intelligence Services to ensure that 
they act in a legal and ethical manner, something further suggested when Hague states 
that ensuring the proportionality, necessity and legality of targeted intelligence has 
always been a basic principle142 governing the British Intelligence Services. Such a 
portrayal was also evident in the Government response to the David Anderson Report ‘A 
Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review’ in which the Home 
Secretary Theresa May alludes to the close scrutiny of the British Intelligence Services 
undertaken by Ministers.143 Implicitly, this suggests that the actions of British 
                                                          
140 Hansard, House of Commons, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 32 
141 Hansard, House of Commons, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 39 
142 Hansard, House of Commons, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 42, 47 
143 Hansard, House of Commons, 11th June 2015, Volume 596, Column 1366 
Page | 157  
 
Intelligence are always under the careful attention of the relevant Ministers, thus they are 
always acting in a legal and ethical manner.  
 
By alluding to the strong legal framework and the checks and balances placed on British 
Intelligence,144 Hague further purported the rhetoric of how acting in a legal and ethical 
manner is an ingrained principle of British Intelligence. This leads to the implicit 
assumption that because of the strength of the mechanisms in place, British Intelligence 
will always act legally and ethically, with any misdemeanours highlighted by the strong 
internal and external mechanisms. This is a continual theme throughout the Government 
response to the Snowden revelations which also exhibited how the Government viewed 
a legal framework being the same as an ethical one,145 demonstrating how the British 
Intelligence Services always acting in a legal and ethical manner according to the 
Government.  
 
However, issues emanate as to whether the public would have the same understanding of 
acting in a legal and ethical manner. Although the Government rhetoric highlighted how 
the British Intelligence Services are acting in adherence to frameworks and legislation, 
due to the limits of legislation governing the British Intelligence Services, a theme which 
will be subsequently discussed, the public may have a diverse view of what constitutes 
legal and ethical behaviour. Therefore, the perpetuating view from the British public 
could be that British Intelligence are acting in an illegal and unethical manner. But, 
assessing whether this is the case would require significant up to date fieldwork gathering 
public understandings of British Intelligence. Graeme Davies and Robert Johns have 
sought to assess public confidence in MI6 following the Iraq War, using data collected 
from 2010. Whilst useful, their analysis fails to explore whether there is public 
confidence that MI6 act legally and ethically. Instead, they explore levels of social trust, 
finding that those with a higher disposition to social trust, have higher levels of trust in 
MI6, and the Government use of intelligence.146  
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Another theme which provides an implicit portrayal of the British Intelligence Services 
is the discussion of the American (US) and UK relationship. Hugo Swire, The Minister 
of State, for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office discussed the importance of US–UK 
intelligence sharing arguing that:   
 
Through our unique and indispensable relationship in the 
fields of intelligence, cyber and counter-terrorism, we 
work together to protect the people of our countries and 
their prosperity. The counter-terrorism relationship 
between the United Kingdom and the United States is vital 
to the protection of UK interests at home and overseas 
from the threats posed by Al-Qaeda and allied terrorist 
groups. The United States remains our most important 
partner in that field.147 
 
This provided the implicit view of the importance of US intelligence cooperation for 
Britain, which is deemed crucial to ensuring Britain’s national security and prosperity.148 
Indeed, the US-UK intelligence relationship has received substantial academic attention, 
from exploring the origins of what has been termed the special relationship between the 
two countries,149 to how this has evolved.150 The intelligence relationship was so crucial 
that Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE) played an influential role in the 
creation of the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) forebearer the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) who once created, established a close working relationship on counter-
intelligence matters with both MI5 and MI6151 Professor Keith Jeffrey explores the 
importance of US cooperation in the MI6 official history, explaining that:  
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The closest and most mutually productive relations of all 
were with the United States and they drew on the extensive 
(if not entirely untroubled) wartime relationships which 
had been established between OSS, SIS, SOE and signals 
intelligence organisations on both sides.152 
 
The importance of this relationship continues, evident through the combined role of the 
US and UK in stopping the AQ Khan network of weapons proliferation.153 Although the 
US-UK bilateral relations debate did not explore the Snowden revelations directly, by 
highlighting the importance of US–UK intelligence cooperation, it provides a subliminal 
suggestion that there may be some validity of the assertions of the close cooperation 
between the NSA and GCHQ. However, this does not automatically correlate to the 
allegations of illegal activity which were made, a theme which the subsequent section 
will explore.  
 
Following the Snowden revelations, one theme evident throughout the Government 
rhetoric were the problems emanating from the existing legislation, something 
particularly prevalent in the Government response to the ISC report. In the first statement 
following the allegations, Hague stated:  
 
There will always be ways of improving procedures… and 
there are always new situations that arise in intelligence 
gathering that require additions to the refinement of the 
legal basis of what we do and practices and procedures 
by which we do that work.154 
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Here, Hague alluded to the necessity of altering existing legislation, a theme he later 
explored in more detail, arguing that ‘We sometimes need to change aspects of the legal 
framework and where we are able to get information from’, due to the continual evolution 
in how people communicate.155 This intimates how, if there are questions surrounding 
the legality of GCHQ’s actions, these are due to the limitations of existing legislation, as 
opposed to GCHQ or the other British Intelligence Services setting out to act illegally or 
unethically.156 Such a depiction was furthered in the Westminster Hall National Security 
debate when Brokenshire argued:  
 
There is a pressing need to ensure that the capability of 
our law enforcement and intelligence agencies keep pace 
with ever-changing technology if they are to maintain 
their ability to tackle terrorism and serious crime.157 
 
This provided the indirect portrayal that if there are issues with the British Intelligence 
Services acting illegally or immorally, it is due to the limitations of the legislation as 
opposed to British Intelligence unilaterally deciding to act outside of the law. Indeed, this 
was alluded to in responses to questions in the 10th June 2013 debate, where Hague 
acknowledged that changes were necessary, and reminded the House of Commons that 
this was a theme which there was cross party support for in the context of the 
Communications Data Bill.158 
 
In repose to the Snowden revelations, the David Anderson report was initiated to assess 
whether ‘the legislative framework we have is the right one’.159 In the Government 
response, there was the implicit suggestion that the British Intelligence Services had 
always acted legally and ethically as they acknowledged the limitation of legislation, as 
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it was ‘spread over several different Acts, and it is necessary to bring it together in one 
law’.160 Implicitly, this provides the depiction that the British Intelligence Services have 
always sought to act within the law, but there are significant problems with the 
legislation, and this is where issues emanate from. Indeed, this is another example of 
where the Government understanding of the legality of the actions undertaken by the 
British Intelligence Services may vary drastically to the public view who would not, on 
the whole, have a clear understanding of the limits to the legislation. If this was made 
clearer, then such confusion may have been prevented.  
 
This is evident in the Security and Intelligence Services Westminster Hall debate where 
although the Government states that ‘GCHQ and our intelligence agencies act within the 
law’,161 this is questioned in relation to the Tempora programme Snowden revealed 
which related to GCHQ’s ability to gather and store mass amounts of data from fibre 
optic cables for up to 30 days.162 In the debate, Brokenshire stated that GCHQ’s 
involvement in Tempora was legal, before intimating that perhaps this demonstrates the 
necessity of updating legislation.163 Whilst this indirectly implied that Tempora was a 
legal activity undertaken by GCHQ, it also alludes to the necessity of altering existing 
legislation, perhaps due to the public concern as to GCHQ’s actions.  
 
But, in the discussions of the communications bill and investigatory powers (IP) bill, the 
Government are keen to highlight that it is in fact law enforcement organisations pushing 
for these powers.164 This is perhaps most evident when communications data is raised as 
a question to the Home Department on 15th July 2013. Brokenshire asserted:  
 
There is an understanding across government on the 
challenges and issues involved in protecting the police’s 
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ability to fight crime and on the fact that a gap is emerging 
in this whole issue of communications data.165 
 
What is interesting in this context is the limited emphasis placed on British Intelligence 
in the responses, despite it only being a month after the Snowden revelations. But this 
omission may be an implicit attempt at demonstrating how the communications data bill 
more controversial techniques, such as stipulating what types of data internet service 
providers must retain,166 were going to be used by the Police in their pursuit of 
paedophiles, terrorists and organised crime organisations.167 The role of law enforcement 
in utilising these techniques was explored in the Government response to the Anderson 
report,168 as well as highlighting that local authorities would also be able to use the 
collected internet data.169 Indeed, elite interviews undertaken also explored how it was 
law enforcement that was pushing for the legislation, as opposed to the British 
Intelligence Services, and that this was a theme the public were perhaps unaware of.170 
Combining elite interview data with the Ministerial statements provides a cohesive 
understanding of the views on this theme across Government, something inherently 
lacking from the academic debate surrounding the Snowden revelations, thus 
demonstrating the contribution made by this thesis in understanding what portrayals of 
the British Intelligence Services are provided by successive Governments.   
 
Although the Communications Data Bill was initiated before the Snowden revelations,171 
by highlighting its use for the prevention of what everyone can agree are heinous crimes, 
there is perhaps an attempt to encourage cross-party support for the proposed legislation. 
In turn, it leads to the implicit portrayal that British Intelligence would not be the only 
entities to use such powers, and in fact the legislation is not an attempt to provide them 
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with more powers, thus intimating although in an inherently subtle manner, that the 
British Intelligence Services act legally and ethically.  
 
In response to the ISC Privacy and Security Report, the limitations of legislation are 
inherently prevalent,172 with the then Home Secretary Theresa May stating that ‘the draft 
Investigatory Powers Bill should be considered as the formal Government response to 
that [ISC] report.’173 This demonstrates the Government’s acknowledgement of the ISC 
finding that having a clear framework that sets out the intrusive capabilities available to 
the British Intelligence Services is necessary.174 This led to the creation of the IP Bill 
designed to provide a:  
 
comprehensive and comprehensible framework 
governing the acquisition of communications, data about 
communications and equipment interference.175 
 
This suggests the necessity for information about which actions the British Intelligence 
Services are able to lawfully undertake to be more transparent, a theme intimated in the 
Government response, suggesting the awareness of increasing public comprehension of 
these topics. Indeed, had this been as prevalent before the Snowden revelations, there 
may have been an increased understanding that their actions were not illegal or unethical, 
but allowed under legislation which did not consider evolving communications 
technology. This demonstrates how increased openness would have been beneficial for 
ensuring public understanding of the British Intelligence Services. 
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The Government response to the ISC report stated what types of communications could 
be accessed and how these will be defined in the IP Bill.176 This was a theme another 
elite interview also explored by discussing what data the IP Bill sought to collect.177 What 
was interesting in this civil service interview was the clear way in which the data the IP 
Bill sought to collect was explained, which  raised questions as to why the public rhetoric 
was not explaining the theme in the same concise manner. The Government response 
implicitly depicted that the British Intelligence Services have always acted legally and 
ethically under the existing legislation which was not designed with modern 
communication methods in mind.178 This is combined with the use of warrants being 
explored and how these have always been utilised but, they will now be combined with 
enhanced safeguards.179 Therefore, there will be the strengthening, or improving of the 
existing situation by enhancing the safeguards.180 
 
Another theme intimated is that whilst the British Intelligence Services may have always 
acted legally, their actions may not have been entirely ethical as one service could gain 
access to a subject of interest’s property via the authority of another organisation’s 
warrant; something the Government is keen to stress is still legal entry as a warrant is in 
place.181 Arguably, this has some correlation to the central claims made by Peter Wright 
in the 1980s in relation to how the British Intelligence Services would access property.182 
Although there may be some operational merit in why warrants were shared, particularly 
if it is a long and convoluted process, it raises questions as to the ethical nature of these 
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actions, thus portraying implicitly that whilst the British Intelligence Services do seek to 
act legally, they may at times act unethically due to issues outside of their direct control. 
But these issues all emanate from the limitations of legislation and therefore, under 
British law, their actions were in fact legal, thus attempting to provide a positive portrayal 
of the British Intelligence Services.  
 
This is furthered when the Government response draws attention to MI6 stating that they: 
 
have launched a review of their use of class authorisations 
to strengthen existing arrangements and to enhance their 
ability to demonstrate compliance in a more systematic 
way.183 
 
Linking back to the discussion of the use of language, this is another example of how it 
can create a particular portrayal. In the case of MI6, the language highlights how they 
have always had internal mechanisms to ensure their actions are legal and ethical, and 
that these are simply being made stronger. This creates the depiction of MI6 being an 
organisation who are continually seeking to ensure that their actions are both legal and 
ethical, a portrayal furthered when the Government response states that the British 
Intelligence Services are:  
 
properly authorised and subject to high ethical 
standards… activities of agents are properly authorised 
and currently subject to oversight by the Intelligence 
Services Commissioner.184 
 
This furthered the depiction evident throughout the Government response to the ISC 
report that British Intelligence are always acting legally and ethically, and indeed, are 
keen to ensure that this continues. Although referring solely to GCHQ, the Government 
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rhetoric has a tough stance towards anyone attempting illegality, such as the misuse of 
an agency capability, something the Government state can lead to criminal 
proceedings.185 Not only does this imply the strong safeguards the Government places on 
British Intelligence, but that if any illegal or unethical behaviour is undertaken, this 
emanates from individuals, as opposed to the British Intelligence Services. 
  
Throughout the Government responses analysed, there are numerous implicit references 
to the British Intelligence Services. Whilst at times these intimate wrongdoing, such as 
the use of NCND in the first Government statement following the Snowden revelations, 
there is an overall positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services being capable 
and effective, although Snowden has affected this. This is combined with how in the 
Government understanding, the British Intelligence Services have always acted legally 
and ethically, with issues emanating from the limitations of legislation. However, 
problems arise as to whether the public are aware of this information which questions the 
extent to which such information is easily accessible to the public. 
 
Conclusion  
Despite the Blair Government publishing the JIC assessment on Iraqi WMDs in order to 
provide the public with an understanding of the information which the Government 
received,186 references to intelligence were implicit or as a subsidiary theme in the 
accompanying House of Commons debates. These still provided a depiction of the British 
Intelligence Services to the public, and overwhelmingly they were portrayed positively. 
This is in stark contrast to the Coalition Government who sought to avoid discussing 
intelligence on the 10th anniversary of the Iraq war, as well as immediately following the 
Snowden revelations where they used the NCND principle. But, in contrast to the Iraq 
case study, intelligence was not portrayed as a subsidiary theme after the Snowden 
revelations, demonstrating that overall, there was increased openness in discussing 
                                                          
185 Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, Special Reports – The Government Response to the 
ISC Privacy and Security Report, Available From: PDF of Government Response Accessed via ISC 
website (Accessed 1st March 2019), p. 11 
186 Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee Report on Iraqi Weapons of Mass 
Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments 11th September 2003 (London, The Stationery Office, 2004), 
p. 5 
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intelligence.  This theme continued after the Snowden revelations,187 and as this chapter 
has demonstrated, was accompanied by an overwhelmingly positive depiction of how 
British Intelligence are capable and effective and also ensure adherence to legislation.  
 
This is perhaps the key difference between the depictions of British Intelligence in the 
two case studies, that the Iraq context did not see an emphasis placed upon British 
Intelligence acting legally and ethically. Perhaps this was not something which was 
questioned in the Iraq case as it was by the Snowden allegations.  Equally, this also 
demonstrates how portrayals evolve over time as there was undoubtedly more 
information about the actions of the British Intelligence Services released in Government 
statements in the Snowden context, although this could also emanate from a desire to 
prevent issues of politicisation occurring again.188 But perhaps more crucially, this 
demonstrates increased openness on behalf of the Government in openly discussing the 
British Intelligence Services which resulted in more information being available in the 
public domain. This is a stark difference between the portrayals of the British Intelligence 
Services provided by the two Governments.  
 
But with more openness after the Snowden revelations, there was a consistent portrayal 
between what depictions the Government as an avenue of information, and the British 
Intelligence Services were both placing in the public domain.  Whilst this was not evident 
in the Iraq context, this is undoubtedly because in 2003, public engagement was still 
something of a new phenomenon, particularly for MI6. Indeed, it was not until October 
2005 that MI6 launched their own website in English, French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese 
and Arabic.189 This has seemingly been a continual trend with two separate elite 
interviews acknowledging that Snowden revelations did encourage the wider debate of 
putting more information into the public domain,190 thus allowing for consistent 
portrayals to become evident. 
 
                                                          
187 Hansard, House of Commons, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 31, 46 
188 Hansard, House of Commons, 10th June 2013, Volume 564, Column 47 
189 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, Second Edition, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
2012), p. 63 
190 Private Interview 2: 8th January 2016;  
Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017 
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Another reasoning for this could be that whilst the Government rhetoric provides a 
positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, issues emanate from the limitations 
of the legislation, something which perhaps the wider public are not aware of. The lack 
of understanding could occur from the fact that for the public to be aware of Ministerial 
statements, they are either reliant accessing Hansard or, on news journalism coverage. 
Whilst the latter does include live coverage of House of Commons and devolved 
Government debates, for 2015 – 2016 and 2016 – 2017, only 0.6% of the population 
accessed BBC Parliament each week.191 This may in fact be another reason for the 
Intelligence Services themselves to undertake more of their own public facing activities.  
 
Overall, there are similarities between the two case studies in their depiction of the British 
Intelligence Services as being a capable, effective, dedicated and professional entity, with 
the Snowden case furthering this depiction by focusing on their adherence to legal and 
ethical standards. Combined, this provides an overwhelming positive portrayal of British 
Intelligence from consecutive British Governments.  
                                                          
191 BBC Annual Reports and Accounts 2016 / 2017, (London, Broadcasting House, 2017), p. 30 
Page | 169  
 
Chapter 4: A Symbiotic Relationship: The British Intelligence 
Services and Academia 
 
 
Introduction  
This chapter examines the constantly evolving relationship between the British 
Intelligence Services and academia. In a contemporary context the ‘culture of openness 
has led to greater engagement between Britain’s intelligence community and its 
universities’.1 However, this is merely the newest way in which the relationship 
manifests, and still remains far behind the engagement witnessed by their American 
counterparts which dates back to the emergence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
when they actively engaged with university campuses across the country.2 As the 
contextualisation section explored, there is a long history of British Intelligence and 
academia cooperating with one another, perhaps due to the symbiotic nature of the 
relationship, demonstrating how interlinked these fields are and thus require significant 
exploration.  
  
To fully assess how intelligence and academia engage with one another, the chapter 
examines how the British Intelligence Services and academia cooperate, a section where 
the symbiotic nature of the relationship will be highlighted. This is due to the existence 
of approved university courses and centres of excellence, Governmental contracts for the 
teaching of intelligence personnel, and how former intelligence practitioners such as 
Michael Herman and Sir David Omand are now well-respected academics.3 Len Scott 
and Gerry Hughes are right in their assertion that this continues as following the Global 
War on Terror, there is a heightened interest in intelligence by both scholars and 
                                                          
1 Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, in Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First 
Century – Journeys in Shadows, edited by L.V. Scott and Peter Jackson, (London, Routledge, 2004), p. 13 
2 Johnson, L. K, ‘Spies and scholars in the United States: winds of ambivalence in the groves of academe’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 34/1 (2019), p. 2–3  
3 De Graaff, B, ‘IAFIE Hosts Annual Conference in Breda, The Netherlands’, International Association 
For Intelligence Education – IAFIE Newsletter, VI/2 (2016) pp. 1 – 11; 
Kings College London, Visiting Staff – Professor Sir David Omand, Available From: 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/visiting/omand.aspx (Accessed 7th December 
2015) 
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practitioners,4 a theme which the chapter will discuss. Based upon empirical research, 
the chapter will demonstrate not only the validity of Scott and Hughes’ assertion, but also 
the ways in which the relationship is apparent. Whilst some of them are merely an 
evolution of previous collaboration, such as academics writing official histories, there 
are new mechanisms such as approved university courses and centres, and the teaching 
of intelligence practitioners by academics. This demonstrates the symbiotic nature of the 
relationship as not only do current practitioners gain an academic understanding of the 
topic,5 but also academics gain a more detailed understanding of intelligence.  
 
The chapter then analyses what views of British Intelligence are evident within the 
intelligence studies literature. By focusing on the official histories of the Security Service 
(MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and 
the Special Operations Executive (SOE), how British Intelligence is portrayed positively 
to the public will become evident. In the case of MI5 and MI6, the official histories were 
approved to mark their centenaries, and thus they provided unprecedented access to 
Professors Christopher Andrew and Keith Jeffrey respectively. In contrast, GCHQ have 
approved Professor John Ferris to write their official history to mark their centenary in 
2019.6  This could in fact aid GCHQ in their attempts to tell their own story, a theme one 
interviewee said that they were attempting to achieve.7 This is something which has 
undoubtedly been the case for MI5 and MI6 in the publishing of the official histories.  
 
The chapter will then explore the wider intelligence studies literature to ascertain whether 
this is a portrayal evident throughout. This will allow for an effective comparison analysis 
of what view academia is depicting of British Intelligence. However, due to the vastness 
of the literature, it is impossible to include it all within this analysis. Therefore, it will 
centre upon examining the view provided by former practitioners, and two sub-genres 
which have been central to this research due to their emphasis upon the necessity of the 
                                                          
4 Scott, L and Hughes, R, G, ‘The Future of Intelligence: Seeking Perfection in an Imperfect World?’, in 
Intelligence and International Security – New Perspectives and Agendas, edited by Len Scott, R. Gerald 
Hughes and Martin. S Alexander, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2011), p. 8 
5 Private Interview 20: 12th September 2017 
6 Government Communication Headquarters, News Article – GCHQ to celebrate centenary in 2019, 
Available From: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/news/gchq-to-celebrate-centenary-in-2019 (Accessed 27th June 
2019) 
At the time of writing, this had yet to be published and is therefore why it has been excluded from the 
discussions about the portrayals depicted within the official histories.  
7 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017 
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public having an informed understanding of the intelligence realm; namely the 
Aberystwyth School and the Intelligence Accountability literature. Within these 
categories, some similarities were evident, particularly in relation to the depiction of how 
capable British Intelligence are in increasingly difficult circumstances. Therefore, 
academia provides a positive portrayal of British Intelligence and thus can provide the 
public with a greater awareness of the actions of the British Intelligence Services. 
 
 
Mechanisms of the Intelligence – Academic Relationship 
 
Empirical research undertaken for thesis uncovered numerous ways in which intelligence 
and academia cooperate, particularly in the American context. This wealth of information 
is perhaps due to the fact that a 2008 survey discovered how there were over 840 non-
government courses in intelligence at over 100 civilian serving higher education 
institutions in America.8 This is combined with the National Intelligence University, the 
senior academic institution of the US intelligence community, receiving top level 
supervision and guidance from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.9  But, 
particularly post 9/11, there has been an increase in the number of intelligence courses in 
the UK,10 (something also enhanced following the 7/7 attacks in London).11 This growth 
of the subject is also evident in the other ‘Five Eyes’ countries Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand,12 and there are developing number of intelligence courses at higher 
education institutions in Israel, some South American countries and Asia,13 in part due 
                                                          
8 Campbell, S, ‘A Survey of the US Market for Intelligence Education’, International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 24/2, (2011), p. 309 
9 Spracher, W. C, ‘National Intelligence University,: a half century educating the next generation of US 
Intelligence Community Leaders’, Intelligence and National Security, 32/2 (2017), p. 231 
10 Moran, C, ‘Note on Teaching Intelligence’ Intelligence and National Security, 31/1, (2016) p. 119 
9/11 also had a huge impact on intelligence courses in the US and in particular what is now known as the 
National Intelligence University as Spracher notes there was more money for both Department of Defence 
and civilian college and university intelligence programmes. Please see: 
Spracher, W. C, ‘National Intelligence University,: a half century educating the next generation of US 
Intelligence Community Leaders’, p. 233–234  
11 Central Intelligence Agency, Library – Studies in Intelligence – Studying and Teaching Intelligence: 
The Approach in the United Kingdom, Intelligence Education by Michael Goodman, Available From: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Studying_Teaching_6.htm (Accessed 22nd August 2019) 
12 Walsh, P, ‘Teaching Intelligence in the twenty-first century: towards an evidence-based approach for 
curriculum design’, Intelligence and National Security, 32/7 (2017), p. 1005 
13 Dexter, H, Phythian, M, Strachan-Morris, D, ‘The what, why, who and how of teaching intelligence: the 
Leicester approach’, Intelligence and National Security, 32/7 (2017), p. 920 
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to increased student interest in the subject.14 This section will only focus upon three keys 
ways in which the relationship manifests itself, both due to the collected information, as 
well as to ensure the chapter remains of a manageable size. Therefore, this section 
addresses how there are now approved university centres and courses, Government 
contracts for the teaching of intelligence practitioners, and finally former practitioners 
turning to academia. By assessing these, the symbiotic nature of the cooperation will be 
evident.  
 
Approved University Courses and Centres  
University Courses  
When undertaking overseas fieldwork, this theme was first discovered through the 
existence of the American Diplomacy Labs and the National Security Agency’s (NSA) 
centres of excellence in cyber defence.15 Empirical research was undertaken to further 
explore both of these projects and a lecture for the Diplomacy Labs project was observed 
at the Stevens Institute of Technology.16 The observed lecture provided students with a 
background awareness of American politics, and in particular, an understanding of the 
American Constitution at the beginning of the module, in order for them to fully 
appreciate how their projects could aid policymakers.17 When discussing the module with 
its convenor Dr Lindsey Cormack, she discussed how this background benefitted the 
students as many came to the programme from more science and technological 
backgrounds.18 This fieldwork allowed for an understanding of how intelligence and 
indeed wider Government was furthering engagement with academia; as well as a desire 
to assess whether such schemes were also prevalent in the British context. 
 
                                                          
14 Lowenthal, M, ‘My take on teaching intelligence why, what and how’, Intelligence and National 
Security, 32/7 (2017) p. 986  
15 United States Department of State, Diplomacy Lab, Available From: 
https://www.state.gov/s/partnerships/ppp/diplab/ (Accessed 29th July 2017);  
National Security Agency, National Centres of Academic Excellence in Cyber Defence, Available From: 
https://www.nsa.gov/resources/educators/centers-academic-excellence/cyber-defense/ (Accessed 25th July 
2016) 
16 Cormack, L, ‘Diplomacy Labs Lecture’, Lecture at Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken New 
Jersey, 7th September 2016 
17 Cormack, L, ‘Diplomacy Labs Lecture’, Lecture at Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken New 
Jersey, 7th September 2016 
18 Private Interview 15: with Lindsey Cormack – 7th September 2016 
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In the UK, there are a total of 18 approved courses do exist, predominantly at master’s 
level.19 Approved by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), part of GCHQ, the 
courses tend to focus upon cyber and technical matters.20 This suggests how these are the 
attributes GCHQ is wanting to see in future recruits, and is therefore encouraging 
academia to focus on these subjects. This is similar to Diplomacy Labs which highlights 
future jobs to those within science and technology.21 The existence of such courses in the 
US and UK should perhaps not be surprising considering that ‘since 9/11 and across the 
‘Five Eyes’ countries, an ever-increasing number of university bachelor and post-
graduate courses are seeking accreditation’.22  
 
However, when further examining these courses, there is no information on the NCSC 
website stating what criteria a course must reach.23 This suggests it is based on an ad-hoc 
process and could be due to staff research. This is implied in the case of the University 
of South Wales’ press release and staff profiles, which highlight previous engagement 
with the British Intelligence Services.24 This seems to be inherently likely as in his article 
about teaching intelligence in the twenty-first century, Patrick Walsh, highlighting the 
Australian context, states that government sponsored accredited university courses ‘rely 
on assumptions that the course submitted to government from the university has been 
peer reviewed by subject matter experts’.25 This is seemingly similar to the US context 
where there is incredible flexibility in terms of how universities become involved in 
                                                          
19 National Cyber Security Centre – A Part of GCHQ, Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Security 
Research, Available From: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/articles/academic-centres-excellence-cyber-security-
research (Accessed 16th September 2017) 
20 National Cyber Security Centre – A Part of GCHQ, GCHQ certifies six more Masters’ degrees in cyber 
security, Available From: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/news-article/gchq-certifies-six-more-masters-
degrees-cyber-security (Accessed 16th September 2017) 
21 Cormack, L, ‘Diplomacy Labs Lecture’, Lecture at Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken New 
Jersey, 7th September 2016 
22 Walsh, P, ‘Teaching Intelligence in the twenty-first century: towards an evidence-based approach for 
curriculum design’, p. 1008 
23 National Cyber Security Centre – A Part of GCHQ, GCHQ certifies six more Masters’ degrees in 
cyber security, Available From: https://www.gchq.gov.uk/news-article/gchq-certifies-six-more-masters-
degrees-cyber-security (Accessed 16th September 2017) 
24 University of South Wales, USW Computer Forensics course gains prestigious GCHQ certification, 
Available From: http://courses.southwales.ac.uk/courses/264-msc-computer-forensics/2245/usw-
computer-forensics-course-gains-prestigious-gchq-certification/?story_types=high (Accessed 15th 
September 2017); 
University of South Wales, Staff Directory – Professor Andrew Blyth, Available From: 
http://staff.southwales.ac.uk/users/296-ajcblyth (Accessed 14th September 2017)  
25 Walsh, P, ‘Teaching Intelligence in the twenty-first century: towards an evidence-based approach for 
curriculum design’, p. 1009 
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Diplomacy Labs. In the two interviews undertaken on the topic, how they became 
involved differed dramatically, with the University of Virginia being directly approached 
by the State Department, and the Stevens Institute of Technology applying.26 Equally, it 
is unclear whether there are nationality requirements to undertake such courses although 
this was not an issue for Diplomacy Labs with one interviewee saying ‘no, to my 
knowledge there is no restriction [on nationality]’.27 Perhaps in the UK context, it is due 
to the university in question utilising their own discretion, but even seeking primary 
research into these themes may not provide the desired information to further 
comprehend how the university courses function in practice.  
 
University Centres of Excellence  
As well as the specific courses already examined, GCHQ has in partnership with the 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, approved university centres of 
excellence.28 Indeed, just the fact that these two organisations are cooperating 
demonstrates another way in which intelligence and academia cooperate. Unlike the 
university courses, the Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Research website 
highlights the strict criteria which all universities must adhere to,29 and are reviewed 
every five years.30 This led to 14 universities being approved in 2017, with the majority 
located in the south of England.31 This certainly intimates closeness between British 
Intelligence and the centres of excellence due to their geographical locations.  
 
Throughout this section about university courses and centres, there is a substantial 
emphasis upon GCHQ’s engagement with academia. This highlights the emphasis the 
                                                          
26 Private Interview 19: 22nd September 2016 
27 Private Interview 15: with Lindsey Cormack – 7th September 2016; 
Private Interview 19: 22nd September 2016 
28 National Cyber Security Centre – A Part of GCHQ, Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Security 
Research, Available From: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/articles/academic-centres-excellence-cyber-security-
research (Accessed 16th September 2017) 
29 National Cyber Security Centre – A Part of GCHQ, Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Security 
Research, Available From: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/articles/academic-centres-excellence-cyber-security-
research (Accessed 16th September 2017) 
30 University of Oxford – Cyber Security Oxford, Academic Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security 
Research, Available From: https://www.cybersecurity.ox.ac.uk/research/oxford-university-academic-
centre-of-excellence-in-cyber-security-research (Accessed 16th September 2017) 
31 National Cyber Security Centre – A Part of GCHQ, Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Security 
Research, Available From: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/articles/academic-centres-excellence-cyber-security-
research (Accessed 16th September 2017) 
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British Intelligence Services are placing on science and technology, further evident as 
one interviewee explained that the academic outreach undertaken by the British 
Intelligence Services does tend to centre around science and technology courses.32 But, 
there is academic engagement outside of this field. Alex Younger, the current Chief (C) 
of MI6, partook in a roundtable about foreign intelligence and cooperation at George 
Washington University in 2016.33 This was the first time Younger had spoken publicly 
in the US, and was an extraordinary event as four intelligence heads from America, 
Afghanistan, Australia and the UK talked, in front of an audience, about the challenges 
they were facing.34 Whilst excellent to see such engagement, it highlights the American 
willingness to engage with academia which perhaps emanates from the culture of 
openness which surrounds American Intelligence Services in a manner other countries 
should strive to emulate. In December 2018, Younger’s second ever public speech in the 
UK was at St Andrews University, 35 further intimating at intelligence – academia 
cooperation, although this may have been a recruitment opportunity.  
 
In contrast, MI5’s website highlights the apprenticeships offered by the Intelligence 
Services, which involving a two-year course at GCHQ, before another two years based 
at another British Intelligence Service.36 However, there is no information as to the nature 
of the work, and whether security clearances will be required. There are only eligibility 
requirements which state:  
 
You’ll need three A levels (or equivalent) at grades A – C, 
including at least two in science, technology or maths-
                                                          
32 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017 
Science and Technology are also fields which the CIA is interested in with Loch Johnson stating that: ‘one 
finds a plethora of research links between the CIA and academe, all focused on the latest technological 
developments’. In:  
Johnson, L. K, ‘Spies and scholars in the United States: winds of ambivalence in the groves of academe’, 
p. 5 
33 Secret Intelligence Service, News – 20 September 2016 – MI6 Chief takes part in panel session on 
intelligence at George Washington University, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/news/george-
washington-university-panel-talk.html (Accessed 18th September 2017 
34 YouTube, CIA-GW Intelligence Conference: Panel on The View from Foreign Intelligence Chiefs, 
Available From: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yefBv7Q3sv0 (Accessed 24th January 2018) 
35 Secret Intelligence Service, News: 03 December 2018 – MI6 ‘C’ Delivers Rare Public Speech at St 
Andrews University, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/news/alex-younger-st-andrews-speech.html 
(Accessed 10th December 2018) 
36 Security Service, Opportunities – School Leavers, Available From: 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/careers/opportunities/school-leavers (Accessed 10th October 2017) 
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related subjects. In return, we will offer you a range of 
exciting challenges, excellent training and development, 
and a competitive salary.37 
 
This implies that technology-related fields are where the British Intelligence Services are 
seeking to further their engagement with this academia, but is this to the detriment of 
others such as languages?  
 
 
Teaching Practitioners  
The United States has a history of academics teaching intelligence practitioners, which 
is particularly evident in the existence of the National Intelligence University, with many 
of its staff being former practitioners.38 This is the American Intelligence Community’s 
sole accredited federal degree granting institution, with academic centres around the 
world.39 From examining the intelligence literature, the realisation of the necessity to 
provide practitioners with an academic understanding of the discipline was first evident 
from the 1960s onwards with Dorondo exploring the theme in the CIA’s ‘Studies in 
Intelligence’ journal40 This led to the emergence of Intelligence Studies being taught in 
American higher education establishments,41 and implies that the realisation that an 
academic understanding of intelligence was necessary, emerged from within the 
intelligence realm itself. 
 
However in Britain, although engagement between intelligence and academia has always 
been evident,42 the realisation that intelligence practitioners could benefit from academia 
emanated some 95 years after MI5 and MI6 were created. Following the Iraq invasion, 
                                                          
37 Security Service, Opportunities – School Leavers, Available From: 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/careers/opportunities/school-leavers (Accessed 10th October 2017) 
38 Private Interview 7: with William Spracher – 17th March 2016 
39 National Intelligence University, About NIU, Available From: http://ni-u.edu/wp/about-niu/ (Accessed 
29th December 2017);  
Spracher, W. C, ‘National Intelligence University,: a half century educating the next generation of US 
Intelligence Community Leaders’, p. 231–232 
40 Dorondo, P. J, ‘For College Courses in Intelligence’, Studies in Intelligence, 4/3, (1960), p. A16  
41 Central Intelligence Agency, Library – Studies in Intelligence – Studying and Teaching Intelligence: The 
Approach in the United Kingdom, Intelligence Education by Michael Goodman, Available From: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Studying_Teaching_6.htm (Accessed 22nd August 2019) 
42 Parliamentary Archives, Houses of Parliament, London, David Lloyd George Papers LG/F/26/1 ‘Lloyd 
George Papers’, 1922 
 
Page | 177  
 
the Butler inquiry was created to review the intelligence regarding Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction.43 The report concluded that there should be the specialisation of intelligence 
analysis and its advancement through the British Intelligence Community,44  and thus 
‘tentative steps were taken to engage with academics working on intelligence’.45 This led 
to the creation of an academic course, run by King’s College London, for civil servants 
about the nature of intelligence.46 Mike Goodman describes this as akin to what the CIA 
was considering in the 1960s.47 Despite the time lag between the creation of the British 
and American programmes, both cases demonstrate how the intelligence services and 
wider Government benefit from their engagement with academia, something with which 
interviewed academics agree. It seems somewhat surprising that in the British context, 
such engagement only began after the Butler Report, particularly as consecutive 
Governments have brought in outside academics, such as allowing William Mackenzie 
to write the history of SOE.48 Thus there may well have been informal arrangements in 
which Government and the British Intelligence Services benefitted from academic 
expertise.  
 
Primary research has suggested that the Government has commissioned several courses 
for intelligence practitioners, with one London university in particular, described as the 
leader in this field.49 This further exhibits public engagement on intelligence matters as 
information about how analysts are being trained is published by the academics 
responsible who explain the nature of the courses. Omand and Goodman (who are 
responsible for the Kings College London course), highlight that by providing a 
multidisciplinary understanding of the concepts and issues surrounding intelligence, 
                                                          
43 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 
2004), p. 1 
44 Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 
2004), p. 114 - 115 
45 Dexter, H, Phythian, M, Strachan-Morris, D, ‘The what, why, who and how of teaching intelligence: the 
Leicester approach’, p. 921 
46 Omand, Sir, D, and Goodman, M, ‘What Analysts Need to Understand: The King’s Intelligence Studies 
Program’, Studies in Intelligence, 52/4, (2008), p. 2 
47 Central Intelligence Agency, Library – Studies in Intelligence – Studying and Teaching Intelligence: 
The Approach in the United Kingdom, Intelligence Education by Michael Goodman, Available From: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Studying_Teaching_6.htm (Accessed 22nd August 2019) 
48 Mackenzie, W, The Secret History of S.O.E Special Operations Executive 1940-1945, (London, St 
Ermin’s Press in association with Time Warner Books UK, 2000), p. xiii 
49 Private Interview 20: 12th September 2017 
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analysts from across Government share a sense of being part of a single intelligence 
analysis community, and are more aware of the:  
 
Meaning, value, nature and proper use of intelligence, 
and more confident in their own discussions of these 
topics.50 
 
 
Equally, it highlights the emphasis placed on the teaching of practitioners, demonstrating 
the symbiotic nature of the relationship between intelligence and academia. At Leicester 
University, the Master’s in Intelligence and Security delivered via a distance learning 
approach, has a number of students who are intelligence practitioners, law enforcement 
and military officers, despite the course not having any nationality or clearance 
restrictions.51 Indeed, this is further evident with the academic education provided to the 
military who insist their personnel have a valuable education to allow them to undertake 
their work as effectively as possible. 52 King’s College London has the contract to provide 
teaching at the Joint Services Command and Staff Colleges.53 Therefore, there is a clear 
awareness throughout British Government of the benefit of engaging with academia.  
 
 
Practitioners turned Academics 
Another mechanism of cooperation is when former practitioners turn to academia. From 
personal experience, this is perhaps more prominent in America, to the extent that Helen 
Dexter, Mark Phythian and David Strachan-Morris argue that the practitioner-scholar is 
one of the defining features of the American approach to Intelligence Studies.54 This was 
evident to me when attending the International Studies Association 2016 and 2018 
conferences, it was astonishing how many academics began their presentation or 
                                                          
50 Omand, Sir, D, and Goodman, M, ‘What Analysts Need to Understand’,  p. 3 
51 Dexter, H, Phythian, M, Strachan-Morris, D, ‘The what, why, who and how of teaching intelligence: the 
Leicester approach’, p. 928 
52 Defence Academy, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Available From: 
https://www.da.mod.uk/colleges-schools/joint-services-command-and-staff-college (Accessed 29th 
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53 Kings College London, The Defence Studies Department, Available From: 
https://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/dsd/about/index.aspx (Accessed 29th December 2017) 
54 Dexter, H, Phythian, M, Strachan-Morris, D, ‘The what, why, who and how of teaching intelligence: the 
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questions by highlighting their former careers. A possible reasoning for this openness in 
the American context could be as Loch Johnson states, that it is when links between 
practitioners and academics are secret that they become inappropriate,55 although 
cynically, this may also be a way of gaining credibility from the audience. Such openness 
about previous intelligence careers is not evident within the British context, with one 
interviewee believing that this is due to the secrecy surrounding British Intelligence,56 an 
assertion in which there is likely to be some merit. This demonstrates how other countries 
such as the US have overcome some of the issues surrounding the secrecy of intelligence 
which Britain continues to grapple with. But, it is clearly something which should be 
further explored due to the benefits practitioners turned academics can bring to the 
teaching and understanding of intelligence in the public domain. Walsh succinctly 
surmises this as he states:  
 
Bridges have been built between some Intelligence 
Community agencies and the academy by former 
practitioners, who have moved to academia (such as 
myself). This has helped universities build content and 
tradecraft skills, while also providing the higher 
education sector with a greater understanding of what 
specialised knowledge is needed by the Intelligence 
Community and should be built into the programme.57 
 
In the UK, one of the clearest and indeed earliest examples is Sir Harry Hinsley. Having 
worked at Bletchley Park during the Second World War,58 he became a distinguished 
academic at St John’s College, Cambridge despite not having a first-class degree or 
doctorate. He then went on to write the landmark British Intelligence in the Second World 
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War over five volumes59 Although this had the full cooperation of the authorities, 
Hinsley’s use of the archives was restricted as ‘secrecy about intelligence techniques and 
regarding individuals remained essential’.60  
 
This demonstrates how former practitioners turn to academia and write on the topic they 
have an implicit understanding of, something also evident in the case of Michael Herman. 
After a career which included national service in Egypt, Herman was recruited to GCHQ 
before being seconded to the Cabinet Office and then the Defence Intelligence Staff 
before returning as Director of GCHQ. After his retirement, Herman became a fellow at 
Oxford University where he not only wrote Intelligence Power in Peace and War, but 
also created the Oxford Intelligence Group. 61 This serves to further the academic study 
of intelligence, with a particular emphasis placed upon understanding intelligence in the 
modern world, by hearing from both practitioners and academics.62 
 
In the British context, the most prominent example of a former practitioner turning to 
academia is Sir David Omand.63 Before his retirement from British Government, Omand 
was a named public official due to his role as both Director of GCHQ and becoming the 
first Security and Intelligence Coordinator.64 As a published academic, Omand explores 
both the nature of intelligence and the relationship between British Intelligence and the 
public.65 Throughout my PhD research project, Omand’s arguments have perhaps been 
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the most useful and persuasive. This demonstrates a way in which British Intelligence is 
furthering its engagement with academia. Former practitioners are in a unique position 
of being able to utilise their own expertise within academic writing, further allowing 
academia to depict British Intelligence; a theme which the following section will examine 
to assess what views former practitioners provide of British Intelligence through their 
work.  
 
Although these are only three examples of practitioner turned academic, one interviewee 
said that there are British academics who have previously worked in the intelligence 
realm, joining academia mid-career.66 This serves as an interesting contrast between the 
US and UK contexts and demonstrates a clear difference which arguably emanates from 
the culture of secrecy in the UK context. 
 
Becoming an academic is not the only way in which former practitioners can engage with 
students as Christopher Moran explains. When providing his first-hand experience of 
teaching intelligence to Undergraduates, he highlights the benefits of having former 
intelligence practitioners talk to the students. After asking all students to fill in 
questionnaires at the end of the module, Moran states that:  
 
By putting a real face on the profession, they help to 
remove some of the mystique of spying, which can lead 
students to think that all spies resemble James Bond. 
Visual learners – students who learn by best by what they 
see – find it particularly valuable to see an intelligence 
officer in the flesh.67 
 
Thus, former practitioners can aid student’s understandings of the intelligence realm, by 
talking to students and providing ‘inside stories’, they further humanise the subject. This 
can prevent certain channels from dominating the depiction of the British Intelligence 
Services which is most synonymous with the public. This is surmised by a comment 
provided by one of Moran’s students who said: ‘It’s very difficult to conceive of a spy as 
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anything but a dashing, muscular, alpha-male when you’ve grown up watching super 
spies like James Bond, Ethan Hunt and Jason Bourne.’68 Crucially, this highlights not 
only how dominant some portrayals of the British Intelligence Services can be, but how 
this can be overcome via engagement from the Intelligence realm, in this case via retired 
professionals. Although it is not feasible for serving intelligence personnel to undertake 
such activities, for those who are retired, it provides a continued way the public and 
specifically students, can fully comprehend the intelligence realm.  
 
Conclusion  
This section has explored three unique ways in which the intelligence – academia 
relationship manifests. With references made to the American context, the British way in 
Intelligence is evident due to the pervasiveness of secrecy seemingly preventing further 
engagement as is evident in America. Yet in both countries, the symbiotic nature of the 
intelligence – academic relationship is clear. Whether this has any impact upon the views 
provided by the literature will now be explored.  
 
 
Views within the literature  
 
Introduction  
This section explores what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are evident 
within the intelligence studies literature. Due to the vastness of the field, the focus will 
be on certain sub-categories. The views of British Intelligence evident within the official 
histories of MI5, MI6, JIC and SOE will be scrutinised before examining sub-genres of 
the literature. The first differentiation is between those academics that are known to have 
previously worked within British Intelligence. Although primary research implied that 
there are several British intelligence academics who fall within this category, having left 
British Intelligence mid-career,69 their previous employment is not common knowledge. 
Therefore, within this chapter, when exploring former practitioners who have turned to 
academia, Michael Herman and Sir David Omand will be focused upon. The chapter then 
explores the Aberystwyth Academics namely, Professor Len Scott, Professor Martin 
Alexander, Dr Peter Jackson and Dr Gerry Hughes. Although not all are based in 
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Aberystwyth anymore, they co-authored several chapters and books whilst working in 
Aberystwyth which explore the necessity of intelligence and provide a view of British 
Intelligence based on a difficult working environment.70 Finally, the accountability 
literature is analysed due to their emphasis upon secrecy surrounding British Intelligence, 
a theme the official histories emphasise. By splitting it into sub-genres, it allows for a 
clearer analysis of the themes explored and what depictions of British Intelligence are 
portrayed.   
 
Official Histories  
To mark their centenaries, MI5 and MI6 allowed established academics, Professors 
Christopher Andrew and Keith Jeffrey respectively, unprecedented access to their 
archives to write comprehensive histories of the services. Such activity was another 
example of the services undertaking public engagement as the histories provided the 
public with a clearer understanding of the services, something both were striving to 
achieve.71 This demonstrates how the relationship between British Intelligence and 
academia has continually evolved, as previous academic explorations of their activities 
were only for official consumption.72 This is evident in comparison to the official history 
of the Special Operations Executive by William Mackenzie which was commissioned by 
the Cabinet Office following the end of the Second World War.73 Although the service 
itself had been officially disbanded in 1946,74 it had a restricted circulation and until its 
publication in 2000, it was an in-house history.75  
 
Although SOE no longer exists, by undertaking extensive analysis of its official history 
within this chapter, it allows for a clearer comprehension of the over-riding themes 
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official histories were providing to the public. Indeed, this was also the case in relation 
to the reading of Spying on the World – The Declassified Documents of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee 1936 – 2013 written by academics Richard Aldrich, Rory 
Cormac and Mike Goodman. Unlike the other official histories, Aldrich, Cormac and 
Goodman reproduce many JIC documents, thus providing primary evidence of the 
themes they examine.76 But, when compiled with analysis from the other official 
histories, a comprehensive view of British Intelligence in five over-arching categories 
becomes evident. These are: British Intelligence’s capability and effectiveness; structure 
and purpose of British Intelligence, whether they are ethical or unethical; the human 
dimension of intelligence and secrecy surrounding British Intelligence. Each of these will 
be explored in turn to establish how British Intelligence is depicted before seeking to 
examine whether these are themes also evident within the wider intelligence studies 
literature.  
 
Capable and Effective  
All the official histories depict British Intelligence as inherently capable and effective, 
although the examples demonstrating this vary between the services. For MI5, their 
effectiveness is demonstrated through the discussion of their involvement in the highly 
successful Second World War Double Cross (XX) system which provided dis-
information via agents to the Germans.77 This is evident in a quote Andrew includes in 
his analysis from Masterman, Chairman of the Twenty Committee which was responsible 
for Double Cross. He stated that:  
 
we actively ran and controlled the German espionage 
system in this country.78  
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Perhaps such an assertion is based on how one XX agent GARBO persuaded the Germans 
that the main target for the D-Day landings was Calais, not Normandy,79 demonstrating 
the importance the XX within the war effort, and MI5’s crucial involvement.  
 
Although MI6 were involved with the XX system,80 their capability and effectiveness is 
perhaps best demonstrated by the nature of the information which they were collecting, 
such as commercial, economic and military intelligence.81 This allowed for more 
cohesive decision-making as MI6 was collecting a variety of information, something 
only possible if they were capable at recognising what was, and what was not, important. 
Although MI5 would arguably also have been capable of such intelligence collection, 
this is not a theme which Andrew explores in his analysis. This suggests that for MI6, it 
was an integral aspect of their work and due to Sir Mansfield Cumming’s forward 
thinking. As C of MI6, he encouraged the collection of economic and commercial 
intelligence during the First World War,82 thus aiding their ability to undertake all source 
analysis, thus demonstrating their capability and effectiveness from the outset. Whilst 
this may seem a subtle difference to what Andrew and Jeffrey deem important, it provides 
a view that all organisations within British Intelligence have differing remits which they 
all seek to undertake to the best of their ability.  
 
One theme evident through all the official histories is the pre-emptive nature of British 
Intelligence,83 namely they are trying to provide information about something before it 
happens. But this is inherently difficult to achieve as the Intelligence Services are not 
able to predict the future, something which the former C Sir John Sawyers reminded MPs 
in the first public evidence session to the Intelligence and Security Committee when he 
said ‘we are not crystal-ball gazers’.84 Rather, the British Intelligence Services make 
projections based on the availability of information. Therefore, the ability to make such 
predictions requires capable and effective intelligence collection and analysis. This 
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demonstrates the saliency of the argument, namely that the capability and effectiveness 
of British Intelligence can be evident through their ability to assess the collected 
intelligence. The discussion of how capable and effective MI5 and MI6 are in the official 
histories is a consistent portrayal to that seen on their websites, demonstrating how the 
positive portrayal is also evident via the avenues of information. 
 
However, in contrast to the websites, the official histories acknowledge that there have 
been times when they have been incapable or ineffective. During the Cold War, MI5 and 
indeed wider British Intelligence, was penetrated by Soviet moles, the clearest example 
of which was the Cambridge Five, a theme upon which Andrew places a significant 
emphasis. By analysing the case of Melita Norwood who remained undiscovered until 
1999,85 Andrew exemplifies MI5’s inability to fully analyse information which had 
already been collected as they had prior warnings of Norwood’s treachery which included 
an un-canny description of Norwood from one of Maxwell Knight’s agents.86 Indeed, 
even when witch hunts for Soviet moles gripped the service,87 Norwood’s activities 
remained undiscovered, it was only due to the Mitrokhin Archives that she was 
uncovered.88  Thus, MI5 are portrayed as being incapable to realise the extent of Soviet 
penetration.  
 
Although MI6 were similarly affected by Soviet penetration, it is not explored by Jeffrey 
due to the time-span of his book, which only covered the period up to 1949. However, it 
does highlight the difficulties in processing collected information,89 thus producing 
ineffective analysis. Indeed, the JIC history also alludes to this theme as they have been 
criticised repeatedly for not analysing all information correctly, something particularly 
prevalent after the publication of the dodgy dossier.90 Whilst the analysis of intelligence 
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leading up to the Iraq War91 is perhaps the clearest example of this, it is not a new 
phenomenon as the limited awareness of the North Korean intention of invading the 
South demonstrates.92 Thus, the JIC history demonstrates their ineffectiveness at times 
to analyse information in as much detail as is required, as well as bowing to suggested 
wordings to further the Government rhetoric.  
 
This limits the ability for policymakers to make informed decisions if the intelligence 
collection or analysis has been incapable or ineffective. Thus, it is important for such 
information to be included within the official histories to demonstrate where problems 
have occurred and demonstrate to the public that the official histories do not merely 
depict British Intelligence as faultless. This serves to demonstrate the issues British 
Intelligence grapple with but, there is undoubtedly an over-arching depiction of their 
capability and effectiveness, something of a consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 ‘A Direct 
Relationship’ and Chapter 3 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’.  
 
 
Structure and Purpose  
Although the structure of British Intelligence is not a theme explicitly depicted within 
the official histories, it is implicit such as through discussions pertaining to the 
relationships between MI5, MI6 and the JIC.93  
 
As was evident in Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’, there is an over-riding depiction 
within the official histories of the organisational and structural difficulties facing the 
British Intelligence Services. Jeffrey and Andrew both demonstrate how such problems 
have been evident since the creation of MI6 and MI5 in 1909.94 Such difficulties 
continued during the First World War which saw tense relations between MI6 and the 
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War Office,95 and MI5 and the Police due to their responsibilities overlapping.96 
Although the Secret Service Committee distinguished between domestic and foreign 
intelligence practices,97 organisational difficulties remained during the Second World 
War as to which organisation was responsible for the XX agents. This implies that whilst 
the Secret Service Committee in practice was combatting such problems, its effectiveness 
was limited, if not, non-existent.  
 
Created during the Second World War, SOE were also affected by organisational 
difficulties as there was disagreement within Whitehall about which department should 
oversee them.98 Although analysis would suggest that such difficulties demonstrate wider 
problems within British Government, Jeffrey has a rather different opinion. He argues 
that it is due to the services seeking to ensure their independence, as MI6 was reluctant 
to be integrated into the central intelligence machinery during the Second World War,99 
that such problems existed. This was not a theme which had previously been considered, 
but is certainly crucial, particularly in terms of MI6 ensuring their existence after the end 
of the Second World War.  
 
Aldrich, Cormac and Goodman highlight how the JIC have been similarly affected, 
particularly in a contemporary context. Under Gordon Brown’s Government, the JIC 
remit to ensure the day-to-day coordination of the Intelligence Community, and the 
Permanent Secretary Committee on the Intelligence Services were abolished, and their 
work amalgamated into the national intelligence machinery.100 Thus, British Intelligence 
continued to be affected by organisational structural difficulties and it is no surprise that 
as Jeffrey assesses, the individual intelligence services seek to ensure their independence 
(including their own culture and identity) if such vast changes are implemented. This 
provides a depiction of the difficult circumstances in which the British Services 
Intelligence are seeking to operate. However, perhaps more recent organisational and 
structural changes, such as those introduced by Brown, Cameron and May, are due to the 
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increasingly cooperative enterprise intelligence has become,101 which would arguably be 
aided by a strong organisational structure. However, without agreement on how to 
implement this, organisational and structural difficulties will continue to affect the 
British Intelligence Services.  
 
It seems that each administration believes they can affect the organisation of the British 
Intelligence Services. As Prime Minister, Theresa May undertook sweeping changes to 
the entire civil service102 and the Intelligence Services were not exempt. She sought to 
instigate the  Investigatory Powers Act,103 and create the position of a Senior Security 
Adviser, believed to deliver a more efficient service due to the creation of a Security 
Profession within Government.104 By exhibiting the structural issues affecting British 
Intelligence, the official histories present a consistent portrayal with the websites of the 
Big 3 in terms of how  the wider structure and organisational difficulties they face being 
out of their control. Implicitly, this enhances the positive portrayal of how the British 
Intelligence Services work in difficult circumstances. 
 
Acting in a legal and ethical manner   
Owing to the importance of the Intelligence Services ensuring democratic legitimacy via 
public support,105 perhaps the most significant depiction of the British Intelligence 
Services is that they are adhering to strict legal and ethical standards, which furthers the 
positive portrayal. This is necessary as the British Intelligence Services, as well as their 
counterparts around the world, increasingly rely on the public to provide information.106 
It is estimated that 90 – 95% of classified intelligence reports are based on open source 
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intelligence;107 – a category which the public fall into, demonstrating the importance of 
the public as a source of information.108 Geoffrey Treverton highlights how the American 
Intelligence Services are using the public to gather a pool of translators from sectors of 
society they would not otherwise have talked to.109 But, if the public are going to provide 
such information to the British Intelligence Services, or indeed work for an Intelligence 
Service, they must have faith that the intelligence will be used in a legal and ethical 
manner, hence the importance of this depiction. Following allegations of illegal and 
unethical behaviour by Peter Wright, Phillip Davies argued that: 
 
Popular perceptions of MI5, amongst legislators as much 
as the electorate, have long been influenced by Peter 
Wright’s evocative image of how Security Service officers 
in the 1950s and 1960s’ “bugged and burgled our way 
across London at the state’s behest.”110 
 
One impact of the illegal and unethical portrayal provided by Wright was the reduced 
recruitment into MI5.111 This is perhaps why it is something of a consistent portrayal 
throughout all the official histories analysed although they explore it in various ways. 
MI5 portrays how they adhere to legislation in both a historical and contemporary 
context;112 MI6 follows ministerial instruction;113 there is a charter governing the JIC’s 
actions114 and SOE consulted with Whitehall.115 Undoubtedly, this depicts a desire within 
British Intelligence to act legally and ethically, a consistent portrayal to that provided 
directly by the Big 3, as well as by the Government following the Snowden revelations 
in 2013. 
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Jeffrey highlights how MI6 would not act in a foreign country without Whitehall 
approval; first evident in the lead up to the First World War when Cumming sought to 
place agents in Belgium.116 However this adherence may not always have been prevalent 
as documents uncovered at the National Archives disputes this due to the emphasis MI6 
placed on covert activities during the Cold War.117 Like Cumming, Kell was similarly 
focused upon legal and ethical standards and instigated the practice from the First World 
War onwards, of MI5 having their own legal advisers.118 Undoubtedly, this demonstrates 
how both Cumming and Kell were forward thinking and determined for their services to 
act legally and ethically. This creates a positive portrayal that from their creation, MI5 
and MI6 have always adhered to legal and ethical standards imposed by both the 
Government and themselves, demonstrating the importance they have continually placed 
on acting legally and ethically. 
 
The Global War on Terror (GWOT) led to allegations of British involvement in the 
American practices of extraordinary rendition and torture,119 actions Andrew argues, MI5 
were fiercely opposed to.120 The strength of feeling on this subject within MI5 was 
palpable when Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller spoke publicly about her time as 
MI5’s Director General (DG), where the condemnation MI5 had for such actions was 
evident in their strained relationship with MI6.121 Andrew’s analysis of the archival 
material has depicted MI5 as an organisation that will not undertake anything they 
perceive as illegal or unethical, evident in how they have continually refused to utilise 
torture as a form of interrogation, even during the Second World War when they were 
responsible for the questioning of captured German agents.122 This creates the over-
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arching positive portrayal of MI5 ensuring that they act in a legal and ethical manner, 
something of a consistent portrayal to what they highlight on their website, as well as the 
depiction provided by the Government in the Iraq and Snowden contexts. Therefore, the 
public are receiving similar overarching depictions no matter the avenue of information.  
 
Jeffrey explores how MI6 have continually sought ministerial instruction and adhered to 
legislation,123 demonstrating their desire to ensure they act legally and ethically. By 
exploring how MI6 abide by legislation, there is the implicit suggestion that if any of 
their actions are deemed illegal or unethical, it is due to the limitation of legislation, as 
opposed to MI6 unilaterally acting illegally or unethically. Although Jeffrey does not 
explore this theme due to the timeframe of his book, a clear example of this has been 
uncovered at the National Archives. Documents suggest that MI6 were involved in covert 
activities in the Middle East, even after the Suez crisis, when ministerial approval was 
given.124 Therefore, MI6 were arguably adhering to the legal and ethical standards placed 
on them by Ministers. Highlighting this theme results in a consistent portrayal with 
Chapter 2 ‘A Complementary Relationship’ which analysed how the limitation of 
legislation was a key theme after the Snowden revelations. This allows for the depiction 
that the British Intelligence Services do seek to act legally and ethically. 
 
Indeed, the limitations of legislation are also exhibited in Andrew’s analysis. He 
highlights how MI5 seek to adhere to legislation, problems arise when this legislation is 
inadequate, something Peter Gill is vocal about.125 In Andrew’s analysis, the limitations 
of legislation are apparent in relation to Home Office warrants governing the interception 
of communication as ‘the precise origin of the power to conduct telephone intercepts was 
a little hazy.’126 Therefore, whilst MI5 believed they were acting ethically and legally, 
there was a clear limitation to the legislation. Indeed, this is further evident in relation to 
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one of the more sensationalist claims by the former MI5 officer Peter Wright in his 
autobiography Spycatcher. He claims that MI5: 
 
Bugged and burgled their way across London at the 
state’s behest, while pompous bowler-hatted civil 
servants in Whitehall pretended to look the other way.127 
 
Andrew does not shy away from exploring the ramifications of Wright’s allegations, and 
argues that the concept of bugging and burgling across the capital was broadly true as 
although intercepting communications was legislated for, entering property to install 
interception devices was not.128 Again, although this demonstrates MI5 acting in an 
unethical manner, it is due to the limitation of the legislation, as opposed to staff wanting 
to undertake actions they knew to be unethical, and furthers the consistent portrayal. This 
demonstrates the validity of Ian Leigh’s assertion that much of the legislation governing 
the British Intelligence Services emerged due to a lack of a legal basis for their actions.129 
This further intimates issues occurring due to the limitations of legislation.  
 
Chapman Pincher also explores Wright’s assertions where he intimates any desire to act 
unethically may in fact have emanated from Wright himself, as opposed to an MI5 wide 
desire.130 In the book Pincher wrote with Wright’s assistance, the subtle inference is that 
if wrongdoing occurred, it was due to an individual, as opposed to the entirety of MI5 
seeking to act illegally and unethically.131 There seemed to be lessons learnt from this 
due to Sir Anthony Duff’s push for MI5 to be placed on a statutory footing,132 as well as 
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the creation of a staff counsellor for individuals to go to with any concerns about 
wrongdoing,133 furthering the depiction that the actions Wright alludes to occurred 
ostensibly because of the limitation of existing legislation. Indeed, Leigh concurs with 
this, as he highlights that it was due to the limitation of the Maxwell-Fyfe Directive which 
was governing the actions of MI5 which meant they would have been found in breach of 
the European Union Convention on Human Rights,134 and thus acting illegally, 
something which the Security Services Act rectified. Leigh’s analysis intimates that it 
was this, as opposed to the Wright allegations that was the catalyst for MI5 being placed 
on a statutory footing.135 The creation of legislation following a landmark moment is a 
consistent portrayal to that seen in ‘A Complementary Relationship’ following the 
Snowden revelations. 
 
Although Andrew focuses upon MI5, when applicable, there are references to other 
British Intelligence organisations, and particularly MI6.136 But despite this, there is no 
reference to MI6’s covert activities in the Middle East during the Cold War, and the only 
references to the Suez crisis are fleeting suggestions at how this embarrassed Britain.137 
This is somewhat surprising due to MI5’s involvement in the Middle East as Chikara 
Hashimoto examines. By closely analysing archival material, he highlights how MI5 
were operating in Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan, both in aiding the establishment of 
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intelligence services but also in the collection of information.138 This theme demonstrates 
that there are certainly limitations to the official histories as it would be impossible for 
them to cover every minute detail, but also the necessity of MI6 further engaging with 
the public to provide a more cohesive understanding of their actions. With secrecy the 
explanation as to why the official history only covers the first 40 years of the service,139 
it is staggering if this is the case, particularly as the ‘Our History’ section of the website 
does explore more contemporary events such as uncovering the AQ Khan network.140 
This is undoubtedly a case where there is too much secrecy and it is preventing further 
awareness of MI6. 
 
Illegal and Unethical Activity  
The official histories provide the over-arching positive portrayal of how the British 
Intelligence Services seek to act legally and ethically. But, there are specific examples 
which demonstrate how at times, this has not been the case.    
 
Both MI5 and MI6 had preconceived notions of who they could and could not employ. 
In the post-war period, MI5 ‘refused to recruit Jews on the grounds that their dual loyalty 
to both Britain and Israel might create an unacceptable conflict of interest’.141 Andrew’s 
analysis highlights how this was an inexcusable policy but despite this, it was not until 
1974 that MI5 lifted this ban, yet some prejudices still existed within the organisation 
towards very orthodox Jews or those who had a distinct Jewish appearance.142 Andrew’s 
analysis of this theme demonstrates how the official history seeks to provide an accurate 
account of British Intelligence, and thus includes aspects of wrongdoing when this 
occurs.  This also stands in stark contrast to the depiction in Chapter 2 ‘A Direct 
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Relationship’ of the British Intelligence Services always having an inclusive and diverse 
workforce. 
 
Due to the time frame of the MI6 official history, it is impossible to ascertain whether 
this prejudice towards Jews was evident across British Intelligence or service specific. 
However, it does explore preconceptions of those capable of undertaking intelligence 
work. During the Second World War, there was the extraordinary preconception that 
those from the Outer Hebrides or Faroe Islands were only capable of undertaking stay-
behind communications.143 Unlike Andrew’s analysis, there is no discussion as to why 
this preconception was evident or critique of MI6 for this policy. This theme further 
manifests itself in the SOE history which suggests that there was an emphasis on 
recruiting males as opposed to females.144 Although a subsequent section will further 
assess the role of women, this demonstrates how British Intelligence as an entity, seems 
to have acted unethically due to the preconceived notions of those who could be 
employed. In the case of SOE, this was the only theme highlighted by Mackenzie 
demonstrating that they acted in an unethical manner, suggesting that the service 
predominantly acted ethically, a theme also suggested by the JIC official history as no 
evidence was ascertained to suggest they had acted unethically. 
 
In both the MI5 and MI6 official histories, unethical actions are further depicted due to 
the actions of Rear Admiral Hugh Sinclair. After Cumming’s death in 1923, Rear 
Admiral Hugh Sinclair was appointed C of MI6, a position he held until his own death 
in 1939.145 As C, Andrew states that Sinclair went above and beyond what was expected 
to try and influence Government policy, particularly in relation to the Sudetenland to 
continue the British policy of appeasement.146 Jeffrey provides some contextualisation to 
this assertion, stating that unusually, MI6 had been asked to provide policy advice to 
Whitehall, leading to the production of a paper entitled ‘What Should We Do’ in which 
MI6 provided a number of proposals.147 However, Andrew fails to acknowledge this, 
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merely stating that the policy paper suggested a view which was prevalent throughout 
MI6 and varied dramatically to MI5’s own assessment which Kell provided to the 
Foreign Secretary.148  
 
Whilst this suggests that MI6 perhaps acted in an unethical manner by providing policy 
recommendations, something the newly created JIC should have taken responsibility for, 
this was as Jeffrey demonstrates, information they were asked to produce. Sinclair’s role 
merely seems to have been in providing the information to policymakers which they 
asked for, a theme overlooked by Andrew, exhibiting how the services can have 
divergent views on the same event. But MI5’s belief that Sinclair was acting unethically 
is perhaps well-founded as in the early 1930s, Sinclair was running agents within the UK, 
something which MI5 was responsible for and understandably, caused tensions between 
the two services.149 This demonstrates how crucial the role of personalities can be in the 
activities of British Intelligence. This is further evident in the case of MI6 acting 
unethically as Major Ernest Dalton, the MI6 head of the Dutch station in the 1930s, was 
embezzling money after finding himself in financial difficulties.150 Although this 
example does not affect the entirety of MI6 or British Intelligence, it does question how 
Dalton was able to undertake such activities unbeknown to MI6. It also demonstrates the 
detrimental impact one individual can have on how the service, something particularly 
evident in the case of Kim Philby151 is perceived both by other Intelligence Services and 
the wider public.  
 
Whilst the official histories do acknowledge that the British Intelligence Services acted 
illegally and unethically; it is due to wider issues, namely the limitations of legislation, a 
theme Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’ also portrays; or the actions of 
individuals as opposed to the British Intelligence Services as an entity seeking to act 
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illegally or unethically. This furthers the overall depiction throughout the official 
histories of a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. However, it will be 
interesting to ascertain whether this remains the case when archival material relating to 
GWOT is released, due to the allegations surrounding not only the Government 
politicisation of intelligence, but also the actions of the British Intelligence Services 
relating to interrogation and torture of terrorist suspects. Andrew does explore this to an 
extent but is limited owing to the availability of sources. Perhaps it is only when the 
services are marking their 200th or even 250th anniversaries that this will be fully 
answered.  
 
Human Dimension  
This section analyses what is arguably one of the more over-looked aspects of 
intelligence, namely the importance of individuals, a theme the official histories all 
explore. The section highlights the emphasis placed upon agent welfare and vulnerability, 
the importance of training, how recruitment has evolved, the role of women and finally 
the role of personalities.  
 
MI5, MI6 and SOE all stress the importance of agent welfare,152 demonstrating the 
emphasis the British Intelligence Services place on it, evident in the numerous page 
numbers in the reference exhibiting just how often this theme is depicted within the 
official histories. By alluding to these themes, there is a consistent portrayal (within the 
official histories and compared with the Big 3 websites) of how the British Intelligence 
Services are genuinely ensuring the welfare of their staff, as opposed to it being for self-
serving purposes of maintaining intelligence collection. Jeffrey further explores this 
theme by assessing how MI6 would scrutinise the private lives of its agents to ensure that 
there was nothing which would adversely affect their work.153 Perhaps this emphasis on 
agent welfare should be unsurprising due to the vital importance of agents, particularly 
for SOE and MI6, in the collection of intelligence.154 Indeed, such a policy of scrutinising 
the private lives of employees continues in a contemporary context for all those within 
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British Intelligence, either via a Security Clearance or Developed Vetting.155 Both of 
these are described as an inherently personal and intrusive process.156  
 
This depicts British Intelligence as an organisation concerned with ensuring the welfare 
of its agents, evident in the emphasis placed on protecting the identity of agents, 
something Andrew and Jeffrey both highlight.157 This creates a consistent portrayal as 
the MI5, MI6, and GCHQ websites all state the importance of staff welfare and support, 
thus enhancing the overall positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services.  
 
The official histories depict the vulnerability of agents and analysts, something which 
can occur in a variety of ways, such as being captured in possession of sensitive 
information,158 or not fully analysing collected intelligence.159 Both of these have a 
significant impact on the capability and effectiveness of British Intelligence. In 1939, 
MI6 agents were captured at Venlo on the Dutch-German frontier after being enticed 
there to attend a meeting with whom they thought were German Army opposition to 
Hitler.160 Jeffrey explores both the events leading up to the capture as well as the 
ramifications,161 and criticises the captured British agents as: 
 
Their tradecraft that day was deplorable. Stevens was 
carrying some coding material, and Best had a list of 
agents’ names and addresses with him.162 
 
Jeffrey’s analysis suggests that their vulnerability emanated from their lack of training, 
resulting in ineffective tradecraft. Therefore, they were captured with information in their 
possession which would undoubtedly affect wider intelligence work. Indeed, the 
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seriousness of the Venlo Debacle is clear as even though MI5 were not involved, Andrew 
explores how it adversely affected MI6.163 This is triangulated with Jeffrey’s analysis 
which highlights how concerned Menzies was that the Venlo Debacle would mean the 
end of MI6.164 Perhaps Menzies concerns also emanated from the detailed knowledge the 
German officers had of the British Intelligence Services and key individuals according 
to the captured MI6 officers on their return to the UK.165  
 
This was not the only example of agent vulnerability explored by Jeffrey, who highlights 
how MI6 Burmese agents were captured after boasting of their successes to the Japanese 
military.166 Although there is the potential of mitigating such risks had MI6 provided 
effective training to its agents, the case of SOE explores that this does not wholly prevent 
the agents from being vulnerable as SOE officers struggled to undertake sabotage 
operations abroad.167  
 
These cases highlight that the British Intelligence Services can be ineffective and 
incapable due to an individual’s actions, a theme which was also prevalent following the 
Snowden revelations. One of the major criticisms levied at Snowden and explored in 
Chapter 3‘A Complementary Relationship’ and Chapter 5 ‘A Complicated Relationship’ 
is the damage to ongoing operations, which included British spies having to be moved.168 
However, the fact that one individual can act in such a manner does raise questions about 
internal staffing mechanisms if staff are able to act in such an ineffective manner.  
 
Vulnerabilities also exist for intelligence analysts, a theme highlighted in the structure 
and purpose section. An analyst’s ability to make an informed decision is inherently 
based on the intelligence collected. Thus, if this has been affected in any way, there is a 
direct impact upon the intelligence analysis provided to policymakers. The intelligence 
cycle, discussed in Chapter 2, demonstrates this theme, as an error at any one stage can 
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have knock-on implications to the wider intelligence analysis and advice provided to 
policymakers. Rather surprisingly however, this is not explored in the official histories, 
despite there being clear examples of this, such as the over-reliance on the intelligence 
provided agent Curveball in the lead up to the Iraq War,169 a theme Chapter 5 ‘A 
Complicated Relationship’ will further explore. The only reference to this within the JIC 
history, is that they were not the only organisation to get their assessment wrong, so did 
intelligence communities in Australia, Denmark, France, Germany and Israel.170 
However, its inclusion would demonstrate that the official histories are seeking to explore 
all facets of British Intelligence.  
 
Training  
During the Second World War, SOE trained all their agents for the work they would 
undertake in hostile countries.171 This resulted in SOE establishing training programmes, 
a system which became institutionalised in 1942172 although there is no evidence of MI5 
or MI6 providing such training. In MI6, any training was ad-hoc, as Jeffrey highlights 
how Graham Greene’s training before going to South Africa was somewhat 
tailormade.173 But this does demonstrate a degree of training being provided to its agents, 
which is in stark contrast to MI5. Andrew states that it was not until 1976 when a four-
week training programme was introduced,174 a theme also highlighted by Chapman 
Pincher in his discussions about the DG Sir Roger Hollis, stating that when he joined 
MI5, there was no professional training, with Hollis learning on the job.175This 
demonstrates how MI5, MI6 and SOE all had a degree of autonomy as they dictated their 
own training methods. But, considering the wartime context, it is somewhat strange that 
there was no centralised decision relating to the necessity of training. As the official 
histories fail to fully examine this theme, it is impossible to assess why there was such 
unilateral decision-making about the training provided.   
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Unlike MI5 and MI6, SOE realised the importance of staff training, and what this should 
include, something which MI5 and MI6 could have benefitted from. Although containing 
no illustrations which would arguably have improved its usefulness, SOE produced a 
handbook for the guidance of the use of explosives and handy tips about guerrilla 
warfare,176 further demonstrating the effectiveness with which SOE sought to train all its 
agents. Rather interestingly, the JIC history does not provide any information about 
intelligence analysis training. Although this could be due to archival availability, it 
certainly creates the impression that this was not something the JIC believed to be 
required. However, if such training were in existence, perhaps it would have aided the 
quality of intelligence, a theme the Butler Inquiry highlighted.177 As Chapter 2 ‘A Direct 
Relationship’ examined, GCHQ highlights the staff training they provide, particularly in 
relation to ensuring actions adhere to legal and ethical standards.178 This suggests that 
there has been a learning curve within the British Intelligence Services in the provision 
of staff training.  
 
Role of women  
Although the MI5 and MI6 official histories directly address the role of women in 
intelligence, Mackenzie’s SOE history does this in a rather inadvertent manner.  All 
references related to recruitment discuss male agents; there is no discussion pertaining to 
the role of women at all.179 This is despite the role of women in SOE being increasingly 
in the public domain, evident in the Herefordshire museum dedicated to the SOE agent 
Violette Szabo.180 Thus there is a significant limitation to Mackenzie’s analysis by 
omitting a crucial element. Indeed, this theme is lacking from exploration within the JIC 
history. MI6 predominantly discusses women in a wartime context, as an example from 
a medal citation demonstrates. Although the woman remains unnamed, it is stated that 
she was:  
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Engaged on the clerical side of intelligence work in a 
Balkan country on the outbreak of war. This secretary 
began to take on direct intelligence work…. In an 
atmosphere of accumulated strain as the Nazi’s 
strengthened their hold on the country, she performed 
most of the tasks of an intelligence officer, including the 
delicate work of contacting agents, which bore no slight 
risk in that Balkan war atmosphere.181 
 
This is a clear example of not only how capable women are of intelligence work, but their 
importance during the Second World War. Perhaps this explains the decision taken in the 
aftermath of World War Two that within MI6, women would be recruited on the same 
grounds as their male counterparts, which would mean they could be sent to work in 
foreign stations.182 This is a consistent portrayal to that provided by the MI6 website 
about the involvement of women during the First World War.183In this respect, MI6 were 
ahead of the time, as even into the 1970s, women in MI5 had to fight for equal working 
conditions,184 and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office were unhappy about MI6’s use 
of women that they refused a cover identity for a female going to work in the Middle 
East.185 Jeffrey’s analysis not only depicts how forward thinking MI6 was, but also how 
unusual it was for women to be seen as equals within British Government. Despite this, 
MI5 were the first to appoint a female DG,186 with MI6 and GCHQ still yet to appointed 
a female head. Although it is plausible that there are women in senior positions, as it is 
only the head who is publicly named, this remains unknown.  
 
Andrew explores how MI5 recruited women directly from universities during the First 
World War,187 although there is no discussion about the work these women undertook. It 
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is  not until  the latter stages of the Cold War when MI5’s female staff discussed creating 
a petition relating to career discriminations that Andrew analyses the role of women.188 
Whilst it is clear that women did work for the service in the intervening 60 years, their 
role is not examined, even in relation to the Second World War, which is when they were 
seen as central to MI6 as this section has highlighted.  
 
The British Intelligence Services seem to have all had divergent views on the role of 
women, although it is clear that MI6 were the most forward-thinking in their realisation 
that recruitment should be equal for both men and women. Perhaps this is due to the role 
of personalities within the MI6 management who saw the benefits of this. This links to 
the portrayal that the British Intelligence Services provide of themselves of the inclusive 
and diverse nature of the workforce, thus furthering the positive portrayal whilst further 
intimating how they remain their own independent organisations. 
 
Role of Personalities  
In particular, the MI5 and MI6 official histories explore the impact of personalities and 
they impact they can have. At a time when MI5 were under public scrutiny due to the 
court case surrounding the publication of Peter Wright’s memoir Spycatcher, Sir 
Anthony Duff had a large influence on MI5 staff morale and the future direction of the 
service189 as he sought to introduce numerous reforms and place the service on a statutory 
footing.190 Duff’s influential role is something which his successor Dame Stella 
Rimington acknowledges in her autobiography.191  
 
In the case of MI6, it was the first three C’s who were influential in the future direction 
of the service.192 Cumming was central in articulating the purpose of the organisation, 
whilst his successors Rear Admiral Hugh Sinclair and Stewart Menzies ensured their 
funding and good relations with Whitehall respectively.193 Future C’s seem to have been 
equally influential, and in particular Sir Dick White who was the only MI6 officer who 
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did not view the MI5 suspicion of Kim Philby, perhaps the most famous member of the 
Cambridge Five being a Soviet mole as unjustified, perhaps because he moved to MI6 
from MI5.194 The MI6 Official History does not analyse this theme due to the book’s 
time frame, but it does explore how the role of personalities was not just evident in MI5 
and MI6, but further afield by exploring the role of William Donovan, the wartime chief 
of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS).195 OSS was the wartime espionage 
organisation central to American wartime operations. Donovan was described as a 
fearless leader, willing to give anything a try!196 Their counterpart, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) also witnessed the role of personalities on the service. Between 1973 
and 1976, the Director Clarence Kelly favoured an open management policy, something 
his predecessor overturned,197 highlighting how influential the role of an individual can 
be on the culture and openness of the service. Thus, the impact of personalities is not 
purely synonymous with British Intelligence but indeed intelligence around the world.  
 
In contrast to analysing the heads of the Intelligence Services, Mackenzie examines the 
role of individual personalities in daily intelligence activities.198 Indeed, Andrew and 
Jeffrey do explore this theme, although in relation to specific individuals, such as Kim 
Philby and Peter Wright. In the case of Philby, he manipulated events for his own benefit, 
evident following Igor Gouzenko’s defection to the West. Philby prevented Jane Archer, 
the foremost Soviet expert British Intelligence had, from interrogating Gouzenko,199 due 
to Philby’s fear that he would be revealed as a double agent. Although Archer’s move 
from MI5 to MI6 demonstrates the organisational issues still affecting British 
Intelligence, it allowed for Philby to make such a decision, one which arguably allowed 
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him, and the other Soviet moles to continue undetected.  In the case of Wright, Andrew 
explores how he was obsessed with uncovering the identity of the fifth member of the 
Cambridge spy ring, and thus became the service’s lead conspiracy theorist.200 But 
Andrew takes his analysis further, stating that Wright’s ‘conspiracy theories arguably did 
as much damage to the Service as Blunt’s treachery.’201 Although there is no supporting 
evidence for such an assertion, it undoubtedly exhibits the role personalities can have 
upon the British Intelligence Services.  
 
Sparse reference has been made within this section to the JIC history as the human 
dimension of intelligence is not a theme overtly depicted. Although the JIC are not 
concerned about running intelligence agents in the same way as MI6 and SOE, 
intelligence analysis is central to their work and there was ostensibly a human dimension 
to this. Fleeting reference is made to the importance of the assessment staff,202 which 
does to an extent, highlight the importance of human analysis. But what about their 
working conditions, did the JIC place the same emphasis on ensuring their welfare as the 
British Intelligence Services? This omission is perhaps unsurprising as the re-producing 
of declassified documents does not lend itself to a discussion on these themes. But the 
human dimension and the importance of individuals remains an over-arching depiction 
within the official histories, demonstrating how important the theme is.  
 
Secrecy 
Due to the nature of the British Intelligence Services, all the official histories explore 
how important it is to ensure nothing is released which could affect their ongoing work, 
something particularly prevalent within the foreword written by Sir Jonathan Evans in 
the MI5 history. He states that information was only omitted if:  
 
It’s disclosure would damage national security or, in a 
small number of cases, if its publication would be 
inappropriate for wider public interest reasons.203 
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As Andrew’s analysis spans the whole of MI5’s existence, this theme predominantly 
affects discussions pertaining to the 21st Century.204 It is understandable that MI5 would 
want to ensure operational security, something the British Government and Intelligence 
Services have been critical of Snowden for damaging, with one interviewee saying that 
overnight, some people lost 10 years’ worth of work.205 But it is in the SOE official 
history where the phrase ‘passage deleted on the grounds of national security206 is 
repeated numerous times. Considering that Mackenzie’s history was originally designed 
for in-house consumption and SOE was disbanded following the end of the Second 
World War, it seems bizarre that such vast amounts of information were omitted on the 
grounds of national security. This is in contrast to Mackenzie’s introduction where he 
states that ‘the work as it now stands has not been subject to any official censorship on 
the grounds of security or of policy’.207 Perhaps this introduction was not updated when 
the book was published in 2000 and his assertion was based on the in-house history.  
 
Despite MI6’s history only pertaining to the first 40 years of the service, there remains a 
degree of secrecy surrounding the identity of those who worked for MI6,208 a theme 
depicted throughout its history, suggesting the emphasis MI6 have placed on ensuring 
the safety and security of its staff. Although there is no evidence to suggest that such 
secrecy is merely due to the desire for information to remain obscured from public view, 
the impact of secrecy upon the portrayals evident in the official histories could be further 
explored. In turn, this would provide readers with a greater comprehension of not only 
how the official histories were written, but also one of the central issues affecting the 
British Intelligence Services. As interviewees discussed, assessing how much 
information to place in the public domain is difficult,209 but shying away from such 
decisions only seeks to further the depiction that the British Intelligence Services are 
hiding behind secrecy.  
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Close readings of all of the official histories provide the depiction that the British 
Intelligence Services seeks to ensure the safety and welfare of its employees, something 
which requires a degree of secrecy. But this must be measured against the necessity of 
engaging with the public, something particularly important if the Intelligence Services 
are to maintain their democratic legitimacy. Perhaps if a policy of greater openness was 
pursued by the British Intelligence Services, this would allay public concern about 
information being shrouded in secrecy as it would be clear that only information that was 
central to ensuring national security was not in the public domain. There is surely a happy 
medium between openness and secrecy which can be achieved as the American context 
intimates. 
 
All of the official histories are based upon archival material, but it is Mackenzie who 
assesses the limitation of sources in detail, thus providing the reader with a greater 
comprehension of the difficulties encountered when researching and writing the book. It 
would be interesting, although difficult, to explore whether the original version, created 
for internal consumption also discussed the limitation of sources. Undoubtedly, Andrew 
and Jeffrey had similar problems, and highlight this in the introductions,210 whereas 
Mackenzie highlights this throughout,211 aiding the analysis. Jeffrey does acknowledge 
in his analysis that the concept of keeping records for historical purposes was not central 
to the fledgling MI6.212 This is not a critique of MI6, but rather demonstrates the 
emphasis upon secrecy which governed the fledgling organisation which has impacted 
upon the sources available for the official history and examines where the limitations of 
these official histories are. Aldrich, Cormac and Goodman explore similar themes in their 
conclusion, examining how our understanding of the JIC is shaped by which archives are 
available.213 This gives the public a distorted view of the JIC, as it does not explore the 
role of the Joint Intelligence Organisation and Current Groups214 who are in fact, integral 
to the JIC analytical capabilities.215  
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Back-channel communications  
Andrew and Mackenzie both explore how the British Intelligence Services have utilised 
back channel communications to instigate diplomatic relations without public scrutiny of 
the on-going discussions. Mackenzie  explores how SOE agents created back-channel 
communications with resistance groups,216 whilst in a contemporary context, it proved 
effective during the troubles in Northern Ireland where British Intelligence established 
communications with the IRA.217 Andrew’s analysis examines how MI6 also played a 
vital role in the establishment of this communication method with the IRA. 218 However, 
as the MI6 official history only pertains to the first 40 years of the service, this is not 
referred to in Jeffrey’s analysis. This suggests that when required, different branches of 
British Intelligence can cooperate effectively, despite the organisational and structural 
difficulties they face. Indeed, this is a consistent portrayal as the role of the British 
Intelligence Services was referred to by Blair when he told the House of Commons that 
the Government was in contact with Iraqi opposition groups.219 This furthers the overall 
positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services by highlighting their capability and 
effectiveness. 
 
Although Andrew does not explore it, it is highly possible that the back-channel 
communications were not just due to the cooperation of MI5 and MI6, but also military 
intelligence units. The British military had a significant involvement in Northern Ireland 
during the troubles, known as Operation Banner and saw 27,000 military personnel 
stationed in Northern Ireland at the height of the troubles in 1972.220 Although the 
activities of the Provisional IRA in mainland Britain are explored,221 there is no 
discussion as to the activities of MI5, wider British Intelligence or military intelligence 
units undertaken in Northern Ireland. One example would be the Four Square Laundry 
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which saw Army Intelligence testing clothes for explosive residue before washing 
them.222  
 
The official histories demonstrate that there is a degree of secrecy which shrouds British 
Intelligence, as the introductions to the MI5 and MI6 histories highlight the archival 
limitations of sources.223 Although the analysis would be strengthened if there was 
discussion pertaining to the reasoning behind such secrecy in the official histories, they 
imply that this secrecy is due to the importance of protecting both the individuals and the 
methods used by the British Intelligence Services. Whilst it is not disputed that these are 
themes which require a degree of secrecy, it is whether there is too much secrecy, such 
as passages of the SOE history still being redacted, which is where problems emanate.  
 
Conclusion  
Analysis of the official histories highlighted how they explore a multitude of themes, 
which this section has sought to examine. Beginning by highlighting how capable and 
effective British Intelligence can be, a consistent portrayal to the depictions provided by 
the Big 3 and the Government was evident. By addressing structure and purpose, there is 
a clear view that the British Intelligence Services continues to struggle with 
organisational difficulties which can affect what intelligence is gathered and how it is 
analysed, something of a consistent portrayal with Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary 
Relationship’. Although specific examples of illegal and unethical activity were 
highlighted in the MI5 and MI6 official histories, there remained the over-arching 
portrayal that British Intelligence adheres to legal and ethical standards. When illegality 
occurs, it seems to be due to the actions of an individual as the human dimension 
explored. This demonstrates just how crucial individuals are to the intelligence process, 
something which the subsequent section about the wider academic literature fails to fully 
explore. Finally, the depiction of secrecy was assessed, something which affected all the 
official histories although this theme more than the others, demonstrated different 
approaches to writing an official history.  
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The official histories provide a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services as 
organisations which adhere to legal and ethical standards, whilst maintaining their 
capability and effectiveness to ensure Britain’s safety and security, and provide staff 
welfare and support. Although there are examples where humans act inappropriately such 
as Sinclair trying to influence decision-making, these do not take away from the positive 
depictions. If such errors were not there, it would provide an inaccurate depiction of the 
British Intelligence Services by negating the human side of intelligence. This section 
highlighted the consistent portrayals between the official histories and Chapter 2 ‘The 
direct relationship’, thus demonstrating that respected academics with substantial access 
to archival material, have come to the same conclusions of the British Intelligence 
Services resulting in a positive portrayal.  
 
 
 
Wider Intelligence Literature  
Former Practitioners  
By focusing on Michael Herman and Sir David Omand, this section will explore the 
depictions of the British Intelligence Services by former practitioners. Herman was a 
trailblazer when after his retirement, he turned to academia, although this required 
Cabinet Office approval and all written work needed to be approved before 
publication.224 Indeed, in the preface to Intelligence Power in Peace and War, these are 
acknowledged as ‘security limitations’.225 But despite these obstacles, Herman succeeded 
in his desire to ‘promote greater public understanding of intelligence’,226 by bringing 
intelligence and academia closer together.227 This demonstrates the difficulties 
encountered by former practitioners when moving to academia, although one interviewee 
suggested that these obstacles have somewhat diminished.228 
 
Herman explores intelligence as a system and a set of processes as well as assessing its 
purposes,229 thus providing a more conceptual understanding of the intelligence process 
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and resulting in it being described as a ‘key reference for all those seeking to study the 
nature, roles, and impact of intelligence as a state function’.230 Although reference is 
made to British Intelligence, this is to substantiate a theme he is analysing such as how 
to organise and structure intelligence.231 Thus, although a view of British Intelligence is 
evident, this is somewhat fleeting and arguably, not the intended purpose of the book. 
Herman’s historical context allows the reader to realise how organisational problems 
have always existed as he explored the difficulties British Intelligence had in the inter-
war years.232  This is a consistent portrayal to that explored in the MI5 and MI6 official 
histories, demonstrating how the same depictions of the British Intelligence Services are 
evident within different academic literatures.  
 
In an interview with Professor Mark Phythian, Herman acknowledges the limitations of 
the book, stating that with hindsight, one major omission was any debate about the 
accountability and oversight of the British Intelligence Services. But he explains why 
this was a conscious decision, namely seeking to ensure Cabinet Office approval for its 
publication.233 This demonstrates the difficulties former practitioners have encountered 
and perhaps explains why there is a limited depiction of British Intelligence throughout 
his writing. Indeed, this is something which American academics have also struggled 
with, despite having a publication review board.234 But by such an entity existing, it 
suggests that it is more commonplace for practitioners to turn to academia, and thus 
structures have been instigated to aid this process, intimating higher levels of openness 
than are evident in the UK.  
 
Sir David Omand joined King’s College London235 after his retirement and has written 
extensively about British Intelligence. He depicts them as inherently ethical and capable, 
evident due to the importance of ensuring public and legislative support for the continued 
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collection of secret intelligence.236 If they were not adhering to high ethical standards, 
then ensuring this public and legislative support would not be paramount to their actions. 
Indeed, this portrayal of British Intelligence is further evident through Omand’s critique 
of popular culture depictions of intelligence. He argues that the BBC Drama Spooks 
provides an incorrect view of MI5 as they are shown to be amoral spin merchants with 
no qualms about beating up suspects in the basement of Thames House.237 Whilst this 
critique is directed at the depiction of intelligence in popular culture, a theme explored 
in Chapter 6 ‘A Fractious Relationship’, Omand’s criticism creates the implicit portrayal 
that the British Intelligence Services act legally and ethically if the Spooks depiction is 
so flawed. Indeed, this is a continual depiction throughout Omand’s work. In the 
Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, Omand explores the importance of the 
Intelligence Services having authorisation for their actions from the policymakers,238 
revealing the importance of adherence to legislation. This is not only a consistent 
portrayal to the official histories, but also with Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and 
Chapter 3 ‘A Complimentary Relationship’. This furthers the overall positive portrayal 
which is being placed in the public domain.   
 
In Securing the State, Omand highlights how intelligence can be exploited when it is 
misused by policymakers,239 providing the depiction that it is not the British Intelligence 
Services who are responsible for the abuse and misuse of intelligence. He further 
highlights this when exploring the importance of analysts cooperating with one 
another,240 depicting wider structural problems as something which causes difficulties, 
as opposed to the British Intelligence Services being incapable. This depiction is further 
evident when Omand explores intelligence failures. Although he does not criticise any 
Intelligence Service directly, Omand suggests in a comparable manner to the JIC history 
that failures can occur due to an inability to assess how actions will be interpreted by 
another regime.241 
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The strength to which Omand explores this theme suggests his own personal experience 
is central to the argument, demonstrating how former practitioners can provide a first-
hand depiction of British Intelligence. Omand depicts a positive portrayal of the British 
Intelligence Services which is consistent with not only the official histories, but also 
Chapter 2‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’. This 
emanates through Omand’s overall depiction of the British Intelligence Services being 
inherently capable and adhering to legal and ethical standards.  There is no discussion 
that the British Intelligence Services have undertaken dubious actions, such as the refusal 
to recruit certain ethnic groups as the official histories explored.242 But he does criticise 
the amount of secrecy still surrounding the British Intelligence Services as this affects 
what information is publicly available.243 If a former practitioner is scathing of the 
amount of secrecy surrounding British Intelligence, there is surely a pervasiveness of 
secrecy which is damaging understandings in the public domain. By increasing openness, 
the British Intelligence Services would be able to encourage public and legislative 
support for their actions. Therefore, it is their interest to further engagement with the 
public.  
 
 
Aberystwyth School 
Professor Len Scott, Professor Martin Alexander, Dr Peter Jackson and Dr Gerry Hughes 
all co-authored numerous books when working at Aberystwyth University, the over-
arching factor in creating this sub-grouping. Another reason for this grouping is the role 
Aberystwyth University had in being at the forefront of intelligence teaching. It was the 
first university in the UK to offer an Undergraduate Degree in Intelligence and 
International Politics, and although it was one of five offering such degree specialisation 
at the Master’s level, offered a research training Master’s in Intelligence Studies which 
was approved by the Government funded Economic and Social Research Council244 (a 
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degree which I did at Aberystwyth having secured ESRC funding for this project). This 
meant that Aberystwyth was something of a trailblazer in the teaching of intelligence.245  
 
Unlike Omand, the Aberystwyth academics explore how although there are times when 
an intelligence failure will occur as these are deemed inevitable;246 this is not due to the 
ineffectiveness of the British Intelligence Services, but rather due to the nature of 
intelligence. This triangulates not only with the official histories, but also with public 
statements made by intelligence practitioners,247 demonstrating the saliency of the 
depiction. By highlighting how intelligence failures can occur, an implicit message is 
portrayed that when a failure happens, this is not necessarily due to the incompetence of 
the British Intelligence Services, but rather due to the nature of intelligence. 
 
Like the JIC history, the Aberystwyth academics explore the availability of information, 
and how this is affected by excessive secrecy. In Journeys in Shadows, Scott and Jackson 
contrast the secrecy surrounding British Intelligence to the situation in America. They 
highlight how both the CIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) have scholars in 
residence,248 combined with the CIA actively encouraging the academic study of their 
work.249 Indeed, when undertaking fieldwork, one interview was within the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Headquarters250 and another was sought with the curators 
of the NSA Cryptology Museum. However, this interview failed to occur as the NSA 
employees were not allowed to sign the interview release form without NSA lawyer’s 
approval. This undoubtedly provides the academic with unprecedented access due to the 
higher levels of openness evident in the US and raises questions as to why the British 
Intelligence Services could not further their openness with academia in the same way. 
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However, it demonstrates not only an ongoing desire for academic engagement, but also 
the ways in which secrecy surrounding the intelligence realm can be reduced while 
continuing to ensure operational security remains, something which would also enhance 
public accountability of the British Intelligence Services. Whilst the American case is 
unique in relation to their openness according to Phythian,251 it demonstrates a way in 
which secrecy can be reduced and further promote academic engagement with 
intelligence, seeing it as unique does not mean that it should not be aspired to. The writing 
of the official histories and heads of MI5 and MI6 attending academic meetings and 
conferences,252 does depict that British Intelligence are attempting to overcome the 
secrecy surrounding them, there remains far more which could occur to reduce the 
pervasiveness of secrecy. We can merely hope for a similar model to America’s to be 
adopted in the UK.  
 
Although there are now more archival disclosures,253 evident in the discovery of Sir 
Stuart Menzies’ secret 1950s slush fund,254 there remains, Scott and Jackson argue, a 
degree of Governmental control exerted upon the archives.255 This is similar to the 
argument Aldrich, Cormac and Goodman explore in relation to how archival disclosures 
provide a specific view of British Intelligence, and therefore, there must be some caution 
about viewing official records as the complete reality.256 Indeed, this also overlaps with 
Omand’s discussion pertaining to the amount of secrecy surrounding British Intelligence, 
suggesting the saliency of the argument. By examining these themes, the Aberystwyth 
academics have depicted how the British Intelligence Services remains shrouded in 
secrecy, a mirrored portrayal to the official histories. But it will be interesting to ascertain 
whether this is con-current throughout the accountability literature.  
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Accountability Academics 
The intelligence accountability literature has been useful throughout this thesis as it 
explores the difficulties of the public having an informed understanding of the British 
Intelligence Services. Key academics in this field include; Ian Leigh, Professor Mark 
Phythian, Phillip Davies, Michael Wesley and Claudia Hillebrand. All depict the British 
Intelligence Services as struggling with organisational and structural difficulties as well 
as the issues of secrecy. 
 
The over-riding portrayal of the British Intelligence Services within the accountability 
literature pertains to the organisational and structural problems affecting British 
Intelligence, something which manifests in numerous ways. Leigh highlights how the 
British Intelligence Services are all on a different statutory footing, the reasoning for the 
legislation being introduced also differed, and perhaps most crucially, what the 
limitations of the legislation are.257 This is something which is exacerbated when 
administrative changes are introduced. After 9/11, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre258 
(JTAC) was established. More recently, Gordon Brown abolished the Permanent 
Secretary Committee on the Intelligence Services and the JIC’s remit to ensure the day-
to-day coordination of the Intelligence Community,259 a theme explored in the JIC 
official history. Under the coalition Government, David Cameron created the National 
Security Council,260 designed to allow collective discussion about the Government’s 
national security objectives via four ministerial sub-committees.261 
 
Thus, Leigh’s analysis highlights the organisational and structural problems such as the 
creation of new organisations affecting British Intelligence, something compounded by 
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the limitations of legislation. In the co-authored Intelligence in an Insecure World, 
Phythian and Gill explored these issues in relation to the coordination of intelligence 
assessments, highlighting how JTAC is staffed by those seconded from other 
organisations and departments.262 Although such a discussion pertaining to structural and 
organisational difficulties may seem mundane, it is important to assess due to the impact 
these can have upon intelligence analysis,263 which in turn can affect policy decisions 
and future intelligence collection. Thus there is merit in the over-arching depiction of 
how the British Intelligence Services are affected by structural and organisational 
problems.  
 
This is surmised by Michael Wesley who argues that British Intelligence is in a difficult 
position due to the structures of Government and the interplay between the services, their 
political masters and political bureaucracy.264 This provides the view that although the 
British Intelligence Services are plagued by organisational and structural difficulties, it 
is due to the wider nature of British Government, a theme the official histories and the 
British way in Intelligence section of the introduction sought to highlight.265 The 
accountability literature highlights the vast expectations placed on the British 
Intelligence Services, not only from policymakers, but also from the public.266 Through 
Wesley’s analysis, the framing portrays the numerous roles undertaken by the British 
Intelligence Services, which implies how overworked they are. This intimates that 
structural and organisational difficulties can impact upon the capability and effectiveness 
of the British Intelligence Services.  
 
Leigh draws an interesting connection between the organisational and structural 
problems and politicisation of intelligence. He highlights that many of the structural 
issues are perhaps there by design, such as the Heads of the services being responsible 
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for the day to day control of the Intelligence Services as opposed to either the Home or 
Foreign Secretary to prevent the political manipulation of intelligence, or the lack of a 
clear definition of national security within legislation to allow for a flexible approach.267 
This provides the suggestion that although there are numerous organisational and 
structural issues affecting the British Intelligence Services which all sub-genres of the 
intelligence literature have explored as well as being evident in Chapter 2 ‘A Direct 
Relationship’ these may in fact be created by design. Indeed, there is arguably some merit 
in Leigh’s assertion as following the Coalition’s election in 2010, they undertook 
substantial changes to the wider intelligence machinery, arguing it was to prevent 
politicisation of intelligence.268  Therefore, a degree of structural and organisational 
difficulties can be a positive. 
 
Another recurring theme in Leigh’s analysis is the limitation of legislation governing the 
British Intelligence Services, something which affects numerous themes such as 
international cooperation, accountability of the Intelligence Services and what actions 
they are able to undertake.269 By examining the various limitations, Leigh intimates that 
issues of illegality or unethical behaviour emanate from the legislation governing the 
Intelligence Services, as opposed to a desire from the British Intelligence Services to act 
illegally or unethically. This is a theme Gill concurs with as he highlights how: 
 
One of the major reasons why domestic security 
intelligence agencies have been found to have abused 
their power is that their tasks have been extremely ill-
defined, or not defined at all.270  
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Although Gill focuses upon MI5, this demonstrates how the limitation of legislation is a 
central problem affecting the entirety of the British Intelligence Services highlighted by 
accountability academics. This provides the portrayal that whilst illegal and unethical 
activity may occur, it is ostensibly due to the existing legislation failing to account for 
key actions of the Intelligence Services, such as GCHQ intelligence sharing, or failing to 
fully define what actions the British Intelligence Services are able to undertake.  
 
Leigh also explores how the secrecy which continues to shroud the British Intelligence 
Services, highlighting how: 
 
Secrecy restrictions placed on the process make it 
impossible for a complainant to the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal to distinguish between an unsuccessful 
application based on justifiable use of legal powers and 
one based on lack of evidence of the services 
involvement.271  
 
The Investigatory Powers Tribunal is an independent judicial forum which provides the 
right of redress to anyone who believes they have been victim of unlawful action by a 
public body, and in particular, they examine complaints including alleged human rights 
abuses about the conduct (as well as on behalf) of the Big 3, who are legally obliged to 
provide information to the Tribunal.272 Whilst this arrangement may satisfy the European 
Convention on Human Rights, both Leigh and Gill are sceptical of its effectiveness as an 
instrument of accountability due to the lack of cooperation with the Intelligence and 
Security Committee (ISC), and its inability to instil public confidence, highlighting the 
lack of publicly recorded tribunal findings against the Intelligence Services.273 Arguably, 
this is the impact of the secrecy surrounding the tribunal.  
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Wesley examines how politicisation of intelligence occurs. One way in which this could 
happen is due to the necessity for the Intelligence Services to justify their existence, 
which can occur by them seeking to be policy relevant,274 demonstrating another factor 
affecting how the Intelligence Services operate. However, this has been an ongoing 
theme since their creation as the official histories acknowledge, with the case of Sinclair 
providing policy suggestions for the Sudetenland.275 Thus, there is a consistent portrayal 
in the official histories and wider intelligence literature.  
 
This section has highlighted how the accountability literature depicts how the British 
Intelligence Services undertake numerous roles, a theme not fully analysed in the official 
histories, demonstrating how the literature provides a slightly different view of British 
Intelligence. However, as with all the other sub-genres which the chapter has analysed, 
the role of secrecy is central to the arguments explored. Phillip Davies argues that it is 
perhaps due to this secrecy, that we only hear about intelligence when something goes 
wrong.276 Whilst there is certainly some merit to this argument due to the nature of 
intelligence, it can create a problematical portrayal of the British Intelligence Services as 
it suggests that failures occur due to the ineffectiveness of the British Intelligence 
Services. Although discussions about intelligence failures may be more prevalent in the 
public domain, there is a great deal suggesting just how capable and effective they are as 
this chapter has demonstrated. However, until the British Intelligence Services are more 
engaged with the public, the depiction of failures will arguably continue to dominate 
public consciousness due to the accessibility of information.   
 
Davies’ assertion fails to explore what information the British Intelligence Services are 
now placing in the public domain. Although instigated 11 years after they were publicly 
acknowledged, MI6 launched their website in 2005 which contained information about 
their history and how to apply to work for the organisation.277 Whilst this demonstrates 
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an attempt to engage with the public, there remains a vast amount of secrecy surrounding 
the British Intelligence Services. Phythian also explores this theme, suggesting that this 
in fact could be in part due to Britain’s  culture of secrecy evident in the ‘need to know’ 
principle which prevented Intelligence Services from sharing valuable information.278 
Davies furthers this argument, suggesting that it is not just British Intelligence who are 
affected by such secrecy, as it is a wider issue within British Government.279 Whilst there 
is certainly some merit in this, evident by what has been referred to as the Whitehall 
culture of secrecy,280 there are perhaps times when it is utilised to prevent further 
discussion or investigation into a certain matter.281 The thesis is not disputing that the 
British Intelligence Services require a degree of secrecy in order to function effectively, 
but, as is suggested by the wider intelligence literature, that there is arguably more 
secrecy than is required. If this were replaced by greater openness, public accountability 
would be far stronger, something which would in-fact benefit the British Intelligence 
Services in ensuring their democratic legitimacy.282  
 
Discussing intelligence post-Brexit, Hillebrand argues that the British Intelligence 
Services will remain well-respected by other nations,283 furthering the positive portrayal 
of the capabilities and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services. Somewhat 
surprisingly, this is the first reference outside the official histories to Britain’s capable 
and effective intelligence. However, in her other publications, Hillebrand demonstrates 
how the British Intelligence Services have at times acted illegally. Focusing more upon 
intelligence oversight and accountability, she explores how the former Foreign Secretary 
and some MI6 personnel are facing legal action for the alleged extraordinary rendition of 
the Libyan dissident Abdel Belhadj despite MI6’s actions having received ministerial 
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approval.284 However this is in contrast to Robert Dover and Mike Goodman’s depiction 
of the British Intelligence Services as inherently legal and ethical organisations who are 
seeking to counter rogue spooks.285 This intimates that if there is any wrongdoing, it is 
an individual who is responsible, as opposed to the entirety of the organisation seeking 
to act in an illegal or unethical manner. 
 
Conclusion 
The different sub-genres of the intelligence studies literature all highlight how the British 
Intelligence Services adhere to legal and ethical standards, and the excessive secrecy 
which still shrouds the British Intelligence Services. A degree of secrecy is required for 
intelligence;286 what is debatable is the amount of secrecy. However, there were 
contrasting views in the literature, perhaps this occurred due to the framing of themes 
and the vast difference in the length of the publications.287 Whilst all explore the 
structural and organisational difficulties, it is only the accountability literature which 
analyses why these problems are evident, concluding that it can prevent the politicisation 
of intelligence. But throughout the academic literature explored, it is clear that there is 
an overarching positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, thus creating a 
consistent portrayal throughout the literature, irrespective of whether the academic has 
had first-hand knowledge or access to information. But there are key moments when this 
is questioned.  
 
 
Conclusion  
The British Intelligence Services and academia have always had ‘A Symbiotic 
Relationship’. Following the First World War, Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
questioned the possibility of an official academic history to mark the end of the conflict. 
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Although this did not happen,288 it demonstrates how even 100 years ago, the British 
Government realised how academia could purport a particular understanding to the wider 
public. Inherently based on primary research including archival material, undertaking 
elite interviews, and attending lectures at an American University, this chapter has 
examined how this relationship occurs in a contemporary context. 
 
The primary research highlighted the emphasis the British Intelligence Services places 
on the relationship as one interviewee explained,289 something evident in the numerous 
university courses and centres of excellence. However, as the American context 
demonstrates, there is more which could occur, particularly in relation to Undergraduate 
student engagement. The chapter then undertook an in-depth analysis of the varying sub-
genres of the intelligence studies literature, all of which had an overarching positive 
portrayal of the British Intelligence Services as being inherently capable and effective, 
adhering to legal and ethical standards and providing support and training for employees, 
although there were differences in how these themes were explored.  
 
Throughout the literature the adherence to legal and ethical standards was a recurring 
theme, and although there were criticisms of actions at times, particularly from the 
official histories, these were due to the limitations of legislation, as opposed to the British 
Intelligence Services unilaterally deciding to act in an illegal or unethical manner, 
something the accountability academic Leigh also explored.290 By examining this theme, 
there was a consistent portrayal to Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’ which 
explored legislation limitations in the Snowden context. This places a positive portrayal 
of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain by the implicit reference being 
on the legislation surrounding them not being fit for purpose.   
 
One theme which received minimal attention was that of modern technologies, with only 
the Aberystwyth Academics, Phythian and Dover assessing this theme.291 Considering 
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the emphasis now placed upon the British Intelligence Services acting legally and 
ethically, evident through the public discourse of the Investigatory Powers Act,292 the 
limited emphasis upon the links between technology and the Intelligence Services acting 
ethically is somewhat surprising, particularly considering the centrality of technology in 
the Snowden revelations. Although Dover rightly asserts that there have always been 
technological matters for British Intelligence to counter, it is the fact that these are 
continually evolving and changing that causes difficulties.293 This has affected how 
British Intelligence work,294 with the impact of the 24 hour news cycle just one 
technological advancement caused difficulties.295 
 
It has also served to demonstrate that there are also themes assessed in the official 
histories not explored in the other sub-sections of the intelligence literature, such as the 
decision not to employ certain ethnic groups, although this is perhaps due to word 
constraints on the wider literature. However, this also demonstrates that the official 
histories are not simply providing a ‘squeaky-clean’ depiction that the British 
Intelligence Services have always been perfect, they do highlight wrongdoing and are 
critical of this. Although there are times when this could have been further evident, such 
as in the discussion of MI5’s involvement in Northern Ireland during the troubles, this 
returns to the central argument of the amount of secrecy which still shrouds the British 
Intelligence Services. It is not disputed that their actions require a degree of secrecy, but 
too much can raise suspicion and thus the public can become critical or scathing of the 
portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain.  
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Chapter 5: A Complicated Relationship: The British 
Intelligence Services and News Journalism 
 
Introduction  
 
Government need public support and understanding for 
their security policies. There is therefore a very strong 
case to be made for government to reveal sufficient of the 
real nature of its security and intelligence world to enable 
the media and the public to retain a sense of perspective.1 
 
This quotation from Sir David Omand demonstrates how influential news journalism can 
be in providing the public with a particular depiction of the British Intelligence Services, 
something Peter Gill also acknowledges.2 Therefore there is a clear significance in 
assessing news journalism portrayals to comprehend what understandings of the British 
Intelligence Services are in the public domain. These are themes central to the chapter 
which has two sub research question that shape it, and these are: what views of the British 
Intelligence Services are portrayed via news journalism; and what is the nature of the 
relationship between the British Intelligence Services and news journalism and to what 
extent does that relationship affect the views portrayed? To analyse what portrayals of 
the British Intelligence Services are evident, the Iraq War and Snowden case studies will 
be focused on.3 Coverage of the case studies often provides a positive image of the British 
Intelligence Services, despite some differences amongst themes different news 
journalists examine, with intelligence often being a subsidiary theme.  
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The chapter begins by addressing the first research question by exploring a typology for 
Intelligence – news journalism engagement which Steve Hewitt and Scott Lucas explore 
as they argue that the relationship can be adversarial, dependent, manipulative, laudatory 
or supportive.4 This discussion examines how at different times, all of these relationships 
have been evident, although some are more prevalent than others. How these impact upon 
the views of the British Intelligence Services provided to the public will be explored in 
the subsequent section which analyses ‘What views of the British Intelligence Services 
are evident within news journalism?’ As Omand highlights, this question is of crucial 
importance due to the way news journalism directly impacts upon the view of British 
Intelligence held by the public.5 However, if the British Intelligence Services furthered 
their own direct public engagement, something which has increased following the 
Snowden revelations, news journalism, as an avenue of information, would not continue 
to be as influential6 in providing a depiction of the intelligence realm in the public 
domain. 
 
Centred upon news articles, newspaper opinion pieces and BBC news documentaries, the 
final part highlights how the British Intelligence Services are depicted. This section 
argues that the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in news journalism are often 
implicit rather than being the central focus of a news item, and that these portrayals can 
be grouped into several key themes. Namely: the effectiveness of the British Intelligence 
Services, which includes assessing whether this is affected by structural and 
organisational difficulties; whether their activities are legal and ethical; how the human 
dimension comes into play in shaping intelligence decisions and operations and finally, 
the role of secrecy. 
 
The case studies demonstrate that there is overwhelmingly a positive portrayal of the 
British Intelligence Services, although there are variations to the extent to which this is 
evident, particularly due to the themes that different news journalists examine. But 
                                                          
4 Hewitt, S, and Lucas, S, ‘All the Secrets That Are Fit to Print? The Media and US Intelligence Agencies 
Before and After 9/11’, in Spinning Intelligence, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, 
(London, C Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2009), p. 106 
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despite this, there is an overall agreement about the politicisation of the dodgy dossier in 
the lead up to the Iraq War and the limits of British legislation surrounding the Snowden 
revelations.  
 
There is academic agreement that news journalism provides a form of intelligence 
accountability,7 something which ostensibly occurs when there are apparent failures in 
traditional intelligence oversight mechanisms.8 But, it also impacts upon public 
accountability due to the influential role news journalism can have upon public 
understandings of the intelligence realm.9 Whilst news journalism is undoubtedly a 
central way of allowing public accountability to occur, if the British Intelligence Services 
furthered their direct pubic engagement something which could occur via their websites 
being more informative or collaborating with museum exhibits, news journalism would 
not be in such an influential position. 
 
As the introduction (Chapter 1) stated, elite interviews have been utilised throughout this 
project to gain a more informed understanding of the topics explored. Elite interviews 
were sought with journalists reporting on relevant stories for the BBC, The Guardian, 
and The Daily Telegraph. Success in gaining interviews with these subjects was mixed, 
with the journalists interviewed agreeing to speak to the author of this thesis on the 
condition that the interviews were conducted off the record. But whilst this means that 
the interviews cannot be quoted nor can the interview subjects be named, the material 
acquired as a result of the interviews nevertheless provides valuable insights into the 
relationship between news journalists and British Intelligence and have shaped the 
analysis in this chapter. The combination of academic literature and news reporting 
provides a triangulated methodology that enables a comprehensive analysis to assess the 
chapter’s two research sub-questions.  
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The nature of the relationship  
Hewitt and Lucas argue that the relationship between Intelligence and news journalism 
manifests variously as: an adversarial relationship; a dependent relationship; a 
manipulative relationship; a laudatory relationship; or a supportive relationship. They 
state that:  
 
From the onset of the Cold War to the era after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, these relationships have 
shifted, overlapped, and varied in the United States and 
Britain, yet they still await examination and critique by 
scholars.10 
 
They are right that the relationships need analysing, which is why it is surprising that 
they omit this from their own critique, instead exploring how informal links between the 
American intelligence community and news journalism have shaped the relationship.11 
This demonstrates how this research provides an original contribution to the existing 
literature. But despite this omission, Hewitt and Lucas’s typology provides a clear 
structure to analyse the first sub-research question: ‘What is the nature of the relationship 
between the British Intelligence Services and news journalism’? The different 
relationships between British Intelligence and news journalism are all evident, with some 
more prominent at times. Establishing how the relationship changes depends on wider 
circumstances, which the second research question will examine.  
 
Adversarial relationship 
There is agreement amongst intelligence scholars of the importance of news journalism.12 
As Richard Aldrich writes: 
 
With formalised national systems of accountability 
looking weaker, informal accountability through 
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revelations by a globalised media in tandem with activists 
and whistle-blowers, may become more important.13 
 
This can result in an adversarial relationship between the British Intelligence Services 
and news journalism as the latter are seeking to publish information that the former seeks 
to keep secret, something particularly evident with investigative journalism. Thus, 
tension is caused due to the secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence Services. This 
has been abundantly clear through the research for both case studies. But the adversarial 
relationship has a long history, first evident in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
In 1946, Chapman Pincher started working as an investigative journalist for the Daily 
Express after his demobilisation from the military and in his autobiography, highlights 
the daily challenges faced in securing classified information without facing the risk of 
prosecution.14 The adversarial relationship continued to be evident, and in 1967, Pincher 
reported that private overseas cables were being collected at the Post Office for 
examination by the security authorities which is now known to be the Government 
Communication Headquarters (GCHQ). Despite having sought the advice of the D-
Notice Committee who stated that the story did not contravene any guidelines, they still 
sought to suppress it under Foreign Office advice. But, in consultation with his editor and 
the Daily Express legal adviser, Pincher published the story arguing it was in the public 
interest.15  
 
The adversarial relationship continued in the 1970s when The New York Times published 
the Pentagon Papers, about American involvement in the Vietnam War. The documents 
were provided to the paper by Daniel Ellsberg after his attempts to get law makers to 
publish the report proved futile. This example highlights how news journalism provided 
a form of accountability lacking within the American Government at the time, although 
                                                          
13 Aldrich, R, ‘Regulation by Revelation? Intelligence, the Media and Transparency, in Spinning 
Intelligence, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, (London, C Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2009), p. 14 
14 Pincher, C, Dangerous to Know, (London, Biteback Publishing, 2014), p. xii; 
Pincher, C, ‘Reflections on a Lifetime of Reporting on Intelligence Affairs’, in Spinning Intelligence, 
edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, (London, C Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2009), p. 150–151  
15 Pincher, C, The Truth About Dirty Tricks, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1991), p. 90–92; 
Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1984), p. 457-459; 
Pincher, C, ‘Reflections on a Lifetime of Reporting on Intelligence Affairs’, p. 160 
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the Nixon administration did try and sue the New York Times for its disclosures,16 
demonstrating an adversarial relationship.  
 
The adversarial relationship continued to be evident in 1970s and 1980s America where 
Geoffrey Treverton argues that the media had more people asking difficult questions of 
the Government of the time and fewer people were prepared to take the Government at 
its word.17 During this time period, the adversarial relationship was also prevalent in the 
UK. Prior to the closure of the Information Research Department (IRD) in 1977, John 
Jenks states that they had become nervous when independent and investigative journalists 
became interested in their work,18 one of the reasons Hugh Wilford argues that the IRD 
was closed. Indeed, it was investigative journalism which provided the first accounts of 
the IRD when they were dissolved,19 highlighting another historical example of an 
adversarial relationship.20  
 
In a more contemporary context, the adversarial relationship has continued via 
investigative journalism. During the Global War on Terror (GWoT), it proved central in 
uncovering initiatives designed to encourage information sharing both in and out of a 
legislative framework. In turn, this was pieced together by investigative journalists who 
in turn provided a degree of accountability and oversight about these otherwise unknown 
activities.21 Thus, investigative journalism not only provided a degree of intelligence 
                                                          
16 The New York Times, Behind the Race to Publish the Top-Secret Pentagon Papers, Niraj Chokshi, 20th 
December 2017, Available From: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/us/pentagon-papers-post.html 
(Accessed 13th March 2018) 
17 Treverton, G, Intelligence for an age of Terror, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009), p. 215;  
This is a theme also explored by Nicholas Schou who argues that the Vietnam War and the Watergate 
scandal strained relations between US intelligence and news journalism. Please see:  
Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, (New York, 
Skyhorse Publishing, 2016), p. 3 
18 Jenks, J, British Propaganda and News Media in the Cold War, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 
2006), p. 86 
19 Defty, A, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda 1945 – 1953 – The Information Research 
Department, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2004), p. 2 
20 The Congress of Cultural Freedoms was the American equivalent to the IRD, and they too were closed 
due to the adversarial relationship, with Wilford arguing that investigative journalists effectively wrecked 
the CCF as an organisation. For more information, please see: 
Wilford, H, ‘ “The Permanent Revolution”? The New York Intellectuals, the CIA and the Cultural Cold 
War’, in The US Government, Citizen Groups and the Cold War – The State Private Network, edited by 
Helen Laville and Hugh Wilford, (Oxon, Routledge, 2006), p. 206 
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Borelli, S, ‘Rendition, Torture and Intelligence Cooperation’, p. 108; 
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oversight, but also granted a degree of openness about the actions of the Intelligence 
Services.  
 
In the American context, there is evidence which demonstrates that an adversarial 
relationship can be overcome as journalists are invited to Fort Meade, a military 
establishment, to understand what information in a story is sensitive,22 thus addressing 
the problems of releasing too much information into the public domain. This is in 
conjunction with the continual policy of the American military embedding journalists 
within their units to further their understanding of being in a combat zone.23 Although 
this began during the Vietnam War, it is a policy which has continued, with Schou stating 
that post 9/11, embedding of journalists happened again to the extent that the press acted 
as the Pentagon’s unpaid publicist.24 Whilst the embedding of journalists into intelligence 
operations would not be possible, the military’s experience with journalists suggests that 
an adversarial relationship can be overcome by the Intelligence Services providing a 
more informed understanding to the news media which would aid journalists’ coverage 
of intelligence matters.  In the American context, there is seemingly a formal process to 
engaging with news journalism as the CIA public affairs officers provide frequent 
background briefings to journalists, often pertaining to overseas hot spots.25 With the 
pervasiveness of secrecy, an adversarial relationship is more likely due to the desire to 
gather any information relating to the intelligence realm. But, via increased openness, an 
adversarial relationship can be overcome as it provides news journalists with a greater 
understanding of the intelligence realm, and what information it would be detrimental to 
publish, such as names of officers.  
 
Another way in which the adversarial relationship can manifest itself is when news 
journalism fails to cooperate with the Intelligence Services as Peter Gill explores. In 
October 1991, Channel 4 broadcast a programme centring on allegations of collusion 
                                                          
Leigh, I, ‘Rebalancing Right and National Security: Reforming UK Intelligence Oversight a Decade after 
9/11’, p. 731 
22 Omand, Sir, D, ‘Intelligence Secrets and Media Spotlights: Balancing Illumination and Dark Corners,’ 
p. 55 
23 Tuosto, K, ‘The “Grunt Truth” of Embedded Journalism: The New Media / Military Relationship’, 
Stanford Journal of International Relations, X/1, (2008), p. 21 
24 Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, p. 69 
25 Schou, N, Spooked – How the CIA manipulates the Media and Hoodwinks Hollywood, p. 3 
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between the Intelligence and security forces and Northern Irish Loyalist paramilitaries in 
a campaign of political assassinations.  The result of this was that:  
 
The Royal Ulster Constabulary obtained a court order 
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act requiring Channel 
4 to disclose its evidence but, when this did not include 
the identity of its main source, Channel 4 was charges 
with contempt of court and eventually fined.26 
 
This was the first time the Prevention of Terrorism Act had been used against news 
journalism to discover a source, with Channel 4 arguing that providing the information 
would put the life of the informant and others at risk.27 It demonstrates how the 
adversarial relationship can also occur in relation to news journalism seeking to protect 
their sources. 
 
Whilst investigative journalistic endeavours can be one of the reasons for this adversarial 
relationship, if the British Intelligence Services themselves placed more information in 
the public domain and oversight structures were improved, news journalism would not 
be in such a privileged position of not only holding the British Intelligence Services to 
account, but also in aiding public accountability of the intelligence realm. As the 
American case demonstrates, there are ways to prevent an adversarial relationship. 
Although cultural differences exist between the two countries, the US context highlights 
both the uniqueness of how the British Intelligence Services seeks to transmit portrayals 
of themselves, but also how via increased openness, this can become a more formalised 
arrangement whilst not detracting from the actions of the Intelligence Services.  
 
Dependent relationship 
The IRD and the British Intelligence Services were dependent on one another for access 
to information in their attempts to further the anti-communist rhetoric. This is the central 
                                                          
26 Gill, P, Policing Politics – Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State, (London, Frank Cass 
Publishing, 1994), p. 52 
27 The Independent, Channel 4 faced ruin for protecting sources: Sequestration of television company’s 
assets may be the only way to ensure that the law is enforced, the High Court was told’, Michael Durham, 
29th July 1992, Available From: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/channel-4-faces-ruin-for-
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characteristic which differentiates the dependent relationship from the manipulative one, 
that both entities are reliant upon one another. Nevertheless, there can be aspects of a 
manipulative relationship within a dependent one. However, discovering evidence to 
support this is difficult. The academic literature does suggest examples of the dependent 
relationship, with Mike Goodman stating that the British Intelligence Services can use 
news journalism to distribute information or gain intelligence about a particular country 
that they could not access28 This is a theme Carl Bernstein explored in relation to the way 
that the CIA used journalists to gather intelligence in specific countries, demonstrating 
the extent to which the Intelligence Services were dependent on news journalism for 
information during the Cold War.29 In return, news journalists can gain information from 
their contacts within the Intelligence Services. Len Scott and Peter Jackson point out that 
news journalists often write well-informed and authoritative pieces on intelligence, 
which are often based on extensive links with officialdom.30  
 
The life of Chapman Pincher succinctly demonstrates this as throughout his career, he 
made links with both the military and the British Intelligence Services which provided 
him with vast amounts of information,31 something which he subtly refers to in his books. 
For example, in The Truth About Dirty Tricks, he merely states ‘I have been assured that 
in recent times similar British operations [dirty tricks] have been quietly achieved’ and 
how Peter Wright is held up to new Security Service (MI5) recruits as everything an 
officer should not be.32 Pincher’s engagement with the British Intelligence Services also 
manifested with him being asked to write articles which would benefit the Intelligence 
Services.33 One of the most high profile examples of this was following the defection of 
                                                          
28 Goodman, M, ‘British Intelligence and the British Broadcasting Corporation: A Snapshot of a Happy 
Marriage’, in Spinning Intelligence, edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, (London, C Hurst 
& Co. Ltd, 2009), p. 124 
29 Carl Bernstein, The CIA and the Media, Available From: 
http://www.carlbernstein.com/magazine_cia_and_media.php (Accessed 16th August 2019) 
30 Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice’, in Intelligence and National 
Security The Secret World of Spies – An Anthology, edited by Loch Johnson and James J Wirtz, (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 24 
31 Pincher, C, Dangerous to Know, p. 31–37 
32 Pincher, C, The Truth About Dirty Tricks, p. 2 and 200 
Another example of this is on page 32-33 when discussing the assassination of the Pakistani Dictator Zia 
ul-Haq where Pincher discusses his conversations with British and American intelligence officers who 
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33 Another example of the Intelligence Services ‘using’ Chapman Pincher was in 1964 when in order to 
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two of the Cambridge 5, Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess to the Soviet Union (USSR). 
This led to a meeting between Pincher and the MI5 chief legal adviser, organised by the 
D Notice Committee Secretary 2 months before Khrushchev the Soviet leader was due 
to visit London34 where MI5 asked Pincher ‘to publish a prominent article warning the 
public that whatever the defectors might say in future would be KGB lies’, an article 
which MI5 were delighted by.35 Another example was when Pincher was asked to 
highlight how Burgess was in breach of the Official Secrets Act (OSA) and thus could 
be prosecuted if he returned to Britain.36  
 
In Too Secret Too Long, Pincher intimates that this is something which occurred on 
several occasions as when MI5 or the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) officers did 
provide him with information, it was a deliberate attempt to ensure publicity for their 
own purposes37 and were thus dependent on news journalists to publish the information 
in question. Perhaps this is why Pincher has been described as a public urinal where 
Ministers (as well as civil servants) queued up to leak!38 This provides a first-hand 
account of how the dependent relationship which was mutually beneficial manifested 
itself during the Cold War. Indeed, this was a tactic also used in America with the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) thought to have 400 journalists who had carried out 
‘assignments’ on behalf of the Agency.39  
 
Intelligence Services have continued to be dependent on news journalism for live 
coverage of events such as 9/11 and 7/7. During the Gulf War, the American Intelligence 
                                                          
the public domain that the swap was meant to occur, thus hoping that the Soviet Union would not pull out 
of the exchange which was due to happen in Berlin.  
34 Pincher, C, Their Trade Is Treachery, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1981), p. 202 
35 Gill, P, Policing Politics, p. 15; 
 Pincher, C, Dangerous to Know, p. 65; 
Pincher, C, ‘Reflections on a Lifetime of Reporting on Intelligence Affairs’, p. 157; 
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Intelligence and National Security, 31/2 (2016), p. 249 
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Pincher, C, Too Secret Too Long, p. 228-229; 
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Services were dependent on news coverage to communicate with opposition forces in 
Afghanistan.40 This demonstrates how the dependent relationship continues to be evident 
at times. Although the dependent relationship could cause issues with a free press in 
terms of news journalists simply regurgitating information that the British Intelligence 
Services provide, it can aid the understanding of intelligence in the public domain. As 
Scott and Jackson intimate, the dependent relationship between officialdom and news 
journalists aids the media’s comprehension of intelligence due to the provision of 
information by the intelligence services, however as Pincher highlights, this can at times 
include the provision of disinformation.41 This perhaps occurs as:  
 
There is always tensions in the routine relations between 
journalists and intelligence officials because of the 
secrecy that envelops the field.42  
 
Potentially, it is due to the pervasiveness of secrecy which can lead to a more 
manipulative relationship. 
 
Manipulative relationship  
In the build up to the First World War, Lord Northcliffe exacerbated fears within society 
of a German invasion through the stories published in his newspapers.43 In doing so, 
Northcliffe manipulated fears to increase the revenues of his media organisations. The 
link between sensational or exaggerated news coverage of events and profitability 
continue to be relevant due to the continued decrease in circulation.44 Fairfax examines 
one way in which this occurs, with a newspaper owner dictating the paper’s policy,45 
which McNair also explores, stating that this can happen by editors influencing editorial 
appointments, thus allowing for a particular political viewpoint to be prevalent.46  
                                                          
40 McNair, B, News and Journalism in the UK – Fourth Edition, (London, Routledge, 2003), p. 29, 65 
41 Pincher, C, The Truth About Dirty Tricks, p. 163 
42 Gill, P, ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq,’ p. 28 
43 Stafford, D, The Silent Game – The Real World of Imaginary Spies, (Toronto, Lester & Opren Dennys 
Limited, 1988), p. 106 
44 Ofcom, News Consumption in the UK, Produced by Jigsaw Research, Summer 2018, Available From: 
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45 Fairfax, J, ‘The press: Providing the protective shield to community interests,’ in Media Values – 
Inspired by Bill Porter; Founder of the International Communications Forum, edited by Richard Lance 
Keeble, (Leicester, Troubadour Publishing, 2010), p. 75 
46 McNair, B, News and Journalism in the UK, p. 57 
Page | 237  
 
 
Following the creation of the CIA, the American journalist Hanson Baldwin was one of 
the first journalists to devote significant time and attention to the new agency, with his 
article ‘myopia on intelligence’. In it, he argues for the necessity of a joint committee to 
provide continuing legislative supervision and protection for what he describes as:  
 
One of the most vital, most secret and most important 
agencies of Government… Intelligence Services cannot 
work except in secrecy. Yet this very secrecy, unless 
somehow scrutinised can breed inefficiency or danger to 
a democracy.47 
 
Following this, CIA Director Allen Dulles who personally knew Baldwin, ‘was careful 
to cultivate the view that the CIA was a decisive, capable agency and cited specific 
objections to the article.48 Thus, Dulles manipulated the view of the CIA portrayed in the 
newspaper articles by using his relationship with Baldwin as Dulles managed to change 
‘a potentially damaging estimate of how much the CIA cost the American taxpayer while 
retaining that budget’s official secrecy.’49 
 
Another way in which the manipulative relationship manifests is by news journalism only 
highlighting certain aspects of Government reports a theme Hillebrand examines in the 
case of the treatment of Iraqi prisoners. She argues that whilst the media were excellent 
in drawing public attention to the issue;  
 
an investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation 
Command had also passed almost undetected by the news 
media.50  
 
                                                          
47 The New York Times, Time Archive, Myopia on Intelligence, Hanson Baldwin, 3rd June 1954, Available 
From: https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1954/06/03/83336950.html?pageNumber=13 
(Accessed 16th August 2019) 
48 Hadley, D. P, ‘A Constructive Quality: The Press, the CIA, and Covert Intervention in the 1950s’, p. 247 
49Hadley, D. P, ‘A Constructive Quality: The Press, the CIA, and Covert Intervention in the 1950s’, p. 248 
50 Hillebrand, C, ‘The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight’, p. 693 
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Therefore news journalism sought to manipulate the view of intelligence to portray that 
American military personnel had acted unprofessionally. But, this is not the first time 
there has been such emphasis by news journalism on specific aspects. When discussing 
the Peter Wright Spycatcher Affair, Pincher highlights how a BBC Panorama interview 
with Wright discussed the allegation of leaking information about the Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson which had generated public outrage. But, the interview was virtually 
ignored by all other media outlets, resulting in a surprising number of people being 
unaware of the interview and this discussion.51 This further exhibits how at times, news 
journalism is guilty of only highlighting certain facets of a story pertaining to the 
intelligence realm. This becomes even more pronounced in the American case where the 
CIA sought to publish an internal Inspector General report into the dark alliance where 
they apologised for their actions publicly.52  
 
And yet, while the CIA might have been prepared to 
confess its sins, the press establishment was not. The 
agency’s mea culpa went almost completely ignored by a 
national news media that was obsessed at the time with 
the sordid details of the just breaking Bill Clinton – 
Monica Lewinsky sex scandal.53  
 
This highlights the crucial role news journalism had in not fully reporting on the wrong-
doing and arguably illegal and unethical activities of the CIA which had been put in the 
public domain.  Considering the importance nowadays of the Intelligence Services 
ensuring public support,54 manipulating the view of intelligence is inherently 
problematic. However, this manipulative portrayal of intelligence could be due to how 
media coverage of intelligence tends to focus on ‘fire alarm’ moments according to Mary 
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p. 44;  
Omand, Sir, D, Securing the State, p. 251 
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Manjikian’s analysis, an argument which is also made about parliamentary oversight.55 
Phillip Davies accurately surmises how secrecy can be a reason for this to occur as he 
states:  
 
Another consequence of the secrecy is that it intensifies 
the difficulty faced by any individual or institution in 
dealing with the press – that is, the allegations get the 
most play in the media. Detailed follow up reporting is 
usually more muted, and any eventual unpacking of what 
happened is often too little too late.56 
 
This is arguably something which affects Britain’s Intelligence and Security Committee 
(ISC) who although ‘produced interesting and informative reports, that added to public 
knowledge, despite redactions,’57 they are still reliant on news journalism for the public 
to become aware of the reports. Therefore, by the British Intelligence Services, as well 
as the ISC having a continued presence in the public domain, when fire alarm moments 
do happen such as the Snowden revelations, a knee-jerk public engagement campaign 
does not need to be initiated as it already exists.  
 
Although pertaining to the British military, Pincher highlights how during the troubles in 
Northern Ireland, an army information officer provided unattributable briefings to the 
press as a way of providing disinformation which the British media cannot be ordered to 
print. Yet managed briefings which included tip-offs often contained disinformation, 
such as how static electricity from women’s nylon underwear could prematurely detonate 
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bombs.58 This highlights the attempt to manipulate the media reporting on the troubles, 
which is perhaps unsurprising as much of the British – Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
intelligence war was played out through the media.59 This is perhaps unsurprising as Gill 
states how the Intelligence Services have a ‘professional interest in the manipulation of 
information and use it as a tool in their trade’.60 
 
The British Intelligence Services also sought to manipulate the view of the USSR by 
utilising its own publishing house and magazines.61 This also happened post 9/11 when 
Schou argues how in the American context, the floodgates opened on official 
misinformation, resulting in the US media becoming a willing participant in 
disinformation propaganda.62 Although there is no evidence that British Intelligence or 
the wider British Government continues to engage in such activities, Aldrich has been 
vocal in his critique of the British Government for manipulating the view of intelligence 
via archival disclosures.63 This demonstrates how the manipulative relationship occurs 
from both entities, although it seems to occur when there are wider influences affecting 
the British Intelligence Services – news journalism relationship, such as a media 
organisation’s financial considerations. It is also inherently problematic for the 
understanding of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain due to these 
external influences affecting the portrayals.  
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Laudatory relationship  
The IRD cooperated with journalists from nearly all of the national newspapers,64 with 
Omand stating that: 
 
The Intelligence Agencies, for their part drew tame 
journalists into their orbit as unwitting channels for 
information operations or simply in the hope of having 
their work portrayed in a better light.65 
 
Although Omand fails to examine how this occurred, utilising key journalists exhibits 
the benefits of cooperation as it allowed for the British Intelligence Services to be 
portrayed in an inherently positive manner, potentially laudatory, something Goodman 
also examines.66 Indeed, the MI5 use of this was something Pincher explored when 
discussing his dealings with the MI5 whistle-blower Wright as he states:  
 
Wright told me that MI5 had a paid informer inside every 
Fleet Street newspaper. When I asked him why MI5 had 
never tried to recruit me, he replied “We considered it but 
decided that you would be uncontrollable.” He was 
right.67 
 
However, this laudatory relationship could be the result of a manipulative relationship, 
suggesting the interlinked nature of the categories which Hewitt and Lucas 
acknowledge.68 However it seems that having laudatory portrayals of their actions is not 
always something that the British Intelligence Services want. Although in the Cold War 
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context, Pincher highlights how for MI5’s Director General (DG) Sir Roger Hollis, 
secrecy was of paramount concern to the extent that Hollis:  
 
Deplored any publicity about his department so much that 
he vetoed even laudatory accounts of its war-time work by 
distinguished colleagues such as the late Sir John 
Masterman.’69 
 
This demonstrates how even during the Cold War, the British Intelligence Services were 
affected by the pervasiveness of secrecy which thus prevented how much could be placed 
in the public domain. In this situation however, it seems that MI5 were overly concerned 
about secrecy if wartime laudatory accounts were prevented from publication. This is a 
clear example of excessive secrecy as it is hard to see why such information should not 
have been in the public domain. Whilst it would be pleasing to hope that such tensions 
have dissipated, this is unlikely as secrecy remains a key feature of the British way in 
Intelligence as Chapter 1 discussed. But, as the American case demonstrates, there is a 
balance to be found between openness and secrecy which still allows the Intelligence 
Services to operate, something Britain should be focusing on discovering as they seek to 
ensure their democratic legitimacy. 
 
But in a contemporary context, whilst it is impossible to ascertain whether there is a 
laudatory or manipulative relationship between the British Intelligence Services and 
news journalism, interviews did suggest that the British Intelligence Services do still 
directly engage with news journalism as the Big 3. have specific media officers.  
Therefore there is cooperation with specific news journalists, although who these were 
was not revealed.70 However, another interview highlighted that this is something which 
occurs across Government departments and is simply because they know some news 
journalists better than others.71  
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A laudatory relationship can occur via what Lord Leveson describes as:  
 
Cross fertilisation of employment with retired senior 
police officer being engaged as newspaper columnists 
and journalists being employed in PR departments or as 
advisers by police services.72 
 
This is perhaps unsurprising due to the available career options for those having 
previously worked for the British Intelligence Services, something the historical 
examples of Tom Braden, Lieutenant General Sir Ian Jacob, Hugh Greene and Guy 
Burgess (one of the Cambridge Five) demonstrate.73 Undoubtedly, this cross-fertilisation 
can aid news journalism’s understanding of the intelligence realm, but there is the 
potential of this leading to a laudatory relationship. Former practitioners may be keen to 
portray the British Intelligence Services in a positive manner due to their understanding 
of themes not in the public domain, as well as the potential of identifying with former 
colleagues as opposed to ensuring balanced reporting. However, this could be seen as a 
manipulative relationship too. 
 
Supportive relationship 
In a contemporary context, the importance of open source information has been 
highlighted,74 suggesting the continued importance of news journalists in supporting the 
work of the British Intelligence Services, whether intentionally or not. This demonstrates 
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the support British Intelligence and news journalism can provide to each another, as 
opposed to being dependent on one another.  
 
Another way in which the supportive relationship manifests is through the Defence and 
Security Media Advisory Notice System, more commonly known as the D Notice 
Committee.  Unique to the UK, the committee has no statutory basis and is an 
independent organisation, with no affiliation to other Government Departments.75 It 
consists of representatives from the Government and the media76 in an attempt to:  
 
To prevent inadvertent public disclosure of information 
that would compromise UK military and intelligence 
operations and methods or put at risk the safety of those 
involved in such operations or lead to attacks that would 
damage the critical national infrastructure and / or 
endanger lives.77 
 
Thus the British Intelligence Services and news journalism support one another to make 
decisions about disclosures,78 confirming the existence of a supportive relationship. 
Pincher surmises this theme when he states how the D-Notice Secretary: 
 
Believed it his duty to secure publication if possible 
without real damage to the national interest. In return, 
editors trusted him to be telling the truth when he assured 
them or their reporters that publication would damage 
national security.79 
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This allowed for information to be assessed on merit prior to publication. Pincher was 
complimentary about this practice, for example discussing how he always gained D-
Notice approval for his articles, often reading them over the phone to the D-Notice 
Secretary to find suitable wording which would allow publication.80 In an interview with 
Richard Norton Taylor, he discussed how the D Notice Committee had prevented the 
publication of stories, although he did not provide examples.81  
 
Andrew explores the role of the D Notice Committee in the MI5 official history. In 1967, 
the Daily Express published information saying that Harold Wilson demanded copies of 
all cables and overseas telegrams for inspection, something Wilson was convinced 
should have been prevented from publication under a D-Notice.82 However, the 
committee subsequently created to examine the circumstances of the article concluded 
that Pincher’s ‘account of the cable-vetting had not been inaccurate and had not breached 
any D-Notice.’83 Indeed, following the media interest into the affair between the War 
Minister John Profumo and Christine Keeler who had links to the Soviet defence attaché, 
Profumo requested a D-Notice to prevent the articles being published, something which 
was denied.84 This example demonstrates how D-Notices do consider whether the 
information is important to national security, or an attempt to keep information out of the 
public domain, something which does occur by claiming national security as the thesis 
has explored. Although a historical example, it exhibits the supportive relationship 
allowing decisions to be made in the public interest, whilst revealing a clear way in which 
the British Intelligence Services and news journalism can cooperate.  
 
Indeed, although the way the supportive relationship manifests is unique to the UK, the 
concept of it is not. Although not referring to it as a supportive relationship, Schou 
examines how many national security news journalists in the US will give the CIA’s 
public affairs office at least one day’s notice of an impending story, a courtesy which is 
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often extended to America’s allies, including Britain.85 Indeed, this was evident when 
The Washington Post sought to publish the name of ‘Jihadi John’ – Mohammed Emwazi 
a British national working with the so-called Islamic State who was involved in the 
murder of several western journalists and aid workers.86 After telling the British 
Intelligence Services of the article, they were asked to wait 24 hours before publishing. 
It transpires, this was so the Emwazi family could be relocated (they had dual nationality) 
for their own safety once the story broke.87 Thus, news journalists are able to support the 
work of the American and British Intelligence Services. 
 
Conclusion  
To assess ‘What is the nature of the relationship between the British Intelligence Services 
and news journalism’, Hewitt and Lucas’s typology of how the relationship manifests 
was explored. Whilst there is substantial evidence of all the relationships occurring at 
different times, it is the adversarial and dependent relationships which are seemingly 
most prevalent, with the laudatory relationship occurring fleetingly. These findings may 
be due to the emphasis of investigative journalism in reporting upon intelligence matters, 
something which would be limited if the British Intelligence Services were more open 
about their activities where possible. How these relationships impact upon the portrayals 
of the British Intelligence Services is something the subsequent section will seek to 
examine. 
 
 
 
Views of British Intelligence 
Introduction  
In both the build-up to the Iraq War in 2003 and the 2013 Snowden revelations, British 
Intelligence received substantial media coverage, allowing for a clear comparison of how 
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British Intelligence was depicted in two separate cases, as well as how reporting of 
intelligence matters may have evolved over the course of a decade. The section explores 
the key themes evident in news and opinion articles. These are: Capable and Effective 
which includes the organisational structure, Ethical Activities, Human Dimension and 
Secrecy. Although the portrayal of British Intelligence within news journalism is often a 
subsidiary topic, overall a positive portrayal of British Intelligence is provided to the 
public, despite depictions of British Intelligence being affected by wider themes such as 
the nature of the relationship and political bias of the media organisation. This results in 
the public receiving multiple depictions of intelligence, something which could be 
overcome if the British Intelligence Services were undertook more direct public facing 
engagement.  
 
Whilst the 2003 Iraq invasion is not the first time countries have gone to war in 
controversial circumstances,88 the academic debate pertaining to the politicisation of 
intelligence following the Iraq War was unprecedented.89 But what remains under-
explored is how the British Intelligence Services were portrayed in the media discussions 
pertaining to both the British invasion, and the dodgy dossier, thus providing a significant 
contribution to the literature. This is also the case for the Snowden revelations. News 
journalists played a key role in highlighting the existence of such mass data collection 
which predominantly led to an adversarial relationship with the British Intelligence 
Services, yet the depictions this created has yet to be examined. By analysing media 
stories relating to both case studies, this section will analyse the depictions that media 
outlets provided of British Intelligence.  
 
Capable and Effective 
In May 2003, the BBC correspondent Andrew Gilligan told BBC Radio 4’s Today 
Programme that the September dossier had been sexed-up at the request of Downing 
Street, and that the Prime Minister’s office had known that the 45-minute claim was 
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misleading. Gilligan’s source was the eminent Ministry of Defence (MOD) scientist Dr 
David Kelly who specialised in discovering weapons of mass destruction.90 He told 
Gilligan that British Intelligence were unhappy about the published version of the dossier 
as it did not reflect their considered view.91 Based on a dependent relationship, it was via 
Gilligan’s report that assertions of sexing-up the dodgy dossier were first revealed after 
Kelly spoke to Gilligan about his concerns.92 Gilligan’s coverage of the dodgy dossier 
suggests implicitly that the British Intelligence Services are capable and effective due to 
the emphasis placed upon the role of the Government in politicising intelligence. As 
Gilligan reported:  
 
Downing Street, our source says, ordered a week before 
publication, ordered it (the dossier) to be “sexed up”, to 
be made more exciting.93 
 
It was the dependent relationship which resulted in Gilligan being able to report on these 
claims, as without Kelly’s information, the story would not have existed. This 
demonstrates how crucial the nature of the relationship can be in the portrayal of the 
British Intelligence Services as it fundamentally shifted the onus away from the details 
of the dossier, to how it had been politicised by policymakers and Alastair Campbell in 
particular. This leads to an implicit view of the British Intelligence Services as being 
capable and effective as alterations to the intelligence occurred at the political level rather 
than the original intelligence reports. This was a consistent portrayal to that evident in 
the US at the time.  
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Some of the most accurate reporting about Iraq came 
from leaks within the CIA, where there was widespread 
resentment against the Bush administration – and 
particularly vice President Cheney’s office – over its 
manipulation of intelligence to justify the war… Cheney’s 
staff had cherry-picked CIA intelligence that suited their 
purposes, passing along reports that seemed to bolster the 
notion Saddam had WMDs, while ignoring other 
intelligence that undercut the administration’s case for 
war.94 
 
However in Britain, the report led to significant confrontations between the BBC and the 
Blair Government95 with Alastair Campbell demanding that the BBC apologise.96 When 
appearing on Channel 4 News, Campbell once again commanded the BBC to apologise, 
whilst showing his confrontational nature when he told Jon Snow to ‘get your facts right 
before making serious allegations’ and to ‘correct yourself’.97 This demonstrates an 
adversarial, and almost confrontational relationship between the Blair Government and 
news journalism, although Campbell’s anger was predominantly directed at the BBC. 
 
To mark the 10th anniversary of the Iraq War, Panorama produced a programme ‘Spies 
who fooled the world’ that explored how flawed intelligence was cherry picked by US 
and UK policy-makers to make the case for war. This was based on what Michael 
Fitzgerald and Richard Ned Lebow refer to as ‘the most notorious example of fabricated 
evidence’98 namely the assertions made by Agent Curveball and others, including an Iraqi 
general, about Saddam Hussein’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities. 
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These informants claimed that Saddam had mobile biological laboratories and these 
assertions were a key facet in Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations,99  to the extent 
that diagrams were shown.100 This is despite the fact the assertions had been dismissed 
by the Defence Intelligence Agency and the CIA had never interviewed Agent 
Curveball.101 
 
Indeed, this selected use of intelligence is an assessment shared by Paul Pillar in his 
discussion of how the Bush Administration used policy to drive intelligence by cherry-
picking intelligence rather than using the intelligence community’s analytical 
judgements.102 Both the Panorama documentary and related news articles103 portray the 
British Intelligence Services, and specifically MI6 as a capable and effective organisation 
who sought to corroborate available information and analyse it to the best of their ability. 
This furthers the positive portrayal of both MI6 and the British Intelligence Services.  
 
This positive portrayal was further evident when Peter Taylor undertook a number of 
high-profile interviews for the Panorama documentary, including with Agent Curveball, 
those within the CIA, the Head of German Intelligence August Hanning and the head of 
Defence Intelligence (DI) at the time, Dr Brian Jones.104 Gaining such high profile 
interviews should be unsurprising as Panorama previously interviewed Peter Wright 
where they uncovered Wright’s fabrication of the Wilson plot as well as interviewing the 
KGB defector Oleg Gordievsky.105 This would suggest a dependent relationship as DI 
sought to provide their account of the lead-up to the Iraq War, but were dependent on 
Peter Taylor to provide this to the public. All these interviews further the positive 
portrayal of the British Intelligence Services by alluding to the problems emanating from 
the politicisation of intelligence. However, the associated article on the BBC news 
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website did not explore this theme in as much detail, 106 perhaps due to editorial issues 
such as ensuring news articles are concise.  
 
The Guardian articles in the lead up to the Iraq War also depict the British Intelligence 
Services as capable and effective, albeit in a more implicit manner as they explore 
Alistair Campbell’s role in changing the September dossier.107 Based on information 
gained via a Freedom of Information (FoIA) request, the 2010 article portrays Campbell 
as responsible for ordering the changes to the pre-invasion dossier to mirror claims made 
by the Bush administration, resulting in extensive comparisons being made to the claims 
made by the CIA.108 Thus, it implies that the British Intelligence Services had analysed 
all the intelligence effectively and the problems occurred via politicisation of 
intelligence. Although Gilligan argued in 2003 that Alistair Campbell had a central role 
in the dodgy dossier,109 the 2010 article uses a more authoritative tone in criticising 
Campbell’s involvement, perhaps due to the clear evidence the paper gained via the FoIA 
request. This raises questions as to whether without investigatory journalism the extent 
of Campbell’s involvement with the dodgy dossier would have been known and 
highlights the role of news journalism of providing this information to the public which 
in turn creates the positive portrayal as the problems were due to politicisation.  
 
Indeed, this theme was also evident in The Telegraph’s ‘The Iraq War Files’, a series of 
articles published to mark the beginning of the Chilcot Inquiry in 2009. These articles 
suggest that no matter what intelligence was provided to the Blair Government, the 
decision to go to war was already made.110 This portrays the politicisation of intelligence 
to support their policy, a theme The Telegraph opinion articles also depict. In ‘Iraq War: 
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Major New Questions for Tony Blair’ the American influence on Britain’s decision to 
go to war is examined. 111 Although intelligence is a subsidiary theme of the article, it 
implies that Blair had already decided that Britain would participate in the invasion of 
Iraq even before the British Intelligence Services provided their views about Iraq and 
WMDs. The Telegraph article therefore demonstrates that the British Intelligence 
Services was capable and effective as the politicisation was due to pressure exerted by 
Blair and his aides.  In turn, this creates a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence 
Services as the issues which occurred were ostensibly out of their control.  
 
In comparison to The Guardian news articles, the opinion articles written in the build up 
to the Iraq War provide an explicit view of the British Intelligence Services being 
professional, capable and effective as the problems emanated from the politicisation of 
intelligence by Government officials. ‘Tell Us the Truth About The Dossier’ makes this 
abundantly clear as it states that ‘the government for months applied pressure on the 
intelligence agencies to come up with a dossier on Iraq’s banned weapons’.112 By 
examining the politicisation of intelligence, there is a positive portrayal provided via 
concise understanding of the difficulties the British Intelligence Services were seeking 
to overcome when the Government had a clear policy they were seeking to follow, 
something also evident in ‘Use and Abuse of intelligence’ as: 
 
The security and intelligence agencies, along with most 
among the senior ranks of Whitehall, opposed the 
invasion of Iraq on the grounds that it could not be 
justified… Officials who expressed concern about the 
claims were slapped down by the Foreign Office 
diplomats – though they also, privately, opposed the war 
– because of the damage such honesty might do to US-UK 
special relations.113 
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The opinion articles analysed provide clear analysis of the difficulties posed by 
politicisation, thus portraying the Intelligence Services as being capable and effective in 
their professionalism. Interestingly, this also places the onus for the situation on the Blair 
Government as opposed to the wider Labour Party.114 This is an interesting theme as it 
demonstrates not only that Blair was acting inherently unilaterally, something Sir John 
Chilcot has highlighted,115 but how The Guardian critiqued the leader of the party that  
they normally supports.116 The ease with which the newspaper criticised the Blair 
Government undoubtedly resulted from The Guardian’s opposition to the Iraq War, a 
recurring theme throughout the opinion articles from the time.117 This demonstrates that 
despite the political affiliation of a newspaper, they can still be critical of a particular 
policy of that Government. In The Guardian’s news and opinion articles, the British 
Intelligence Services are characterised by their professionalism and effectiveness, thus 
providing their readers with a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services.  
 
Opinion articles demonstrate this as Richard Norton-Taylor states:  
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I am told that a member of the JIC realised immediately 
the 45-minute claim referred only to short-range 
battlefield weapons.118 
 
This reveals that the British Intelligence Services were capable and effective in analysing 
intelligence pertaining to the 45-minute claim and that the assertions about it in the dodgy 
dossier were due to the politicisation of intelligence, thus furthering the positive portrayal 
of the British Intelligence Services. But the phraseology also highlights another salient 
theme, namely how Norton-Taylor had engaged with British Intelligence to receive such 
information. One of the first interviews undertaken for this research was with Norton-
Taylor who did suggest that he had cooperated with MI6 as he was approached for advice 
when they were creating their website.119 It was also seen in an article entitled ‘The 
evidence against Blair which Hutton cannot ignore’, albeit in a subtler manner. Here, 
Norton-Taylor states how:  
 
Intelligence officials, who are also in the frame, are now 
distancing themselves further from the dossier they were 
provided by their political masters to draw up.120 
 
Other articles by Norton-Taylor suggest this relationship was due to his excellent 
awareness of British Intelligence. His article titled ‘An Insult to British Intelligence’ 
highlights the imprecise nature and limits of intelligence,121 an assertion explored within 
the academic literature.122 This provides the public with an analytical view of some of 
the difficulties the British Intelligence Services may encounter but this does not mean 
they are ineffective, rather Norton-Taylor highlights how supportive the former Foreign 
Secretary, Jack Straw, is of the British Intelligence Services, furthering the depiction of 
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how effective and capable they are.123 This provides a consistent portrayal between news 
journalism and the Government in their portrayals of the British Intelligence Services in 
the lead up to the Iraq War. 
 
It is clear that news journalism depicts the British Intelligence Services in an inherently 
effective light, particularly in the Iraq War case, therefore providing a positive portrayal. 
All the media outlets analysed, firmly place the onus upon the politicisation of 
intelligence from policy-makers as being responsible for the issues within the dodgy 
dossier. Utilising data collected in 2010, Graeme Davies and Robert Johns analysed 
public attitudes towards MI6 and discovered that there were high levels of confidence 
from the public in the intelligence which MI6 produces. This is contrasted with the 
distinct lack of public confidence in the Government’s ability to use intelligence, as the 
graph below (figure 8) from their article depicting public perception of MI6 and British 
Government presentation of intelligence demonstrates. 
 
 
 
(Figure 8)124 
 
                                                          
123 The Guardian. An insult to British intelligence, Richard Norton-Taylor, 30th April 2003, Available 
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Davies and Johns’ analysis suggests that the public can draw the distinction between 
whether the intelligence practitioners or policymakers were responsible for the 
intelligence assessments in the public domain, something which news journalism 
implicitly suggested due to the emphasis placed upon the politicisation of intelligence.  
 
Structure  
In the BBC Panorama programme ‘Spies Who Fooled The World’, the structural 
difficulties affecting the Iraq dossier are alluded to. This results in DI not receiving all 
the intelligence MI6 had, as well as DI’s warnings not being listened to, according to Dr 
Brian Jones.125 This points to a theme referred to in Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ 
and Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’, namely the organisational and structural 
difficulties affecting the British Intelligence Services. This is evident as the programme 
emphasises the role of MI6 in the analysis of agents Curveball and Red River; two key 
Iraqi defectors, whilst only making passing reference to the Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC) and ‘other agencies’ who were refuting the claims made by the two agents in 
question.126 Considering the key role the JIC has in intelligence analysis, a structural or 
organisational difficulty is suggested if they were unable to undertake the analysis of the 
information provided by Curveball and Red River. 
 
This depicts the British Intelligence Services as being affected by the wider structural 
and organisational difficulties which impacted upon the quality of intelligence 
assessment, creating a consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and 
Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’. It also raises questions about why there is simply 
a reference to other agencies, particularly considering the role of DI in questioning the 
validity of the intelligence included in the dodgy dossier.127 The omission of DI and the 
role of the JIC suggests that MI6 was solely responsible for the intelligence in the dodgy 
dossier, rather than a recognition that MI6 was the actor responsible for intelligence 
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collection whereas the analysis was conducted by the JIC which provided ‘a national 
assessment of what is gathered’.128  
 
The Guardian also highlights the structure of British Intelligence, especially through 
articles exploring the JIC that were written by the newspaper’s Westminster 
correspondent David Hancke. He states that the JIC is comprised of:  
 
 Representatives from SIS, MI5, MI6, the Foreign Office, 
the Cabinet Office, the Treasury and Customs and 
Excise.129 
 
Crucially, this omits several organisations that are permanent members of the JIC: the 
MOD; Home Office; Department of International Development and most crucially, 
GCHQ.130 However, the inclusion of both SIS and MI6 is problematic as these are in fact 
names for the same organisation.131 Despite attempting to provide an understanding of 
the structure of British Intelligence, there is a flawed understanding of who constitutes 
the British Intelligence Services being depicted to the public. This becomes inherently 
problematic due to the important role of news journalism in informing and educating the 
public. Whilst the structure of intelligence may require such cooperation with both the 
Treasury and Customs and Excise, this is arguably not their main objective, something 
implied by Hencke’s writing. If there was more openness surrounding the JIC, such 
misunderstandings could be overcome, something a supportive relationship could also 
aid. Information pertaining to the JIC structure is publicly available, albeit in a simplistic 
manner on the Gov.uk website,132 raising questions as to why such a limited view of 
British Intelligence is evident within the article. Two possible reasons are the journalists’ 
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30th November 2015) 
131 Secret Intelligence Service, Home, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/index.html (Accessed 23th 
November 2015) 
132 Security Service, How We Work – National Intelligence Machinery, Available From: 
https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/how-we-operate/national-intelligence-machinery.html (Accessed 
30th November 2015) 
 
Page | 258  
 
limited awareness of British Intelligence or errors within the editing process. One off-
the-record interview did highlight the rigorous nature of the editorial process, leading to 
further questions as to how such a flawed comprehension of the JIC was allowed to be 
printed. 
 
In The Telegraph’s article ‘British Intelligence provided main source for dossier’, there 
is a clear comprehension of the JIC’s role in combining intelligence assessments from 
the individual organisations, from the defence correspondent Michael Smith.133 This 
clearly depicts the structures of analysis within British Intelligence, thus allowing the 
public to have a clearer understanding of these themes. Indeed, examining the structure 
of British Intelligence is evident in another article written by Smith and Johnston. In 
‘Dossier will draw on MI6 and CIA files,’ Smith explores the role of the MOD in 
providing intelligence for the September dossier, as well as the difficulties posed for 
British Intelligence by the Government seeking to publish the report.134 This further 
creates a consistent portrayal within the public domain about the wider organisational 
and structural issues affecting the working environment of the British Intelligence 
Services. 
 
Articles in The Guardian by Norton-Taylor, the newspaper’s defence and security 
correspondent,135 also elicit a clear awareness of the British Intelligence Services as this 
chapter has intimated. ‘Threat of War: Dossier: Secrets of Saddam’s hidden arsenal’ 
refers to how the intelligence community has responsibility for analysis.136 Although a 
subtle theme to highlight, Norton-Taylor demonstrates the complex structure of British 
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Intelligence,137 as well as the importance of intelligence analysis, exhibiting an excellent 
awareness of the existence of a wider intelligence community. This portrays the 
intricacies of the structure of British Intelligence to the public.  
 
Tom Utley implicitly explores the structure of British Intelligence when examining the 
politicisation of the dodgy dossier where he argues that Alastair Campbell: 
 
Did everything in his power to strengthen the wording of 
the document, so that it gave the impression of a much 
more immediate threat from Saddam than actually 
existed. But the inconvenient fact remains that every word 
of the dossier was approved by the head of the JIC. The 
JIC’s Chairman, John Scarlett, was misguided to accept 
so many of Mr Campbell’s suggested amendments to the 
dossier.138 
 
Unlike the other articles exploring the politicisation of the dodgy dossier, Utley argues it 
was Sir John Scarlett who let the politicisation happen by approving the wording of the 
dodgy dossier, perhaps due to political pressure exerted upon him as the quote above 
highlights. This demonstrates that the structure of the British Intelligence Services meant 
it was the JIC that was responsible for the intelligence provided to policymakers, 
implicitly portraying the Big 3 as capable and effective; the dodgy dossier was something 
which occurred out of their control, thus creating a positive portrayal of the British 
Intelligence Services. Although this was an opinion piece, Utley provided a clear and 
concise understanding of the role of the JIC, something lacking in other news and opinion 
articles. This raises the question of whether there was a supportive relationship between 
Utley and British Intelligence for this view to be provided to the public. 
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Whilst some of the articles in this section have explored the structure of British 
Intelligence in a more concise and analytical manner, all of them seek to highlight to 
some extent the organisational difficulties that are posed by the structure of British 
Intelligence. This allows the public to have a clearer and more concise understanding of 
how intelligence was politicised in the lead up to the Iraq War, as well as placing 
information in the public domain about the mechanics of British Intelligence. Although 
one interviewee believed that this is not a subject the public are interested in,139 this can 
never be fully assessed unless the public are given the possibility of understanding such 
themes. But the central issues remains that although this information is being discussed 
by news journalism, the onus remains on the individual to access, read and digest this 
information.  
 
Although the news journalism articles examined thus far was portrayed the British 
Intelligence Services as being portrayed as capable and effective, this was not always the 
case. When interviewing Sir John Chilcott, Laura Kuensseberg implied that the British 
Intelligence Services were, in fact, incapable. In a confusingly worded question, she asks: 
 
So, you believe the report should in theory, could stop 
another rush to war where, not enough was being done 
either in the legal process, or the intelligence process to 
be sure, that it was the right thing.140 
 
Kuensseberg, the BBC’s political editor, implies that the British Intelligence Services 
were incapable in the lead up to the Iraq War by not ensuring that the invasion was the 
right course of action. This suggests to the audience that the British Intelligence Services 
had the ability to tell policymakers what to do with the intelligence provided, despite the 
British Intelligence Services not having a role in assessing whether a policy decision was 
right or wrong. This contrasts with the clear understanding and analysis of intelligence 
in both a contemporary and historical context demonstrated by Gordon Corera, the 
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BBC’s security correspondent,141 suggesting the importance of the role of the individual 
news journalist in the depiction provided to the public. But despite this, there does seem 
to be an overarching understanding of the organisational and structural issues affecting 
the British Intelligence Services, something of a consistent portrayal. 
 
Legal and Ethical Activity 
Discussing the Cold War context and the troubles in Northern Ireland, Pincher highlights 
how the British Intelligence Services sought to act in a legal and ethical manner, even in 
difficult circumstances by contrasting their actions with others such as the Soviet 
Intelligence agency the KGB as he states:  
 
When the fanatical pro-Iranian Hezbollah terrorists 
extended their kidnapping campaign in the Lebanon by 
seizing four Soviet diplomats and killing one of them, the 
KGB responded in the only way barbaric murderers 
would be likely to understand. They grabbed a close 
relative of one of the Hezbollah leaders, shot him and 
returned his body, with his testicles in his mouth, along 
with a message that this was only the start if the diplomats 
were not released… By contrast, the British Army in 
Northern Ireland is allowed to hold a captured terrorist 
or suspect for only half an hour before having to hand him 
over to the Police.142 
 
By using this example, Pincher explores how the British Intelligence Services maintained 
legal and ethical standards when compared to their adversaries, perhaps due to the 
standards expected of intelligence services in democratic countries. This is a theme he 
further highlights when exploring how the British Army wanted to doctor sten gun 
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ammunition143 in order for it to explode when the IRA used it, but such a tactic was 
deemed ‘too dirty’ by Whitehall civil servants.144 Thus, it is implied that the British had 
a legal and ethical response to the troubles in Northern Ireland through Pincher’s 
assertions. This is a continuing theme throughout The Truth About Dirty Tricks.  Pincher 
furthers such a portrayal in The Trade is Treachery as: 
 
Having no powers of arrest or legal authority of its own, 
MI5 cannot require suspects to undergo interrogation. 
They can only be invited to do so.145 
 
This highlights the limitations placed upon MI5 to ensure that they act in a legal and 
ethical manner, unlike their KGB counterparts. Indeed, in the conclusion, Pincher 
highlights how MI5’s powers to carry out routine procedures such as tapping a 
telephone146 have been greatly reduced and controlled, with the Post Office refusing to 
undertake surveillance work for GCHQ unless there was a warrant.147 This further 
highlighting the overall assertion of the book that wrongdoing emanated from 
individuals, not the service. 
 
When discussing the Spycatcher Affair, Pincher intimates that it is the actions of 
individual officers as opposed to the service as a whole who is in the wrong, thus 
intimating that the British Intelligence Services acted in a legal and ethical manner, an 
overarching theme in Their Trade is Treachery. This provides a consistent portrayal to 
‘Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ as the official histories not only portrayed the 
Intelligence Services as acting legally and ethically, but how the role of individuals can 
cause problems.  
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Based on comments from the former DG of MI5 in 2010, The Guardian article ‘UK 
complained to US about terror suspect torture, says ex-MI5 boss’ portrays the British 
Intelligence Services, and specifically MI5 as acting legally and ethically as they ‘did 
lodge a protest’ about the US use of torture. But, Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller 
does acknowledge that they were slow to realise the US use of torture.148 Whilst this 
article does explicitly acknowledge how MI5 were seeking to act in a legal and ethical 
way, it could have further explored the ramifications of such a complaint by assessing 
structural and working difficulties with the Americans following these concerns. This 
view is centred upon the comments of the former DG and demonstrates a form of 
engagement between the British Intelligence Services and news journalism. Therefore, 
engagement between the British Intelligence Services and news journalism can still result 
in critical reporting of their actions, whilst also providing a cohesive understanding of 
British Intelligence to the public.  
 
Whilst the overriding portrayal of the British Intelligence Services provided by this 
article is that they act legally and ethically, the article also implies that MI5 were 
somewhat incapable due to the length of time that it took for them to discover the 
Americans’ use of torture, although why this was the case is unclear. However, this does 
not detract from the central view being that MI5 acted legally and ethically in their 
attempts to stop the use of torture. Not only does this result in a positive portrayal of the 
British Intelligence Services, but demonstrates another example of a consistent portrayal 
from the previous chapters, and most notably Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’. This 
demonstrates that the avenues of information are providing the same over-arching 
depictions that the British Intelligence Services themselves seek to provide to the public.  
 
The Guardian’s article ‘Blair Government rendition policy led to rift between UK spy 
agencies’ also explores ethical activity, although framing it in a solely British context as 
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it discusses the tensions between MI5 and MI6 caused by the latter’s involvement in the 
American practice of extraordinary rendition. This created: 
 
 … A serious and prolonged breakdown of trust between 
Britain’s domestic and foreign spy agencies provoked by 
the Blair government’s support for rendition.149 
 
By drawing the distinction between MI5 and MI6, it portrays that illegal and unethical 
activity were not commonplace throughout the British Intelligence Services as they were 
just undertaken by MI6. In highlighting MI5’s role in seeking to prevent such behaviour, 
it further intimates how they did seek to act legally and ethically. This is evident as the 
article goes on to explore how MI6’s illegal and unethical behaviour adversely affected 
their cooperation, although a greater emphasis could have been placed upon this theme 
to fully allow the public to understand the issues affecting the British Intelligence 
Services. However, perhaps this was impossible as it would have required engagement 
from the British Intelligence Services in a supportive or dependent relationship and this 
was lacking at the time.  
 
The BBC’s coverage of the technological aspects of the Snowden revelations portrayed 
an implicit view of the British Intelligence Services acting both ethically and 
professionally. In the Panorama episode, ‘Edward Snowden: Spies and the Law’, Peter 
Taylor draws the distinction between GCHQ having the capability to remotely access a 
smartphone and actively using it.150 This was further evident as news articles examined 
the amount of personal data technology companies gathered and their relationship with 
the British Government.151 This demonstrates the implicit portrayal of GCHQ seeking to 
act in a proportional manner; just because such capabilities exist, does not mean they are 
utilised. This is something that even Snowden himself highlighted,152 and is also a 
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consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 3 ‘A 
Compl3mentary Relationship’.  
 
‘Edward Snowden: Spies and the Law’ had a clear focus on GCHQ, signifying how the 
Snowden disclosures solely involved GCHQ rather than the British Intelligence Services 
as a whole. This implies that MI5 and MI6 had not been acting in the same manner as 
GCHQ, something which undoubtedly aids public understanding of intelligence. This is 
in stark contrast to the discussions of Snowden in Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary 
Relationship’ which focused upon the British Intelligence Services as an entity. It also 
demonstrates ethical adherence, examining the number of interception warrants approved 
in 2014, although erroneously it states it was the Home Secretary who approved these,153 
despite the Foreign Secretary having day-to-day ministerial responsibility for GCHQ.154 
Although the details of the approval process are presented in a somewhat confusing way, 
the article does indicate that GCHQ follows a process of applying for interception 
warrants and thus that it adheres to legal and ethical guidelines, creating another 
consistent portrayal to both Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 3 ‘A 
Complimentary Relationship’. This determines that whilst the avenues of information 
highlight the same overall themes, there are subtle differences in the way in which these 
depictions are provided.  
 
The Telegraph article ‘‘GCHQ is a greater problem than American spies’, claims 
intelligence whistle-blower’155 explores the issues surrounding the legislation governing 
GCHQ, a theme also analysed in the academic literature.156 The article portrays how 
GCHQ are always striving to ensure the safety and security of British citizens by acting 
in a legal and ethical manner by adhering to legislation, a consistent portrayal to that 
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GCHQ themselves have on their website and the argument made by Leigh.157 This is a 
theme which was explored in BBC’s Panorama ‘Edward Snowden: Spies and the Law’, 
exhibiting how different news journalists can provide a similar depiction of the British 
Intelligence Services to their audiences, it is the way in which this occurs which differs. 
But this undeniably leads to questions about how effective news journalism can be in 
providing the public with an understanding of the British Intelligence Services if there 
are such different ways that the same theme can be depicted. To an extent, this can be 
due to the political affiliation of the news outlet, but could be easily overcome if there 
was more openness from British Intelligence Services themselves. This would prevent 
news journalism being in such a privileged position in terms of providing understandings 
of the British Intelligence Services to the public.  
 
Being in the wrong  
As more information became publicly available, it seems that The Telegraph changed its 
stance on Blair’s decision to go to war. Written to mark the 10th anniversary of the 
conflict, ‘Iraq War: Major new questions for Tony Blair’ explores how Blair misled the 
public over the threat posed by Saddam and WMDs due to his desire to support Bush’s 
invasion.158 This is in sharp contrast to ‘Dossier will draw on MI6 and CIA files’ written 
in 2002 which implies that the dodgy dossier was solely based on intelligence.159 
However, this may also be due to the timing of events. Following the 2010 General 
Election, the Conservatives, whom The Telegraph supports,160 were in a coalition 
Government with the Liberal Democrats. Potentially, this explains the impetus of the 
newspaper changing their stance on the dodgy dossier and placing the onus on Blair for 
the politicisation of the dodgy dossier; namely wanting to continue to support the 
Conservative Government.  
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Indeed, providing support to the Cameron Government was also implicitly suggested in 
the reporting of the Snowden revelations and the framing of article titles. The title 
‘Edward Snowden is a traitor to the United States: he must be brought to justice’ strongly 
asserts that Snowden was wrong for disclosing classified material, a consistent portrayal 
to that in Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’. The article then argued that he had 
endangered intelligence personnel and should be brought to justice as a result.161 This is 
a view which has been highlighted by intelligence officers from around the world,162 and 
is the major critique of Snowden’s decision to place such vast amounts of sensitive 
material in the public domain, a central theme explored in Chapter 3‘A Complementary 
Relationship’. The article ends by stating:  
 
It is the dedicated and professional staff in these agencies, 
and at GCHQ in Cheltenham, that provide vital and 
timely insights into immediate and future threats to the 
UK national interest.163 
 
This furthers the depiction of the British Intelligence Services being inherently capable 
and Snowden being in the wrong with his revelations, leading to a more positive portrayal 
of the British Intelligence Services.  
 
Indeed, such framing was also evident in The Telegraph’s obituaries for Melita Norwood 
and Peter Wright. Norwood was a double agent for the Russians but was not uncovered 
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until 1999,164 despite evidence of her treachery as early as the 1930s.165 Wright, a whistle-
blower in the 1980s, took the British Government to court in his attempt to publish his 
memoir Spycatcher.166 Although there were some positive outcomes from Wright’s 
assertions,167 The Telegraph’s discussion of Wright frames him as a whistle-blower who, 
along with Norwood, sought to damage Britain’s security by placing more information 
in the public domain.168 This demonstrates how the framing of Snowden as someone who 
has damaged national security is another example of The Telegraph portraying as traitors 
those whose actions it does not approve of, suggesting a bias towards national security, 
in whatever form it occurs. Indirectly, this depicts British Intelligence as always seeking 
to act in the public interest.  
 
Many of The Guardian articles about Iraq WMD capabilities explore the British 
Government decision during the 1980s to help build the Iraqi chemical warfare plant, 
Falluja,169 at a time when Saddam was thought to be gassing Iranian troops during the 
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Iran-Iraq war.170  Here, The Guardian’s articles are implicitly suggesting that the 
Thatcher Government had questionable ethical considerations because it was 
unconcerned about providing Saddam with the capability to produce and use chemical 
weapons. The articles are based upon Government documents, portraying the Thatcher 
Government as being in the wrong for supporting Falluja 2. This resulted in the UK 
taxpayer giving £300,000 in compensation to the Iraqi Government after the final checks 
on the plant were interrupted by the first Gulf War,171 something which furthers the 
article’s argument of Thatcher being in the wrong. In the Iraq War context, the article 
depicts the JIC assessment for being wrong in not highlighting the British involvement 
in Falluja 2, however the articles do not state how the assessments would have been aided 
by its inclusion.  
 
This clearly exhibits The Guardian’s political stance as a left-wing newspaper with a 
readership of predominantly Labour and Liberal Democrats supporters.172 Undoubtedly, 
this limits the analysis provided as it portrays the Conservative Government as wrong for 
their approval of Falluja 2. But, despite this, The Guardian were opposed to the Iraq War, 
but place the blame for such actions firmly on Blair as opposed to the Labour Party,173 
demonstrating how although a newspaper may have a clear political stance, this does not 
prevent them from criticising party policies. Therefore, it is somewhat surprising for the 
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articles to have a limited focus upon the Iraq War context and rather seek to place the 
onus for the current situation upon the actions of the Thatcher Government.  
 
Although impartiality has been a guiding principle of the BBC since the 1920s,174 there 
are times when this has been questioned. Peter Taylor interviewed numerous high-profile 
individuals for the Panorama programme ‘Edward Snowden, Spies and the Law’, 
including: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Deputy Director Mark Giuliano; 
Metropolitan Police (Met) Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley; General Mike 
Hayden; David Anderson; Sir Malcolm Rifkind and Edward Snowden.175 This exhibits 
the possibility of a supportive relationship being evident for such individuals to talk 
candidly about surveillance and related themes. But the interviewee selection leads to the 
programme providing the view that Snowden is a traitor, a view particularly promoted 
by the FBI Deputy Director Mark Giuliano.176 Whilst it is admirable that Taylor 
interviewed Snowden, providing a balanced view of Snowden’s actions could have been 
furthered by interviewing those who have praised Snowden’s actions, perhaps even Glen 
Greenwald who was responsible for publishing the information. This results in the 
portrayal of Snowden as being wrong for revealing classified information, a consistent 
portrayal to that evident in Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’. Perhaps this is 
best evident when Taylor puts to Snowden the charges the US Government has brought 
against him and states how each one is accurate, although Snowden disputes this.177 
 
Unethical Activity  
 
 The history of intelligence agencies over the last 50 years 
in the US and UK – with the targeting of trade unionists, 
left-wingers, peace campaigners, civil rights activists and 
others, as well as the dodgy dossier – shows the need for 
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strong oversight by parliament and the judiciary, neither 
of which exists.178 
 
Written after the Snowden disclosures, this passage from an opinion article by Ewen 
MacAskill portrays how the British Intelligence Services are acting in the shadows due 
to a lack of oversight, suggesting that the British Intelligence Services were not under the 
control of the Ministers who are meant to oversee them.179 This creates a negative 
portrayal of the British Intelligence Services for not acting legally and ethically. The 
wording implies British Intelligence had been acting unethically in their targeting of 
certain groups, a theme which Christopher Andrew explores in the MI5 official history.180 
Thus, Ewen MacAskill’s assertion of such unethical activity seems apt in the MI5 
context, providing the view that the British Intelligence Services have at times 
undertaken illegal and unethical actions.  
 
The Guardian’s coverage of the Snowden revelations portrays him as a hero who has 
done the right thing in providing information about Intelligence capabilities to the public. 
In turn, this creates the implied portrayal that the British and American Intelligence 
Services have acted illegally and unethically: 
 
 The existence of the programme has been disclosed in 
documents shown to the Guardian by the NSA whistle-
blower Edward Snowden as part of his attempt to expose 
what he has called “the largest programme of 
suspicionless surveillance in human history”. “It’s not 
just a US problem. The UK has a huge dog in this fight”, 
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Snowden told the Guardian. “They [GCHQ] are worse 
than the US”.181 
 
This is further evident in how defensive The Guardian reporting is about anyone who 
has criticised Snowden. Following allegations in The Sunday Times about David 
Miranda’s involvement with the Snowden documents and the access Russia have had to 
the classified documents,182 The Guardian was highly scathing of the reporting, claiming 
it was factually inaccurate that David Miranda had met Snowden in Moscow and was in 
possession of classified documents when he was detained at Heathrow Airport.183 If the 
assertions of Miranda’s detention were accurate, something The Guardian reporting 
suggests, it would further the portrayal of the British Intelligence Services acting in an 
unethical manner due to their perceived role in the detention of Miranda at Heathrow. 
This raises questions about whether those involved are almost too close to the story to 
provide an un-biased, analytical view of the subject matter. But it also serves to 
demonstrate the adversarial relationship between the British Government and The 
Guardian, something which continually manifested itself during the course of the 
Snowden revelations. 
 
Glenn Greenwald, the investigative journalist responsible for publishing the Snowden 
revelations in 2013 provides his account of the time leading up to, and after the Snowden 
documents were published in his book No Place To Hide. In it, he states how he, Snowden 
and Laura Poitras – another investigative journalist involved, vetted all the material 
before publication, to ensure nothing which would harm anyone was released.184. 
Implicitly, this suggests that whilst British and American intelligence organisations had 
acted unethically, Snowden, Greenwald and Poitras were seeking to act ethically in their 
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decision as to what information to publish. However, considering the vast scope of the 
Snowden disclosures, it seems impossible for Snowden, let alone the investigative 
journalists Greenwald and Poitras to have the in-depth knowledge to assess what 
information should be redacted. But had Britain had more openness akin to America’s 
and a system of teaching journalists what information could be detrimental to national 
security, the journalists involved would arguably have had a better awareness of what to 
omit from the Snowden revelations. 
 
The failure to fully ‘vet’ the Snowden revelations is one of the major critiques of 
Snowden and the journalists levied by intelligence officials185 as is discussed in Chapter 
3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’. It demonstrates the adversarial nature of the 
relationship following the Snowden revelations which increased when GCHQ employees 
entered The Guardian offices and ordered computer hard drives to be destroyed.186  
 
The portrayal of unethical actions following the Snowden revelations was further 
demonstrated in an opinion article for The Guardian. Following the terrorist attack in 
Paris in 2015, Trevor Timm argues that:  
 
Politicians in the UK, which already has the most 
expansive surveillance laws in the western-world, are 
using the tragedy to attempt to rush through their even 
more invasive new mass-spying bill.187 
 
Referring to the Investigatory Powers Bill, Timm suggests that the British Intelligence 
Services already undertake in mass surveillance, and is therefore acting unethically. As 
Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’ and Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ 
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explored, this is not the British Intelligence Services acting illegally and unethically, but 
rather a significant limitation of the legislation, a subtle difference which is not fully 
explored by Timm. If it were, it would depict that the British Intelligence Services were 
acting lawfully, but issues arose due to the obscure language, and lack of legislation 
directly relating to the collection of information online.  
 
Indeed, MacAskill highlights a similar theme, albeit in a more muted manner. He argues 
that: 
 
The intelligence services, after decades left to their own 
devices, have been exposed to publicity. The idea that 
their activities can be left free from at least some degree 
of transparency and oversight is no longer tenable.188 
 
This suggests that new legislation was required if the current system was untenable. What 
this means for the actions the British Intelligence Services can undertake, could have 
been further explored, thus highlighting the limitations of the legislation. In turn, this 
could have provided greater analysis for the Investigatory Powers Bill which sought to 
provide legislation of gathering information from the internet,189 and was incredibly 
controversial.190 
 
In 2015, BBC Panorama explored the Snowden revelations as part of their coverage of 
the Investigatory Powers Bill, where Taylor examined the necessity of the new 
legislation.191 This implied the limitations of the existing legislation and that issues 
emanated from this as opposed to the activities undertaken by the British Intelligence 
Services. By interviewing the Met Assistant Commissioner and discussing the use of 
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social media information,192 suggestions were made as to how law enforcement would 
also use the newly-legislated capabilities.  One interviewee also highlighted this theme, 
stating that British Intelligence and Law Enforcement realised the necessity of the 
legislation, as it would put all powers together in a more transparent way, with the only 
new power being internet connection records, and it was Law Enforcement who were 
pushing for the new power.193 If the Police’s use of the new legislation was made clearer 
throughout the programme, it would have highlighted to the audience that it was not 
British Intelligence who were keen to have further powers of surveillance and would 
have furthered the depiction that British Intelligence were not acting unethically.  
 
The Snowden revelations highlighted the cooperation between social media companies 
and Governments,194 a theme which Panorama also explored. Taylor interviewed Simon 
Milner, the Director of Facebook in the UK and Ireland who repeatedly stated how 
Facebook rely on users to report terrorist content and also requests from law enforcement, 
suggesting that this was ample to prevent terrorist content.195 However, the ISC report 
into  the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby  suggested  that this was not adequate, after the 
subsequent discovery of a Facebook chat between one of the killers and an Al Qaeda 
affiliate about wanting to kill a British soldier with a knife.196 This implies how crucial 
the new legislation would be to law enforcement if social media companies are relying 
on requests for information, as opposed to providing them with any suspicious online 
activity. It also alludes to a manipulative relationship; if this part of the ISC report 
received substantial media attention, public attitudes towards the IP legislation could 
have been very different. 
 
‘Torture: British role suppressed’ implicitly argues that British Intelligence acted 
illegally, unethically and crucially without Government approval as:  
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MI5 and MI6… have been very keen that British MPs and 
the public did not discover how they were complicit in CIA 
operations, including that involving Binyam Mohamed… 
subsequently tortured and sent to Guantanamo Bay.197 
 
This portrays that the British Intelligence Services were acting unethically by engaging 
with CIA operations and without the approval of Ministers if they were seeking to prevent 
MPs becoming aware of their actions. Indeed, this theme is further implied by discussing 
how the controversial Closed Court Proceedings are preventing the disclosure of 
information which supports the allegations of British involvement in torture,198 perhaps 
an impact of how following the Binyam Mohammed case there was a more sceptical 
judicial mood according to both Gill and Leigh’s analysis.199  
 
In the BBC’s ‘Q&A: The Iraq Weapons Row’ it asserts that the JIC oversee security 
services reports,200 something which is in fact the ISC’s responsibility.201 By permeating 
such a counterfactual view of intelligence, it implies that there are James Bond-like 
characters on the streets of the UK, something which does not happen as MI6 is the 
foreign intelligence service. But the portrayal suggests that MI6 are acting within the UK 
and possibly in an unethical way. In the biography of a former MI5 officer – the domestic 
intelligence service – the adherence of observing a suspect before their arrest is 
paramount,202 refuting the assertion within news journalism.  
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Although this is an attempt by a retired intelligence officer to engage with the public 
domain, news journalism arguably reaches a bigger audience, and thus it is the unethical 
depiction of MI6 acting unilaterally that the majority of the public will consume. But 
despite this, it still requires the public to actively access, read and digest the information. 
If the British Intelligence Services themselves were more willing to engage publicly, 
news journalism as an avenue of information, would not continue to be such a prominent 
way in which the public are informed of intelligence matters.  
 
Human Dimension  
In a consistent portrayal to that evident in Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic relationship’, news 
journalism explores the human dimension of intelligence, and in particular, the role of 
personalities. The role of the individual is examined in ‘Iraq War: major new questions 
for Tony Blair’ as the article stipulates:  
 
Mr Blair has been accused by critics of being a ‘war 
criminal’ for his role in the conflict which ultimately cost 
the lives of 179 British soldiers and an estimated 100,000 
civilians.203 
 
This places the onus for the politicisation of intelligence and the Iraq invasion firmly on 
Blair and his closeness to the Bush administration, demonstrating how influential Blair 
was within the British Government’s decision-making process. Indeed, many of the 
articles which have examined the politicisation of intelligence do suggest this theme, 
although many, including Gilligan, place the onus on Alastair Campbell204 as opposed to 
Blair, although many of these resulted in an adversarial relationship. ‘Downing Street 
told spy chiefs to rewrite dossier six times’205 creates the impression that the British 
Intelligence Services did what was asked of them by their Ministerial bosses, and 
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therefore it was the Cabinet Ministers who caused the problems with the dodgy dossier. 
This provides the implicit assumption that the British Intelligence Services have acted 
legally and ethically throughout and have done the right thing by not bowing to political 
pressure, as the title suggests. In turn, this creates the positive portrayal of the British 
Intelligence Services.  
 
The human dimension was seen in an article Gilligan wrote for The Telegraph to mark 
the 10th anniversary of the conflict. Here, Gilligan firmly demonstrates the human 
dimension, placing the onus not only for the invasion, but also the military conflict 
including the number of British personnel who died, on Blair and his successor Gordon 
Brown, arguing that the Labour Government failed to support troops when stationed in 
Iraq.206 This goes against the newspapers support for the invasion at the time,207 
suggesting the difference between an individual journalist’s view and the editorial 
position.  
 
When Mr Campbell saw their (British Intelligence) latest 
offering, which was distinctly lacking in the kind of hard 
evidence that Mr Powell presented to the Security Council 
last Wednesday, he could not resist the temptation to spice 
it up with an obscure PhD thesis.208 
 
This excerpt from a Telegraph opinion article explicitly states that issues of sexing-up 
intelligence emanated from Campbell, with British Intelligence only referred to in terms 
of not providing the hard evidence which had been evident in Colin Powell’s UN 
speech.209 This suggests that the British Intelligence Services had failed in providing 
policy-makers with the information they required, suggesting that the role of the 
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Intelligence Services was to support Government policies. However, as the intelligence 
literature examines, this was not the case. Gill and Phythian argue that British 
Intelligence are responsible for assessing collected information and disseminating this to 
policy-makers, as the intelligence cycle demonstrates.210 Thus in an inherently implicit 
manner, there is a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services as Con Coughlin 
places the onus of the politicisation of intelligence on Campbell,211 exhibiting how 
influential the human dimension can be.  
 
Therefore, the human dimension is depicted as being the cause of the politicisation of 
intelligence. In turn, this portrays British Intelligence as not doing as their political 
masters required, and therefore, they acted legally and ethically which furthers the 
positive portrayal. If there were more active engagement from the British Intelligence 
Services, such a view could have been clearer, such as highlighting that it is not the role 
of British Intelligence to provide policy-makers with the information they want, but 
rather with analysis of the available information.  
 
The Guardian implicitly examines the human dimension in the Iraq War which saw some 
MPs resign in protest to Blair’s actions, something evident in ‘Our Prime Minister has 
been ill served by the US’ which centres upon John Denham’s resignation from 
Parliament.212 Indeed, this continued to be prevalent in ‘Sixth aide resigns over Iraq’ 
which described what David Kidney had said, combined with his personal background.213 
Considering these junior Government Ministers had resigned over Blair’s decision to 
invade Iraq, there is limited analysis about the reasoning for the resignations, such as the 
assertions of the intelligence being sexed up, or the ramifications of the resignations. 
Equally, this highlights how intelligence was a subsidiary theme to the article when 
arguably, considering the resignations related to the Iraq invasion and the dodgy dossier, 
                                                          
210 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, Second Edition, p. 12 
211 The Telegraph, A distinct lack of intelligence, Con Coughlin, 9th February 2003, Available From: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3587299/A-distinct-lack-of-intelligence.html 
(Accessed 23rd August 2018) 
212 The Guardian, ‘Our prime minister has been ill served by the US’, Nicholas Watt, 19th March 2003, 
Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/19/houseofcommons.iraq (Accessed 
25th June 2018) 
213 The Guardian, Sixth aide resigns over Iraq, Staff and Agencies, 19th March 2003, Available From: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/19/iraq.iraq (Accessed 25th June 2018) 
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intelligence should have been far more prominent in the discussion. This limits the view 
of the British Intelligence Services provided to the public. 
 
The Telegraph supported the Iraq invasion and the opinion article ‘In Our Name’ 
questioned why people were going on the anti-war demonstrations:  
 
They intend to protect the world, and themselves, against 
the threat of chemical, biological and nuclear attacks by 
Saddam Hussein; to liberate the people of Iraq, who have 
suffered more under Saddam than anybody else; to 
overthrow the most dangerous of the regimes that sponsor 
international terrorism; and to uphold the authority of the 
UN by enforcing the disarmament of Iraq. How many of 
the marchers disagree with these aims?214 
 
By placing the onus on the individual, the article seemingly sought to encourage The 
Telegraph readers to believe that the Iraq invasion was the right decision, by focusing on 
the ousting of Saddam as being a good thing, a theme also explored in Chapter 3 ‘A 
Complementary Relationship’. This omits any discussion of the British Intelligence 
Services, despite how central the dodgy dossier was to the Iraq invasion and demonstrates 
how British Intelligence was a subsidiary theme in the article. This results in an article 
demonstrating its support for the Iraq War, believing that it was the right decision, 
irrespective of intelligence. Arguably, this is seeking to manipulate the readers into 
supporting the Iraq invasion. This goes against the newspaper’s party affiliation and 
demonstrates their desire to support actions deemed to encourage national security, 
something highlighted in the case of the framing of the paper’s titles in the Snowden 
case.  
 
‘British spies moved after Snowden files read’ examines the assertions that Snowden had 
put the lives of British Intelligence personnel in danger after his documents had been read 
                                                          
214 The Telegraph, In Our Name, Telegraph View 15th February 2003, Available From: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3587643/In-Our-Name.html (Accessed 23rd 
August 2018) 
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by China and Russia. The BBC intelligence correspondent, Gordon Corera provides clear 
contextualisation of these themes based on interviews with Sir David Omand, Professor 
Anthony Glees and Shami Chakrabarti.215 The article provides a greater comprehension 
of intelligence such as the emphasis placed upon ensuring the safety and security of 
British Intelligence personnel, thus providing a consistent portrayal to the information 
the British Intelligence Services themselves place in the public domain.216 Throughout 
the article, the depiction of the British Intelligence Services is inherently subtle as it 
focuses more upon the assertions of Snowden damaging national security and the 
assumption that hostile states may have accessed the Snowden documents.217  
 
Such an in-depth awareness of the impact upon British Intelligence of the Snowden 
revelations suggests the article benefitted from a supportive relationship with British 
Intelligence. By highlighting their sentiments towards Snowden as being a ‘traitor’, the 
BBC article received information from a ‘senior Government source’.218 This 
demonstrates a form of engagement from British Intelligence which has undoubtedly 
aided the portrayal of British Intelligence as being concerned about their personnel, a 
view not always prevalent within news journalism depictions but was evident within 
Chapter 2 ‘ A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’. 
 
Secrecy 
As with Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ secrecy is a theme news journalism 
emphasises. In The Telegraph’s ‘Gordon Brown admits Iraq War was not “justified”,’ 
secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence Services is implicitly highlighted. It states 
that Brown only became aware of top-secret American intelligence held by the 
Department of Defence once he left office which challenged the official US view about 
Saddam’s WMD.219 Throughout the article, British Intelligence is a subsidiary theme but, 
                                                          
215 BBC News, British spies ‘moved after Snowden files read’, 14th June 2015, Available From: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33125068 (Accessed 15th June 2015) 
216 Jeffrey, K, MI6 The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909 – 1949, (London, Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2010), p. xii 
217 BBC News, British spies ‘moved after Snowden files read’, 14th June 2015, Available From: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33125068 (Accessed 15th June 2015) 
218 BBC News, British spies ‘moved after Snowden files read’, 14th June 2015, Available From: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33125068 (Accessed 15th June 2015) 
219 The Telegraph, Gordon Brown admits Iraq war was not “justified”, Nicola Harvey, 5th November 2017, 
Available From: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/11/05/gordon-brown-admits-iraq-war-not-
justified/ (Accessed 4th May 2018) 
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there remains some very interesting implicit depictions of them. What is perhaps most 
telling is the amount of secrecy surrounding intelligence on Iraq if Brown only became 
aware of the report in question once he left office, raising questions about why the 
intelligence had not been shared with Britain, thus providing an implicit message of 
British Intelligence being capable and effective based on the information they had. In 
turn, this furthers the positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. This 
highlights the levels of secrecy surrounding intelligence, even amongst allies in the 
intelligence realm.  
 
Secrecy surrounding intelligence is highlighted by Norton-Taylor in ‘UK spies fooled by 
scale of raid on US’ where he discusses findings from the latest ISC report.  
 
In a report sprinkled with asterisks denoting censored 
information, the parliamentary intelligence and security 
committee revealed that the agencies reported “an acute 
awareness in the period before September 11 that [Bin 
Laden] and his associates represented a very serious 
threat”.220 
 
Although it may seem trivial, by highlighting the asterisks throughout the report, Norton-
Taylor portrays just how much secrecy there is surrounding intelligence, even in a 
parliamentary report.  This is a theme which Glees, Davies and Morrison examine in The 
Open Side of Secrecy, one of the few academic studies of the ISC. Although they 
acknowledge the necessity of the Intelligence Services operating in secrecy, they 
highlight how ‘the ISC agree to the exclusion of sensitive material before the report’s 
publication’.221 This highlights how Norton-Taylor’s discussion has provided a view to 
the public of one of the major difficulties faced when holding the British Intelligence 
Services to account. This suggests why news journalism remains such a crucial avenue 
of information, that the pervasiveness of secrecy surrounding the British Intelligence 
Services even reduces what information accountability mechanisms are able to publicly 
                                                          
220 The Guardian, UK spies fooled by scale of raid on US, Richard Norton-Taylor, 14th June 2002, 
Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/jun/14/politics.september11 (Accessed 26th June 
2018) 
221 Glees, Anthony, Davies, H, J, Phillip, Morrison, N, L, John, The Open Side of Secrecy, Britain’s 
Intelligence and Security Committee, (London, Social Affairs Unit, 2006), p. 19 
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discuss. This therefore puts a greater emphasis on the role of news journalism being a 
form of public accountability if there are issues surrounding the existing accountability 
structures. 
 
Conclusion 
References to the British Intelligence Services were something of a secondary theme 
within many of the articles analysed, which is somewhat surprising considering how 
central British Intelligence was in relation to the dodgy dossier and the Snowden 
revelations. This resulted in many of the portrayals of the British Intelligence Services 
being implicit, as opposed to explicit, although this was less evident in articles written 
by intelligence, security and defence correspondents. Perhaps this is due to a supportive 
or dependent relationship being evident. This demonstrates how the nature of the 
relationship seems to have a direct correlation with the portrayal of the British 
Intelligence Services as these articles sought to highlight how capable and effective 
British Intelligence were, and their emphasis upon the safety and security of intelligence 
personnel.222 
 
There also seems to be an overall positive portrayal of British Intelligence being capable 
and effective, with issues of politicisation and the nature of the legislation being 
highlighted as the cause of the British Intelligence Services being in the public domain 
in both case studies. This therefore depicts that there are wider issues affecting the British 
Intelligence Services which are beyond their control.   
 
 
Conclusion  
The chapter has explored two inter-related questions in order to assess what views of the 
British Intelligence Services are portrayed to the public via news journalism. It began by 
examining ‘What is the nature of the relationship between the British Intelligence 
Services and news journalism’ by analysing the typology suggested by Hewitt and 
Lucas.223 This analysis demonstrated that although all of the relationships are prevalent 
at different times, the adversarial and dependent relationships were most evident, with 
                                                          
222 BBC News, British spies ‘moved after Snowden files read’, 14th June 2015, Available From: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-33125068 (Accessed 15th June 2015) 
223 Hewitt, S, and Lucas, S, ‘All the Secrets That Are Fit to Print? The Media and US Intelligence Agencies 
Before and After 9/11’, p. 106 
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the laudatory relationship arguably occurring least often due to the availability of 
information. Perhaps it was unsurprising for these relationships to be most common due 
to the case study selection as it was the dependent relationship which arguably led to the 
allegations of the sexing-up of the September dossier,224 and the adversarial relationship 
being evident with the Snowden revelations.  
 
The chapter then examined the second research sub-question; ‘What views of British 
Intelligence are evident within news journalism’ by analysing the coverage of the dodgy 
dossier and the Snowden revelations in the BBC, The Guardian, and The Telegraph. 
Rather surprisingly, this highlighted that a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence 
Services is depicted to the public via all media organisations and that engagement with 
British Intelligence can still result in critical reporting of the actions of the British 
Intelligence Services. This refutes arguments that cooperating with Intelligence Services 
results in a laudatory relationship being prevalent.  
 
In the Iraq War context, this occurred by articles centring upon the politicisation of 
intelligence, which they highlight occurred at the political level, with Blair and Campbell 
both being deemed responsible for the sexing-up of the dossier. Indeed, had it not been 
for the dependent relationship, such assertions would not have been published in 2003. 
This clearly highlights how the nature of the relationship impacts directly upon the view 
of the British Intelligence Services provided to the public, as well as how they overlap as 
the dependent relationship soon turned into an adversarial one. In the Snowden context, 
this continued to be prevalent with the adversarial relationship displayed when The 
Guardian first published the stories.225 The overriding portrayal is of the issues affecting 
the legislation governing the British Intelligence Services, thus leading to a consistent 
portrayal with Chapter 4 ‘A Complementary Relationship’. 
 
However, the analysis has demonstrated how British Intelligence is not always a central 
theme explored within news journalism, and instead is a subsidiary theme. It is also 
                                                          
224 Audioboom, Andrew Gilligan – Iraq – 29th May 2003, Available From: 
https://audioboom.com/posts/822830-andrew-gilligan-iraq-29-may-2003 (Accessed 22nd June 2018); 
BBC News, Full text: Gilligan’s Today reports, 24th July 2003, Available From: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3090681.stm (Accessed 4th May 2018) 
225 The Guardian, The NSA files: the Guardian front pages – in pictures, 10th October 2013, Available 
From: http://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2013/oct/10/nsa-files-guardian-front-pages (Accessed 
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inherently dependent on the individual journalist, perhaps due to the cooperative 
relationship which exists between some and British Intelligence. This demonstrates how 
engagement from British Intelligence themselves, aids understanding of the intelligence 
realm and gives a more informed view to the public.  
 
Throughout this chapter, it has been clear that the tensions between openness and secrecy 
in Britain continue to affect the Intelligence Services – news journalism relationship. By 
being so secretive, investigative journalism fills the void of public knowledge, however 
this often results in an adversarial relationship, as well as the British Intelligence Services 
having to react to a fire alarm moment when they are forced to be in the public domain. 
If there was more openness, as is evident in America, news journalism as an avenue of 
information would not continue to be so important in creating public understandings of 
the intelligence realm, and would arguably also reduce the adversarial relationship. In 
turn, this could also prevent as much damaging information being placed in the public 
domain by investigative journalists. Thus, it is hard to see in this context, how increased 
openness is anything but a positive. 
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Chapter 6: A Fractious Relationship: British Intelligence and 
Popular Culture 
 
Introduction  
 
They [portrayals of intelligence] are not just fictitious 
fluff and nonsense; they have a real-world impact in 
respect of how they help to condition the public to think 
about intelligence, the use of state sanctioned violence 
and counter-terrorism.1 
 
As Robert Dover demonstrates, popular culture is an influential way in which the public 
are conditioned upon intelligence matters, something which has emanated from how 
‘popular culture found itself in a unique and privileged position’2 before Intelligence 
Services around the world were publicly acknowledged. Although the British 
Intelligence Services are publicly acknowledged and do place some information in the 
public domain as Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ examined, popular culture remains 
a key avenue through which the public domain consumes an understanding of the British 
Intelligence Services.  
 
Dover’s assertion demonstrates not only the continued role of popular culture in 
informing the public, but also why assessing this is of paramount importance, a theme 
Len Scott and Peter Jackson concur with as they argue that:  
 
fictional representations of intelligence form the basis of 
much public understanding.3  
 
                                                          
1 Dover, R, ‘From Vauxhall Cross with Love: Intelligence in Popular Culture’, in Spinning Intelligence, 
edited by Robert Dover and Michael S Goodman, (London, C Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2009), p. 202  
2 Library of Congress – Webcasts, Ian Fleming, James Bond and the CIA – Christopher Moran, Available 
From: http://www.loc.gov/today/cyberlc/feature_wdesc.php?rec=5223 (Accessed 14th September 2016) 
3 Scott, L, and Jackson, P, ‘Journeys in Shadows’, in Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First 
Century – Journeys in Shadows, edited by L.V. Scott and Peter Jackson, (London, Routledge, 2004), pp. 1 
– 28  
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This theme is also explored by Christopher Moran who succinctly argues that: 
 
in an ideal world, popular attitudes towards intelligence 
services should not be conditioned by popular culture but 
sadly the world is not ideal.4  
 
This is furthered in Moran’s co-authored article with Trevor McCrisken where they state 
that the Bond franchise in particular:  
 
Has filled a public knowledge vacuum about intelligence 
agencies and security threats. With the intelligence 
services historically unable and unwilling to open up 
about their operations, we would argue that Bond – 
unclassified and accessible – has functioned as an 
important site through which the public has come to 
perceive intelligence, plus the threats faced by 
intelligence communities.5 
 
This is best demonstrated by the introduction to the Imperial War Museum’s exhibit 
‘Secret War’. It begins by highlighting popular culture portrayals of the British 
Intelligence Services, as the picture below (Figure 9) demonstrate.  
 
                                                          
4 Library of Congress – Webcasts, Ian Fleming, James Bond and the CIA – Christopher Moran, Available 
From: http://www.loc.gov/today/cyberlc/feature_wdesc.php?rec=5223 (Accessed 14th September 2016) 
5 McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary 
between the ‘real’ and the imagined’’, Intelligence and National Security, 33/6 (2018), p. 806 
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Figure 9 shows the entrance to the secret war exhibit where at the centre there is a poster 
from the Bond film Casino Royale with the phrase ‘It is easy to mistake spy fiction for 
reality….’ above it.6 
 
According to Amanda Mason the exhibit’s curator, beginning with Bond was a conscious 
decision as the public often think of spies through fiction.7 This demonstrates the validity 
of the academic arguments explored, and in particular Dover’s assertion of the real world 
impact popular culture portrayals of the British Intelligence Services can have. But if the 
British Intelligence Services furthered their own engagement with the public domain, 
popular culture would not continue to be such an influential avenue of information about 
the intelligence realm. This exhibits the clear importance of scrutinising what depictions 
of the British intelligence Services are portrayed through popular culture, something 
which this chapter strives to achieve in order to comprehend what depictions of the 
British Intelligence Services are in the public domain and thus impacting upon public 
accountability of the British Intelligence Services. 
 
However, it is possible that the British Intelligence Services are using popular culture to 
their advantage by directly engaging with it. Although no concrete evidence of this was 
                                                          
6 Imperial War Museum, Secret War Exhibit, London, United Kingdom, 16th September 2015 
7 Private Interview 1: With Amanda Mason – 7th October 2015 
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found, interviewees did intimate how MI6 acknowledge that there are some positives 
from the Bond franchise as it increases recruitment and have permitted filming outside 
its Headquarters,8 something Chapman Pincher also acknowledged.9 This demonstrates 
how the elite interviews allow for the perspective of the British Intelligence Services to 
be evident within this thesis, thus furthering the contribution to the literature.  
 
To fully comprehend what understandings of the British Intelligence Services popular 
culture provides to the public, the chapter first provides a brief contextualisation which 
examines what popular culture constitutes, a key term for this chapter. Secondly, this 
section explores the evolution of popular culture portrayals of the British Intelligence 
Services as it has always been a keyway in which to promote specific ideas and concepts, 
evident as:  
 
Organisations and individuals, from the CIA to the FBI, 
from V I Lenin to Joseph Goebbels, have all expressed the 
view that cinema is the most important medium for 
transmitting political ideas.10 
 
The chapter will then analyse what themes are evident in the Bond franchise, John Le 
Carré’s Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, and the BBC drama Spooks. This selection allows 
for the three main forms of popular culture namely, film, TV and books to be compared 
and contrasted. In all of them, the themes explored include: communications and code, 
surveillance, science and technology, secret diplomacy, deception and secrecy, acting 
legally and ethically, threats and society, and finally the role of gender. The chapter then 
examines under-explored themes in popular culture which include the monotonous 
nature of intelligence, support mechanisms and financial difficulties. Due to the real 
world impact popular culture can have on the intelligence realm, it is crucial to examine 
what portrayals this avenue provides and whether like the other avenues, there is an 
overarching positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. 
 
                                                          
8 Private Interview 2: 8th January 2016; 
Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017 
9 Pincher, C, The Truth About Dirty Tricks, (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, Ltd, 1991), p. 331 
10 Alford, M, Reel Power – Hollywood Cinema and American Supremacy, New York, Pluto Press, 2010), 
p. 170 
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Contextualisation  
What is popular culture? 
As the literature review examined, there is an academic literature which explores popular 
culture depictions of intelligence, although these tend to focus on a particular theme such 
as the role of gender and feminism, leadership or the geopolitics of the Bond films.11 
This, combined with the Cultural Cold War literature, has provided a rich source of 
information about intelligence and popular culture by demonstrating how its uses have 
continually been evident, thus suggesting the importance of popular culture in putting 
information into the public domain. Indeed, it would be strange if something which was 
continually used throughout the Cold War was dismantled in the post-Cold War era. 
However, one consistent theme across these literatures was the lack of a concise 
definition as to what constitutes popular culture. 12  
 
Work which focuses solely upon popular culture such as Buhle’s chapter, fails to provide 
a definition of what popular culture is.13 Perhaps this is due to the problematical nature 
of seeking to define what culture constitutes.14 Rotter believes that such difficulties arise 
from how interlinked it is with the nation state, language, identity and values.15 Whilst 
there is certainly merit to Rotter’s argument, it fails to consider the increasingly 
globalised and inter-connected nature of the world nowadays which arguably allows for 
the existence of transnational culture. However this does not necessarily aid defining 
culture. In 1990, Joseph Nye argued that power in world politics was inherently changing 
                                                          
11 Amacker, A, K and Moore, D, A, ‘ “The Bitch is Dead”: Anti-feminist Rhetoric in Casino Royale’, in 
James Bond in World and Popular Culture: The Films are Not Enough- Second Edition, edited by Robert 
G Weiner, B. Lynn Whitfield and Jack Becker, (Newcastle Upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 
2011), pp. 144 – 155; 
McNeely, T, L, ‘The feminisation of M: Gender and Authority in the Bond Films’, in James Bond in World 
and Popular Culture: The Films are Not Enough- Second Edition, edited by Robert G Weiner, B. Lynn 
Whitfield and Jack Becker, (Newcastle Upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), pp. 156 – 161; 
Oldham, J, ‘The Main Behind the Desk and Other Bureaucracies’, in Spy Chiefs Volume 1 – Intelligence 
Leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom, edited by Christopher Moran, Mark Stout, Ioanna 
Ioradanou and Paul Maddrell, (Washington D.C, Georgetown University Press, 2018), pp. 283–300; 
Black, J, ‘The Geopolitics of James Bond’, in Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century – 
Journeys in Shadows, edited by L.V. Scott and Peter Jackson, (London, Routledge, 2004), pp. 135 – 146   
12 Gienow-Hecht, J, C, E, ‘On the Division of Knowledge and the Community of Thought: Culture and 
International History’, in Culture and International History, edited by Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and 
Frank Schumacher, (New York, Berghahn Books, 2004), p. 3  
13 Buhle, P, ‘Popular culture’, in The Cambridge Companion to Modern American Culture, edited by 
Christopher Bigsby, (Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 392  
14 Rotter, A, J, ‘Culture’, in Palgrave Advances – International History, edited by Patrick Finney, 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 267  
15 Rotter, A, J, ‘Culture’, p. 268 – 269  
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to a softer style, centring upon resources such as cultural and ideological attraction 
combined with rules and institutions of international regimes.16 This is a logical theme 
which continues to be prevalent within the academic literature17 and primary sources.18 
Gienow-Hecht provides the closest to what could be considered a definition when 
highlighting cultural diplomacy and what this constitutes as she argues it is: 
 
The creation and communication of memory, ideology, 
emotions, lifestyles, scholarly and artistic works and 
other symbols.19 
 
Gienow-Hecht’s definition provides a useful starting point in considering what popular 
culture may constitute. Although not an academic source, the most cohesive definition 
of popular culture is found in The Oxford English Dictionary. It states that it is ‘culture 
based on the tastes of ordinary people rather than educated elite.’20 This suggests that it 
is predominantly based upon the preferences of the public. This highlighted that whilst 
culture can take many forms, for the purposes of this chapter, popular culture is centring 
upon forms of culture that are widely accessible in the public domain. This is a theme 
prevalent within Storey’s analysis where he continually suggests that popular culture is 
based on the non-elite urban masses,21 thus allowing for a clear distinction between 
popular culture and high culture which refers to opera, renaissance art and classical 
music.22 Therefore this chapter will be assessing popular culture depictions of the British 
Intelligence Services which are ubiquitous in the public domain. Thus the chapter will 
focus upon spy novels as well as films and TV programmes due to their influence and 
                                                          
16 Nye, J, ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy, 80, (1990), p. 168  
17 Rotter, A, J, ‘Culture’, p. 279 - 280 
18 British Council, Soft Power in 2016, Available From: 
https://www.britishcouncil.org/organisation/policy-insight-research/insight/soft-power-2016 (Accessed 
17th May 2017) 
19 Gienow-Hecht, J, C, E, ‘On the Division of Knowledge and the Community of Though’, p. 6 
20 Oxford English Dictionary, Popular Culture, Available From: 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/popular_culture (Accessed 22nd February 2017) 
21 Storey, J, ‘Culture: The ‘Popular’ and the ‘Material’,’ in Materiality and Popular Culture – The Popular 
Life of Things, edited by Anna Malinowska and Karolina Lebek, New York, Routledge Publishing, 2017), 
p. 15 
22 The Guardian, High culture versus pop culture: which is best for engaging students, Available From: 
https://www.theguardian.com/teacher-network/teacher-blog/2013/feb/20/pop-culture-teaching-learning-
engaging-students (Accessed 19th May 2017) 
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popularity. This is particularly salient due to the overlap between these types of popular 
culture, something which the chapter will seek to explore in greater detail. 
 
Although the academic literature does seek to explore whether popular culture depicts a 
romanticised or credible view of the British Intelligence Services, this tends to occur in 
a historical context.23 This is unsurprising as, due to the nature of their work, Intelligence 
Services are shrouded in secrecy, evident by the exemption of the British Intelligence 
Services from the Freedom of Information Act.24 This raises the question of whether it is 
even possible to discern whether popular culture provides a realistic depiction of 
intelligence work in a contemporary context. Therefore, the chapter analyses which 
themes popular culture depicts to the public, thus allowing for a clear comprehension of 
whether this provides a positive or negative portrayal, or indeed is consistent with the 
depictions provided by the other avenues of information.  
 
Popular Culture Portrayals of the British Intelligence Services: An Evolution 
Popular culture has capitalised upon matters of public intrigue since the Victorian era.25In 
the 1840s, the dime novel in America popularised stories about both detectives and 
cowboys26 whereas it was not until the 1870s when the spy novel came into existence 
with the publication of The Battle of Dorking, which provided a vivid account of a 
German invasion in the UK.27 However, it was in France where spy fiction initially 
gripped the popular imagination, arguably due to the French defeat in the Franco-
Prussian war28 but such interest subsided over time, intimating how intrigue into the spy 
genre linked to the public having an experience of war, conflict or espionage. This was 
                                                          
23 Hiley, N, ‘Decoding German Spies: British Spy Fiction, 1908 – 1918’, in Spy Fiction, Spy Films and 
Real Intelligence, edited by Wesley Wark, (London, Frank Cass Publishing, 1991), p. 55  
24 Freedom of Information Act, (London, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 2000), p. 2 
25 Whelehan, N, and Fielding, P, ‘Spies, Dynamite and Victorian Terrorism’, Lecture at National Library 
of Scotland, 19th April 2017  
26 Bold, C, ‘Secret Negotiations: The Spy Figure in Nineteenth-Century American Popular Fiction’, in Spy 
Fiction, Spy Films and Real Intelligence, edited by Wesley Wark, (London, Frank Cass Publishing, 1991), 
p. 17 
27 Cobain, I, The History Thieves – Secrets, Lies, and the Shaping of a Modern Nation, (London, Portobello 
Books, 2016), p. 18 
28 Trotter, D, ‘The Politics of Adventure in the Early British Spy Novel’, in Spy Fiction, Spy Films and 
Real Intelligence, edited by Wesley Wark, (London, Frank Cass Publishing, 1991), p. 38;  
Scott, L, and Jackson P, ‘Intelligence’, in Palgrave Advances – International History, edited by Patrick 
Finney, (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 179 
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evident as spy fiction did not enjoy popularity in Britain until the turn of the century,29  a 
time of considerable fear and uncertainty about British power and security. 
 
These were concerns which William Le Queux exacerbated, due to his conviction of 
Britain’s inability to retaliate against a German invasion.30 Due to the success of Le 
Queux’s novels, Spies for the Kaiser was serialised in the Weekly News31 at a time when 
newspapers were further permeating the fears of German espionage. This was evident as 
Lord Northcliffe’s the Daily Mail exacerbated concerns32 of a German espionage ring in 
Britain stating that every German was a potential spy,33 albeit with slight adaptations to 
ensure continued newspaper sales.34 In Edwardian society, serialising books in 
newspapers allowed for more people to access them, demonstrating the ongoing desire 
to adapt novels into other forms of popular culture in order to appeal to a wider audience. 
This was in conjunction with other authors such as Robert Childers and E Phillips 
Oppenheim permeating fears of a German invasion.35 Although these novels did not 
directly depict an image of the British Intelligence Services, they did have a significant 
impact upon British Intelligence.  
 
With continuing concerns furthered by popular culture surrounding a potential German 
invasion and the balance of power in Europe in question, there was, as Stafford wrote:  
 
the need for drastic measures to protect British society in 
the new century.36  
 
This manifested itself in the creation of the sub-committee of Imperial Defence in 1903, 
to whom Le Queux provided considerable evidence.37 In 1909, they recommended the 
establishment of the British Intelligence Services, and thus MI5 and MI6 came into 
                                                          
29 Trotter, D, ‘The Politics of Adventure in the Early British Spy Novel’, p. 30 
30 Stafford, D, The Silent Game – The Real World of Imaginary Spies, (Toronto, Lester & Opren Dennys 
Limited, 1988), p. 3 
31 Trotter, D, ‘The Politics of Adventure in the Early British Spy Novel’, p. 31 
32 Young, J, Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century, (London, Arnold, 1997), p. 50 
33 Stafford, D, The Silent Game, p. 48 
34 Andrew, C, Defence of the Realm, the Authorised History of MI5, (London, Penguin Books, 2009), p. 9 
35 Stafford, D, The Silent Game, p. 33 – 35, 41 
36 Stafford, D, The Silent Game, p. 9 
37 Cobain, I, The History Thieves, p. 16 – 19  
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existence.38 This intimates how influential spy fiction could be on public understanding 
of intelligence and on the Intelligence Services themselves, a theme Trotter explores.39 
This was further evident by numerous claims of espionage cases that inundated MI5 
during the first four months of the First World War.40 
 
Popular culture depictions of the intelligence realm continued, perhaps owing to 
returning First World War veterans wanting to write about their experiences. A.E.W 
Mason, Somerset Maugham and Compton Mackenzie all published books based upon 
their personal wartime intelligence work.41 As archival material collected on overseas 
fieldwork suggests, it is these examples which are the likely origins of  insider spy fiction 
as those who had served during the First World War had a desire to engage with the 
public and provide their account of events.42 Like Oppenheim, who explored the impact 
of war upon human combatants, 43 these authors were inspired by the events around them, 
in stark contrast to Le Queux’s earlier portrayals of the intelligence realm, which Stafford 
argues were highly romanticised.44 This is somewhat unsurprising as until 1909, the 
British Intelligence Services did not exist, and it was in part due to the evidence Le Queux 
provided to the sub-committee of Imperial Defence that the British Intelligence Services 
were created.  
 
 The Thirty-Nine Steps, a best seller as soon as it 
appeared, is often described as the first British spy novel, 
and its hero, Richard Hannay, as the prototype of the 
fictional secret agent.45 
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Written by John Buchan in 1915, The Thirty Nine Steps is about a British officer who 
after being framed for the murder of a British spy, clears his name by exposing German 
officers who have infiltrated British Intelligence. It was instantly popular resulting in its 
adaptation to film in 1935,46 before being re-made several times as well as becoming a 
TV series47 and a West End theatre performance.48 During the 1920s and 1930s, Herman 
Cyril McNeile’s The Adventures of Bulldog Drummond (written under the pseudonym 
Sapper) was adapted for both newspaper serialisations in Lord Northcliffe’s publications 
and for films.49 This allowed a wider audience to engage with the storyline and gain a 
further understanding of British Intelligence, something evident in both novels. Although 
the extent to which it occurred is disputed, Buchan is thought to have worked for British 
Intelligence following a career in the military,50 a path it seems McNeile also followed.51 
Unsurprisingly, these events influenced their writing, and therefore both are examples of 
insider spy fiction.  
 
Without the success of Buchan’s hero, a capable individual who can save the entirety of 
British Intelligence single-handedly, and his writing style, McNeile and other novelists 
such as Ian Fleming, would not have followed the ‘formula’ first evident in Buchan’s 
writing. Namely; a fictional agent acting alone to counter the threats Britain was facing, 
which for Buchan’s hero Richard Hannay, was German espionage. This suggests 
Stafford’s assertion of The Thirty Nine Steps being the first British spy novel52 may have 
some saliency as it created a formula for future authors to follow. This is certainly evident 
in The Adventures of Bulldog Drummond, as it mirrors the adventures of Richard Hannay, 
albeit with a different hero.53 Indeed, reference was made to Bulldog Drummond in John 
Le Carré’s Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy,54 demonstrating how fiction can feed fiction. This 
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is still something which occurs in contemporary spy fiction and programmes such as 
Spooks which had dedicated researchers to find aspects of intelligence tradecraft in spy 
fiction.55 As the chapter will further explore, this can aid the positive portrayal of the 
British Intelligence Services provided to the public. This suggests just how popular the 
spy novel had become and demonstrates how popular culture was providing the public 
with a particular view of intelligence.  
 
Indeed, spy fiction was so popular that under the leadership of J Edgar Hoover, the 
American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) engaged with popular culture during the 
1930s.56 Their counterpart, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which was created in 
1947 continued to cooperate with popular culture and they covertly worked with 
producers, with the 1951 version of George Orwell’s Animal Farm one such example.57 
For the FBI, their  public engagement took the form of radio programmes, news reels in 
the cinema58 and the creation of FBI toys that were sold in shops across America.59 The 
photograph below (figure 10) was taken at the International Spy Museum and shows a 
selection of the toy cars, guns and magazines that the FBI created during this time.  
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(Figure 10) This is showing (from the top) toy guns, cars, and magazines that were 
created by the FBI.60 
 
Spy fiction continued to be popular with the British reading public throughout both the 
Second World War and Cold War, with insider spy fiction occupying a central position. 
Graham Greene and Geoffrey Household, both of whom had been stationed abroad, 
published espionage novels on their wartime escapades.61 With both being in a privileged 
position of having a first-hand view of intelligence, they were examples of insider spy 
fiction, namely a former practitioners using their experiences to write fiction. This genre 
is certainly influential not only in providing the public with an understanding of the 
intelligence realm, but also in influencing other authors such as Eric Ambler who built 
upon the foundations created by Somerset Maugham. Ambler therefore made mundane 
and boring aspects of intelligence fascinating and brought it into mainstream fiction.62 
This contradicts what one interviewee said in relation to the public not being interested 
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in the minute mechanics of how the British Intelligence Services operate.63 Not only does 
this demonstrate Ambler’s importance to the creation of the modern spy novel, but also 
in providing a view of intelligence to the public. 
 
Spy fiction and other depictions of the British Intelligence Services continued to be 
produced and rose in popularity dramatically during the Cold War. This is evident in the 
response to John Le Carré’s The Spy Who Came in from the Cold which outsold all other 
works of fiction in America in 1964, selling 230,000 copies and a further 2 million copies 
the following year when published in paperback.64 Bond’s escapades were equally 
popular and were not only serialised in the Daily Mail, but were also turned into a comic 
strip.65 This highlights how Bond: 
 
Functioned first and foremost, although not exclusively, 
as a Cold War hero, an exemplary representative of the 
virtues of Western capitalism triumphing over the evils of 
Eastern communism.66 
 
Thus, popular culture had a significant role in showing the West’s political and 
ideological superiority.  
 
Although John Le Carré acknowledges his time working for the British Intelligence 
Services, he states that:  
 
I am a writer who, when I was very young, spent a few 
intellectual but extremely formative years in British 
Intelligence…. Some of you may wonder why I am 
reluctant to submit interviews on television and radio in 
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the press. The answer is that nothing that I write is 
authentic. It is the stuff of dreams not reality.67 
 
Despite his argument, Le Carré’s depictions of intelligence undeniably constitute insider 
spy fiction, particularly due to the implication of how important and informative his time 
was within the British Intelligence Services.  However, there is no discussion either in 
the information available on the website, or in an interview Le Carré gave in 1965 to 
Malcolm Muggeridge as to what work he undertook.68 In his rare 2017 public 
appearance, to coincide with the publication of his most recent book, A Legacy of Spies, 
Le Carré did discuss his time working for both MI5 and MI6, whilst stating that Smiley 
was based upon the author John Bingham.69 Coinciding with this PhD research, this 
provided another perspective on this topic and was a rare glimpse into the creation of 
George Smiley (the main hero in many Le Carré novels).  
 
During the Second World War, at Churchill’s request, Ian Fleming worked at the British 
Security Corporation in New York following America’s entry into the war, to spread 
propaganda to ensure victory in Europe.70 Therefore, like Le Carré, Fleming is another 
example of an author of insider spy fiction. But unlike Le Carré, Fleming utilises his 
experiences of the British Intelligence Services with the use of gadgets,71 a central 
component of the Bond franchise.  
 
Both Le Carré and Fleming demonstrate the continued emphasis upon adapting novels to 
other forms of popular culture, a substantial history of which has been highlighted within 
this section. This demonstrates the continued importance of popular culture in providing 
a depiction of intelligence to the public. If such portrayals were not well received by the 
public, then surely adaptations would not be continually evident. Perhaps such intrigue 
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was in part due to the case of the Five Soviet moles within the British Intelligence 
Services who were known as the Cambridge Five, who Denning believes created such 
public intrigue into espionage.72 
 
Therefore, there was a public appetite for intelligence, which was utilised and perhaps 
fuelled by the products of popular culture, and which arguably still occurs today. The 
former Director General (DG) of MI5, Dame Stella Rimington took the unusual step of 
publishing her autobiography in 200173 which created some concerns for MI5,74 despite 
the fact that large sections of the book focus on her formative years and family rather 
than on her career. Rimington subsequently published a series of fictional books featuring 
Liz Carlyle, a female operative in MI5,75 a contemporary example of insider spy fiction. 
In 2016, a film adaptation of Le Carré’s Our Kind of Traitor was released,76 as well as 
The Night Manager. First published in 1993, The Night Manager was adapted into a six-
part BBC TV series and became instantly popular before receiving critical acclaim.77 Due 
to its success, there are now discussions to adapt Le Carré’s The Spy Who Came in From 
The Cold into a modern TV series.78 If there was not a public fascination with the 
intelligence realm and particularly with the British Intelligence Services, then such 
adaptations would not have been created, or well received. This demonstrates that 
popular culture continues to be a central avenue through which portrayals of the British 
Intelligence Services are placed in the public domain.  
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Themes in popular culture 
This section explores what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are prevalent 
in popular culture by focussing on the following themes: communications and code; 
secret diplomacy; surveillance and information gathering; science and technology; 
deception and secrecy; acting in a legal and ethical manner; and finally, threats and 
society. Whilst these are not themes directly examined in the other chapters, they still, 
on occasion, create both a consistent and positive portrayal of the British Intelligence 
Services. 
 
Communications and code 
In both historical and contemporary contexts, one of the most common aspects of the 
work undertaken by the British Intelligence Services depicted in popular culture is 
communication and the encryption of information, namely cryptography. By exploring 
the emphasis on ensuring information remains secure and cannot be unduly accessed, 
there is the implicit suggestion that the British Intelligence Services are capable and 
effective, furthering the positive portrayal of them in the public domain. Somerset 
Maugham’s Ashenden scrutinises the difficulties encountered when both coding and 
deciphering a message as the code used must be committed to memory, preventing the 
possibility of the adversary gaining a clear advantage of deciphering the coded 
messages.79 Whilst technology may have created other ways in which communications 
can remain secure without having to commit the code to memory,80 the importance of 
communication remains.  
 
In Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy the importance of communication and code is an overarching 
theme, thus depicting the importance of it to the public. There is a discussion of the 
communication techniques used by Soviet spies which consists of ‘secret writing, 
microdots, stuck all over full stops on innocent looking letters, and dead letter boxes in 
Western capitals’.81 This is undoubtedly an example of fiction feeding fiction as 
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microdots are also explored in Spooks.82 Although unknown whether microdots are still 
used by the British Intelligence Services, by exploring how important communications 
and code are, the British Intelligence Services are depicted as being capable and effective 
in ensuring all information remains secure. This leads to an overarching positive 
portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. Seemingly, this is an inherently subtle 
consistent portrayal to Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’ and Chapter 5 ‘A 
Complicated Relationship’ which examined how Snowden had damaged the capabilities 
of the British Intelligence Services, a theme one interviewee also discussed.83 
 
Set in Russia at the time of the Bolshevik revolution, Maugham’s main character 
Ashenden requires instructions as to what his next actions should be as the original plan 
was no longer viable. Whilst he deems sending the message to be rather boring and 
cumbersome, he acknowledges the importance of it.84 The necessity of receiving 
instruction was also something Tarr required in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy when Irina, the 
Russian spy, wanted to defect.85 By awaiting for instructions, there is an implicit 
suggestion that the British Intelligence Services are seeking to act legally and ethically 
as opposed to just undertaking what actions an individual perceives as necessary. Indeed, 
even former practitioners highlight the important role of communications and code in 
finding out what their actions should be. In the Dominican Republic in the 1970s, Robert 
Chapman, a CIA officer was desperate for instructions from superiors as to what actions 
he should undertake.86  
 
Numerous popular culture depictions including Spooks, Ashenden, and Washington 
Shadow (by Aly Monroe about the fictitious British Intelligence officer Peter Cotton), 
highlight the use of a code book for ensuring encrypted information. In a monologue by 
a former MI6 officer, believed to be a traitor, the trade craft of a code book is discussed 
in Spooks. The rogue officer states that a code book is:  
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A robust form of transmission as long as you are working 
from identical books. Modify the code with a basic shift 
pattern, and it’s all but unbreakable… It can’t be decoded 
without the right shift pattern and the exact source text. 
Not just the right book…. The exact edition.87 
 
The analysis of how a code book functions is also evident in Ashenden, Tinker Tailor 
Soldier Spy and Washington Shadow. Its usefulness is explored as the code book tends 
to be an ordinary novel which would not arouse suspicion. For Peter Cotton in 
Washington Shadow, it was The Ambassadors88 whereas in Spooks it was Two Cheers 
for Democracy,89 perhaps a subtle reference to the wider themes explored in both that 
episode and the entire series. In an interview at Edinburgh Spy Week, Zinnie Harris, a 
former scriptwriter for Spooks discussed that for aspects relating to tradecraft, researchers 
would look to other spy fiction novels for examples of it.90 Indeed, this highlights how 
key themes could in-fact emanate from earlier popular culture depictions of the British 
Intelligence Services. Before attending the 2017 Edinburgh Spy Week where this theme 
was discussed, it had not been previously considered but is undoubtedly central. One 
clear example of fiction feeding fiction sprang to mind during a talk about Victorian 
popular culture. Professor Penny Fielding discussed The Dynamite Ship whose central 
plot was to blow up the Houses of Parliament from The Thames,91 a concept directly 
repeated in Spooks when a terrorist threatens to blow up the House of Commons by boat 
in series 4 episode 4.92 However, Harris did not discuss which novels were utilised or 
give an example of the trade craft  portrayed after such research, something which would 
further comprehension of whether Spooks was in fact simply repeating themes depicted 
in other popular culture depictions, an assertion her comments certainly seem to suggest. 
But this does serve to highlight how fiction feeding fiction remains a prevalent aspect 
within popular culture, even in a contemporary context. 
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Another form of communication explored within popular culture is the signalling of 
whether a meeting between intelligence officers is safe and is a theme particularly 
prevalent within Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy. Perhaps one of the clearest examples of this 
are the instructions Prideaux has when going to meet a presumed Czech general to find 
out who the mole is. Prideaux is warned that he should only proceed with the meeting if 
there is no sign of anyone being at the cabin in the woods, no lights or a bicycle outside, 
for example.93 Such consideration of safety is also taken when Haydon meets with his 
Russian contact at a safe house, with milk bottles on the door step being the sign of the 
meeting.94 Whilst the ways in which messages are portrayed may have become more 
sophisticated as communication methods have evolved, this demonstrates the 
overarching importance of communication and code to the British Intelligence Services.  
 
By depicting how important communication is, through the portrayal of the encryption 
and cryptography, popular culture depicts that the British Intelligence Services are 
seeking to ensure the safety and security of both the information and by extension, the 
staff by preventing information such as their locations being available to the enemy. This 
creates a mirrored portrayal to that in Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship; and 
Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’. This is also evident through the existence of 
certain key organisations within Britain. GCHQ, one of the main British Intelligence 
Services, focuses upon communication and the encryption of information95 as they 
support the British Intelligence Services, military, law enforcement and wider 
Government,96 themes Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ discussed. Whilst the way in 
which communications and code are depicted may use artistic licence, it places a positive 
portrayal of the British Intelligence Services in the public domain.  
 
Surveillance 
Another theme portrayed within popular culture is the role of surveillance, and how this 
can lead to the gathering of previously unknown information.97 The techniques utilised 
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in pursuit of this aim are explored in depth within Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy. Although 
not actively gathering intelligence in the field, Smiley and his colleagues in London all 
undertake routine surveillance as part of their daily lives. When arriving at the Circus by 
taxi, (the name Le Carré gives to the MI6 Headquarters), the name of a nearby shop or 
restaurant is given before walking the short distance to the office, as opposed to asking 
to be dropped at the front door.98 Smiley takes such surveillance further as he counts the 
number of parked cars where he lives and whether there any which are unfamiliar.99 This 
demonstrates how crucial surveillance is within intelligence work if even those 
intelligence officers undertaking desk jobs or who have retired, are utilising such 
surveillance techniques in their daily lives to ensure that they are not being followed. 
 
Indeed, in the novel, such an emphasis is placed upon surveillance that the Circus has a 
dedicated section to it – the Scalphunters. Whilst this certainly indicates the importance 
of surveillance to the work of an intelligence organisation,100 it also illustrates class and 
educational structures. The Scalphunters, under the leadership of Toby Esterhase, are not 
based at the Circus, but rather in Brixton, suggesting they are not necessarily seen as an 
integral part of the Circus. This is combined with the actions that the Scalphunters 
undertake. Whilst surveillance is certainly a central aspect to their work, they are also 
utilised for actions including kidnapping, burglary, blackmail and assassination.101 
Although none of these actions are undertaken by the Circus in the novel, it serves to 
demonstrate that the Scalphunters are used to undertake the riskier aspects of intelligence 
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work. Implicitly, this can also suggest to the reader that actions which are legally and 
ethically dubious are not part of the central MI6 structure due to the geographical distance 
between the Circus (MI6 Headquarters) and the Scalphunters in Brixton. Equally, when 
compared to analysing intelligence, the skill sets required are fundamentally different. 
For those undertaking surveillance activities, there is the necessity of not standing out in 
a crowd and convincingly doing nothing,102 something highlighted several times within 
the novel.103 Despite Le Carré not fully articulating this, it serves to highlight how distinct 
aspects of the intelligence cycle need to be undertaken by different people due to the 
expertise required.  
 
Another and perhaps more subtle form of surveillance is the honey trap. Rather 
interestingly, honey traps within popular culture all manifest themselves in very different 
ways, with Spooks arguably demonstrating the more ‘classic’ honey trap approach, where 
someone in a position of power is befriended, either to gain valuable information or 
influence their decision-making by blackmailing them.104 In series 4, episode 4, the 
honey trap is used in conjunction with surveillance where the technical gurus place 
microphones and cameras into a hotel room to gain firm evidence of the honey trap to 
thus blackmail the Crown Prince of Baja (a fictional country) into giving the information 
MI5 require about a terrorist plot.105 The bugging of hotel rooms is something Pincher 
claims MI5 did when the Soviet leadership visited London in an attempt to gather 
valuable information.106 In contrast, Ashenden utilises an on-going affair between 
Lazzari and Chandra Lal to gain more information about his actions by turning Lazzari 
into an agent.107 It is also referred to in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy when obtaining 
information about a Soviet intelligence officer. 108 
 
This serves as another example of where the overarching theme, in this case surveillance, 
provides a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. In this avenue of 
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information, popular culture depicts how surveillance can occur by using techniques such 
as bugging hotel rooms and the honeytrap which may lead to an implicit view of the 
British Intelligence Services acting illegally or unethically due to the way they are 
portrayed in gathering the information. But, the detailed depictions of surveillance 
occurring in this manner may be due to the commercial considerations placed upon 
popular culture. 109 But this becomes problematic if it continually leads to a negative 
portrayal of the British Intelligence Services acting illegally and unethically simply to 
ensure viewing figures.  
  
However, what is lacking from the depictions of surveillance is the political decision-
making to initiate or discontinue it. Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy briefly highlights this theme 
when Smiley is asking Connie about her work on Polyakov who she believed constituted 
a threat, but she was over-ruled.110 Implicitly, this leads to a portrayal of the British 
Intelligence Services acting legally by adhering to what their political masters request, a 
consistent portrayal to that evident in all of the previous chapters. But this is also subtly 
suggesting how decisions can be made without assessing all available information. 
Considering this is something of a controversial matter in the UK following the lead up 
to the Iraq War as Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’ and Chapter 5 ‘A 
Complicated Relationship’ explore, popular culture could in fact aid the continuing 
debate, and thus aid the understandings of the British Intelligence Services in the public 
domain.   
 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the British Intelligence Services deem 
surveillance to be an important tool of information gathering. The whistle-blower Annie 
Machon discussed the role of social media for the Intelligence Services, describing 
Facebook as ‘a spy’s wet dream’111 as it allows for an understanding of a target and who 
they associate with. There have been numerous debates in the UK about social media 
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being utilised to collect personal data following the creation of new legislation (the 
Investigatory Powers Bill),112 something explored in Chapter 5 ‘A Complicated 
Relationship’. In one of the interviews undertaken for this thesis, the interviewee 
discussed this topic in detail, and how it would aid the work of law enforcement and the 
British Intelligence Services.113 But one crucial aspect seems to be lacking from this 
rhetoric, the realisation that surveillance has always been undertaken, dating back to the 
1700s,114 and it is merely the way in which this is undertaken which is evolving due to 
technological advancements. Thus, the British Intelligence Services are merely seeking 
to adhere to legal and ethical standards in their continuing desire to ensure Britain’s safety 
and security.   
 
Science and Technology 
Whilst science and technology may sound like an obscure theme, it is perhaps one of the 
more prevalent themes depicted within popular culture due to the emphasis, rightly or 
wrongly, placed upon gadgetry within portrayals of intelligence. The James Bond films 
are famous for their use of gadgets however, gadgetry is also explored within Le Carré 
depictions although they have not received the same condemnation. This does seem to 
be something of a double standard, but perhaps this is due to the type of gadgetry which 
is explored. Written in the Cold War context, a theme prevalent throughout Tinker Tailor 
Soldier Spy, Tarr describes the gadgetry being utilised by Soviet intelligence which 
included: ‘a recessed fountain pen with a signal plan folded up inside, (and) concealed 
camera,’115 whilst the gadgetry created by those in ‘nuts and bolts’ – the Circus’s 
technology department - included a lamp with an embedded camera.116 In contrast, the 
gadgetry evident within the Bond films is perhaps somewhat more glamorous, evident as 
Goldfinger, released in 1964, has an ejector seat in Bond’s infamous Aston Martin.117  
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Such glamorous gadgetry has continued to be evident, to the extent that it has arguably 
become synonymous with the Bond franchise.118 For example, the 2015 Bond film 
Spectre included: an Aston Martin accessorised with an ejector seat and rear-firing 
missiles, as well as a watch with an explosive charge, a reference to the gadgetry evident 
in the earlier films.119 This provides an another example of fiction feeding fiction, albeit 
within the same franchise, as both Skyfall and Spectre have sought to pay homage to the 
earlier Bond depictions. But surely however gadgetry is explored within popular culture, 
it provides the portrayal of the British Intelligence Services seeking to ensure their 
capability and effectiveness by the ways in which they are attempting to gather 
information. This is evident at the International Spy Museum which explores the use of 
gadgets within intelligence, particularly within a historical context, and displays tools 
used by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) during the Second World War 
such as a rectal tool kit and a pipe pistol, seen in the photographs (figures 11 and 12) 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 (left) is of a rectal tool kit which was used by SOE. It was made up of escape 
tools which could be stashed in the body where they would not be found during a search. 
Figure 12 (right) is a tobacco pipe pistol which could fire a projectile that could kill 
someone at close range.120 
                                                          
118 McCrisken, T, Moran, C, ‘James Bond, Ian Fleming and intelligence: breaking down the boundary 
between the ‘real’ and the imagined’’, p. 816–817  
119 Spectre, Eon Productions, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios and Colombia Pictures, Directed by Sam 
Mendes, 2015 
120 Copyright: Abigail Blyth: Photo Taken At: International Spy Museum, School for Spies Exhibit, 
Washington D.C, United States, 12th September 2016 
Page | 310  
 
 
By highlighting the use of gadgetry, there is a consistent portrayal with Chapter 2 ‘A 
Direct Relationship’ of how important gadgetry can be. Indeed, Chapman Pincher also 
highlighted this theme in Their Trade Is Treachery where he discussed how MI5 created 
a cavity microphone for their Australian counterparts to place in a wall in the Soviet 
embassy.121 This was a theme also highlighted in Too Secret Too Long when Pincher 
highlights how the Canadians also placed microphones in the Soviet consulate with 
MI5’s assistance when it was rebuilt following a fire, and how MI5 and MI6 placed 
microphone in a Claridge’s hotel room when the Soviet leadership came to London.122 
Thus, technology has always been something the British Intelligence Services have used 
to gather information. This is combined with how MI6 have acknowledged the existence 
of Q – the quartermaster who is responsible for all the technology evident,123 a role which 
has been continually depicted within Bond films.   
 
Secret Diplomacy  
Rather interestingly, the role of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and their 
Embassies is a theme depicted within intelligence novels but omitted from the film and 
television adaptations of those books, although there does not seem to be any apparent 
reason for this omission. From the British perspective, highlighting the FCO within the 
intelligence realm is understandable as they oversee both MI6 and GCHQ,124 suggesting 
that its inclusion within popular culture provides an understanding of the British 
Intelligence Services which is not apparent on the Big 3 websites. When interviewing the 
American intelligence academic Professor Loch Johnson, he discussed that when he 
wanted to write about the use of embassies for intelligence activities, he struggled to gain 
approval to discuss this theme, battling to prove it was already in the public domain.125 
However, following the Salisbury attack in 2018, embassies as diplomatic covers for 
intelligence officers has been clear in the news journalism coverage.126  
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Ashenden explores the importance of the British Foreign Office for intelligence officers 
working abroad. When he arrives in Vladivostok, the British Consulate provides 
assistance including the provision of a travel companion on the long train journey across 
Russia,127 themes also prevalent within the former CIA officer Robert Chapman’s 
writing.128 Washington Shadow also depicts the role of the Foreign Office as Peter Cotton 
is sent to the British Embassy in Washington D.C despite being an intelligence officer,129 
as opposed to a diplomat.  
 
Embassies and Foreign Offices are mentioned numerous times within Tinker Tailor 
Soldier Spy but always in a fleeting manner. However this still manages to provide the 
reader with a clear comprehension of the link between intelligence and the Foreign 
Office. For those intelligence officers stationed abroad, the Embassy can provide a cover 
identity for their work, explored in relation to Soviet intelligence in Tinker Tailor Soldier 
Spy. In the novel, set at the height of the Cold War, there were numerous Soviet 
intelligence officers stationed in London under the guise of  a driver, an assistant coding 
clerk and a cultural attaché.130 This is in conjunction with Mackelvore who was 
introduced as being a Circus elder (senior leadership) who has spent his career working 
in embassies.131 However, such actions were commonplace as Martha Peterson, a former 
CIA officer, was stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow issuing visas.132 Perhaps 
this is based on how consulates and embassies can provide legal and diplomatic cover 
for intelligence officers, a theme Le Carré highlights.133 
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When asked about engagement with popular culture, one interviewee discussed how the 
FCO had engaged with the BBC drama Ambassadors in relation to highlighting the role 
of the diplomatic bag,134 something Le Carré demonstrates can be used for intelligence 
work,135 a theme the interviewee did not highlight. Whilst the nature of the work 
undertaken by an intelligence official stationed at an embassy is unknown, the 
highlighting of the theme demonstrates a depiction of the work of the British Intelligence 
Services which is lacking from Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’.  
 
Deception and secrecy 
Popular culture depicts deception and secrecy by examining the necessity to lie when 
required. This is known as having a cover story or legend, and allows an intelligence 
officer to work undercover to gain valuable intelligence.136 In Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy, 
the necessity of having a cover legend is discussed in relation to Tarr, Peter Guillam and 
Jim Prideaux. When discussing Operation Testify, Control asks Prideaux if he has a 
legend and cover story he can use when going to meet the Czech general.137 Tom Marcus, 
the former MI5 officer who published his autobiography in 2016 also explored this 
theme. Undertaking surveillance on numerous targets, Marcus examines the importance 
of living your cover so as not to raise suspicion.138 When Smiley remembers his previous 
attempts at getting Karla to defect, this theme is explored. Rather interestingly however, 
this comes in the form of how difficult maintaining a cover story can be as Smiley tells 
Karla about his personal life in an inadvertent manner.139 Whilst depicting the importance 
of secrecy, Le Carré also highlights how difficult this can be for an individual to maintain. 
This was the over-riding theme of the first and third series of Spooks, thus providing a 
more human view on intelligence matters by assessing the impact of this upon those 
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within the intelligence realm.140 In turn, this provides the consistent portrayal of the 
British Intelligence Services seeking to ensure the safety and security of their employees 
by ensuring their real identities and families by extension are kept safe, themes explored 
in Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’. 
 
David Shayler, the MI5 whistle-blower, discussed the impact that constantly lying can 
have on an individual in a 2002 newspaper interview,141 suggesting that the popular 
culture depictions of this theme provides the public with an understanding of the actions 
of the British Intelligence Services not explored by the other avenues analysed in this 
thesis. This is further triangulated by the fact that a former Spy Master at MI5, Maxwell 
Knight, focused his recruitment primarily on whether an individual had the ability to lie 
daily,142 perhaps demonstrating his realisation even in the 1930s of how this could affect 
an individual.  
 
Although Spooks highlights the use of legends for an intelligence officer to work 
undercover, and the stress this places on the individual,143 it fails to explore the element 
of deception as it allows intelligence officers to reinvent themselves when going to a 
different country or, if they feel their life could be in danger. This is evident in Tinker 
Tailor Soldier Spy when Tarr evolves from the Australian Thomas in Hong Kong, to the 
British citizen Poole in Malaysia, due to the belief that Soviet officials would be 
following him.144 Deception and secrecy not only allows intelligence officers to gain 
valuable intelligence, but also ensure their own safety. Such an emphasis is placed upon 
this theme that Le Carré highlights the importance of maintaining secrecy. Perhaps one 
of the clearest examples of this is when Smiley visits the woman Haydon has been living 
with. Instead of stating Haydon is a traitor, Smiley lies, telling her that Haydon is abroad 
on a secret job, to the extent he could not tell anyone, and may be away for years.145 This 
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demonstrates the importance of secrecy to the British Intelligence Services as despite 
Haydon’s treachery, they do not want it to become common knowledge.  
 
Indeed, this portrayal is further evident in the Minister’s concerns over Haydon publicly 
stating what he has done when he arrives in Moscow.146 This does lead to ethical 
questions in relation to the actions undertaken to ensure secrecy is maintained. Perhaps 
it is these such suggestions of how self-preservation is so crucial which angered those 
within the British Intelligence Services, combined with the clear links between Haydon, 
the Cambridge Five and Snowden, both of which were scandals which deeply affected 
the British Intelligence Services. The depiction of the importance of secrecy to the 
ongoing work of the British Intelligence Services provides a consistent portrayal to 
Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’, Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’ and 
Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’. However, unlike these other avenues, popular 
culture does not emphasise how there can be the pervasiveness of secrecy and the 
problems which this can create.  
 
Acting legally and ethically  
Len Scott and Peter Jackson argue that acting legally and ethically is one of the 
overarching themes depicted within popular culture,147 which is perhaps unsurprising due 
to the centrality of legal and ethical considerations to decisions about intelligence. 
Indeed, McCrisken and Moran highlight that this is one of the key messages throughout 
the Bond films, the professionalism of British Intelligence who are a morally upright 
organisation.148 This theme is arguably of interest to the British Intelligence Services as 
it can show them either positively or negatively in relation to the actions they undertake 
which in turn, can have an impact upon public support for their continued democratic 
legitimacy.  What has become evident within the analysis is how adherence to legal and 
ethical standards is portrayed very differently in the various depictions of intelligence.  
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Within Ashenden, the intelligence services are depicted as a very ethical organisation.  
When discussing whether a munitions factory should be blown up, there is a clear 
emphasis upon how this should be very much a last resort due to the number of people 
who would be killed as a result.149 This suggests that the methods utilised are continually 
discussed to ensure that nothing illegal or unethical is undertaken. But such an assertion 
is refuted by the whistle-blower Annie Machon whose analysis suggests MI5 is an illegal 
and unethical organisation where nothing is ever questioned, and decisions are simply 
adhered to.150 Yet, popular culture provides a very differing view of intelligence, 
particularly evident within Spooks. After an operation goes wrong, Zoe, a junior 
intelligence officer stands trial in the Old Bailey, accused of conspiracy to murder after 
the death of an undercover police officer on Operation Aladdin which sought to infiltrate 
the Turkish mafia who were bringing weapons and drugs into the UK.151 Whilst this leads 
to interesting discussions about what standards intelligence officers are held to, it is a 
monologue that takes place outside the court room which is most telling, with a senior 
intelligence officer stating: 
 
If we creep around in the dark it is because we have to, 
because there are people out there who also move in the 
dark. Look at the old man selling the newspaper, that 
woman scratching her back as she talks. The couple 
whose fingers are just touching, who are obviously having 
an affair. They know they should go to the gym, give up 
smoking, consolidate their debts. We do our best to try 
and protect them from people who would happily blow 
them to pieces. You can question our methods, we do that 
all the time – but don’t question our motives.152 
 
By continually questioning whether they are using the right methods, this monologue 
portrays MI5 as an organisation who have legal and ethical considerations at the centre 
of all their decision-making; something which is depicted as Spooks’ overarching 
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concern in numerous episodes.153 An example of this is evident in series 4 where senior 
MI5 officials threaten to resign over the American extraordinary rendition of a potential 
terrorist suspects as they state the Americans are acting illegally and unethically.154 As 
Chapter 5 ‘A Complicated Relationship’ explored, this was a theme which caused 
substantial tensions between MI5 and MI6 as MI5 were horrified by MI6’s involvement 
in extraordinary rendition.155 Indeed, this is a theme Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller 
has alluded to in public comments,156 furthering the positive portrayal of MI5 in the 
public domain, as well as highlighting a substantive consistent portrayal between MI5 
and the avenues of information. 
 
However, Spooks has not always depicted the British Intelligence Services in such a 
positive manner. When a mercenary reveals that a missile attack on London is imminent, 
he is questioned and tortured by MI5 operatives.157 Sir David Omand is highly critical of 
this depiction, arguing that it shows how MI5 ‘has no compunction about beating up 
terrorist suspects in the basement of Thames House’.158 Whilst Omand’s anger at this 
portrayal is somewhat understandable given his previous role within British Intelligence, 
this is not the only depiction which portrays the British Intelligence Services acting 
illegally and unethically. Le Carré’s The Spy Who Came In From The Cold sees the West 
using the same dubious ethics as those in the East.159 Whilst such a depiction may perhaps 
originate from Le Carré’s own disillusionment with the Cold War after being based in 
Germany,160 those within the British Intelligence Services were angered by this portrayal 
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of the service as though it were staffed by those who lacked trust or loyalty and would 
sacrifice officers without a second thought.161 
 
It is understandable why those within the British Intelligence Services were angered by 
these portrayals, particularly as Dover argues that:  
 
the politics of state intelligence are every bit as political 
as those of the terrorist or dissidents they seek to contain 
and defeat.162  
 
This demonstrates how at times, popular culture provides a negative understanding of the 
actions the British Intelligence Services are willing to undertake, something which could 
arguably affect public accountability due to the perception that the British Intelligence 
Services would undertake unethical activity. However, if they were more open and 
engaged more with the public, then the portrayals provided by popular culture could be 
countered.  
 
Popular culture also addressed the British Intelligence Services acting legally and 
ethically by examining an individuals’ motivation to work for the intelligence realm. 
Maxwell Knight, an MI5 spy-master in the 1930s,163 joined MI5 due to a sense of duty 
and patriotism, a characteristic he looked for in those he recruited.164 Although why this 
was a trait Knight believed to be of importance is unclear, perhaps it emerged through a 
belief that this was a more ethical and moral reason for working within intelligence. 
However, as Ashenden explores, this is not the only motivating factor. For the individual 
only referred to as ‘the Hairless Mexican’, money was the overriding factor behind his 
involvement with British Intelligence due to a desire to return to Mexico.165 Whereas in 
Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy, Tarr’s decision to join British Intelligence was due to his anger 
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at gunrunning and disillusionment, having worked for the Belgians.166 Therefore, whilst 
Tarr’s engagement with British Intelligence was based on a legal and ethical decision, 
this was not the case for the Hairless Mexican. 
 
Motivations are further explored in relation to becoming a traitor – one of a plethora of 
words which could be used to describe someone who works for an opposing intelligence 
organisation or non-state actor, a theme explored in Ashenden.  There is a long discussion 
of Caypor’s motivations to become a traitor; a decision it is stated is based: 
 
not from hatred of the country… not even from love of his 
wife, but from a desire to score off the big wigs who never 
knew of his existence.167  
 
Whilst this highlights Caypor’s motivations, whether ethics was a factor in the decision 
is unclear. Indeed, there is no indication in Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy of Haydon’s reasons 
for working for Soviet intelligence. But it is clear he was disillusioned with Britain and 
the Empire168 but, whether it was an ethical or moral decision is not articulated, providing 
a reference to the Cambridge Five. This is something Spooks also refers to in an even 
more veiled manner.  
 
In a rather convoluted plot in series 5 of Spooks, a seconded MI6 officer seeks revenge 
for the death of his Israeli wife and child by cooperating with Israeli intelligence who are 
acting under the guise of a terrorist organisation.169 Whilst exploring the more human 
side of intelligence, this provides evidence of how popular culture is seeking to highlight 
a plethora of themes salient to intelligence, with motivations and ethics just one aspect 
to this. Indeed, with the exception of the Bond film Spectre, all of these popular culture 
depictions of the British Intelligence Services which have been analysed, pre-date the 
Snowden revelations. However, they provide an overarching portrayal that those who are 
seeking to adversely affect the British Intelligence Services are in the wrong. Therefore, 
for anyone reading or watching these post Snowden, there is the implicit assumption that 
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Snowden damaged the capabilities of the British Intelligence Services, creating a 
consistent portrayal to Chapter 3 ‘A Complementary Relationship’. 
 
Corruption is another facet of acting legally and ethically which is explored within 
popular culture and in particular, is a story line throughout series three of Spooks.  In this, 
Oliver Mace, chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee, is seeking to politicise 
intelligence by interpreting the information collected to suit the current Government 
policy.170 This demonstrates the saliency of Zinnie Harris’s (the former Spooks writer 
who spoke at Edinburgh Spy Week 2017) argument that the producers of Spooks always 
wanted to try and make the events seem plausible,171 in this case by including a story line 
reminiscent of the Blair Government’s politicisation of the dodgy dossier in the lead up 
to the Iraq War. Dover argues that the existence of such a story line demonstrates how 
the producers have been conscious about portraying the inter-play between politics and 
intelligence,172 but his analysis falls short by failing to explore what understanding this 
inter-play provides to the public. Omand is also critical of this portrayal in Spooks, stating 
that it is merely depicting those at the top of the intelligence community as amoral spin 
merchants.173 Whilst the argument that power can corrupt those in a position of power is 
applicable to numerous fields, Omand’s comments merely seem to criticise Spooks, 
despite his arguing that the public need to be informed on intelligence matters. Whether 
he likes it or not, surely Spooks is doing this. If popular culture as an avenue of 
information is to have less of an impact upon public understandings of the intelligence 
realm, then there needs to be more openness from the British Intelligence Services. But, 
until they stop seeing public engagement as a ‘necessary evil’174 as one interviewee 
stated, popular culture will continue as a crucial avenue of information. 
 
This theme was also explored, although in a more nuanced way, within Tinker Tailor 
Soldier Spy. When gathering information about what happened when Prideaux was shot, 
the off-duty officer is not only scathing of the Minister in his comments to Smiley, but 
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also makes a passing comment of how power corrupts.175 This, along with the story line 
in Spooks provides a depiction of how it is those politicians who cause problems within 
the intelligence realm. It is the intelligence officers who are seeking to overcome this, 
once again depicting good versus bad in the overarching theme of legally and ethically, 
thus aiding the overall positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services. Indeed, this 
also furthers the consistent portrayal in both Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ and the 
other avenues of how the British Intelligence Services do seek to act in a legal and ethical 
manner. However as with Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’ there are times when 
popular culture depicts the British Intelligence Services acting in an illegal or unethical 
manner.  
 
 
Threats and Society 
 
The Bond franchise has been adept at keeping abreast of 
the perceived changes in security fears from the Cold War 
threat of nuclear annihilation through to so-called ‘new’ 
globalised security threats, many of which such as 
terrorism, bio-threats or transnational crime, Bond 
stories anticipated before they became commonplace on 
political or academic agendas.176 
 
This argument was succinctly surmised at the International Spy Museum’s ongoing 
exhibition Exquisitely Evil: 50 Years of Bond Villains which said: 
 
Each Bond villain embodies the fears we face in 
society.177  
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Jeremy Black argues that this is due to the way that the franchise ‘drew on current fears 
in order to reduce the implausibility of the villains and their villainy’.178 Lindner’s 
analysis is in agreement with this position, as he argues that Bond has adapted to major 
developments in world politics.179 Wesley Wark furthers this by highlighting how ‘the 
details of the plot, character and setting (are) designed to simulate the real world’.180 This 
is evident as the 1980s Bond films depicted the impact of Thatcherism and Reaganism 
on politics, which can be seen with a sharper political edge to Bond.181 McCrisken and 
Moran also explore this theme in relation to Casino Royale, stating that Bond’s use of 
whatever force necessary tallies with contemporary counterterrorism actions in the 
UK.182  The more recent Bond films explore threats posed by non-state actors,183 
something also evident within Spooks.184 In Skyfall, non-state actors was a central theme 
where Dame Judi Dench, as M when giving evidence to the Parliamentary Intelligence 
and Security Committee states in response to the continuing necessity of ‘00’agents:  
 
I suppose I see a different world than you do. And the trust 
is that what I see frightens me. I’m frightened because our 
enemies are no longer known to us. They do not exist on a 
map. They’re not nations, they are individuals. And look 
around you – who do you fear? Can you see a face, a 
uniform, a flag? No. Our world is not more transparent 
now, it’s more opaque. It’s in the shadows – that’s where 
we must do battle.185 
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McCrisken and Moran argue that M’s speech is ‘one of the most pivotal and reflective 
speeches to be delivered in a Bond film’,186 an assertion which seems rather accurate. 
Not only does it succinctly demonstrate the evolution of the Bond franchise, tallies with 
the threats MI6 are countering,187 and also portrays the importance of intelligence 
accountability to the public and how serious MI6 take the process.  
 
The role of real world events inspiring what is seen on screen is one Dover also explores 
in relation to Spooks, as he argues that they replicate issues evident in the news media188 
such as mass protests.189 This links to the assertion that the producers of Spooks wanted 
it to emulate themes which could be evident on the BBC news which always directly 
followed the show.190  Therefore, popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence 
Services, and Spooks in particular, provide a consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 ‘A Direct 
Relationship’ in terms of the threats which the British Intelligence Services are 
countering, as well as how these have evolved over time. Equally, by the threats depicted 
in Bond evolving, there is an increased global appeal, something of an undoubted 
importance due to the vast expense of making and producing a film.191 In 2007, it was 
estimated that the cost of producing a film was $106.6 million, a figure which has likely 
increased, and thus ensuring commercial success of the film becomes integral. Therefore, 
if the themes exhibited within the film appeal to a global audience, there is a greater 
possibility of the box office sales recouping this money.  
 
In 1954, Casino Royale was adapted into an hour-long American TV programme about 
Jimmy Bond,192 followed by the creation of a Bond comic strip which was distributed in 
Yugoslavia,193 perhaps an activity associated with the Cultural Cold War. Since then, the 
Bond franchise has become a worldwide phenomenon, evident in the photographs taken 
of Bond posters (figures 13, 14 and 15) in multiple languages at the International Spy 
Museum.  
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Figures 13 (top left), 14 (top right) and 15 (bottom) are a selection of the posters on 
display at the International Spy Museum which demonstrate how Bond has become a 
global franchise.194 
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As this section has explored, the overarching theme portraying the threats the British 
Intelligence Services are seeking to counter, leads to a consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 
‘A Direct Relationship’. This highlights the role popular culture has as an avenue of 
information about the intelligence realm. Although the British Intelligence Services have 
websites where they highlight the threats that they seek to counter,195 as Chapter 2 ‘A 
Direct Relationship’ explored, an individual must know the websites exist before actively 
accessing them. Thus, the onus remains on the public to access them if they wish to 
further understand the work of the British Intelligence Services. Although popular culture 
depictions of the British Intelligence Services still require an individual to watch or read 
them, the depictions arguably permeate the public consciousness in a manner unseen by 
the British Intelligence Services engaging directly with the public. However, if there were 
more openness from the Intelligence Services themselves, they could perhaps undertake 
more public engagement than simply placing information on the difficult to navigate 
websites, thus reducing the impact of popular culture as an avenue of information. In 
fact, this is in the interest of the British Intelligence Services as they seek to maintain 
their democratic legitimacy, which is dependent on public support, making more 
openness crucial for their future.196 
 
In providing the public with an understanding of the threats which the British Intelligence 
Services seek to counter, there is a consistent portrayal to Chapter 2 ‘A Direct 
Relationship, but not with any of the other avenues of information. One possible reason 
for the consistent portrayal is engagement directly between the British Intelligence 
Services and popular culture,197 although Dover’s analysis of this fails to consider the 
way in which this occurs. This is arguably because, as Tricia Jenkins argues, when there 
is cooperation, it is a very informal process and therefore difficult to trace.198 Although 
the CIA created an Entertainment Liaison Officer position in the mid-1990s, suggesting 
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a formalised system of engagement, the way in which the engagement occurs remains 
rather informal and unique to the US due to the revolving door between Government and 
private business.199 However, merely the existence of an Entertainment Liaison Officer 
not only suggests at increased openness, but demonstrates a willingness to engage with 
these avenues of information in a manner not evident in the UK due to the pervasiveness 
of secrecy. 
 
Role of Gender 
One theme explored by the academic literature, is the role of women and gender in 
popular culture depictions of intelligence.200 In the early Bond films, women are only 
evident as a sexual encounter for Bond,201 a depiction which many people nowadays are 
horrified by. But Dover rightly points out that such a portrayal must be seen in the cultural 
setting of the time in which the film was released, and explores this using the example 
homosexuality. At a time when homosexuality was still illegal, it was depicted within the 
Bond films through many of the villains and their associates being gay,202 which provided 
a subtle suggestion that homosexuality is wrong, something also evident within Tinker 
Tailor Soldier Spy as it is revealed that the traitor Bill Haydon is gay.203 However, more 
recent depictions of intelligence within popular culture do not portray such themes, 
demonstrating the validity of Dover’s argument.   
 
Indeed, not only are changing attitudes towards women in society explored, but also the 
role of women within the British Intelligence Services. In Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy, there 
are women within the Circus, however, they tend to have somewhat menial jobs. While 
Connie undertakes research, Mollie McCraig runs a safehouse,204 despite both seeming 
to be inherently capable of undertaking other intelligence roles. When working at the 
Circus, Connie was convinced that Karla was attempting to build an army of moles, 
having undertaken meticulous research in conjunction with the military which led to the 
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identification of three new Karla trainees.205 Despite this evidence and convinced of 
Polyakov’s involvement, which later turned out to be the case, Connie could not get 
anyone to listen to her hypothesis.206 Although not explicit, there is the assumption within 
Le Carré’s writing that this is due to her being a woman and is not seen as an equal by 
those she works with, despite her clear job capability. 
 
The case of Mollie McCraig further emphasises this point, particularly as Le Carré is 
more implicit in his highlighting of the role of women within intelligence. Described as 
the housekeeper for the safe house where Haydon met Polyakov, Mollie is described as 
a professional eavesdropper,207 demonstrating her capabilities within the intelligence 
realm. But despite this, she is not involved in a job which would utilise her clearly 
impressive skill set. When Smiley is setting up the meeting to discover who the mole is, 
there is one interesting sentence from Le Carré which surmises how women were viewed. 
Namely:  
 
She remained downstairs, she said, as if that were a 
woman’s place.208 
 
This demonstrates how Le Carré portrays the role of women within society as being 
subservient to men, further exhibited as Mollie McCraig sees herself as being there to 
help her male colleagues, as opposed to seeing herself as their equal. The women 
highlighted within both Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy as well as in some of the earlier Bond 
films, fall into two categories. There are those like Connie and Mollie, who are unmarried 
and capable of doing their jobs, but have a maternal instinct over the males they work 
with, and others who are young and there as a sexual encounter. By only highlighting 
these roles for women, it further permeates the suggestion of how women were not 
deemed to be as capable as men. However, more contemporary depictions have portrayed 
women as being equally capable within the intelligence realm, demonstrating changing 
attitudes towards the role of women. This is particularly evident in Skyfall  as M – the 
head of MI6 in the Bond films – is portrayed by Judi Dench who, in this film, has a male 
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secretary.209 This flips the gender stereotype evident in the previous Bond films, of a 
male M helped by a female secretary known as Miss Moneypenny who is infatuated with 
Bond. 
 
This section has explored what themes are evident within popular culture portrayals of 
the British Intelligence Services. Whilst these have predominantly resulted in a positive 
portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, and provide consistent portrayals to themes 
explored by the other avenues of information such as acting legally and ethically, there 
are some themes omitted from popular culture and rather interestingly, these are aspects 
which the British Intelligence Services emphasise. 
 
 
Under-explored themes  
Whilst the analysis has examined key themes explored in popular culture depictions of 
intelligence, there are also ones which have been overlooked. This section will seek to 
explore these disregarded themes whilst also assessing why popular culture depictions 
have not sought to address them. The topics scrutinised include: the monotonous nature 
of intelligence and research; the supportive mechanisms in place and finally, the financial 
difficulties intelligence officers can face.  
 
Monotonous nature of intelligence 
Former practitioners such as Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller and the whistle-blowers 
Annie Machon and David Shayler have been scathing of the depiction of MI5 in popular 
culture. Baroness Manningham-Buller, MI5’s former DG has publicly criticised Spooks, 
arguing that the only similarity was entering through the pods,210 a criticism also made 
by Shayler and Machon.211 The academic (and former practitioner) Mark Lowenthal has 
made similar criticisms about popular culture, arguing that analysis is the mainstay of 
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intelligence work, yet this is not portrayed.212 But popular culture will remain in this 
privileged position unless the British Intelligence Services further their own engagement 
with the public. Such criticisms arise from the minimal emphasis placed upon the 
monotonous nature of intelligence work, something which Shayler’s newspaper article 
highlights as integral to the work of an Intelligence Officer.213 This is supported by 
McCrisken and Moran who highlight in their analysis of Bond that:  
 
Intelligence is usually a painstakingly slow business, 
where it can take months, even years, for threats to be 
identified, monitored and stopped.’214 
 
Yet despite this, it is a theme rarely explored within popular culture depictions. However, 
as Joseph Oldham highlights, this is not the only theme lacking discussion within popular 
culture portrayals of intelligence. When exploring intelligence leadership depictions in 
popular culture, he argues that whilst intelligence bureaucracy had a key role in the 
overall narrative, it was rarely a direct focal point in itself. 215 There is saliency to 
Oldham’s argument as even within Le Carre’s Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy there is only one 
veiled passing reference to it when Mackelvore is introduced to the story.216 This 
implicitly demonstrates that even when stationed abroad, intelligence is not glamorous, 
or romantic. However, in the earlier popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence 
Services, this was an overriding theme, demonstrating how popular culture portrayals of 
the British Intelligence Services have evolved.  
 
In Ashenden and Extremes Meet by Maugham and Mackenzie respectively, the 
monotonous and repetitive nature of intelligence gathering are central.217 This highlights 
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how popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence Services have evolved over 
time as there are now numerous commercial factors affecting popular culture, and in 
particular film and TV depictions meaning that ‘drama has to be more exciting than real 
life’218 to entice the audience. Perhaps the emphasis on the monotonous nature of 
intelligence was the reasoning for both to become core reading for recruits to MI6 and 
the American Office of Strategic Services respectively.219 In Ashenden, the nature of 
intelligence is succinctly summarised as:  
 
Ashenden’s official existence was as orderly and 
monotonous as a city clerk’s… The work he was doing 
was evidently necessary, but it could not be called 
anything but monotonous.220 
 
Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy also explores the role of research, albeit in an indirect manner 
as it is more of a passing comment to aid the ongoing story, as opposed to an integral 
aspect. This is despite how Smiley’s meticulous research leads to the realisation of the 
interplay between Source Merlin and the mole, Gerald.221 Thus, a high paced view of 
intelligence is portrayed, in relation to the operational nature of intelligence, and further 
demonstrates the validity of Shayler’s argument. Perhaps this over glamorised view of 
the British Intelligence Services is why popular culture depictions are often disliked by 
British Intelligence Services personnel. But despite this, for those wanting to join the 
intelligence realm, popular culture can in fact be their first insight into this secretive 
world, as was the case for the 1930s MI5 officer Olga Grey. The role of popular culture 
in informing the public continues, with one of the interviews undertaken stating how 
Bond is a great recruiter for MI6 and they were happy to see Bond play a key role in the 
London 2012 Olympics Opening Ceremony!222 This is a continuing perspective from the 
British Intelligence Services as McCrisken and Moran discuss how many intelligence 
professionals, including the former C Sir Colin McColl see Bond as one of the best 
                                                          
218 The Guardian, Must Spy Harder, Available From: 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2002/may/15/bbc.davidshayler (Accessed 1st May 2017) 
219 Stafford, D, The Silent Game, p. 4 and 83 
220 Maugham, S, Ashenden, p. 101 
221 Le Carré, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, p. 119 and p. 249 
222 Private Interview 2: 8th January 2016 
 
Page | 330  
 
recruiting tools they have.223 Rory Cormac agreed with this assertion; speaking at the 
2019 Hay Festival, he stated that MI6 like the image which Bond creates, and also aids 
intelligence diplomacy around the world.224 But it is somewhat telling that in a time when 
the British Intelligence Services all have websites and GCHQ use other social media 
platforms, a popular culture depiction of their work remains such an active recruiter, thus 
intimating the permeation of popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence 
Services versus the limited information due to the pervasiveness of secrecy actively 
provided by them.  
 
Support mechanisms 
The British Intelligence Services demonstrate that they are organisations with supportive 
mechanisms in place for employees as Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ demonstrated 
and was consistent in Chapter 4 ‘A Symbiotic Relationship’. Considering the secretive 
nature of their work, it is unsurprising that the British Intelligence Services seek to 
provide all facilities that an individual would need ‘in house’ as it were. Such services 
are highlighted to a limited extent on the MI6 career web page, showing potential recruits 
the range of services available, if required. 225 Research suggests that the importance of 
providing a support mechanism was realised in the 1930s. Whilst also being the head of 
the first agent-running section in MI5, Maxwell Knight acknowledged the importance of 
supporting his agents and thus acted as a counsellor to many of them, something which 
Olga Grey benefitted from immensely.226 Yet this supportive mechanism is lacking clear 
references within popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence Services.  
 
Nowadays, the British Intelligence Services have a staff counsellor, a post created in 
1987 allowing anyone who works in, or closely associated with British Intelligence, the 
opportunity to discuss ethical matters, personal grievance or anything else which arises 
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from their work.227 However, whether this is effective remains unclear. Annie Machon 
was somewhat scathing about the effectiveness of this position and suggested that there 
is a lack of confidentiality,228 raising questions about the effectiveness of everything 
occurring ‘in house’. This can lead to concerns from those accessing the services that 
their bosses could become aware of their difficulties, a theme Tom Marcus states was a 
central concern before asking for help with his Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.229 How 
the support mechanisms function and the effect of these is something of an overlooked 
aspect within popular culture, this is despite there being some depictions of intelligence 
officers struggling with the demands of their job.230  
 
By demonstrating an awareness of this theme, popular culture depictions would create 
more of a consistent portrayal in the public domain as to how the British Intelligence 
Services seek to support their employees. In turn, this would allow for a greater 
comprehension of British Intelligence, something still lacking within public awareness 
of intelligence matters.  
 
Financial Difficulties 
Another theme popular culture, as well as the other avenues fails to explore, is the limited 
salaries of those within the British Intelligence Services, one which former practitioners 
seek to analyse, suggesting what a critical issue it is. David Shayler states that:  
 
It is never explained in Spooks how officers living in 
central London can afford such lavish designer labels and 
cosmopolitan lifestyles on a salary of 10% higher than a 
civil servant of equivalent grade.231 
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Yet there is no comprehension of this either within Spooks or any other popular culture 
depiction of intelligence. Although the Spooks characters wearing designer clothes may 
be due to commercial product placement,232 this does not explain how young 
professionals can afford such luxuries and live in central London. Whilst the MI5 website 
seeks to promote how attractive working at MI5 can be, the section on their website 
pertaining to salaries and benefits fails to stipulate the starting salary of an intelligence 
officer.233 However former intelligence officers allude to it being minimal, as Tom 
Marcus highlights – despite ensuring the safety of the country daily, he was drowning in 
debt.234 Although this would have been an interesting theme to explore in the interviews 
undertaken, this was not deemed appropriate. However, this remains a theme overlooked 
within popular culture which seems somewhat surprising, particularly when there are 
depictions of what motivates individuals to become involved with intelligence.  
 
Why popular culture fails to highlight certain facets of the intelligence realm is unclear, 
but it seems strange that these factors which former practitioners have addressed, and 
there is some information about in the public domain, remain under-explored. But these 
could be described as the more mundane aspects of intelligence, one which popular 
culture predominantly fails to address. Perhaps if such themes were included within 
popular culture, the British Intelligence Services themselves may have a better view of 
popular culture as it is not something always appreciated by the Intelligence Services, 
despite how crucial it can be for them as the following section will explore.  
 
Impact of these themes 
The chapter has analysed depictions of intelligence evident within popular culture. 
However, it is important now to examine the impact of these as often films and television 
programmes provide the only information the viewer has about the intelligence 
services.235 By the portrayal of science, technology and gadgetry within the Bond 
franchise, the Soviet politburo believed that such technology was being used by British 
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Intelligence, and thus demanded the Soviet Intelligence organisation (the KGB) to 
acquire the same gadgetry.236 This demonstrates that whilst popular culture depictions 
may be light hearted and fun, there is a clear real-world impact which these portrayals 
can have. Indeed, the impact of gadgetry was further demonstrated after a dinner party 
where President J.F. Kennedy asked Fleming for his advice on the situation with Fidel 
Castro in Cuba. The suggestions made by Fleming included dropping pamphlets over 
Havana explaining that beards were a natural repository for radiation from US atomic 
radiation testing. As radiation caused impotency, Cuban men would be forced to shave 
their beards, thus severing a symbolic link to both Castro and the revolution.237  These 
suggestions then manifested themselves in Operation Mongoose.238  
 
The CIA Director Allen Dulles was also a Bond aficionado, which Moran argues was in 
part because Bond was an ‘unashamed celebration of the spy business’ and Dulles was 
ostensibly involved in selling the spy business to the public. But perhaps more crucially, 
this was due to the close friendship Dulles and Fleming shared, with the CIA Director 
feeling he could turn to Fleming for inspiration.239  This is perhaps most evident in the 
fact  that Dulles requested the CIA to replicate as many of Bond’s devices as 
possible,240and was thrilled when a spring-loaded knife embedded in the sole of a shoe 
went from being a fictional weapon to something which worked!241 This success was 
arguably one of the reasons that the CIA continued to create Bond like gadgets under 
Dulles successor, Casey.242 Apart from liking the message provided by Bond, Dulles was 
suitably impressed by Fleming’s wartime experiences with espionage and covert 
action243 and thus thought Fleming was in an opportune position to provide advice and 
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support to the formative CIA, perhaps a reason why the CIA were willing to use 
Fleming’s suggestions in Operation Mongoose. Thus, the portrayals of intelligence 
within popular culture can be utilised by other Intelligence Services as they believe 
popular culture to be an accurate representation, demonstrating its real-world impact.  
  
Trotter argues that the British spy novel in the Edwardian era was a response to the 
erosion of British power and prestige.244 As the historical section exhibited, it was the 
influence of the spy novel and the themes they permeated which led to the creation of the 
Secret Service Bureau in 1909. This demonstrates the impact popular culture can have 
upon society by instigating new organisations and changing attitudes. Indeed, such 
themes were also depicted within Bond. Following the Suez crisis Britain was in a period 
of decline; and Bond highlighted that Britain could be great again.245 This was combined 
with demonstrating to civil society, that despite the realities of the Cold War, society 
could enjoy themselves and travel,246 thus impacting upon the behaviour of the British 
public.    
 
Another impact popular culture can have is on recruitment to the British Intelligence 
Services, particularly now that an individual applies directly to them.247 This is something 
one interviewee highlighted when asked about the role of popular culture saying that 
Bond can be positive for recruitment, although it is important to remember that Bond is 
fictional.248 Despite the British Intelligence Services attempting to directly engage with 
the public, popular culture remains a key avenue through which an understanding of what 
they do permeates public consciousness. Indeed, those who have worked within British 
Intelligence have been somewhat influenced by the popular culture depictions. Maxwell 
Knight became keen on an intelligence career after reading 1920s spy fiction and in 
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particular John Buchan.249 This influenced his time in MI5 and would run meetings with 
his agents in the manner he believed would be seen in one of his favourite spy novels.250 
But unless there is more openness from the British Intelligence Services, the depictions 
of intelligence promoted by the avenues of information will continue to be in a unique 
position of providing a view of intelligence to potential recruits.   
 
Conclusion 
The chapter examined what depictions of the British Intelligence Services are evident in 
popular culture by analysing novels, films and TV programmes. Beginning by defining 
popular culture, the evolution of popular culture depictions of the British Intelligence 
Services were then explored by charting a history of British popular culture depictions 
of the intelligence realm. As the threats and fears in society changed over time, so too 
did the overarching depictions provided by popular culture. This exhibits how popular 
culture as an avenue of information has always sought to provide the public with an 
understanding of the intelligence realm.  
 
The chapter then focused on the Bond franchise, Le Carré’s Tinker Tailor Soldier Spy, 
and the BBC drama Spooks, to analyse what depictions of the British Intelligence 
Services are evident in these three forms of popular culture. By triangulating the 
interviews undertaken, archival research at the American Film Institute and National 
Cryptography Museum in America, museum visits to the Imperial War Museum and the 
International Spy Museum with the popular culture depictions, there was a clear 
understanding of what portrayals of the British Intelligence Services popular culture 
places in the public domain. The overarching themes such as surveillance, 
communications and code and acting legally and ethically demonstrate how the British 
Intelligence Services are capable and effective in their collection of intelligence, an 
important facet to their work. Combined, not only did these create an overall positive 
portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, but also a consistent portrayal to the 
depictions provided by the other avenues of information. In particular, it was adhering to 
legal and ethical standards which was a central theme explored by all avenues of 
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information. However, popular culture does omit discussions pertaining to the 
monotonous nature of intelligence, support mechanisms and financial difficulties, 
perhaps due to the commercial considerations which result in popular culture needing to 
be more exciting than real life to ensure commercial viability, a theme the other avenues 
of information do not have to contemplate. 
 
Despite the overall positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services, former 
practitioners remain somewhat scathing of popular culture depictions as the chapter 
highlighted. But, unless the British Intelligence Services undertake more openness and 
place more information in the public domain in an accessible manner, portrayals of the 
British Intelligence Services via the avenues of information which frustrate former 
practitioners will continue to inform the public about the intelligence realm.  Therefore, 
increased openness benefits the British Intelligence Services as there would be a more 
informed understanding of intelligence in the public domain. This is crucial as Dover 
rightly argues that popular culture depictions are: 
 
Merely diversions from reality, showing fragments of 
intelligence activity – as a result we should enjoy them, 
but guard against their seductive but counter-productive 
charm.251 
 
Yet despite Dover’s words of caution, popular culture continues to have a real wold 
impact on the intelligence realm.252 This demonstrates what an influential position 
popular culture as an avenue of information is in. If the pervasiveness of secrecy 
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252 As the chapter explored, this was evident after due to the fears of a German invasion exacerbated by Le 
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is how Allen Dulles, as CIA Director utilised weaponry and techniques evident in the Bond films, although 
part of this may have been due to Dulles’ close friendship with Fleming. For more information, please see: 
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continues to shroud the British Intelligence Services to such an extent, popular culture as 
an avenue of information will continue to be the view of the secret world many consume.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
As Chapter 2 ‘A Direct Relationship’ highlighted, there is an attempt from the British 
Intelligence Services, namely the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service 
(MI6) and the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) to engage directly 
with the public domain. This ostensibly occurs via their websites and through rare public 
speeches made by the respective heads, with the websites providing transcripts of these.1 
Despite this direct engagement, the websites are not publicised effectively, if at all; and 
it is only if an individual is interested enough that they will search for this information. 
Therefore, the onus remains on the public to be aware of these public engagement 
activities, access the information and interpret what is included on the difficult-to-
navigate websites. But this results in the British Intelligence Services being able to state 
that information has been placed in the public domain, although it is often hidden in plain 
sight.  
 
Although the existence of the official websites2 is a good starting point for the British 
Intelligence Services to portray themselves to the public, the onus remains on the 
individual to access them, and presumes that everyone has the ability to access the 
internet. Only 41% of the population aged over 75 was an internet user in 2017,3 
highlighting a wider socio-economic problem due to the continued emphasis placed upon 
the internet as a means of engaging with the public. By contrast, it is much easier for 
ordinary members of society to be reached by the information about the British 
intelligence services provided by the avenues of information, namely wider Government, 
                                                          
1 Security Service, News and Speeches, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news-and-speeches 
(Accessed 14th December 2019); 
Secret Intelligence Service, News, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/news.html (Accessed 14th 
December 2019); 
Government Communication Headquarters, Latest News, Available From: 
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2 Security Service, Home, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/ (Accessed 15th June 2016);  
Secret Intelligence Service, Home, Available From: https://www.sis.gov.uk/index.html (Accessed 23th 
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academia, news journalism and popular culture.  This results in the avenues of 
information being in a privileged position due to their role in informing the public domain 
about the British Intelligence Services.  
 
It is surprising to see that despite the different avenues of information analysed, there is 
a consistent positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services evident through all of 
them. Whilst they all emphasise different themes to reach this overall conclusion, this is 
unsurprising due to the diversity of the avenues. An example of this is how the British 
Government explore the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services, 
whereas news journalism emphasises the limitations of legislation, particularly in the 
post Snowden context. But, there are some themes all the avenues agree on, such as how 
the British Intelligence Services seek to act legally and ethically, which enhances the 
overall positive view of the British Intelligence Services.  
 
The introduction’s research puzzle addressed the tensions between openness and secrecy, 
something which has been a recurring theme throughout the thesis. It is not disputed that 
the British Intelligence Services require a degree of secrecy for their work, what is 
questioned is the amount of secrecy which acts as a barrier between the British 
Intelligence Services and the public domain. Ultimately, this can result in a disconnect 
between the intelligence realm and the public domain, with the avenues of information 
filling this void. This becomes problematic for the British Intelligence Services as to 
ensure their continued democratic legitimacy, they require public and legislative 
support,4 thus increased openness can in fact be beneficial for the British Intelligence 
Services. This exhibits the necessity of a delicate balance between openness and secrecy.  
 
In ascertaining this, there are lessons Britain can take from America. America has a very 
different historical culture to secrecy and openness as the latter was forced upon the 
American Intelligence Community following the Watergate Scandal in 1975 where it 
transpired that the Intelligence Services had undertaken constitutionally dubious 
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domestic intelligence activities.5 This resulted in the creation of oversight mechanisms 
which increased openness about the intelligence realm, as well as the instigation of what 
Geoffrey Treverton refers to as the social contract. It meant that the American public 
allowed the Intelligence Services, who they realised they could not know everything 
about, to operate in their name, even to undertake illegal or unsavoury actions, but to 
understand the limits imposed by American values.6 However, it was damaged in the 
mid-2000s following allegations that US military personnel were torturing terrorist 
suspects under instructions of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the Abu Ghraib 
prison and Guantanamo Bay.7 However, it highlights a salient theme in how increased 
                                                          
5 Examples of the constitutionally questionable operations undertaken include how President Nixon 
approved individuals to break in, and install eavesdropping equipment in the Democratic National 
Campaign headquarters as Nixon prepared for his election. Another example is how the CIA was spying 
on anti-war protestors for over a decade. For more information, please see: 
United States Senate, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities (The Church Committee), Available From: 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/ChurchCommittee.htm (Accessed 
25th February 2017); 
CNN.com, Watergate scandal: A look back at the scandal that changed US politics, Faith Karimi, 17th 
May 2017, Available From: https://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/17/politics/watergate-scandal-look-
back/index.html (Accessed 30th October 2019) 
6 Treverton, G, Intelligence for an age of Terror, (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009), p. 235 
7 BBC News, I hate myself for Abu Ghraib abuse, Tara McKelvey, 16th May 2018, Available From: 
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and Accountability, edited by Hans Born, Ian Leigh and Aidan Wills, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2011), p. 
111; 
Gill, P, ‘The Intelligence and Security Committee and the Challenge of Security Networks’, Review of 
International Studies, 35/4 (2009), p. 933; 
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3690097.stm (Accessed 29th August 2019);  
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of references. 
 
Page | 341  
 
 
openness from the Intelligence Services, can result in an increased public understanding 
of the intelligence realm and that certain actions do require secrecy. If the British 
Intelligence Services became more open with the public, not only would their democratic 
legitimacy continue, but they would not have to undertake a knee jerk public response 
when they received public scrutiny.  
 
One example of this would be the Snowden revelations in 2013 which claimed that the 
American National Security Agency (NSA), in partnership with GCHQ, had 
implemented the bulk collection of telephone, internet and email records by collecting 
data from technology companies, including Facebook, Google, Verizon, Microsoft, 
Apple, and Yahoo.8 One interviewee spoke candidly about the Snowden revelations, and 
the debate it has initiated, with GCHQ increasing their public engagement.9 But had they 
already been doing this, perhaps the public would not have been so keen to believe the 
Snowden revelations which claimed that GCHQ were acting illegally and unethically, as 
opposed to acting within the existing legislation. What was interesting in Chapter 5’ ‘A 
Complicated Relationship’ analysis was that news articles published at the time of the 
Snowden revelations portrayed GCHQ acting illegally and unethically, whilst those 
written subsequently, were more critical of the existing legislation. This demonstrates 
how a negative depiction of the British Intelligence Services was first evident, but this 
soon changed after the initial debate surrounding the revelations. However, had there 
been more openness to begin with, the negative portrayal may have been prevented. 
 
There are other lessons which Britain could take from their American counterparts who 
have seemingly found the balance between openness and secrecy such as engagement 
                                                          
8 The Guardian, NSA collecting phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily, Glenn Greenwald, 
6th June 2013, Available From: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order (Accessed 12th March 2018); 
BBC News, Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme, 17th January 2014, Available From: 
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with museum exhibits. The NSA engages with the public via the National Cryptologic 
Museum, and perceive the museum, which is located next to their Headquarters, to be 
their principle gateway to the public.10 This was one example of the increased levels of 
openness which I witnessed when undertaking fieldwork in America and highlighted how 
the American balance between openness and secrecy is something which Britain should 
aspire to. But for this to occur, the pervasiveness of secrecy which is a key characteristic 
of the British way in Intelligence will have to change.  
 
The introduction explored the British way in Intelligence which Mike Goodman argues, 
due to the unique historical cultural context of British Government, means there are two 
defining characteristics in approaching intelligence. These are, a committee style 
approach to decision making, which is evident through the role of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) within the wider intelligence community, and the drive for consensus 
in decision making, something also witnessed through the JIC seeking to provide one 
cohesive view of intelligence to policymakers.11 The thesis builds on this, arguing that 
the pervasiveness of secrecy also characterises the British way in Intelligence due to the 
historical emphasis there has been on complete secrecy shrouding the British Intelligence 
Services to the extent that the Whitehall view was that any information was an official 
secret until officially released.12 But, this does not need to be a defining characteristic of 
the British way in Intelligence. 
 
There have been attempts at increased openness such as the Waldegrave Initiative which 
Richard Aldrich argued was nothing short of a major revolution as it changed the default 
setting of Whitehall to releasing as opposed to withholding information,13 something 
which coincided with John Major placing MI6 and GCHQ on a statutory footing in 
1994.14 But despite this, there remains a culture of secrecy surrounding the British 
Intelligence Services, in part due to the engrained need to know principle which 
                                                          
10 National Cryptologic Museum, Home, Available From: https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-
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prevented discussions of the intelligence realm.15 However, as the American case 
demonstrates, further openness of the British Intelligence Services is possible without 
having an adverse effect on operations or collecting information. By locating this 
balance, the British Intelligence Services can continue to ensure Britain’s safety and 
security whilst reassuring the public that they are acting in their best interest, adhering to 
legal and ethical standards, as opposed to skulking around in the shadows and 
undertaking dubious activities. Providing this understanding to the British public is 
crucial as the British Intelligence Services seek to ensure their continued democratic 
legitimacy. Although successive Intelligence heads have explored this theme in their 
speeches,16 it was Baroness Eliza Manningham-Buller who highlights its importance in 
a clear and succinct manner as she states:  
 
We need to continue to tell them (the public) about the 
threat, explain the nature and extent of it, and be clear 
about what can be expected of us by the public. We need 
and rely on public cooperation and support for our 
work…. Informing the public increases their confidence 
that the authorities are addressing the problem and have 
                                                          
15 Gill, P, and Phythian, M, Intelligence in an Insecure World, Second Edition, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 
2012), p. 107 
16 Secret Intelligence Service, News: 03 December 2018 – MI6 ‘C’ Delivers Rare Public Speech at St 
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Security Service, News and Speeches – The International Terrorist Threat and the Dilemmas in Countering 
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Security Service, News and Speeches – Intelligence, Counter-Terrorism and Trust: Jonathan Evans, 5th 
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(Accessed 17th December 2018); 
16 Security Service, News and Speeches – Global Terrorism: Are We Meeting The Challenge?: Baroness 
Eliza Manningham-Buller, 16th October 2003, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/global-
terrorism-are-we-meeting-the-challenge (Accessed 13th December 2018) 
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the capability to respond appropriately to terrorist 
threats.17 
 
Although she said this in 2003, it remains the case 16 years later and further highlights 
the importance of the public having an informed understanding of the British Intelligence 
Services. However, although the British Intelligence Services have increased their 
openness since Manningham-Buller’s comments in 2003,18 there remains far more they 
could do such as engage with museum exhibits, or use social media platforms to promote 
their websites.19 Due to this secrecy, the four key avenues are placed in the unique 
position of providing the public with an understanding of the British Intelligence 
Services. All provide a positive portrayal of the British Intelligence Services and rather 
surprisingly, the same overarching themes such as acting legally and ethically are 
explored by the British Intelligence Services themselves, and is discussed in Chapter 2 
‘A Direct Relationship’, as well as by the four key avenues of information. This creates 
a consistently positive portrayal of how the British Intelligence Services act legally and 
ethically. 
 
The thesis’s originality and contribution to the literature emerges from the extensive 
analysis of the portrayals provided by each of the avenues of information. As the 
introduction discussed, there is an awareness, particularly from the intelligence 
accountability literature of the importance of assessing what information is placed in the 
public domain. In particular, Sir David Omand explores this, as he discusses the 
importance for the British Intelligence Services to ensure legislative and public support.20 
                                                          
17 Security Service, News and Speeches – Global Terrorism: Are We Meeting The Challenge?: Baroness 
Eliza Manningham-Buller, 16th October 2003, Available From: https://www.mi5.gov.uk/news/global-
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When examining how news journalism can act as a form of intelligence accountability, 
Claudia Hillebrand discusses the roles of the media in transmitting information, 
scrutinising decisions, act as a substitute watchdog, or as a legitimising institution. 
However, this does not account for what portrayals are provided of the British 
Intelligence Services. In relation to popular culture, Simon Willmetts, Trevor McCrisken 
and Christopher Moran, and Robert Dover, also explore the importance of assessing what 
themes are portrayed in popular culture due to the role this avenue of information has on 
public understandings, evident as:  
 
They [portrayals of intelligence] are not just fictitious 
fluff and nonsense; they have a real-world impact in 
respect of how they help to condition the public to think 
about intelligence, the use of state sanctioned violence 
and counter-terrorism.21 
 
McCrisken and Moran agree with this theme. Focusing on the Bond franchise, they argue 
that it has ‘played a vital role in constructing the meaning of secret intelligence and 
framing the discourse used to understand it.’22 Thus, there is a clear importance in 
assessing what portrayals popular culture provide, as was discussed in Chapter 6 ‘A 
Fractious Relationship’. Although this did utilise Dover’s analysis, he compares British 
and American popular culture depictions. By having a British centric approach, the thesis 
aids the ongoing debates by undertaking this important analysis and being able to 
compare and contrast the portrayals provided by the different avenues of information, 
something the conclusion has referred to. 
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This is a theme also highlighted by Willmetts in his article:  
Willmetts, S, ‘The Cultural Turn in Intelligence Studies’, Intelligence and National Security, (2019) 34/6, 
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Overall, all of the avenues of information have provided a positive portrayal of the British 
Intelligence Services, with their adherence to legal and ethical practices and overarching 
theme the avenues explored. In the first case study, the lead up to the Iraq War, this is 
implied as the debates centre around the politicisation of intelligence, a theme 
particularly evident through academia and news journalism avenues of information. 
Unsurprisingly, the British Government did not explore this theme, but rather sought to 
highlight the capability and effectiveness of the British Intelligence Services due to their 
ability to gather extensive intelligence about Saddam Hussein’s nuclear desires and 
capabilities. Implicitly, this is almost suggesting that if there are issues with the 
intelligence, then it was due to the information provided by the British Intelligence 
Services This was a key contrast in how the avenues of information portrayed the lead 
up to the Iraq War,  with the others emphasising the politicisation of intelligence by 
policymakers which in turn created a positive depiction of the British Intelligence 
Services. 
 
In the Snowden case, although there was a negative portrayal of the British Intelligence 
Services immediately following the revelations, over time the avenues of information 
intimated that the British Intelligence Services adhered to legal and ethical standards by 
critiquing the limitations of existing legislation. Thus, while news journalism provided 
the same overarching positive portrayals of the British Intelligence Services as the British 
Government, they reached the conclusions in very differing ways. Thus there are 
competing depictions of the actions undertaken by the British Intelligence Services in the 
British public domain, although there are significant areas of agreement on key points in 
those portrayals.  This will continue to be the overarching depiction in the public domain 
unless there is increased openness from the British Intelligence Services in a meaningful 
way. If the British Intelligence Services stopped hiding information in plain sight, the 
avenues of information would not be in such an influential position.  
 
To achieve this, Britain should strive to emulate the American balance between openness 
and secrecy. Whilst this would alter the pervasiveness of secrecy which the thesis has 
argued is a characteristic of the British way in Intelligence, this would be a positive 
change. But, there also needs to be a realisation from the British Intelligence Services 
that increased openness can not only increase recruitment, but their democratic 
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legitimacy, as opposed to viewing public engagement as a necessary evil.23 Only then 
will the avenues of information through which the public are informed about the 
intelligence realm stop being in such an influential position to inform and educate the 
public. 
 
 
                                                          
23 Private Interview 21: 12th September 2017 
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